IR 05000373/1982020
| ML20052G610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1982 |
| From: | Chrissatimos, Chrissotimos, Connaughton K, Jackiw I, Lanksbury R, Reyes L, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052G596 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-82-20, IEB-82-01, IEB-82-1, NUDOCS 8205180508 | |
| Download: ML20052G610 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-373/82-20(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-373 License No. CPPR-99 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles IL Inspection Conducted: April 5-16, 1982 bNb h
Inspectors:
L. A. Reyes f-A f, M b
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Y~M-fk Approved By:
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R. D. Walker, Chief Y-2 92 - f> 7 Reactor Projects Section 1C Inspection Summary Inspection on April 5-16, 1982 (Report No. 50-373/82-20(DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, resident and preoperational testing inspection.
The inspection consisted of followup on previous inspection findings, review of IE Bulletin No. 82-01, followup on NRC identified items, review of pre-operational test deficiencies, review of preoperational test results and preoperational test witnessing. The inspection involved a total of 221 inspector-hours onsite by six NRC inspectors including 68 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identified in five areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in one area (failure to follow preoperational test procedure - Section I,
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Paragraph 1).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted B. B. Stephenson, LaSalle County Station Project Manager
- R. H. Holyoak, Station Superintendent R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Engineer
- G.
J. Diederich, Station Operating Assistant Superintendent
- R.
D. Bishop, Administrative and Support Services Assistant Superintendent
- J. C. Renwick, Technical Staff Supervisor J. M. Marshall, Operating Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the technical, operating, and construction staff, as well as certain licensee contractor employees.
- Denotes persons present at management interview conducted at the close of the inspection period.
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SECTION I J
Prepared By:
L. A. Reyes Reviewed By:
R. D. Walker
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1.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Items (373/82-10-15 and 373/82-18-04): Testing
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program for vibration monitoring of the Low Pressure Core Spray 1A and Residual heat Removal System IB pumps. The inspector reviewed the vibration data against the acceptance criteria specified in
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Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition, Summer of 1975 Addenda. The results of the vibration test was determined to be within the acceptable range for both pumps.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-18-03):
Inadvertent initiation of the Standby Liquid Control System (SBLCS) during the performance of Preoperational Test PT-SI-102.
During the testing of the SBLCS on March 29, 1982, an inadvertent initiation of the system occurred that resulted in a pump trip when the SBLCS pump discharge paths to
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the reactor vessel and the test tank were isolated. The licensee's-
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investigation indicated that no equipment damage resulted from this event.
The major contributing factors to the incident were that the test
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procedures were not followed and the Shift Foreman nor the Test
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Engineer took sufficient time to ensure that personnel involved understood the testing activity.
This event was discussed briefly in a management meeting held on April 2, 1982, between Region III and Commonwealth Edison Company
management at the LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station site.
(See IE Report No. 3/3/82-18). As requested in the meeting, a memo
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dated April 5,1982, from the site Project Manager was issued to all site personnel. The memo emphasized the need for compliance l
with station procedures.
In addition to the memo issued to all site personnel, the licensee
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implemented the following corrective action:
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a.
A training session was held with each shift which addressed the
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following items:
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(1) The chronology of this event.
(2) The factors which contributed to the event.
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(3) The importance of operating department personnel understanding and control over activities by other departments that could I
affect safe plant operation.
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(4) Strong emphasis on use of procedures.
(5) The importance of cicar communication.
b.
The system was flushed in accordance with Procedure LOP-SC-07 to remove any sodium pentaborate from the system.
c.
All tech staff engineers will be given a copy of the event report and the incident will be discussed in the respective training sessions. The major topics to be discussed are:
(1) The necessity of using procedures during a major evolution.
(2) If a Test Engineer feels he needs help while conducting a test, he should ask for it and his supervision should give it to him.
(3) The importance of insuring that shift supervision is aware of what is intended prior to commencing a test.
Failure to follow the preoperational test procedure is considered an item of noncompliance. Corrective action taken by the licensee appears to be adequate to prevent reoccurrence. The inspector has no further questions on this matter and no response is required on this item of noncompliance.
2.
Review of Bulletin No. 82-01 The review of the corrective action taken by the licensee was docu-mented in Paragraph 6 of Inspection Report No. 373/82-13. The licensee's actions were completed and reviewed by Region III prior to the official issuance of the bulletin because of the need to determine the impact of this matter on the license issuance.
Subsequent to the issuance of the bulletin, the licensee responded on a letter dated April 9, 1982, from C. Schroeder to J. G. Keppler.
The inspector reviewed the licensee response and determined that:
a.
The written response includes the required information.
b.
The written response includes adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and licensee's response.
c.
The licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to appropriate onsite management representatives.
d.
The information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate.
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The corrective action taken by the licensee was as described
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in the written response.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Followup on NRC Identified Items a.
Washington Public Power Supply System Reportable Deficiency 10 CFR 50.55(e) No. 161 related to load capacity data sheets.
The inspector forwarded the above mentioned report to the licensea for review. The licensee's review indicated that catalog loads were not used in the design of pipe supports.
The information used was from certified load data sheets supplied by the vendor.
b.
Rockwell International Design Deficiency Report on Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiners manufactured by Rockwell International, Energy Systems Group.
The inspector forwarded the above mentioned report to the licensee for review. The licensee's review indicated that the Deficiency Report only affected the Rockwell Hydrogen Recombiners used on Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR). The only boiling water reactor that uses the PWR model is the Clinton Nuclear Power Station, c.
General Electric (GE) letter from G. G. Sherwood to R. C. DeYoung dated April 1, 1982, documenting a deficiency in HMA relays manu-factured from January of 1976 through June 1981.
The inspector forwarded the above mentioned report to the licensee for review. The licensee has completed an inspection of the HMA relays at LaSalle using the GT Field Disposition Instructions and concluded that the relays in use at LaSalle are not affected.
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SECTION II Prepared By:
L. A. Reyes Reviewed By:
I. N. Jack 1w, Chief Test Program Section 1.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (373/81-28-25): Failure to control welding of " temporary" brackets to the containment liner.
The inspector toured the containment liner and noted that the arc gouge reported in the original inspection report had not been repaired. The inspector discussed this with the licensee and they agreed to repair and test the are gouge, plus two others found during their own inspection, as agreed to in their response (C. Reed letter to J. Keppler of December 16, 1981). The inspector subsequently reviewed the test results for the three arc gouges, the te-t results for the two burn mark areas, the letter to the various site contractors detailing the rules to be followed for work on the liner, and the acknowledgement by each contractor that they have instructed their craft supervisory and QC people of these rules. The second ILRT of Unit 1 is being tracked via a license condition.
(Closed) Open Item (373/80-25-13):
Determine changes in containment free air volume due to modifications, and their effect on Pac.
The inspector reviewed a letter (Pollock, S&L, to Watts, CECO, dated February 2, 1982) providing the results of S&L's review of changes in the drywell free volume due to modifications. The calculations indicate that the drywell free volume has been reduced from 231,198 cubic foot to 229,538 cubic feet for a charge of 1,660 cubic feet or 0.7%.
This was analyzed to be e negligible change in the drywell free volume.
2.
Preoperational Test Results Review The inspectors reviewed the following test procedure and test results against the FSAR, the SER, Regulatory Guide 1.68, and the QA Manual and found them satisfactory unless otherwise noted.
Deficiencies which remain unresolved must be reviewed by QA prior to system release for operation. At that time, all items which must be corrected prior to fuel loading will be identified, a.
FT-VP-102, Post LOCA Hydrogen Control b.
PT-SI-101, Seismic Instrumentation c.
SD-CQ-101, Communications
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3.
Review of Preoperational Test Deficiencies FT-DG-101A " Diesel Generator 0 and 1A" The inspector reviewed the licensee's Preoperational Test Defi-ciency Log for PT-DG-101A to identify those deficiencies which
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had been resolved since September 1, 1981. Approximately 120 deficiencies were cleared over this time period. The inspector chose 25 of these deficiencies and verified through document review, interviews with licensee personnel, and/or physical verification, that the deficiencies had been resolved in accordance with the
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licensee's preoperational test program administrative controls, including documentation, review and approval, and retesting requirements.
SD-CX-101 " Process Computer" The inspector reviewed the completed process computer system demonstration to determine whether or not the licensee had identified test deficiencies where acceptance criteria were not met or required steps could not be performed. Additionally, the inspector verified that the system demonstration results received required engineering evaluations and final approvals.
No items of noncompliance were identified 4.
Preoperational Test Witnessing The inspector witnessed the performance of the secondary contain-ment integrity test (SBGT testing) conducted on April 13, 14, and 15, 1982. The initial tesc run on April 13 met the acceptance criteria of the FSAR and Technical Specifications but it was found by the inspector that the test was run with both railway access doors closed. Since Technical Specification 4.6.5.1 allows one door to be open without violating secondary containment, the inspector requested the licensee to perform the test again with one door open.
During the subsequent testing on April 14th, the licensee was unable to meet the FSAR and Technical Specification acceptance criteria.
After several tests on April 15th, the licensee was finally successful in meeting the required acceptance criteria.
In between tests the licensee searched for and repaired leaks in the secondary containment and worked on the seal of the railway access doors to improve their effectiveness. Part of the final solution in scaling the railway access door is the use of a large (approximately 2 1/4") clear plastic hose (tygon tubing) as a seal along the bottom.
The licensee has agreed to issue an administrative procedure to control this plastic hose and insure it is in place at all times that secondary containment is required.
It is noted that high wind conditions _during the testing may have made the passing of the test more difficult (the acceptance criteria is based on low wind, less
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than 5 mph, conditions). However, due to the number of failures
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prior to the test being completed, there is some question as to the c
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repeatability of acceptable performance of the system. The licensee has agreed to reperform the test within the next two weeks when wind conditions are within an acceptable range. This item was previously identified as Open Item 373/81-24-04 and will remain open pending the retest of the system and the issuance of a station procedure to control the plastic hose under the railway access door.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Management Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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