IR 05000373/1990011
| ML20055D808 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1990 |
| From: | Hasse R, Langstaff R, Nejfelt G, Phillips M, Rescheske P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055D807 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-90-11, 50-374-90-11, NUDOCS 9007100038 | |
| Download: ML20055D808 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 111
Report No. 50-373/90011(DRS); 50-374/90011(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-13 Licensee: Connonwealth Edison Company Opus West 111 r
1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Marseilles, IL 61341 Inspection Conducted: May 14 through June 13, 1990 Inspectors:
6h f/9#
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R. A. Hasse r
Date m Leade Un/rd P. R. Rescteske Date Y
6/29/f9
M. Nej elt Date
$fM/99 s
R.
Langstaff Date
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Approved By:
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M. P. Phillitis, Chief Date Operational Programs Section
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Inspection Summary inspection conducted on May 14 through June 13, 1990 IReport No. 50-373/900ll(DR5); 50-374/90011(DRS))
s Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of design changes and modifications and follow-up of previously identified violations and items of
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concern. This inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Modules 37700, 92701, and 92702.
Results:
No violations or items of significant concern were identified.
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of the previously-identifico items of concern and violations had been resolved.
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Design changes and modifications were being conducted in accordance with l
progrannatic and regulatory requirements.
t 9007100038 900629 n
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PDR ADOCK 05000373 O'
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
G. Diederich, Station Manager W. Huntington, Technical Superintendent H. Massin, ENC
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- D. Spencer, Lead Engineer, Technical Staff
- T. Hannerich, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor J. Gieseker, Technical Staff Supervisor W. Betourne, QA Superintendent R. Shields, Technical Staff P. Lucky, Technical Staff R. Jasik BWR Systems J. Williams, ENC-L. Lauterbeck, On-site Nuclear Safety U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission T. Tongue, Senior Resident Inspector R. Kopriva, Resident Inspector Other personnel were contacted as a matter of routine during the inspection.
All personnel listed above' attended the exit interview held on June 1, 1990.
- ThesepersonnelparticipatedinadditionaldiscussioNsandprovided additional information subsequent to the on-site-inspection.
2.
Licensee Action On Previous-Inspection Findingss a.-
(Closed) Open item (373/88016-01; 374/88015-01): Failure to monitor air and nitrogen systems for particulates.
The licensee had initiated a program for monitoring and trending particulates in the air and nitrogen systems. This item is considered closed, b.
(Closed) Violation (373/88016LO2;374/88015-02):
Failure to take corrective action on deficient diesel generator output relays. The deficient relays had been replaced in-both units. The' sensitivity
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to potential connon mode failures gained by the licensee while addressing this issue was considered adequate-to close this item.:-
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(Closed) Open Item (373/88016-03; 374/8P015-03): Unreliability of
' diesel generator air start compressors.
The licensee had been_
working with the manufacturer on the reliability problem
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(due primarily to gasket failures). -Changes had been made in the bolt and gasket material.
Also, a hot re-torqueing process had been
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implemented on a monthly basis.
Based on the improved reliability
obtained (6-8 month gasket life),-the routine surveillance efforts, and: continued efforts to improve reliability, this item is
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considered closed.
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d.
(Closed)OpenItem(373/88016-04;-347/88015-04): Diesel electrical isolation from the generator. The. licensee had implemented a
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surveillance'to measure the degree of isolation of the DGs from
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their associated generators and to trend the data.
Based on this action, this item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation'(373/88016-05):
Test frequency of Unit 1 emergency diesel generators. The licensee had itnplemented a revised i
procedure for tiaching the success / failure data for attempted DG
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-starts.
The-inspectors concluded that the revised method should
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preclude miscounting the failure rate and testing at the wrong i
frequency. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed)OpenItem(373/89018-01;374/89018-01):- Revise UFSAR to reflect 500 gallon High Pressure Core Spray DG fuel oil reseryc.
The UFSAR section 9.5.4.1.1.d.3 listed the fuel oil reserve-for a
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seven day duty cycle as 1000 gellons. Table 8.3.1 of the UFSAR listed the. load on the DG as 3280 bhp. Based on this load,_the
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reserve would be 500 gallons.
The licensee had performed a new-calculation (00-14-dated 3-5-90) showing.the maximum load to be
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3050 bhp which supports the 1000 gallon reserve capacity; The
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licensee will revise the UFSAR to more accurately state the basis
for the stated reserve capacity.
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open item (373/89018-02; 374/89018-02):
Revise Technical-
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Specifications to incorporate correct valves for.HPCS DG largest load and ful.1 ' toad and full load reject tests. The. licensee evaluated the current loads on the HPCS DG. The largest single load (HPCS pump) was 2421 KW vs the TS lead of 2381 KW.- The licensee was
in the process of revising this TS. The total load on this DG using-
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l current loading data was 2597 KW VS-the TS load of 2600 KW. Thus, i
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no TS change was required. The total load presented in the UFSAR was 2719KW. -The licensee was planning to revise this numoer in the
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UFSAR. This item =is considered closed.
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(Closed)Unresolveditem(373/89018-04;374/8901P-04): Determine
capability of equipment to operate as required.for the lowest
'i expected DC voltage that would be present at the end device. The
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licensee performed a test _of the Division I and.II 125V DC fuses by
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disconnecting the batteries and reducing)the battery charger "altage-to 105V (lowest expected battery voltage. They then verified that all essential equipment (DG controls) on the bus'would operate at'
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.this voltage. The test was considered to adequately address the
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~4 Division 111 125V fuses since the essential equipment was identical to Divisions I and 11.
Based on this information, this item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open item (373/89018-06; 374/89018-06):
Revise Technical Specifications to make. Division III DG surveillance.requireFients consistent with Division I and 11 DGs. -Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.7.b (Division Ill DG surveillance) required verification that the DG overcurrent trip was not bypassed on an ECCS actuation. The corresponding specifications for the Division I and 11 DGs required that this trip be bypassed on an ECCS actuation signal. The_ licensee had submitted a request for.a technical specification change to bypass the Division 111 overcurrent trip during an ECCS actuation.
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation (373/89018-07; 374/89018-07):
Failure to' document the basis for concluding that a modification did not generate an unreviewed safety question. The modification in question added a function to relay 86-N/1432 which would prevent'the HPCS DG from-closing onto its bus if an overcurrent condition existed on that bus. This modification changed the results of this relay failing in the closed position (i.e., preventing the DG from closing on its bus). The modification also'had the potential for increasing the probability of the HPCS being unable to perform its safety function due to the loss of normal and emergency power if the relay. failed closed. Tne 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. performed for this modification
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did not address either of these issues. The licensee had revised this evaluation in response to the violation to address these issues. The licensee had-also issued a new procedure (NED Q.6.1)
subsequent to the original evaluation which provided a detailed methodology for performing these evaluations. Based on'these actions, this item is considered closed, k.
(Closed)Unresolveditem(373/89018-08: 374/89018-08):. Potential Unreviewed Saf ety question. The failure to address the' issues described in Paragraph 2.j above resulted in the failure'to determine whether or not an unreviewed safety question existed. The revised evaluation concluded that no unreviewed. safety question existed. This was based on the fact that'no increase in consequences (increase in off-site exposure) would result.from-relay failure and
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the probability of' HPCS failure was not significantly impacted considering the added DG protection and its relative probability compared with current more dominant failure modes. The inspectors agreed with this conclusion. This item is considered. closed..
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(Closed).Openitem(373/89018-09;-374/89018-10):
Revise. Technical 5pecifications to required minimum battery temperatures of 65"F.
-1 Technical Specification 4.8.2.3.2.b.3 required that.the station 125V DC battery electrolyte temperature should be determined every seven days and the temperature' should be 60 F or greater.
Battery-sizing-t
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I calculations had been based on a 65* minimum electrolyte temperature.
In one case (Ur.it 1. Division 11), the batteries had insufficient margin to be considered operable at 60'F.
The licensee i
ogreed to revise the Technical Specifications to raise the minimum temperatures to 65*F.
Subsequent to that inspection,' the Division 1 batteries for both units had been replaced.
The replacements had ample margin to be considered operable at 60'F.
The licensee had also performed calculations for the existing batteries showing adequate margin based on measured capacity to be considered operable at 60'F.
Further, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Division 2 batteries were scheduled for replacement in February 1991 and January 1992 respectively.
Based on this, the licensee concluded
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that no Technical Specification change was required.
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calculation for the Division III batteries used an aging factor s
of 1.11 which was not consistent with the acceptance criteria
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(80% of manufacturers rating) for the battery performance (capacity)
test. Since the Division III batteries are not currently scheduled for replacement, the licensee committed to revise the performance test acceptance criteria to be consistent with this aging factor prior to the r. ext performance test. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open item (373/989018-10; 374/89018-11):
Revise Technical Specification to reflect actual Division 2 battery load profile.
The licensee had submitted the Technical-Specification change request. This item is considered closed, n.
(Closed) Violation (373/89018-12; 374/89018-13):
Inappropriate surveillance procedure. Surveillance procedure LOS-DG-M3, Revision 19, "1B/2B diesel generator operability test" did not require monitoring of the separate motor' driven fuel supply train to assure proper functioning. The licensee had revised this procedure to incorporate the motor driven fuel supply train into the operability test. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation (373/89018-13;374/89013-14):
Failure to
implement corrective action regarding air start system overpressure It for Division 111 DGs. The licensee had verified that the pressure
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downstream of the air start pressure regulators were acceptable (< 200 psig) for all DG's by using' temporary calibrated-gauges.
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THe licensee had also initiated a monitoring program to periodically l
l monitor these pressures ~for all DGs.. Final' frequency will be determined by the stability of the regulator setpoints. This item is considered closed, p.
(0 pen)Openitem(373/89018-14;374/89018-15):' Correction of small bore tubing and piping deficiencies on DGs and followup to Information Notice 89-07. Several deficiencies in DG small bore tubing and piping configuration and support were identified which could lead to failure. The licensee had initiated an engineering-analysis of these problems considering both operating and seismic vibration concerns to identify required modifications.
The study e
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September 1991. This item will remain open.pending completion of
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the identified modifications.
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(Closed) Violation (374/89018-09):. Failure to perform adequate post
/ calibration installation verification of relay timing setting.
Relay 2451-AP074B was set at 3.0L rather then the required 1.0L.
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The licensee had corrected the relay setting and revised calibration
control procedures LES-GM-129 and LES-GM-229 to verify timing
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settings following relay calibration.
Based on these actions, this
item is considered closed.
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3.
Design changes and Modifications'
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The inspectors reviewd eight permanent pinnt modifications and a selection of temporary modifications to determine if. they had been
conducted in accordance with programmatic and regulatory requirements'and if all technical issues hed been adequately addressed.
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inspectionResfhs The results of'the inspection are presented in the following c
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(1) Modification M-1-2-88-004. " Replacement of Unit' 2. Division-1
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T25v oc Batteries" i
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This modification wcs part of a program to replace the
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Div sion I and II'125V' catteries and the 250V batteries for both
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units. These battery 'repibcements were a culmination of;a
study initiated by the licensee in December 1984 to determinu the adequacy. of the existing batteries to service plant loads and. provide adequate design margin.
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The' inspectors reviewed the sizing calculation for the,new batteries ind found it'to be conAistent with the guidance in
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IEEE-385(1983).- One concern identified wassthe use of 65* as the minimum battery room temperature. The LaSalle Technical
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Specifications allow a minimum batwry room' temperature of 60'F
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for the 125V batteries. An NRC condu,ted SSFI performed during
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July and August 1989 (See Inspection Reports No.. 50-4373/89018; 50-374/89018) had identified this di,crepancy between the design temperature and Tethnical-Specifdcation allowable temperature (see also paragraph 2.1 of this report.) The r
increase in required battery capacity tc accommodate the lower minimum temperature is approximately 3%. The battery size selected had' amp'le margin to accommodate this discrepancy.
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The inspectors reviewed the results of the performance (capacity)andoperational(service) tests. The performance
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test indicated a capacity of 97% of manufacturers rating, which was well within the band expected for new bat +.eries. The service test,'which measured the battery's ability to service i
the actual plant loads, resulted in a final voltage of 110V
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with an acceptance criteria of >105V.
The inspections also reviewed the battery rack installation documentation. Severalnon-conformanceReports.(NCRs)andField'
s Change Requests (FCRs) had been issued as a result of. problems
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with vendor supplied equipment.
The most significant problem during the installation phase of
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this modification was the failure of 1" clamping nuts provided
by the supplier (GHB) when torqued.to the specified value. This
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was initially thought to have-resulted from an installation error.
Further investigation _by the licensee identified a i
materials problem. A metallurgical examination performed by the
licensee. indicated the nuts had apparently become hydrogen
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embrittled due to the manufacturing process. All 4" clamping-nuts were replaced with an' approved alternate from another vendor,Unistrut. The inspectors' reviewed the disposition of this issue and concluded it had been adequately resolved. A 10 CFR Part 21 Report was to be issued by the vendor (GNB).
Another problem experienced during. installation involved
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vendor supplied bolts being longer or shorter than.specified.
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The inspector determined that'these items had been appropriately dispositioned. The licensee's Quality Assurance activities relating to these problems are discussed in Paragraph 4 of this report.
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t The inspectors had no other concerns with this modification.-
(2) Modification M-1-2-88-001, " Replacement of Unit 2 250 VDC Battery" d
This modification replaced the' existing 250 VDC; batteries with f
116 Gould Lead Calcium Type "N" CX27-cells. Also encompassed in this modification was the' replacement of the 800 ampere battery shunt with a shunt rated for 1,000 amperes.. By changing the battery shunt, several ranges of the ameter scales at the Main Control Board were made consistent to.
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correct a human factor engineering. concern identified by-the'.
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licensee.
(This was also done for the Unit 2, Division I, 125V battery discussed above.)'
The data for the Unit 2 250 VDC Service Test Discharge
demonstrated that the battery was satisfactory in accordance
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with IEEE Standard 450-1980, " Recommended Practices for-Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement,of Large Lead Storage-f
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Batteries for Generation Stations." However, during the subsequent battery recharge, Battery Cell No.101 Individual Voltage was too low to be acceptable (i.e.,)2.07 VDC compared to 2.25 VDC average for other battery cells. This defective battery cell was planned to be replaced prior to the unit startup.
The performance test discharge, LTS-700-1, Revision 5, did not
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include Cell No. 101 because of'the low cell voltage. The test proved that the 115 battery cells actual capacity was 94.5%.of
the design capacity for 116 cells.
This is consider 3bly above the 90% test acceptance criteria of IEEE standard 450-1980.-
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Two minor concerns were identified with these tests. A
typographical-error in the service test procedure resulted.in the specification of an erroneous teinperature correction factor for determining specific gravity at the noted. temperature.
Test personnel used the correct correction factor indicating
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appropriate training. The second concern involved specific gravity measurements during the performance test. The procedure required measuring the specific gravity of each cell at the end of the discharge. At this point the specific gravity was below the range of the hydrometer used to make these measurements. The licensee agreed to determine the necessity
of making this measurement at the end of-discharge and if the measurement is of value providing appropriate equipment.
If not necessary, the licensee planned to delete the requirement'
from the procedure.
The inspectors witnessed the welding of the last portions of the battery support structure to.its base plate and the torquing of several clamping bolts.
Unistrut clan, ping nuts were used because of the problems experienced with.the vendor supplied nuts noted in Paragraph 3.a above.
The inspectors had no other concerns with this modification.
(3) Modification M-1-2-87-085-01, "SOR Replacement"'
This modification replaced the static-o-ring (SOR)~ differential pressure (DP) switches with a Rosemount analog trip system for Division 1.
This modification responded to the NRR Safety Evaluation dated April 1, 1987, which required the S0R replacement by the third Unit'2 refueling outage.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had adequately addressed the increased electrical load on the station batteries, other system interactions, seismic mounting
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criteria, and procurement requirements.
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Procedures affected by this modification (e.g., Surveillance
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Procedure LIS-NB-204A, " UNIT 2 Reactor VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 1 ECCS Division 1 INITIATION AND LEVEL 2 RCIC INITIATION IH5TRUMENT CHANNELS A&C REFUEL CAllBRATION," Revision 0, dated April 1990) had incorporated the appropriate changes.
The appropriateness of the Quality Control (QC) Hold Points were verified for the " Division I Instruments Return to Service Testing" using Procedure LAP-1700-3, " GUIDELINES FOR QUALITY
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CONTROL HOLD / WITNESS POINTS," Revision 2.
No problems were identified.
l The inspectors did not identify any significant discrepancies involving this modification.
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L (4) Modification M-1-1-84-074, " Unit 1 Drywell Coolers" This modification installed six area coolers in the upper elevation of the Unit 1 drywell (i.e., 796' and 807'). The nodification was sampled to. verify that testing was done upon installation (e.g., hydrotest and flush; and logic testing;for
. Motor Control Center overloads and fans). The' inspector's
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review was limited in scope.
During the pre-installation verification for this modification, structural steel cracks were found in Beam 80 at elevation 796'
6".
Work request Package L80450 was written to ' repair the damage. The extent of the investigation conducted to determine the cause for this. failure was reviewed.
Sargent & Lundy's letter of May 23, 1988, documented the walkdowns of other drywell structural supports at the 796' elevation.. The design engineers, Sargent & Lundy, concluded that the structural.
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cracks found in Beam 80.were not due to metal fatigue, but were
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instead probably present in the initial construction, and that this was an isolated case.. Beam 80 was repaired and revised loading calculations were completed.
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The inspectors had no other concerns with this modification.
(5) Modification Mi-2-87-040, " Unit 2 Rod Worth Minimizer Replacement" This modification replaced-the Unit 2 Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)
with an enhanced dual micro-computer system which works independent of the plant Process Computer. A touch. screen CRT-was installed in the control room to provide information and functions to the operator.
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Testing was satisfactorily completed with discrepancies noted and resolved. ' Training was required to be completed and the applicable plant procedures revised prior to unit startup.
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,e inspectors reviewed the completed modification package, revised
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procedures, and training course materials, and walked through
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the' installation with the licensee, s
Based on the inspector's review, the modification appeared to a
be adequately performed and tested.
The inspcctor noted that
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the Unit 1 RWM had been replaced during the previous Unit-I J
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outage.
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(6) Modification M1-2-87-007 " Diesel Generator Transfer Switch
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i This modification added a '!1ocal-remote" transfer switch and 'a
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new set of control circuit fuses to the existing Diesel-Generator (DG).2A' cooling water _-pump (2DG01P) control circuit.-
t The purpose for this change was to address the toncerns raised
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in NRC.lE Information Notice 85-09. The licensee was concerned i
that a failure of'the remote fuses could. render the'DG2A
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cooling water pump control circuit inoperablejif the cooling.
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' Wdter pump Could not be operatea from the. control room panel.
(e.g., a fire in the co'ntrol: room could short thc' wires for
- the-DG2A cooling water pump control circuit and blow the' remote
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fuse). The modification would isolate tne,DG2A cooling water pump. control circuit from 4he control room and supply power to the control circuit via a new redundant set ofmlocal centrol fuses'in the event the remote fuses blow. No Technical Specifications were affected by-this change.
Based on the inspector'st review of the modification package, the design, safety.ev'aluatien, installation, and testing appeared to be adequate and performed in'accordance with requirements,:
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codes, and accepted standards.
(7), Modification M-1-2-89-001, " Replacement of~2B33-F067 Valve Internals" L
This modificati6h replaced.the. discs, guides, bonnets, an'd stems for the discharge isolation valves (Valves-2B33-F067A and.
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2B33-F067B)-in the recirculation (RR) system of Unit'2. ~The
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internal components were redesigned'and replaced due-to.
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operat:onal problems resulting from turbulent; flow-through the valves.
A similar modification had been. performed for Unit 1.
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Design, safety-evaluation, procurement, and instc lation procedures i
ior the Unit 2 modification were reviewed during this inspection.-
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No concerns were. identified.
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(8) hodification M-1-2-89-016, "VR Isolation Damper Indicatjng Light Logic"
This modification performed a wiring change to the circuitry.
for the reactor building ventilation (VR) system damper
indicating light logic for. Unit 2.
Prior to the modification.
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the licensee had identified an error in the logic circuitry
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which could give a. false closed indication. A similar modification had been performed for Ur.it 1.
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Design,1 safety evaluation,.installat' on procedures, test i
procedures, test ~results, and associatedTsurveillance procedures for the Unit 2~ modification were reviewed during this inspection, t
Based on review of this' modification, the inspector conclu(ed that the. licensee had performed and tested the modification-in
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an adequate. manner.
Upon review of associated surveillance procedures, the inspector noted that although the local panel indicating ligrts were used by. Surveillance LOC-CS-01, Eevision 12. " Secondary ~ Costainmerc
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Damper Operability Test,".the: control room indicating lights were not verified to agree'with thoseaof the local panel. The
licensee agreed.to. correct this ~ discrepancy by a change to the -
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surveillance procedure during-the next normal-revision.
(9) Temporary System Change Program and Implementation
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The licensee used LAP-240-6, " Temporary -System Changes," to-
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-control:and. document.electricalsjumpers,' lifted leads,-
i mechanical bypasses, and other ' temporary. devices and system changes. The inspectors reviewed the: program and discussed its
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implementation with the11icensee.
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A sampling of temporary changes installed on' Units.1 and 2 was also reviewed and discussed.
Each system change was documented
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with an installation record cud a 10 CFR: 50.59 safety; evaluation. The temporary change: issue log was controlled _by.
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l the operations department. The-log was reviewed. monthly and'a i
quarterly verification of each installation was performed. LAll documentation generated required = appropriate'rev.iews and.
approvals. - The. licensee periodically: held tech. ' cal review board meetings 'to review.the.sthtus of, all installed temporary system changesz and make recommendations for their closure.
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Based on the inspector's revier,:the: licensee's temporary.
. system change program,.and its implementation and controls,
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appeared to be adequate'.1 Documentation was generally good,: end
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the. safety; evaluations. were of sufficient detail to assure that l'
an unreviewed safety question'was.not involved.
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Conclusions
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The-inspectors concluded that the~1icensee had done an effective job in implementing'the modifications reviewed. The persistence ia identifying the.cause of the clamping nut _ failures duria;, the
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battery rack installation _ represented a good effort.- fhere also
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appeared'~to be good coordination of efforts between the station and the Corporate Nuclear Engineering Department.
No pervasive
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weaknesses were identified;-
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Quality Verification Effectiveness As a result of the problems'the licensee experienced with vendor
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l supplied materials. for the battery racks described in paragraph 3.a. the inspectors reviewed the quality assurance activities related to.their)
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procurement.
The batteries and racks were procured from GNBLas a safet9 related -
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procurement withf10' CFR 50,- Ap.pendix B and 10 CFR^ 21 applicable. The licensee performed a QA audit of GNB's Appendix B program in.
August 1989. The audit identified no significant problems at the GNB manufacturing facilities; however,-several problems were identified at-the GNB corporate-level. These findings included:.
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GNB had not reviewed the status and adequacy-of.its quality program
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since 1987.
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GHB had not adhered to;their, required internal / vendor-' audit program.
Anindoctrinationandtrainingprogramforpe.rson'nelperforming'
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quality activities at GNB. Divisional Headquarters was not being implimented.
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'Of special significance to this procurement.wns-t_he fact that GNB-had subcontracted the battery rack fabrication to) vendor (Kim Manufacturing,.
Inc.) that was not on the GHB apporoved vendors list.
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be fabricated to GNB design and specificatior.) Tc'be placed on this;. list required an engineering, materials,.and QA evaluation by GNB.and:a
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facility audit by the GNB QA organization. ~ Thisihad not been done. As a
,
result; the licensee contracted their A/E (Sargent and Lundy) to perform
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a 100% review of Kim's procedures, including ~ welding procedures.
Some source inspection was also: performed.- This indicated positive action'to
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address identified quality problems byLthe licensee, a
5.
Exit Interview
Theinspectorsmet:withlicenseerepresente.tives(denotedinParagraph1)
at the end of the. on-site portion -of tha: inspactionion' hne 1,1990, and -
summarized the purpose, scope, and findings to date of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the information andLindicated that nothing
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