IR 05000373/1990005

Insp Repts 50-373/90-05 & 50-374/90-06 on 900605-08.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise,Involving Review of Exercise Scenario & Followup on Licensee Actions

ML20055E073
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	06/25/1990
From:	Dan Barss, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055E071	List: IR 05000373/1990005 ML20055E070
References
50-373-90-05, 50-373-90-5, 50-374-90-06, 50-374-90-6, NUDOCS 9007100342
Download: ML20055E073 (36)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

l Report Nos. 50-373/90005(DRSS); 50-374/90006(DRSS)

Dockets No. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 o

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company '

Post Office Box 767 0 Chicago, IL 60690

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Facility Name: LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 i i

j Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois t .

Inspection Conducted: June 5-8, 1990  !

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Inspectors:

YM 0W D. Barss N T9

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Team Leader -Date

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T. Ploski

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6/ar //o .i l Date Accompanying Inspectors: 1 s

<- H. Simons G. Cicotte l i

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b Approved By: .WiT11am Snell, Chief Radiological Controls and

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Date Emergency Preparedness'Section

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection on June 5-8, 1990 (Reports No. 50-373/90005(DRSS): 50-374/90006(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the LaSalle. Station's :

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annual emergency preparedness exercise, involving a review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302); observation by four NRC' representatives of key funct-lons, #

activities and locations during the exercise (IP 82301); and followup on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 92701).

Results: No violations' deficiencies, or deviations were identified. The

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' licensee demonstrated an overall excellent response to a hypothetical scenario with multiple events and equipment failures. One exercise weakness was identified for a failure to assess in a timely manner conditions which  ;

warranted an unusual Event declaratio ^'

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i f-DETAILS

, Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed i

L D. Barss, Fire Scene, Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency

Operations Facility (EOF)

'i T. Ploski, Control Room (CR), TSC H. Simons, Fire Scene, TSC, Field Monitoring Teams (FMT)

G. Cicotte, Operational Support Center (050) and inplant teams Commonwealth Edison Company G. Diederich, Station Manager

, J. Renwick, Production Superintendent K. Klotz, GSEP Coordinator L. Holden, EP Onsite Programs Administrator J. Houston, CR Controller M. Vonk, EP Onsite Programs R. Carson, NSEP, OPS and Onsite Programs J. Thorpe, NSEp, OPS D. Hieggelke, Health Physics Services Supervisor J. Walkington,- Services Director -

T. Hammerich, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor L. Lauterbach, Nuclear Safety T. Benoit, Quality Assurance L. Bryant, Radiation Protection Foreman i

'R. Clark,-Stores' Supervisor R. Crawford, Electrician J..Schmeltz, OPS L. Jasonowicz, Computer Support '

- Norris, Admin. Director S. Rao, HP (Environs Staff)

B., Westphal, Maintenance Staff Supervisor

.R. Barla Asst. Security Administrator K. Goode,_ Asst. Office Supervisor D. Stapleton, Asst. Security Administrator D. Waldschmidt, Security Director J. Atchley, Operations Engineer ,

L. Soth, Manager.of Emergency Operations i All of the above listed personnel attended the NRC exit interview held i on June 7, 199 .The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel during the course {.

of the inspectio .

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! Licensee Action on Previously-Identified Open Items (IP 92701] [

(Closed) Open Item Nos. 50-373/89015-01 and 50-374/89015-01: During I the 1989 exercise, the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the '

capability to account for all onsitt personnel in a timely. manner following the Site Area Emergency declaration. All personnel were not accounted for until 67 minutes after the assembly siren sounde During the 1990 exercise, the assembly siren was sounded in a timely ;

manner after the Site _ Area Emergency declaration. Approximately 900 personnel, including a number of contractors onsite for an outage, ,

participated in the accountability demonstration. All onsite personnel :

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were accounted for within 41 minutes of the siren's sounding. Nineteen onsite persons had initially been presumed missing from any assembly area or emergency response facility roughly 28 m'nutes into the demonstratio ;

Security personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and in the- 1 assembly areas demonstrated good coordination in determining the onsite locations of these nineteen persons. 1alfunctions in one or more assembly '

area card readers and the failure of (ne person to use one of these card readers caused these 19 persons to in'tially be considered as missin The timely, coordinated efforts of se:urity personnel to verify the locations of these persons resulted in a successful demonstratio l This item is close ' General An announced, daytime exercise of the laSalle County Nuclear Generating Station's Generating Station Emergency Plan -(GSEP) was- conducted at the'LaSalle site on_ June 6, 1990. This exercise tested the licensee's .

emergency response organization's capabilities _to respond to a simulated !

accident scenario which contained multiple events and equipment failures, and which resulted in a simulated release of radioactive effluent offsite.

This was a full participation exercise for the State of Illinois and for >

LaSalle-County and Grundy Count Attachment I to this report describes the scope and objectivet M the .

exercise. Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenari . General Observation ,P_rocedure s This exercise was conducted in anordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Commonwealth Edison GSEP, the LaSalle Annex to the GSEP, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).

. Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely. If the scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and to permit State and local authorities to take appropriate action to protect ;

the public's health and safet .

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, Observers The licensee's controllers /evalutAors monitored and critiqued this U exercise along with four NRC observer : Exercise Critique i

The licensee's controllers / evaluators held critiques in each j facility with participants immediately following the exercis '

Lead controllers met jointly after the facility critiques to 1 discurs observed strenDths and weaknesses for each facility and ;

the overall exercise. The NRC discussed observed strengths and weaknesses, developed independently by the NRC evaluation team,.

during the exit interview, a

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Specific Ob:ervations (IP 82301)

' Control Room (CR)

t The Shift Engineer (SE) did a very good job in understanding the

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many changes in plant conditions and in directing the CR crew's responses to these changing conditions in accordance with abnormal ;

operating procedures. A Snift Foreman (SF) and an Equip:nent Attendant (EA) were promptly dispatened to investigate a reported r

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fire at the IB Turbine Driven Re<ctor Feed Pump (TORFP), while an ;

operator was told to closely monitor the RFP panel for abnormal

." indications. At 0722 hrs., the SE prudently requested Health [

t Physics (HP) support at the fire scene due to an earlier indic. tion of a noble gas leak in.the vicinity. He was persistent in ensuring that HP support was sent. However, several calls were needed to-the 3 Rad Chem office before the HP support was finally dispatched ;

n 20-25 minutes after the initial request. The IB TDRFP was taken out of service and reactor power reduction began per pror,edures by 0730 hr The SE frequently briefed CR personnel on changing plant conditions and on his decisions regarding their priorities. Uncertainties on priorities and assignments were quickly resolved during these :

briefings. Verbal briefings were supplemented by a sequence of i events status boar P W The Fire Brigade (FB) was dispatched at 0730 hrs. Despite E occasional radio communications difficulties between the CR and the j fire scene, plus reports of other changes to plant conditions, the :

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SE showed good aggresshaness in seeking frequent updates from the l s fire scen M In contrast to his attentiveness to relevant operating procedures

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and quick evaluations of changes to plant equipment availability,

L the SE did not adequately assess the fire with respect to the Station's Emergency Action Levels (EALs). Despite a number of good updates from the fire scene between 0727 hrs, and 0755 hrs.,

neither the SE nor the Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE) reviewed

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the EALs before'0755 hrs. Based on the SE's remarks, the fire was perceived as a "I-hour non-emergency" reportable event per 10 CFR 50.72. The SE finally began checking the EALs at 0757 hrs. after V

a licensed communicator suggested that the continuing fire likely satisfied an Unusual Event (UE) EAL. The SE's failure to assess, in a. timely manner, that the onsite fire warranted an UE declaratio per the EALs is an Exercise Weakness and will be tracked as Open Item No. 50-373/90005-0 Between 0805 hrs, and 0810 hrs., the SE indicated that he was considering an upgrade to an Alert since 2 UE EALs had been satisfied (onsite fire and contaminated / injured man needing offsit transport) and since other plant conditions (trip with two rods. out)

were abnorma The SE declared an Alert at 0810 hrs, since he w&nted the Technical Support Center (TSC) activated due to the

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several deteriorating plant conditions. This was a judgement

. decision and was prudent given the number of abnormal onsite conditions and the likelihood of receiving timely support from the TSC, The SCRE initially notified State officials within 10 minutes of the Alert declaration. The reasons given for this declaration on the Nuclear Accident Report System (NARS) message form were a fire and the transport of a contaminated injured person. The relevant EAL numbers were also-give The SCRE quickly modified the Event Notification Worksheetl(ENW),

which he earlier had completed before calling the Resident Inspector, before he initially notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (H00) of the Alert declaration. At 0826' hrs., he correctly informed the H00 that an Alert had been declared at 0810 hrs., and indicated that there was a fire affecting the IB TORFP and that there had been an onsite injury. This initial notification was timel However, the SCRE did not indicate that the TSC and OSC were being activated

.or that the victim was potentially contaminated. He provided'the EAL numbers that were applicable and used the acronym "GSEP" - both i

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pieces of information that were probably not familiar to the H0 At 0832 hrs., a CR operator used a hand-held radio to broadcast a message that a " Site Alert" had been declared and that all TSC and

03C. Directors should report to their duty station Between about 0835 and 0839 hrs., the SE and the TSC's Station Director (S0) conferred by telephone on past and current plant status and response activitie The SD then announced that the TSC's SD was in command and that the TSC and OSC were operationa With the exception of the Exercise Weakness, this portion of the

, licensee's program was acceptable. However, the following items 1 l- should also be considered for improvement:

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When initially communicating with NRC duty officers provide information in plain language, avoiding the use of site <

, specific jargon, and in sufficient detail so that the NRC

can make an. informed decision on whether or not to activate-F its emergency organizatio I

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Promptly announce all emergency declarations and their ,

reason (s) on the station's PA system, b. Technical Support Center (TSCl i ,

, The TSC was fully operational, with the Station Director (SD) in command of onsite response activities, within 30 minutes of the

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Alert declaration. Habitability monitoring provisions were established and maintaine .

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Status boards were kept adequately updated with accurate information, f Appropriate plant parameters were trended either on a status board or on a computerized display. Updates of plant parameter data were faxed to the EOF af ter personnel had arrived at that facilit !

The SD and a number of other director-level personnel provided a all TSC defi 1th update briefings on major decisions, concerns, 1 activities of inplant teams, and results of technical analyse ,l Personnel were generally attentive during these concise' announcement *

The SD also convened very useful group discussions involving.many of' i his directors to discuss priorities, concerns, and potential courses !

of actio '

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The SD and his staff adequately monitored plant parameter values and EALs that were potentially relevant. A Site Area Emergency l'

was correctly declared in a timely manner at about 0934 hrs. .The

, SD correctly recognized that the causes for the rapid increase in 'L}

containment radiation levels was an unplanned injection of relatively y cold water into the reactor vessel which increased previously -

identified leakage in fuel rods, and leakage into the drywel ,

State officials were initially notified of the Site Area Emergency (SAE) and the relevant EAL's number within 10 minutes of that-I

.s declaration. TSC staff quickly formulated an appropriate od fsite !

Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) based on dose projection data and included the PAR in the initial notification message, n TSC personnel were promptly informed of the SAE declaration and [

its reason, A communicator called the CR to inform the SE of this declaration and to arrange for the assembly siren to be sounded, i As the'onsite accountability progressed, plans were formulated for .;

the subsequent evacuation of nonessential onsite personnel. The Security and Rad Chem Directors chose the optimum route based on '

current wind conditions. A late change to that route was made -

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due to a wind direction shift. The simulated evacuation of (

f nonessentials began in a timely manner following the completion '

of the accountability proces <

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The SD and corporate duty officer had occasionally conferred about i Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) activation prior to the SAE declaration. The decision to activate the EOF was made shortly !

.before 0900 hrs. The SD announced that the Manager of Emergene-Operations (MEO) in the EOF assumed overall command of emergency ;

response efforts At 1000 hrs. A communicator notified the CR of a this change. Transfer of offsite survey team control to the EOF i p was subsequently announce A status board was used at the Maintenance Director's work station to list higher priority. tasks of inplant teams and the status of i l work package preparation for these teams. Heavy reliance was

placed by the SD and his staff on using TSC PA announcements and ;

i interpersonal communications to provide information on the dispatch ,

status of inplant teams and the results obtained by these team ':

Although such verbal communications did not result in significant

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misunderstandings during the exercise, a status board could be -i

utilized to post

inplant team assignments; team dispatch and .

s! retwn times; and the team's findings and results. This weuld- 'i

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reduce the reliance on memory or n'ote taking during verbal briefings i or other discussions regarding inplant team activitie Two offsite survey teams had been formed following the Alert  :

declaration, per procedures. The teams were br*,efed in the TSC !

by the Environs Director around 0900 hrs., and then left to obtain l and check their kits. After the offsite teams' control was transferred to the EOF, the TSC's environs staff continued to

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monitor communications between the teams and the EOF. ' TSC Environs staff also continued to produce offsite dose assessments and to closely monitor current and forecast weather condition Rad Chem staff requested a Reactor Coolant Sample (RCS) and Containment (CTMT) atmosphere sample by about 0915 hrs. The liquid sample analyses results were later used to generate a preliminary .!

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core damage estimate of about 8 percent. This result was discussed with EOF staf I

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By 1145 hrs., discussions had taken place regarding the SE's opinion

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that a possible RCS leak path was at valve IVQO35, while another path could involve the main condenser vacuum breaker which was showing

.a duel indication position. The SD also had technical staff estimate how much of the elevated release rate could be due to normal  ;

containment leakage at its peak or current pressure. This task was done by 1300 hrs. .The SD instructed his staff to develop an action'

plan to manually close valve IVQO35, taking into account the radiological concerns of a reported 3 Rem field and airborne activit Proper concern was given to stay time at the job site and '

potenti.a1 dose rates to and from the job site. An alternative plan to attempt to close this valve from its motor control center was ;

discusse '

By noontime, the Store Director had located a needed component at l

the Braidwood Station. The Security Director adequately described the simulated coordination with roadblock personnel, Braidwood ,

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Station, and an offsite survey team that would have taken place to'

$[rf . avoid delays and unnecessary exposures to someone sent from LaSalle to get the part and bring'it,back to LaSall .

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ration.was apparently given to saving time by_ having 'a B.s h.,od Station employee bring the needed part some, if.not al !

b@" the way to the LaSalle Statio h

%p Following a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> scenario time jump,'the SD convened his -

directors to develop an~onsite recovery action item list. LThe list was. comprehensive. addressing: root cause investigations-for-(4 K

components that malfunctioned; coolant cleanup and radwaste storage-pr%1anning;. whole body count and bioassay needs: for. onsite personnel;.

$ the impact on Unit 2's,startup; the needs to prepare for an internal p investigation and an NRC investigation; and further onsite' surveys p and sampling. The;11st was merged with one prepared by EOF staff F during a teleconference. Recovery planning procedural guidance was

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~ Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the folicwing' item should be considered F for improvement:

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Develop a TSC status board for posting information on inplant

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,- team assignments, dispatch hnd return times, priority, and result '

c. . Operational Support Center (OSC)

Setup o/ the Operational Support Center (050) was performed efficiently. ' The OSC Director made-regular announcements to OSC F 1

. personnel after'he was informed of significant changes in plant Le U

status. Radiological briefings were complete. Team members were

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aware of their responsibilities and used checklists and logs' to aid in. recording of~ data, i >

Task planning was performed as far in advance of anticipated team dispatch as possible. As plant problems came to the. attention of.

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the OSC Director, experienced personnel were consulted as to how l the task might be accomplished most efficiently, in order to more (L F quickly complete preparations once teams were requested by TSC staff. For example, manual operation of a' valve in a very high U, , . radiation area was reviewed by potential team members such that-personnel were ready.when the OSC Director received a request to

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dispatch a team to operate that valv However, when the team encountered significantly higher dose rates-i than had been anticipated, they failed to stop and re-evaluate their action plan considering the increased radiological hazar Information hendling in the OSC lacked some coordination. Status boards labeled, "Radiologica' Survey Data," "LaSalle Plant Status,"

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and '.'OSC Tasks," were updated regularly, although the information varied from 10 to 50 minutes behind actual plant statu Several i

updates were. received by the communicator, but were not given to personnel assigned to update the posted status, resulting in some inconsistent plant data and confusion as to whether some teams had completed their tasks. Untimely updating of the OSC status boards contributed to a lack of timely feedback to the CR, TSC ana EOF _on repair statu The completion of some' tasks was not reported to the OSC Director until a' team debriefing had been conducted.- This debriefing was after completion of frisking and equipment return tasks. This delayed reporting the teams' results to the OSC Director as well:

as to the TSC, EOF and CR staff Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl Emegency Operations Facility (EOF)

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The Station Director requested at 0854 hrs that the Emergency Operations Facility-(E0F) be activated due to the need for /

additional support with regards to the deteriorating plant statu At 0945 hrs...the Advisory Support Manager (ASM) provided an initial status briefing to the EOF staff. With the exception of the Manager u of Emergency Operations (MEO), the minimum staff was available and

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. the ASM was prepared to declare the facility activated with the ASM

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qualified to assume the ME0 position. The ME0 arrived in the EOF:

just before this decision was implemented. The ME0 received a-

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thorough update briefing from the ASM and other E0F staff personne The ME0 made contact with the Station Director (S0) and discussed the current plant status hnd other appropriate turnover informatio At 1000 hrs., the ME0 assumed command and control and declared the EOF activate An initial problem was encountered when. personnel attempted to log

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onto several computer terminals to obtain plant-parameter data and trends. The ME0 directed them to contact the TSC and to manually obtain and trend the data, if necessary.- The computer terminal problem was quickly resolved and determined to be a system delay

. caused by a large volume of system activity.-

LThroughout the exercise, briefings were' conducted with the EOF staff G to keep them informed of major. evolution and plant status. These briefings were brief and to the point. Key E0F staff personnel met with the ME0 as appropriate to. discuss major points of concern and

"y- action plans.- The Pu)1ic Information Manager / Spokesman had frequent briefings and discussion with ME0 in preparation for press release Plant parameters were monitored and trended. EALs were continually assessed to determine if changing conditions warranted emergency reclassification. The General Emergency was declared in accordance with established procedural guidance. Default PARS were determined

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and confirmed with dose assessment calculations. Notifications were !

promptly and accurately made to state and local authorities after the General Emergency was declared. Protective Action Recommendations- i (PARS) were clearly communicated utilizing the established Nclear i Accident Reporting System (NARS) . for !

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The ME0 communicated frequently with the. Illinois. Department of !

NuclearSafety(IDNS)RadiologicalEmergencyAssistanceCenter(REAC)

t commander and discussed plant status and PARS prior to officiall i transmitting them using the NARS '

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prominently posted on an enlarged NARS message form displayed in the -t i E0F. On one occasion,'the HE0 discussed a change in the' utilities

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L PAR'with the IDNS REAC commander. Based'on this~ discussion, the ME0'

. correctly decided not to issue the revised PAR since the State had !

already implemented a more conservative action.- ,

r ( An inconsistency was discovered between procedure ED-5, " Calculation !

of Potential Whole Body Dose from Noble Gas Radioactivity in the

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Containment,".and procedure LZP-1330-70, " Dry Well High Range Gross =.

Gama Correction factors." A correction factor for time'since 4 reactor shutdown has been utilized twice in procedure ED-5 which a could have resulted in an unwarranted general emergency  !

classification. The licensee has initiated action to correct this .

error. 'This procedural inconsistency will;be tracked as Open Item- 1

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No. 50-373/90005-0 Access. control and security of the EOF was well maintained throughout i the exercise. Security personnel did an excellent job of arranging !

for coordination with state police and road _ blocks to allow passage :

.of utility' personnel when necessary. However, security personnel :

, iused'a-roster of exercise participants when. granting. access to th '

facilit Such a list would not be available.had events been rea '

The Administrative Support Director prepared schedules for shift'

rotations and long-term staffing of the E0 l Comunications between the Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) and the E0F were clear and' concise. Field monitoring results were effectively J communicated.. Teams were appropriately positioned to determine the q

leading edge of the plume when release rates increased. Teams were redirected as necessary to identify the plume boundaries and obtain i representative environmental sample i

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Contamination surveys were not conducted inside the E0 State

. personnel do' provide monitoring of persons arriving at the facilit ,

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program .

was acceptable.= One Open Item was identified and the following items t y should be considered for improvement:

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Consider conducting contamination surveys of the EOF and/or L monitoring at- the facility entrance, particularly if personnel

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h i ~crrive at the EOF before state teams establish monitoring point .

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The demonstration of access control by E0F security personnel L .would be enhanced if they did.not rely on exercise participant i lists.

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' Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs)

P Two field monitoring teams (FMis), gold and black, were assembled.

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briefed on the plant status and current meteorologi::a1 conditions, and= dispatched in a timely manner from the TSC. The black team arrived at their vehicle, a van dedicated for the b't y' purpose of environmental monitoring, and performed appropriate operability and calibration checks on their instruments. The black pg FMT members did a spot inventory check of the van while the team f leader assigned each team member the proper dosimetry; a TLD, two n

finger rings, and three self-reading dosimeters. The inspector,

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however, never observed team members- reading their dosimeters during the exercise. Team members did estimate their exposure from dose.

L rates recorded and estimates of times spent in the plume.

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After finishing the radio checks and being updated on plant status,

', 4 both= teams were instructed to don-protective clothing and respirators. The black team successfully demonstrated this and, for-the remainder of the exerciso, wearing of protective-clotning and respirators were simulated. . The black team plumeasdirectedbytheEnvironsDirector(proceededtotrackthe ED). They correctly took dose rate readings and gathered, labelled and stored air, vegetation, and soil samples per procedures 'The black team also correctly smeared' equipment for contamination and used good contamination control techniques. In addition, they also e ectly changed a TLD and stored .it properl The gold team was also observed to collect. vegetation and soil ..

isamples correctly. One minor error was noted while they took an air sample. The air sampler.was parallel to the station, while

' . procedure EG-11 states that an air sampler should be positioned towards the statio Both teams communicated very well with the TSC and later with the EOF using.the phonetic alphabet and appropriate repeat backs. The teams were kept well informed of plant status and meteorological conditions. The teams demonstrated good initiative to comprehend and assess the information that was given to them. . Adequately detailed 4 logs were maintained by each tea Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

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Training should emphasize the need for FMT members to frequently

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check self-reading dosimeters and obtain air samples following *

established procedural guidance, i, e i

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u 4' TheJointPublicInformationCenter(JPIC)wasactivatedandutilized

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by. State and utility representatives. Representatives of local news i media were present in the JPIC throughout the exercise. NRC ';

%o representatives only visited the JPIC very briefly during one press !

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briefing. -During the observed briefing, information was presented

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clearly utilizing appropriate maps and other visual aids. Reporters'

(both real and mock) questions were answered directly and factuall l f 1

. The-Public Information Manager / Spokesman had frequent briefings and.

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s : discussionswiththeManagerofEmergencyOperations(MEO)in ' i

preparation for. press releases. Press releases were reviewed'and' :

a approved by the MEO.- Press releases were clear, concise, factual,-

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and were issued at regularly scheduled interval .c Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . Exercise Objectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302_)_

The licensee submitted the exercise scope and objectives and a draft scenario package for. review by the NRC within the established timeframe i

'. i Following reviews,. minor comments were provided to.the licensee regarding- '

- the scenario package. These comments were considered and revisions made *

-to the scenario package where applicable.

c The. licensee scenario was challenging, having multiple operational events : and equipment failures which resulted in'an elevated rate of release of 1 radioactive effluent offsite. The scenario contained sufficient diversity to include the fire brigade, first aid responders, operators, health

' physics personnel as well as instrumentation, mechanical and electrical maintenance personne j The licensee very effectively made use of several mock-ups to provide ,

realistic conditions for responders to timely demonstrate implementation 1 of corrective actions. This use of mock-ups is very beneficial and  ;

encouraged, t c

h Based u)on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was j accepta)1 t t Exercise Control and Licensee Critiques (IP 82301) -

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One minor incidence of controller prompting was observed. While a Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) was conducting a radiological survey, the controller provided a completed survey map instead of the  :

, specific data requested by the RPT. Otherwise, the licensee's controllers ;

did an-excellent job of controlling exercise pla '

Good restraint was used.in not issuing a contingency message.to the Shift Engineer (SE) to

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' declare an Unusual Event for the.onsite fire. Controllers were also able i W to handle-various unanticipated actions with well-thought out response l

[ The licensee's controllers / evaluators held critiques in each facility.with '

the participants'immediately following the exercise. Lead controllers ~ met :

, after the facility l critiques to discuss observed strengths and weaknesses ,i for each facility and the overall exercise. NRC personnel attended

'

'

several of these critiques and determined that the self-critique. process! . :

. was-well performed. Significant NRC identified exercise,deficiencie:; had also been identified by licensee personnel, as well as numerous other items,  ;

e ,

'

-

Based upon'the above. findings, this portion of the licensee's program was

+ . acceptabl '

, ..

4 . Open Items -

<

Open items are matters which have been discussed $11th the licensee which will be revit 9ed further by the inspector and which involve some actions ;

. on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. The Open Items disclosed ;

during this inspection are discussed in detail in Section 5.a. and 5.d of- ;

this report.-

.t Exit Interview (IP 30703)

'

The inspection team held an exit interview on June 7, 1990 with the .,

licensee representatives denoted in Section'1. The NRC team leader !

discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. No violations of NRC .- i requirements were identified. The licensee was informed of the Exercise ;

-Weakness. identified during the inspection and was' requested.to *

, redemonstrate timely classification and declaration of emergenc t conditions.at a future drill or exercise. The licensee was also: informed "

of the open item regarding the procedura1Linconsistency.

'

The licensee was asked if any of the.information discussed during the exit :

interview was proprietary. ' The licensee responded that none of the i information was- proprietar ' Attachments:

1 1 LaSalle Nuclear Power Station o 1990 GSEP Exercise Scope  ;

and Objectives .

2. ..LaSalle Nuclear Power Station ,

.

1990 GSEP Exercise Narrative a Summary

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'2)' ' Notification u c- -leations (c:ct'd) ,

- -' Demonstr0to the ability to pr vid3 infsrmation updat00 to th2 i State at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of l changes in monitored condition !

- (CE*, TSC*, 30F*)

• Demonstrate the capability to contact appropriate support

'

- organisations that would be available to assist in an actual i emergency within one (1) hour of conditions warranting their i assist anc !

- (TSC, R0F)

L5 3 Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of  !

( communication with the NRC on EN8 upon reques !

i- - (TSC,' EOF)

_ Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of  ;

communication with the NBC on RPR upon request.- <

';

- (TSC, E0F)-

- >

. .

1. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the r NRC at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of changes I L' in monitored' conditions.' )

'

l

- (CR, TSC, 50F)

i 1

- j Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate informational  !

announcements (i.e.; declaration of emergency classification,- I assembly. instructions, significant events, changes to plant I conditions, etc.) over the public address system in the plan (CR*, T8C*) , Demonstrate the ability to provide all pertinent information

'

(i.e.; job priorities, change of command and. control, significant events and changes in plant conditions, etc.) to the OS ,

- (CR*, TSC*) ,

t 1 ,

) Demonstrate tho' ability of CBCo and State Environs personnel to exchange Field Team informatio (TSC*, B0F*)  !

l 3) Emermancy Facilities

. , Demonstrate the ability to staff and activate the on-sit <

'

Emergency Response Facilities within thirty (30) minutes of the Alert classification in accordance with EPIP (TSC, OSC) >

! Demonstrate the ability to augment the Control Room staff within thirty (30) minutes of an appropriate GSEP classification in accordance with the EPIP (CR*) Demonstrate the ability to staff and activate the Emergency ,

Operations Facility and Joint Public Information Center Q within approximately one (1) hour of the Site Emergency V classification in accordance with EOF procedure (BOF, JPIC)

NOTE ** INDICATES A PREVIOUSLY NOTED PROBLEM OR WEAKNESS 0249L/2/wja i

i r

_ _ _ . . . . . _ . . . . . _ .

>N* '. LASALLE COUNTY WDCLEAR POWER STATIOR

' GSEP EEEECISE l ,

l , June 6,.1990 I

OLTECTIVES PRIMARY OL7ECTIVE Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to implement the Generating Station EmerSency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of'

the public health and safety in.the event.of a major accident at the LaSalle County Ruclear Power Station. The 1990 demonstration will be conducted during the hours which qualify as a daytime azercise in accordance with NRC guideline SUPPORTIhG OBJECTIVE 8:

1) &aas - t =ad Classification Given information provided by the exercise scenarcio, demonstrate the ability to assess initiating conditions which

'

warrant a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) ainute (CR, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to determine which Emergency Action Levels (EALa) are applicable within fifteen (15), minutes of determination of the initiating conditions warranting classificatio (CR, TSC, E0F)

2) Notification and Communications Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out a RARS form in accordance with IPIPs or E0F procedure (CR, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to make applicable notifications to offsite State and local organisations within fifteen (15)

ainutes of making a CSEP classificatio (CR, TSC, IOF) Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out an ENS Notification Worksheet in accordance with EPIPs or E0F procedure (CR, TSC, E0F) Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC immediately after'

the State notifications and-within one (1) hour of the GSEP Emergency classificatio (CR)

,

ROTEt "*" INDICATES A PREVIOUSLY NOTED PROBLEM OR WEAKNESS 0249L/1/wja

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I

3,' ( . , ..

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T*O-

. J '. ' ' > 3) Enkraency. Facilities-(cont'd) )

a ,. ' .

I Using information supplied by the exercise scenario, I demonstrate the ability to record, track and update I information on Status Boards at least every thirty (30) )

g; (/ minute ! - (TSC, OSC*, 30F)

" Demonstrate the ability to document and track all Operations and Maintenance team activities in logs and on appropriate j Status Board ,

- (CR, TSC, OSC) j Demonstrate the ability to provide station activity updates l :

to the EOF at least every thirty (30) minute :

p ~

--(TSC) j

, Demonstrate the use of electronic status board .

'

- (TSC#, EOF *)

4) Engrasney Dir.t& tion _and_.Gnatn l )

i Demonstrate the ability of the individuals in the Emergency j Response Organization to perform their assigned duties and i responsibilities as specified in Generic GSEP and i position-specific procedures, t

- (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC) ,

b. ' Demonstrate the ability of the Managers and Directors to ,1 exert command and control in their respective areas of: l

, ,;

-responsibility as specified in Generic GSEP and 3

,' position-spectfic procedure '

'

- (CR, TSC, OSC, E0F, JPIC)  ;

L '[

' Demonstrate the ability to coordinate Operations and -

Maintenance activities during abnormal and emergency I situation !

I> - (CR, TSC, OSC) +

t Demonstrate the ability to priorit17e 19.-plant Maintenance -l activities during abnormal and emergency situation !

- (CR, TSC, OSC)  ; Demonstrate the ability to requisition, acquire and transport ,

emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or

'

' control unsafe or abnormal plant condition ,

- (CR, TSC, EOF) I

.

k Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Environs teams within ~'[ ~

forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field sample f

- (TSC, OSC)  !

3 Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate Environs l team (s) activities in accordance with ED and EG procedure , - (TSC, EOF)

}

L NOTE: *** INDICATES A PREVIOUS 1.Y MOTED PROBLEM OR WEAKNESS

'i 0249L/3/wja

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a

!:

. - . . .--- $.A . - . . - . . . . ~ , ~ . . . _ - . . , . . - . . - . . . . - , . - . . . ..-

- . _ . _ . . . . . _ . .

' .' l ' - 5) . 41 1.,t,m1 A----* ==d Protective Aeti- -(cont'd)

, t, e. Demonstrate the ability to issue'. 2 adminstratively control'

i>

dostaetry to the teams dispatched from the OSC.in accordance

'

wit.h established policies and station procedure , - (OSCe) Dancestrate the ability to establish radiological controls in accordance with establichod Realth Physics policies and plant procedure (0$C)

I' Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document

' > radiation exposure to-implant Operations and Maintenance teams in accordance with established policies and plant

.

procedure "

- (08C)

h. -Demonstrate the ability to establish radiolo81 cal monitoring

.o and controle of assembly areas in accordance with established policies and plant procedure .

,#- 2

- (08C)

' Using information provided by the exercise scenario,.

f' ~

demonstrate the ability to calculate offsite dose projections in accordance with appropriate procedures, programs and Suidance (TSC, BOF).

j. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate Protective Action

,

6 Recoemeendations (PARS) within ten (10) minutes of determining an offsite dose projection or using an emergency classification flowchar (CR, TSC, BOF) Demonstrate the ability to perfora decontamination of

'*: radioactively contaminated individuals in accordance with established policies and procedure (OSC).

> Demonstrate the ability to colleet RC8 and Containment Atmosphere samples using the Post Accident Sample System (PASS) equipment in accordance with PASS procedures and proper Bealth Physica control (08C) Demonstrate the ability to analyse SC8 and Containment Atmosphere samples usin8 appropriate analysis equipment in accordance with PASS procedures and proper Health Phystes control (08c) Given information obtained from the PASS results, demonstrate the ability to perform a core damage assessment in accordance with RPIP (TSC)

-

ROIK1 **" INDICATES A PREVIOUS 1.Y ROTED PROBLEM OR WEAERES8

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i-0249L/$/wja

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,' = f.; - 4). Emeraancy Direction and Control (cont'd)

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- -' Demonstr:to the cbility ts' transfer contral and coorgination' I of Environs team (s) activities.in accordance with Station EPIPs and 30F procedure I

! .- (TSC, 30F) Demonstrate-the ability to assemble and account for all l on-site personnel within thirty (30) minutes of sounding the i Assembly Alar j

- (TSC*)  ;

'

' j. Dem wtrate the ability to release emergency response workers to perform their response duties.

.

- (OsC*) ,

!

, Demonstrate, the ability to promptly. identify and release OSC -l Response Teams who have been assigned priority work in the 5 plan i

- (0SC*, TSC*) ' Demonstrate the ability of Emergency Response Facility I management to provide briefings and updates concerning plant >

, status, event classificat' ion and activities in progress at  !

least every thirty (30) minute l (CR, TSC, OSC, B0F) ~'

i Demonstrate the ability to provide access for a Mock NRC Site ,

team in'accordance with access control procedure (TsC, 30r)  :

t

,

,0 Demonstrate the ability to interface with a Mock NBC' site tea I

'

,

- (TSC, B0F)

{

5) Radiological Assesament_ nd Protective Actions f *

a.4 Demonstrate the ability ~to trend plant radiolosteal. survey information for conditions presented in the exercise i

4 scenari (.'.

L

'

- (TSC, OSC, 30F) l i

' Demonstrate the ability to collect and= document all l radiological surveys taken for conditions presented in the -!

'

azercise scenari y - (OSC) , Demonstrate the ability to take appropriate protective  ;

actions for on-site personnel in accordance with station  :

EPIP '

- (TSC, OSC) *

' Demonstrate the ability to adequately prepare and brief personnel fo? entry into a High Radiation Area in accordance with Station procedures and policie (TSC, OSC)

NOTE: "*" INDICATES A PREVIOUSLY NOTED PROBLEN OR WEAKNESS 0249L/4/wja-

,

'

ig a- e4 e . , -+= -+ w - - , -+ ,

aw -

. . .

1. • ' l' .5) 8adialaa{ pal Amman me ' praggegigg ggggggg (ggggeg)

' Demonstrate the ability to collect. field samplas in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedure '

- (Field Teams)

. Demonstrate the ability to perfore field sample analysis in accordance with Ravironmental Samplina procedure (Field Teams)

'

q. Demonstrate the ability to document, trend and assess field

. sample results in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedure (TSC, 30F)

6) First Aid Actions Demonstrate the ability of a First Aid Team to prema*1; respond to the scene and evaluate the situation within 15 minutes ef receiving notification of a probi (OSC)

7): Relocation Oblactives .

a. Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-essential personnel within a half an hour after deciding to evacuate the sit (TSC) Demonstrate the ability to explain the evacuation route, properly brief non-essential personnel prior to the start of .

site evacuation and arrange for traffic contro .(TSC)

-8) Offaite Amancy Coordination-a. -Demonstrate the ability to coordinate emergency response with the 8 tate of 1111 acts (850C and MAC) in accordance with established Emergency Plans and procedure (TSC, 30F) Demonstrate the ability to exchange pertinent information

'

with the State of Illinois (880C and.REAC) in accordance with established Emergency Plans and procedure (T8C, 30F)

9) Enhlic Information Demonstrate the ability to maintain a CkCo representative in the JPIC at.all times in accordance with CECO policies and

,

procedure '

.

- (JPIC) Demonstrate the ability to respond to Media requests within 30 minutes in accordance with CECO policies and procedure (JPIC)

ROTEt **" INDICATES A PREVIOUSLY NOTED PROBLEM OR WRAKRESS .

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%' 9)I'Public'Information: ,

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c..: Demonstrate the. ability to anchanne event >information with i

@ ,

non-Ceco JPIC' representatives for media briefings in'

N: ,

accordance;with' Ceco policies =and procedures ^.

--(JPIC)

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d.. Demonstrate.the ability to coordinate information with

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-hon-CBCo JPIC representatives for.nedia, briefings in

'".. accordance with CBCo policies and'procedura ,(JPIC)- ,

yU vf- 4

,, ' Demonstrate;the ability to prepare' accurate press. releases

,

n eiF m within ninety:(90) minutes of significant events while-in a

'

s . Site:Emergencyjor General Emergency classification. >

, '(JPIC*)

'N :f;- Demonstrate-the ability to present media briefings within ninety (90) minutes of significant; events while in'a Site orc

'  ?'- . General Emerasacy classification.-

'

\ - (JPIC) ,

% ' Demonstrate the ability to use visual aids to support media-

' briefing informati n in accordance with Ceco policies and

'

' procedure '

.-L(JPIC).

10) kecovery '

a.' Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to enter a-

. .

recovery classification in accordance with procedure M '

'(TSC,' EOF)

(k(; -b. ' Demonstrate-the ability to' generate a Recovery Plan Ohic . will'. return the plant:to normal operations.in accordance with- '

Ceco policies and procedure i

,y - (TSC*, E0F*)

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' ~

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EDIII- '"*" INDICATES A PREVIOUSLY ROTED PROBLEM OR WEAERES3^

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LAS4LLp EDCLEAR POWEE STATIOS i

1990 G8EP EXEECISE

' #

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, SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION'

y f'

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JUER 6,-1990

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DAZE 1

[W

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TYPE 2 FULL PARTICIPATION I

, OFFSITE AGENCY P&ETICIPATIOEr-State of Illip is (ESDA, DRS). l X

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LaSalle County Grundy. County y ,

, , PURPOSE -Test the capabillty of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company.CSEP. The Exercise will include mobilization of CBCo personnel and resources 'I

~

adequate to' verify their capability to respond to a,

['.

U'y f

simulated emergenc *

RCo FACTLTTIE8-5 ACTIVATED:

e Control Boon j e; TSC ,

e OSC e 50F ..

e. JPIC j

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'

Ceco FACILITIES .l EDT ACTIVATEpr e. CCC

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The Exercise Ruelear Duty Person will be notified of a

simulated events as appropriate on a real-time: basis. He and the balance of the R0F Encovery Groep will ba -

propositioned'elose:to the Mason EOF.te permit use of? 1 p

L

- .

Lpersonnel from distant" locations. ,However, dispatch os EOF: . 'l personnel will;be atagstred to simulate driving-tias ,

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- -l ,

m Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the; capability to_make j" H !

"' contact with contr6 tors whose assistance would be required,

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by ths simulated accident situation,,but will'not:actually

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incur the +zpense of using contractor services to sinnlate Q

amargency response except as prearranged specifically for

$ 'the. exercise.

> '

Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual'

.

.

q p transportation and communications support in-accordance

$

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with existing agreements to the extent specifically 1 prearrranged for the Exercise. C a nonwealth Edison will l

.,, * .

provide = unforeseen-Actual assistance on)y.to the extent- (

'#

that the resources are atallable and do not hinder w raal )

operation of the Compan <

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• .,  : LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATIONJ -

, 's 9 7 -.' A * -

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1990 GgEP IIERCISE- 0

,  ;;. ; , ~j

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a Jinte 6,:1990'

p  ;(

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NARRATIVE SINSIART

%;.

JIITIAL CONDITIONS f

{.7 , (0700 - 0715): 4 >

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TUNIT 1 -; The Unit has been operating in Mode 1 for the past.161 days.and  !

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- is currently operating at 100% of rated capacity." The HPCS' Pump * (

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was taken out of service at 1615 on June 4 to allow Electrical- .,

Maintenance personnel to replace.the upper motor bearing. - The-

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'

work.is' expected to be' completed on the, day shift on Jun '

The Technical Specification (TS) allows the NPCS Pump to be oute 1,

$

of service.for up to 14 days (3.5.1.c.) '}

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The Primary Containstent Isolation Valve Operability Test -(LOS .

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' ' PC-Q1) wex performed on'the previous' shift. .The Drywell Vent

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-Outlet Upstream Bypass Isolation Valve (1VQO35) failed'to close after-the opening cycle. A work request was initiated to .

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correct the problem. The appropriate valves (1VQ068 and;1VQO36).

L- were deactivated as requite'd by Technical Specification 3.6. ;

. Noble gas problems in the.1B Turbine Driven Reactor, Feed-Pum J (TDRTP)-Room-are being caused by a packing leak ~on 18 TDRFP' .y h :Above Sent Drain Valve', 1B21-F4288.- The packing leak is' 1 li scheduled to be repaired during the next outag p

,

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1 The specific activity of the reactor coolant has-been steadily 3 L increasing over the past 5' days. Reactor; coolant' chemistry-samples-are being taken every 4 honra-in' order'to determine the-

~

HW* 1 f

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number. of fuel rods' that' are leaking.. : Main Steam Line:and J.

L',' Offgas radiation'levstis are higherithan, normal.': j m^

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T'

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UNIT =2'- The Unit is curtently shutdown in Mode 5' and :is making 1

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I

'

preparations to startup followins'a' refueling > outage.; Primary i y;, Containment Integrity has:not been set.- ,

The Unit 2 Standby Gas Trxeteenc System (SBGTS)1 f( out' of ;

El service for maintenance on the fan. Mechanical Maintenance y'

personnel have,taken apart the fan and expect to'be able to'

return it to. service by day shift tomorrow. This puts Unit on <;

f'

,

in a 7 day Lisiting Condition of Operation ~-(LCO).

n N '

AIPECTED ACTIOES ,

Maintenance Personnel Nill continue the work on replacing the;HPC5 .

Ptap Bearing and to repair the SBGTS fan. The Electrical Maintenance ~'

"4 V personnel will begin work on IVQO35 during this shift. Chemistry l personnel vill continue to sample to determine-the rate.of. fission

~

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t' '

a.,'- ~

product intrusion into the reactor coolan +m . a

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,g~~N) 20238L/1/wjaJ  ;

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. LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

.. - .- 1990 GSEP EXERCISE

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Jun9 6,1990 RARRATIVE SUI 9tARY UNUSUAL EVERT (0715 - 0832)

At 0715, a Security Guard will report to the Control Room that a lot of smoke is coming from a doorway on the Southeast corner of the Turbine Deck at elevation 768'. The smoke will cause switchgear 132Y to trip. After the smoke has been cleared to the point where the Fire Brigade can fight the fire, they will discover that the fire is on the 1BTDRFP and is being fed by oil spraying from the oil header which supplies oil to the bearings. They will not be able to isolate the oil header because the valves are below the grating and the oil is common to both feedpumps and the Main Turbine. The fire will spread to the pump side of the partition separating the pump and turbine. The 1BTDRFP bearing temperatures will increase rapidly. After the MDRFP is started, MCC 136Y-3 will trip on high current. This will be due to cable damage to the 1B TDRFP Turning Gear Motor. When the MDRFP is put in service, the discharge check valve will hang open and some of the flow will be short cycled. The Operators will not be able to close the pump discharge isolation valve because it is fed from switchgear 132 The Fire Brigade will be able to contain the fire but will not be able to put it out immediately. They will not need assistance from the outside fire companies. Since it will take them longer than 10 minutes to fight the fire, an Unusual Event will be declared in accordance with EAL 6.C. During the fire, a brigade member becomes overcome with smoke inhalation and must be assisted from the first aid tea Before the oil can be isolated to the 1BTDRFP, the IATDRFP will trip on low oil pressure. The level will drop and the reactor will SCRAM at 12.5" reactor vessel level. The RR pumps will downshift and an RR pump FCV runback will occur. Feedwater flow to the reactor vessel will be reduced due to the 1BTDRFP discharge check valve, 1FW001B being partially stuck open. Reactor level will decrease to -10", and then continue to slowly decreas The Main Turbine Auxiliary 011 Pumps and Emergency Backup 011 Pumps will automatically start as the turbine coasts down. These pumps will not be able to develop adequate pressure to lubricate the bearings due to the leak in the feed pump room. The #10 and #11 bearings will start to overheat. When the operators open the condenser vacuum breaker to slow down the main turbine the valve will cock open, although it will indicate closed in the Control Roo EXPECTED ACTIONS The Control Room will dispatch the Fire Brigade to the reported area of the smoke. The Fire Brigade will not be able to get near the fire due to the dense smoke and will have to set up fans to evacuate the smoke from the roo Since it will take them longer than 10 minutes to fignt the fire, an Unusual Event will be declared in accordance with RAL 6.C. The Fire Brigade will remove and water soak the lagging from the turbine and then stay at the scene to prevent the fire from refisshin sL/2/wjs

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, ,. . =LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATIO ~l

'

y 4 . g.7, j - ' ,

'1990 GSEP EXERCISE ,

. . N '

f ^  ?.. ,

Juni 6,'1990 I

-

NARRATIVE SUfflARY-  !

[  ;

'A._L EXPECTED ACTIONS

h The Operators will start RCIC to reestablish RV level. When they utscover

'r that the RCIC Pump' parameters are off-scale high, they vill isolate the steam

. supply to'the' pump., An Alert will be declared in accordance with EAL '

The. Operators will enter procedure LCA-01 when vessel level goes.below 12.5" and they will' enter procedure LGA-03 when drywell prensure exceeds 1.69". ,

They will carry out the required actions, including the' initiation of J

,

Suppression Pool Cooling and Spray. The Control Room wil11 dispatch a crew to ,

attempt to close the VR damper and attempt to expedite the repair of'1VQO3 ;

'"

'

SITE EMERCENCY f

'

(0930 - 1110) j t , 3". -

The Operating Crew may be trying to isolate the 1BTDRFP by closing 1CB003 '

\ 4 .

At 0925, IFWOO1B~will slam closed. As.the valve closes, the flow path that

provides;for'short. cycling the feedwater will be isolated. A large volume of relatively cold water will rapidly be diverted to the reactor vessel. Reactor'

vessel. level and Reactor pawer will rise-rapidly as indicated by short period alarms. There will be gross failure of fuel rods the? ~0re already leakin , If the Main Steam.Line is still unisolated, a Group I 1 solation will occur on i 3 X norma 1' radiation level in the MSL. THe "B" Inboard MSIV will fai1~to

close, and containment will reach 420 R/hr at which time a Site Emergency.will t

"- be declared in accordance with EAL Containment' Rad levels will continue t

---

.

to increase,. exceeding 2000 R/hr by 1105. The Main Stack /SBGTS. effluent I hAe radiation levels will increase somewhat due to leakage through the following s paths:

il) '"B" Inboard MSIV failed open and "B" -

Outboard MSIC leaking by its

, seat, then through leaky or apen bypass valves to the condenser and,

'

then through the-partially open condenser vacuum breake "

2) The packing leak on the.1BTDRFP-Above Seat-Drain Valve, 1821F428B,

will worsen throughout'the-fire. The radioactive gasses will. escape down the steam line and enter the turbine deck are L

3)' Valve IVQO35 and leaking or open valves downstream, through the VR 4 exhaust dampers.

e Technicians on the Turbine Deck will report very high radiation levels nea .1BTDRFPgRoom and near the generator end of the Main Turbine. Radiation' levels on the Turbine Deck will be much higher than normal. Reactor Building

, ' radiation levels will be high near the Drywell Vent Outlet VQ line and around

'

e the_SBGTS Trai !

EXPECTED ACTIONS 'A-Site Emergency will be declared in accordance with EAL Operators will UN reauce- feedwater flow and will note the Steamline High Radiation Alarms. They will. monitor the Area Radiation Indicators. The Common. Area ARMS are-powered a

(* p

, from switchgear 132Y and will not be available. They will get the Radiation Protection personnel out in.these areas to provide surveys, samples and monitoring. .As Operators become aware of the leaks and radiation levels, they will initiate activities to isolate and repair them, oe 0238L/4/wja I,

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LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATION-o T. 1 * . *. ? 1990 G8EP EXERCISE E' Jun3 6,1990 RARRATIVE SUFMARY EXPECTED ACTIONS (cont'd)

"

The Fire Brigade member will be' treated outside of the pump room by a

'

qualified first aid responde It will be determined that he needs to be transported to the-hospital for treatment'and observatio The Control Room will make preparations to start the MDRFP and to take 1BTDRFP-out of service. This will require' reducing power to 1 90% of rated due to the lower capacity of the MDRFP. They vill also try to isolate the pump by-manually closing the suction valve, ICB003B, which can be accessed from-outside the' pump room. The Operator s will be reluctant to shutdown the MDRFP because the loss, of MCC 136Y-3. isolated the power supply to its Auxiliary 011'

Pump. -The Operators will want to bring the Main Turbine.to a stop faster _and'

therefore, will open the condenser vacuum breaker. The Operators will enter procedure LGA-01_ to reestablis'.t and maintain reactor vessel level. When the-level will not recover, the Control Room may send Operators to the Feedwater Regulating-Valve (FRV) Room or they may try to use the low flow controlle The Control Room will attempt to inset rods 14-15 and 18-19 to " FULL-IN". The rods will be air bound and will require ver. ting of the withdraw line to fully inser .

The Shift-Engineer may decide'to declare an Alert in accordance with EAL at this time due.to.obtain additional suppor '

O' ALERT (0810 - 0930)

The reactor. vessel water level will continue to decrease.- The Operators wil start Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump in order to reestablish Reactor; Vessel Level.- The RV level will increase until the RCIC Pump-n -overspeeds. RCIC Ptanp CR parameters for speed, discharge pressure and flow-indicate off-scale high. Pipe supports and the injection line in the upper drywell area will fail. The condensing steam from the pipe break,will cause the "B" Inboard MSIV Closing Solenoid to fail. The steam to the RCIC Pump Turbine will be isolated by the Control Room.-

=The reactor vessel level will drop and the drywell pressure will start to increase. The- drywell pressure will reach 1.69 psig (LOCA Signal). ' The PCIS-isolations (Croups 2', 4, 7, 10) will occur, the diesel generators will start, and'the'ECCS programmed actions will occur. All required' valves will operate except the Reactor Building Exhaust Dampers IVR05YA and IVR05Y IVR05YA will indict's _ dual: position and IVR05YB will indicate closed but will be partially

open and leaking by the. seat. The drywell pressure will increase to 7 psig and the:drywell temperature will increase. The pressure in the suppression chamber will increase. An Alert will be declared-in accordance with EAL ' as Reactor Vessel Coolant Leakage of > 50 spm is indicated by DWEDS/DWFDS i totalizer .The Fire Brigade will report that the fire is extinguished and that the, are waiting for the IB TDRFP to stop spinning so that they can isolate the oil 0 supply to its bearings, 0238L/3/wja- l

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,4 .X-d:.b * ,, , . ,q

.t LASALLE NUcutAR POWER STAT 105>

.

m , 1990 G8EP EXERCISE-y' .

1 June'6,'1990

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R&RRATIVB-SIN 91&RY v aussaan xxxBasscY (1110 - 1330)

Containment Radiation Levels-will continue to increase to 3000 R/hr. A Ceneral Emergency,will-be declared in accordance with'EAL '

> EXPECTED ACTIONS

' A-General ^ Emergency will-be declared in accordance with EAL The'

. Operators will initiate Shutdown Cooling operation once the high pressure

' ' interlocks: clear. As the Primary System is depressurized the area and: stack f, radiation levels will decreas .

BBC0VERY (TIME JIBtP 24 BOURS - 1330)

tThe reactor vessel will be depressurized and-in Cold Shutdown. The releave-

_psths will:have been isolated in the 24. hours between the initiation of the General' Emergency and the start of the'. Recovery Phase, as follows: .

1) The "B" Inboard MSIV will have closed on loss of' air shortly after-Reactor Vessel depressurization. After the RV depressurization, the MSIV Leakage Control System will be initiated and provide'a radiation-

,O . filtration path for gasses in the steamlin )- 'The Operators will isolate'the packing leak on the.18 TDRFP Above Seat Drain Valve,'1821-F4288, by' isolating- the Main Steam to Aux

' Loads Isolation Valve, 1821-F418 ) The IVQ035 valve actuator will have been repaired.and the valve-will:

be closed.'

4) The condenser vacuum breaker leakage will have ceased due to the RV

depressurization and the MSIV closure. The and of.the. pipe will have-been temporarily sealed by 19tD personnel _ as ai procautionary measure. .

5)- Dampers IVR05?A and IVR05YB will be closed by MMD personne Switchgear 132Y vill st.111 be de-energized and its repair by EMD personnel-

'will be in_ progress._ MCC 136Y-3 will have been re-energized. . The radiation release ~1evels-from-the Main Stack will be in the normal rang EEPECTED ACTICEB The Station will implement *ecerarf and Re-entry plans in accordance with LZP 1610-1.z The Operators win w e.ify all leakage paths with the' assistance of the RP surveys. Bach of c, patN will be isolated. Cleanup operations will begin'and an assessment rJ the t'erall plant damage will be mad _ .

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, cj LASALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER STATION.' d M.;j@ y F.?: - '

1990 GSEP EXERCISEi g r

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, June ,6, '1990 -

40, ,

4 Event' Description 7 ]

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X EVENTI 15 TDEFF OIL LEAK

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'? DESCRIPTION: An oil' leak will develop on the oil supply header to the 15 .

0 7 '

TDEFP. The c11' leak will cause a fire.in the 18 TDRFP Roo N The leak will. continue to grow until it is isolated fros'the

'

x t

Main Oil Beader. The' pressure in the header will drop to the:

(

V" ,s point that.the'.1A TDRFP will trip on low oil' pressure (assues j

1B TDRFP is shutdown by OPS).. The Reactor will SCRAM anditha l'J Main Turbine will. trip on reverse power; The Main Turbine'#10

'

'

il i, , and'#11 (Generator Outboard and' Excitor Inboard) bearings.will'- ',

" overheat;due to the loss of oil pressure in the header, j Operators will 'open the condenser vacum breaker ~ to slow the i turbine more rapidly. When' the condenser vacum breaker is .  ;;

reclosed,' it will cock open. The discharge check valve to the i F 15 TDRFP will-hang open., Thu 13 TDEFP will have to be manually: [

isolated because the power. supply to the discharge. valve will be- ' i mavailable and-the flow from the NDRFP will be short cyclin through the common feed s ter suction'lin .

-Q GB&LLEMIM

,

The oil system'is common to both of the TDRFPs and the Main

.

j ASPEQTS:

yh Turbine.-.Therefore,1the oil cannot be shutoff remotely in order i to stop.-feeding the fire. The oil leak'will not be isolabl ' Q~- from the 18 TDEFP until the fire is out.' The isolation valves  ;

.are located below the grating and they-are involved in the

.

. fire.L Also,.the room will be' contaminated due'to the packing ',

= leak on valve 1821-F4288.: The Control Room will want'to keep'

the-'1B TDRFP on line-until the:MDEFP is1put into service.- ' ,p

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EIPECTED _ ,

The Operators will perform;those actions that are necessary to

.

.

a}

h ACTIOES: -'

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put the MDRFP on line..'They will'also perform those required  !

actions:following the Reactor SCRAM,'as identified by thei > operating procedures. The Fire Brigade will be instructed by <l

' the Control Room not to isolate;the oil'until the 15 TDEFP stops- 1 spinning. The Control Room.will: attempt.to slow the Mai '

e 4 Tarbine by opening' the . condenser vacuum breaker. In order to

' isolate-the feedwater flow from'1B TDRFP,1the Operators wil ,

. elect to close the IC80038,~because its handwheel is located outside of the pump roo _,

s

!4 IWCEDPS/ o

!

1. SIIEILATIONS: The fire will be simulated through messages and the Control Room and IB TDRFP soon will be used,to stage the personnel and

~

a! , actions required ~to address the problems related to the event.- .

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LASALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER STATION gs < < . - 1990 CSEP EKERCISE

, .* Juno 6,1990 Event Description EVENT 1 1B TDRFP FIRB DESCRIPTIORt An oil leak will develop in the 18 TDRFP Room. The leak will soak oil into the insulation laning on the turbine casig. The oil will the 0715, start oiltowill amolder andthe ignite and fill the fire room with smok will spread At to the pump side of the partition separatiu the pump and turbine. The smoke from the fire will cause Switchgear 132Y to trip ope This will result in loss of power to the discharge valve 1FW 0108. After fi dting the fire for more than 10 minutes an The Unusual Event wIll be declared in accordance with EAL 6,. Operators will start the MDRFP in . **estion to shutdown the 18 and shorting trip of the TDEF The fire will cause the melti cables to the 1B TDRFP Turni u Gear, Okich will result in a trip of MCC 136Y-3. The MCC supp1Ies M wer to the MDRFP Auxiliary i

the Feedwater Feed Regulating Valve Isolation Stop 011 Valve Pumpd an to the Feedwater Low Flow Feed Regulatig Valv Since the MCC will not trip until after the MDRFP is started the loss of power to the Auxiliary 011 Pump will not affect Ehe operation of the MDRFP. Although the fire will be contained it will take approximately one-half hour to bring the rapidlyder fire un control and lt will not be completely exti uished until 0845. One Fire Brigade member will suffer an i un due to smoke inhalation while fighting the fire. First Ai vill be required, and he will need ,t,o.be transported to the hospita leak TheIBTDRFPRoomwillbecontaminatedduetothepacki$flityin on valve 1821-F4288. Heavy smoke will obscure the visi the pump room and therefore make it difficult to identify the source and location of the fire. The oil ayates is common to both TDRFPs and the Main Turbine. The oil cannot be shutoff in order to stop feeding the tire because of the possibility of The isolation valves major damage occurring to plant equipmen are located below the grating and they are involved in the fire. The loss of power to the MDRFP Auxilian Oil Pump will O discourage the Operators from securing the MD M .

TheControlRoomwilldiehatchtheFireBrigadetodeterminetheire cause of the saoke. The Brigade will ventilate th they will get rid of the smoke. When the oil catches fire,f the fire is contain the fire and determine that the source o -

the leakpower reactor in the inoilorder heade Thethe to put Control MDRFP Room in servic will reduceAfter they put the ERFP on line they will not want to turn it off due to the loss of p wer to the E RFP Auxilia n Oil % . The Fire Brigade may be instructed by the Control Room not to isolate the oil until the IB TDRFP stops spinning. After the fire is out the Fire Brigade will begin cleanup and acavenging operations,.

First aid will be rendered to the ld ured brigade member and be will be transported to the hospital for observation and treatmen CtNPS/

'

The Control Room and 1B TDRFP Room will be used to stage the

' 1adTIOES M rsonnel and actions required to address the probi.is related to the event. The Contamination and Radiation will os aisulated through Control Message L/2/wja

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=LASALLE' COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER STATION O 7,t sf J. < '. * , :1990 GSEP EXERCISE I

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s

. June 6,: 1990 :

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- Event Description

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EVIETs .SY!TCBERAR 132Y TRIP ~

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DESCRIPTIOEr At'0720, Switchgear,132Y will trip as a result of the smoke and2 oil laden particulate'from the fire in_the IB TDRFP Room. The'

t switchgear.wi11' require cleaning and refurbishment prior tot its-being returnedito service. The loss of 132Y wilitcause the:

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'J

'

desnergization of the IB TDRFP discharge valve,' 1FW0105,' while:

,

- it' is stil1~ in the open position. The discharge check valve, 1FW001B, will have hung open.- Flow from the MDRFP will b m partially short cycling through the 18 TDRFP.' This will prevent-the Operators from stopping the rotation of the IB TDRFF. The  ;!

Common ARMS and the:High and Low Pressure Steam Stop Valves for

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the 18 TDRFP are also powered from the'switchgear.- q

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CHALLENGING .

In order to stop the 15 TDRFP-fros rotating and to eliminate'the

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ASPECTS:

<

reverse flow through he 15 TDRFP, the Operators will have to l annually close either the d1Weharge-valve'or the auction valve

.to the 1B TDEFP. Since the steam stop valves are;also-deenergized, the leakage,from the packing leak on 1521-F4238 .

will continue even after the pump'is isolated. Also,~since'th Common ARMS will not:be functional, it will be-difficult to

,

-detect radioactive gasses leaking onto the turbine deck from:th . pump room or from the condenser vacu m breake :l

'

EIPECTED _

_

19119511 The. area where the discharge valve handwheel.is located will be: H

'

contaminated and involved in the fire, thereforaf the Operator ,

'l will' attempt.to-isolate the 15 TDRFP by closing the sectioni valve 1CB-0038, which is outside of: the pump room. The

' operations and EMD personne1'will attempt to restors the'

switchgear to servic :1 1 MDCIUPS/

SIIRILATIOES: - Mockups of the switchgear will be used to demonstrate th cl trouble shooting and attempts to restore the power to the-  ;

~j valves. ; Messages will'be used"to provide additional information to the operating and maintenance-crew l

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LASALLE. COUNTY NUCLEAR.-POWBR STATION:

gg .^ 1990;GSEP EXERCISB!

y% , F i f , J ae 6, 1990-a "

Eventi Description -

EVERT 1 ,la'TDRFP TRIP AND REACTOR SCRAM 5  :

. . -

DESCRIPTION: Because of.the lea.k in the lube oil' system, oil header pressure 1'> will drift down. The Turbine Oil Suction P ep and Emergency:

Bearing 011'P ap will not be able to develop adequate pressure z

6 ( to provide sufficient lubrication. ' The Turbine Turning Gear _ and LifttPunpa are unavailable following the loss of MCC 136Y-3.-

The Main Turbine will asperience high temperature and vibration on bearings #10 and #11 (Generator Outboard and Exciter-Inboard). -At 0745, the'1A TDRFP'will' trip on low oil pressur This will cause a RV Level drop. TER BR Pump Flow Control Valves will runback at 31.5" RV water: level'. A reactor SCRAM'

will occur and the'RR Pumps will downshift _at 12.5" RV-water

. level, as, expected. Two-rods will. fail to fully: insert. .The

Main Turbine will' trip on reverse power. RY: level will. approach; stability.at_10"' decreasing,-

. . .

ASPECTSt The Operators will have to assign priorities as several areas

, e +,- demand attention,-including RV Level = control, Reactor SCRAM ._

verifications, and Main Turbine bearing high temperatures and'

~

'

vibration EEPICTED

.

..

ACTIONS: The Control Room personnel will respond in accordance with LGP:

-

3-2, Reactor SCRAM and LGA-01,;"Lovel/ Pressure Control".. The

' Operators will attempt to slow the Main; Turbine by opening ~the-Condenser Vacuan Breaker.. The Control Room will dispatch

' personnel to vent the' withdraw lines;for-the stuck control rod '

IGCEUPS/

RIIRILATIORS t All! operating' conditions will be simulated through' control or-Plant Status Message g-t j l r

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'gy/ W D1 - LASALLE COUlffY NUCLEAR POWER' STATION:

• ;1990 GSEP EXERCISE t ~.e ' -

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a .-

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June 6, 1990

!

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' Event Description

'

EVIEft RCIC 0VERSPEED-AND PIPE FAILURE

>

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c DESCRIPTIOEt At-0755, the Operators will start the RCIC Pump to regain IV, L

level control in accordance with LGA-01, " Level / Pressure- . . .

b , Control." RV water level-will: increase until the RCIC Turbine' -

..

i ' Governor fails at which. time the turbine will overspeed.: N-turbine overspeed trip device will fail and the RCIC Pusp' j$

'

?

discharge pressure, flow rate and turbine speed will all .

]

indicate off-scale high. The RCIC injection line pipe supports.- j

• -will fail and the injection line will develop a crack'in the l l <

upper drywell head area. Water will spray into the dryvell' t W until.the Operators isolate the RCIC pump.= Steam will escape; 1 L

through the crack and the: condensing steam will cause the "B"' t

!

Inboard MSIV Closing Solenoid to fail. N RV level will start

l0 to slowly decrease after.RCIC is isolated.: Drywell pressure ~

+ will reach 1.69 pais (LOCA signal) within.5 minutes of the pipeL l failure.: The ECCS will, automatically start,-the diesel: >

generators will start and groupe 2,4,7, and'10 of PCIS wille '{

' isolate. All PCIS valves will close except for the Reactor,

Building Rahaust Vent Dampers, IVR05YA and IVR05YB. N Reactor l[

Building Rxhaust: Vent Dampers only partially-close, but.1VROSYB indicates closed in the Control' Room.: The Unit l'830T8 Fan will J

. automatically start,.but flow will'be restrii.ted due to the i failure of the flow control damper to fuliy ope I Stack Effluent and Primary Containment radiation levels will increase after the:RCIC line break. N CN-Div 1 Gross Gamma -

Radiation Monitor,will not increase,>however. 'Also one of the

'

Suppression Chamber Pressure' Indicators stayn downscal .q u

GEMsLIMIM N ASPECTS The Operators will be faced.with determining where'the dryvell l leak is coming from and how fast-it.is' leaking. The failed open.'

-

's IVQ035 will now become-a concern. !In order.to close'1VR05YA, af <

hatch will need to be opened and an entry ande into the duct M work. . The RV level will still be decreasing,'which vi11' command l

[ nost of the Operator's ' attentio o m im 4 .

.

.

j ACTICERt The Operators will start the RCIC Pump and attempt to recover EV j

' '

level. After they determine that.the RCIC. Pump'has oversped ,ead l they do not have contro1Lof the pump, they v111' isolate steen g supply to the RCIC Turbine. .The'CR personnel vill attempt to- ,

discover the source of the increase in drywell pressure. 'llisy l will verify that all of the automatic actions occur in' response I W to the ICCS initiation. Operators will beldispatched toTisolate- i the open containeent lines. They also.will' start the l

<

Suppression Pool Cooling-upon initiation of RCIC. They win J y also have started Containment Cooling-in accordance with t-

- . LOA-VP-02. The station will dispatch IMD personnel to _

i investigate.the Division I Gross Gamma Radiation Monitor and 1

,i ~

Suppreesion Chamber Pressure indicato ;

lm M ggMEDPS/

I SIIEILAT10ES r All operating conditions will be simulated. Mensal operation of j ulves will be simulated. Mockups will be used as needed for

)M,ss , instrument failure j

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o p 4 y:k # ,? LASALLE COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER' STATIO ' '

.

i  :; . 1990 G8EP "4 CISR 'j '

.  :.

June 6, 1990

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. . ~ ,

' Rvent Description

. EVIEft 15 TDRFP CB CE VALVE FAILURE

,

DESCRIPTION When the MDEFF is started, most of the feedwater flov will be- l

6 1 ..6-short circuited through the 18 TDRFP to the Feedwater ptap  !

E . common section huder, due to. the 18 TDEFF Discharge Check - ,

'

Valve, 1FW0018, hanging open.- The discharge isolation valve, l'

V '1PWO108 will be de-energized open-due'to'the failure of- s 8vit-hgear,132Y. The RV leve1~will continually drift down.~- The:

< reactor will SCRAM due to the loss of feedvater associated with; t ;the trip of the 1A TDRFP. RV level wil? be restored after the;  ;

'

Operators start the RCIC Pump. .The cL cz valve will eventually fall into its seat,: causing a reactor power excursio >

V CRALLENGING .

.

-

ASPECTS The-Operators will not be able to-isolate the IB TI)RFP b '

elosing'1FWO108. They will not be able:to isolate thu oil to IB

,TDRFP because the pump is=still spinnin !

ca' '

IIPEC1'ED ~

ACTIONSI The Operators;will observe that feedvater flow is being diverted-  !

.through the.18 TDRFP and will attempt to isolate the'18.TDEFP.by- l'

closing Its suction valve,TCB0038, manually. The oil to IB TDRFP will'not be. isolated until the pump stops spinning to l

avoid major damage to the IB TDEFP. The: Operators will start l

'the'RCIC Pump'in order to regain RV level = control.-

'

i IWCEEPS/

SIIELATIONS: All operating conditions will be simulated through' Control or .

-Plant-Status Messages.' - 'l L

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LASALLE' COUNTY NUCLEAR POWER STATION  :

l pcf4Lh' 1990 GSEP EXBRCISE  ! >

l-

%; '

ts i June 6, 1990 _,

K Event Description I

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[t EYEEZ1 MBIV- FAILUitt j DESCRIPTIOEt Water will spray into the drywell until the Operators secure;th j

<

RCIC Pump and then steam from the RV will' escape through the l crack.- The' condensing steam will'cause the:"B" Inboard MSIV-

!

,'

Closing Solenoid to fail. At 0925, PCIS. Groups 1 and 3 willt ~.'

isolate during the power excursion and subsequent fuel damag N

The;"B" Inboa:d MSIV will not close,'but will'etart to drift i

% toward closure. The Outboard MSIV will. leak by its seat. Level  ?

4 will be reatored when the check valve falls into its sea j L' -

CHALLENGING

,There will be very little feedwater. flow going to the'IV, even

"

ASPECTS:

'

though the MDRFP is operating and the Feed Regulating' Valve is

, fully open,'until I N0018 falls into its sea .I 2  ;

"

,

EXPECHD .. . .

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.

ACTIONS Actions will then be taken.in an attempt'to determine the-magnitude.of the power excursion and.autsequent fuel-damag During the reactor power.. excursion ~ and rapid level- rise,:.  !

' Operators may: trip the'MDRFP in an attempt to halt the cold j

"

water transien MDCKUPS/

, RItEILATIONS: All operating conditions will-be simulate ,

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• - LASA118- COUNTY WUCLEAR POWER STATION a. f* L "y -1990 CSEP EIRECISE-

'

. June 6, 1990

1. Event Description O EVEBf; 899f8 LOW FLOW

'

pasCRIrrIOR: .The SBCTS flow control desper IVG002Y v111'only partially open e' upon the automatic starting of the fan. This results in a low-

'

flov'of approximately 1500 SCFM. The low flow combined with the leaking Reactor = Building Exhaust Vent Despers creates a reactor i building differentia 1' pressure greater thart 0 paid. The high

. differential pressure in the reactor building combined with the-low flow through the 88GT8 will result in higher radiation release rates through the stack, because the affluent is not being fully processed by the 88GT CEALLERGIRG The . lower. efficiency of thel 88GT8 will cause' the Operators to

'

ASPECTS:

divert their already thin resources to manually get the IVG002Y open and investigate the possibility of getting.the Unit.2'88GTS in service.- , , ,

EXPECTED ACTIOR8: Tha' Operators will note.the' low flow and the high differential-

. pressure. They,will dispatch a crew to investigate'the problem. LGA-02 will direct the Operators to isolate.any.known leakage paths. The les and Operations personnel-will attempt to -

open the valve to increase the flow rate.through 8BCT8L

~

Operations may also attempt to return the Unit.2=89GTS to 0 MDCEUP8/

servic SDEILATIORS .All operating conditions will be simulate Q s

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l w .g y., o C LASALLg COUNIT NDCLEAR POWER STATI05i L

' 1990 G8EP.EIIRCISE' 'l u.~ <

June 6, 1990' .

.s..< .

Event Description'

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j l

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EVIEft RAPID POWER EXCURSION-p DESCRIFf10Et -At 0925, 18 TDEFP Check Valve.-'1FWOO18, will slam closed. The-

" reverse flow through the 15 TDEFF will cease and full flow fro the MDRFF will be diverted to the IV. The large Volme ofL e

relative 11 cold water will cause a rapid rise in IV Level with a p . subsequent power.ezcursion. .The-large'and rapid rate of change-  :[

k/ -in power. fails' fuel rods that were already: leaking.: The-  !

. Containment Radiation Level will increase to.400 R/Br, at Which ~ ,

,

I time a Site Emergency will be declared'in accordance with EAL- 1

!

'"' 2.L. The Main 8 tack /88GTS radiation levels will increase due to^

,

leakage through the-following paths:  :

'

1) The failed open "B" Inboard MSIV, "B" Outboard MSIV-leaking

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b

'

by its seat, the leaking or open bypass valves-to the l condenser and then though the, partially. open condenser L

vacu m breaker.:

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2) The packing leak on the 15 TDEFF Above Seat Drain Valve, l

1821-F4285, will woraan throughout the ftre.= The'

radioactive gasses will escape down the steam

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"

line and. enter.- t

'

the turbine dec c-3)- Valve IVQO35 and leaking or open valves downstream vf11'

g,hn = increase ~the SBGTS radiation effluent and will also increase the stack. radiation effluent because the Reactor Building-

Vent Return. Air' Riser Valve:1VQ041 is also 1eaking by lte

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seat.-

< A site assembly will'be condueted and.non-essenttal; personnel

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will be evacuated.:

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CEALLINGIBG .

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ASPECTS 1 The station will be faced'with a core' damage event and the-y

'

-potential of'an elevation to a General'Baergenc i

.

, '(f E CIII ..

.

'

ACTIoES: The Station Director will carry out actions.in accordance with

' LEP 1110-1,L"Inpresenting Procedure",. as required for' aL Site Emergency., Operations.will carry out actions in accordance with

, ,

~ LOA-AR-02 for "Eigh Area Radiatlon" and LOA-AR-03.for "Righ

. Airborne Activity.".= They will continue with thacactions

' '

described in LGA-03, " Primary Containment Centrol",'LGA-02,

,

-"8econdary Containment' Control", 'and IA&-01, "Lovel/ Pressure

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> . MCIDPS/

, s, SIELAT10ES: All operating conditions will be sinnlate l

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