ML20205D705

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Notice of Violation from Insp & Investigation Concluded on 981119.Violation Noted:On 980511,supervisor Employed by Raytheon Corp Contractor at Lasalle,Confirmed Odor of Alcohol on Employee & Failed to Perform for-cause FFD Test
ML20205D705
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/02/1999
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205D703 List:
References
IA-99-009, IA-99-9, NUDOCS 9904020285
Download: ML20205D705 (2)


Text

1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION

. Charles W. Davis lA 99-009

[Home' Address Deleted.

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-Under 10 CFR 2.790(a))

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- During an NRC inspection and an NRC investigation concluded on Novem'ber 19,1998, a

. violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 50.5(a)(1) requires, in part, that any employee of a contractor of a licensee may not engage in deliberate misconduct that causes or, but for detection, would have caused, a licensee to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order, or any term, condition, or limitation of any license, issued by the Commission.

10 CFR 50.5(c)(2) provides, in part, for the purposes of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1), that deliberate misconduct by a person means an intentional act or omission that the person knows constitutes 1

a violation of a requirement, procedure, instruction, or policy of a licensee or contractor.

l 10 CFR 26.20 requires that a licensee establish and implement written policies and procedures designed to meet the general performance objectives and specific requirements of 10 CFR Part 26.

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- 10 CFR 26.24(a)(3) requires testing for-cause as soon as possible after receiving credible

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information that an individual is abusing drugs or alcohol.

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. Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed) Corporate Nuclear Security Guideline No. 200,

" Comed Fitness for Duty Program," (FFD) implements 10 CFR Part 26, and refers to Comed Corporate Nuclear Security Guideline No. 207, " Testing for Cause." Revision 10, dated April 18,1997, of Guideline No. 207 was applicable to all Comed and contractor personnel granted unescorted access to protected area 3 of Comed nuclear stations. Ssetion 5 of Guideline No. 207, provides, in part, that for-cause testing ~is required when the odor of alcohol has been detected on an employee and a supervisor has confirmed that odor. Guideline No. 207 further provides that the person be escorted at all times until the issue is satisfactorily resolved or the person exits the protected area.

- Contrary to the above, on May 11.1998, while you were employed as a supervisor for Raytheon Corporationi a contractor at the LaSalle Ccaty Station, you confirmed the odor of alcohol on ~

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- an employee and you deliberately failed to have the required for-cause FFD test performed.

Specifically, you were trained in Comed's FFD policies and procedures when you confirmed the odor of alcohol on a Raytheon employee, and knew that you were required to have the employes *ested. : You then deliberately failed to require the employee to submit to for-cause FFD testing las required by 10 CFR 26.24(a)3), and you allowed the employee to leave the' LaSalle County Station without being tested. (01013) :

fThis is a Severity Level ill violation (Supplement Vil).

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9904020295 990329' PDR ADOCK 05000373 G

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.h i Notice of Violation 2-The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective

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actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the dates when full compliance was achieved is adequately address on tne docket in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-373/98017(DRS); 50-374/98017(DRS) and in a February 17,1999, letter from Comed.

However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your. corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a "Repiy to a Notice of Violation, EA 98-560," and send it to the NRC Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator and the Enforcement Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351, and the NRC Resident inspector at the LaSalle County Station, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).-

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a ccpy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

'If you choose to respond, your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Therefore, to the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR viithout redaction.

Dated this 29th day of March 1999 i

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i s.m, w February 17,1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Response to Apparent Violations in Inspection Report Nos. 50-373/98017(DRS); 50-374/98017(DRS) and Ol Investigation Report No. 3-98-032 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Reference:

J. A. Grobe letter to O. D. Kingsley, dated January 14,1999, related to NRC Inspection Report 50-373/374-98017 and NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 3-98-032 The attachment contains our response to the apparent violation of NRC fitness for duty requirements.

We have also enclosed a copy of a letter from George Rogers, Senior Vice President, Raytheon Constructors, to O. D. Kingsley, President, Comed Nuclear Generation Group, dated February 12,1999. This letter acknowledges the fitness for duty program violations committed by the Raytheon employees, and confirms the corrective actions taken by Comed and Raytheon.-

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FEB 2 2 899 Ov5vY W'

Should you have any questions.concerning this. letter, please contact Mr. Robert R. Brady, Jr., Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 357-6761, extension 2383.

Respectfully,-

l Jeffrey A. Benjamin Site Vice President LaSalle County Station Attachments cc:

Regional Administrator - NRC Region Ill f

Enforcement and Investigation Officer - NRC Region lil NRC Senior Resident inspector - LaSalle County Station

February 17,1999 U.S. Nuclocr R::gulatory Commission

' Page 3 i

' Attachment Response to Apparent Violations in Inspecti_on Report Nos.

50-373/98017(DRS); 50-374/98017(DRS) and 01 Investigation Report No. 3-98-032

' APPARENT VIOLATION:

The reference letter describes an apparent violation of the NRC Fitness For Duty (FFD) requirements. Tne apparent violation involves failure to ensure that proper "for cause" testing was performed in accordance with NRC requirements. On May 11,'1998, a supervisor employed at LaSalle County Station by Raytheon~ Corporation, failed to follow Commonwealth Edison (Comed) Company FFD procedures when he permitted an employee to

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leave the protected area without the employee receiving a "for cause" FFD test after the supervisor had confirmed the presence of alcohol on the employee.

I REASON FOR VIOLATION:

We concur with the facts as stated in the reference letter and inspection Report 373/374-98017, and acknowledge that the apparent violation occurred. The deliberate violation of the Comed FFD Program, as

!mplemented at LaSalle County Station, was the result of misjudgment on 1

the part of a contractor supervisor. The supervisor knowingly failed to follow LaSalle's FFD procedures by permitting an employee to leave the protected area of LaSalle County Station, after the supervisor had confirmed the odor of alcohol on the employee, without the employee receiving a "for cause" FFD test.

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CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED':

1.

~ Access was denied to the supervisor and the subject employee. An

. internal investigation conducted by Comed security found three other individuals (one supervisor and two laborers) with knowledge of the j

event. It was determined these individuals understood thqir ~

responsibilities under Comed FFD policy, but failed to implement the I

required actions under the policy. The laborers failed to notify supervision upon detecting the odor of alcohol, and the supervisor failed to follow up and resolve the issue. These three individuals were also denied access to the site.

2.

Based on the investigation findings noted in corrective step one (above), the investigation was expanded to determine if similar problems existed in other contractor organizations at LaSalle. None

. were identified.

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' Febru ry _17,1999 C

U.S. Nuclear Regulttory Commission -

Peg 3 4

' Attachment I

< Response to Apparent Violations in inspection Report Nos.

' 50-373/98017(DRS); 50-374/98017(DRS) and Ol investigatiori

. Report No. 3-98-032 t

3.

Contractor foremen and supervisors were retrained in their duties and responsibilities under the Comed FFD program.

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- Subsequent to this training, the foremen and supervisors were interviewed to evaluate their understanding of and' compliance with i

the FFD program requirements. The evaluation confirmed that they understood the FFD requirements. The personnelinterviewed affirmed that they would take the appropriate actions if faced with an FFD incident.

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The LaSalle event and the corrective actions taken were communicated to all Comed Nuclear Generation Grnup (NGG) sites.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS:

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1.

A scheduled audit of Fitness For Duty p.ogram implementation during 1

the period of May to July 1998 was conducted by Nuclear Oversight.

The audit scope was expanded, as a result of this event, to include an evaluation of the understanding and implementation of the program I

requirements by both Comed and contractor personnel. The audit found that..."the administration of the Fitness for Duty Program I

meets the requirements of 10 CFR 26. There is a robust program in place that provides reasonable deterrent as anticipated in the Rule.

j An extensive set of procedures (Corporate Security Guidelines) are in place which provide detailed instructions for the specific administration of FFD program elements." The audit verified that i

personnel understood and were properly implementing the program

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requirements.

2.

Instructions on handling the odor of alcchol are included in the Comed " Pocketbook for Administrative Excellence" issued to licensee employees and contractors, in order to raise their level of awareness.

The Comed Pocketbook is a pocket-sized, quick reference summary of NGG policies and important programs. Additionally, information on FFD responsibilities was included in all NGG site newsletters.

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Fcbru ry 17,1999 U.S. Nucirr Reguintory Commission Page 5 Attachment Response to Apparent Violations in inspection Report Nos.

50-373/98017(DRS); 50-374/98017(DRS) and Ol investigation Report No. 3-98-032 3.

On July 10,1998, NGG Security held a meeting with the major modification contractor companies, site construction superintendents, and union business agents, in order to stress the importance of fitness for duty and access authorization requirements, emphasizing the responsibilities of the contractor companies. The LaSalle incident was specifically discussed. The NGG Senior Vice President l

expressed his commitment to the FFD and access authorization requirements, and issued a letter of accountability to the contractor companies, dated July 10,1998.

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In December 1998, an effectiveness review was performed that j

determined that the corrective actions from the investigation had been

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effective. The effectiveness review noted that there had been three i

subsequent events where FFD program requirements were appropriately.followed. The effectiveness review was approved by j

the LaSalle Corrective Action Review Board.

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1 DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:

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The Comed fitness for duty program has been in compliance with applicable rules and regulations. The apparent violations were the result of a misjudgment on the part of an individual supervisor who failed.to follow FFD procedures. This supervisor and the subject employee 'were removed from the site and denied access on May 19,1998.

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6 fr T1T" 510 Came06e Center Princeton, NJ 08540 80 e

08543-5287 609.720.2050 fax February 12,1999.'

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley President, Nuclear Generation Group

' Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Regulatory Services Executive Towers West 111 1400 Opus Place, Suite 500 Down' rs Grove, IL 60515

- SUWECT:

FAILURE TO FOLLOW FITNESS FOR DUTY PROCEDURES - ACTION TAKEN

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

' The purpose of this letter is to provide a summary of our actions taken relating to the incident where a supervisor violated Fitness for Duty (FFD) procedures when, based on the confirmation of the employee's odor of alcohol the supervisor 'did not enforce the required FFD testing. Instead, he gave the employet. ae option of going home. Initially, the supervisor was not forthright with information pertaining to this event. However, later, after the event, he stated that he recognized.his actions were not adequate.

During the investigation it was further determined that two other employees came in contact with the individual in question. One employee admitted that he had smelled alcohol

- on the employee in question; the other employee Indicated that he observed an individual a week earlier who did smell of alcohol. These two employees failed to report these indc!ents to their supervisors. A fifth individual, the employee's foreman, became knowledgeable of the event and did not report it to management.

The investigation revealed that all of the people involved in these incidents knew the FFD requirements to report and test an employee who smells of alcohol. These employees also knew the consequences for failing to report the incident. The investigation revealed that all the employees knew and understood the FFD policy and did not adhere to the requirements of the FFD policy.

As I indicated during our conversation at the time, this incident was especially troublesome to me in that the supervisor involved had been a long term Raytheon employee and had worked in the nudear industry for many years. We do not and will not tolerate failure to follow regulations.-

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j February 12,1999 o

Mr. Oliv:r D. Kingil:y President, Nuclear Generation Group p

Page 2 Investigations were performed by both Comed and Raytheon personnel. I concluded that the investigations were in depth and thorough. The following actions were taken as a result of the investigations:

The supervisor involved was interviewed and terminated for failure to follow the FFD program.

.' The employee who was involved with the alcohol and sent home was terminated.

The two employees who failed to repoit the incidents' have been terminated.

The foreman who became knowledgeable but failed to report the incident was terminated.

- Raytheon supervisors at LaSalle were given reinforcement training on the requirements of the station's FFD policy. The requirement to report to management for possible testing anytime the odor of alcohol is detected was emphasized.'

in separate meetings, foremen were given reinforcement training on the e

requirements of the station fitness for duty policy. A question and answer session was included to solicit feedback.

Requirements for fitness for duty policy administration were addressed at a weekly communication meeting. All Raytheon personnel attended these meetings and the station security management staff participated in these presentations.

interviews were conducted with the supervisors to verify that the requirement to

- e report to management for possible testing in all cases where the odor of alcohol is detected is understood.

We' take these violations very seriously. Our company policies are very clear and we fully support the FFD requirements. Furthermore, we support an environment where employees are encouraged to report all violations immediately. At LaSalle, we have our Raytheon Ethics hot line phone number in each hard hat to facilitate reporting.

In order to ensure that our personnel are indoctrinated and support the standards ~ we provide Raytheon Ethics training for all of our employees. The essence of our program

_ requires that "every employee should report any moduct which he or she believes in good faith to be a violation of the standards."ine company strongly encourages employees to work with their_ supervisors in making such reports, and in addition, provides to employees the right to confidentially or anonymously report such violations to the ethics and compliance office. "No employee will suffer retaliation for a report made in good faith."

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February 12,1999

.i Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley 1

' President, Nuclear Generation Group t

Page 3-f l

i in spite of our best efforts, there is the possibility that an individual will enter the site'under the influence of alcohol. However, I believe that the following actions, which have been taken, will create an environment where this situation will be reported properly and promptly:.

.. Penodic tre!ning is in place for both supervision and craft to ensure that our management expectations are understood.

We will continue to communicate our expectations so that all employees are aware of e

the regulations.

. An open door policy exists which allows employees to raise concems.

e I would like to emphasize that Raytheon is fully committed to maintaining an environment

- at LaSalle which meets your expectations. I will cor,itinue to communicate my expectations to the Raytheon management team for LaSalle; Mr. Hyster, Mr. Reeder, Mr.

Schultz and Mr. Costello, who is responsible for Ratheon's engineering at Comed. I believe that they understand the importance of maintaining this standard and they are fully committed.

We hope this information addresses the questions raised. If you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to call me at (609) 720-3531.

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Sincerely,

< Copy > Original signed by George Rogers George Rogers Senior Vice President-Roytheon Constructors-Intemational CC:

D. Helwig, Senior Vice President H. Stanley, PWR Vice President

C. Crane, BWR Vice President R. Krich, Vice President, Regulatory Services

!J. Benjamin, Site Vice President T. O'Connor, Station Manager R. Bradey, Regulatory Assurance Manager