IR 05000373/1990021
| ML20062E038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1990 |
| From: | Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062E026 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-90-21, 50-374-90-22, NUDOCS 9011190222 | |
| Download: ML20062E038 (15) | |
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a U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N REGION 111 Report Nos. 50-373/90021(DRP); 50-374/90022(DRP)
Docket Nos. $0-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted: September 2 through October 20, 1990 Inspectors:
T. Tongue R. Kopriva C. Phillips R. Lerch
,Putsifer Approved By:'..J.
. Hi Chief NOV o 91990 Reactor Projects Section 1A Date jnspectionSummary
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Ins >ection from September 2 through October 20, 1990 (Report Nos. 50-373/90021
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced saf ety. inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee event reports followup; operational safety; engineered safety feature systems; monthly maintenance; monthly surveillance; training r
effectiveness; report review; events; design changes and modification program;
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_ maintenance program; and site visits by NRC staff.
Results: Of the eleven. areas inspected, no violations were identified in ten areas. In the remaining area one no response violation was identified regarding problems with 10 CFR 50.59 reviews and proper documentation.
One unresolved item was identified regarding the need for a Technical Specification Amendment for isotopic analysis of the enriched boron in the Standby Liquid Control System.
NRR is evaluating this for resolution. During the inspection period, Units 1 and 2 operated at ce near full power. On September 12, 1990 Unit 2 scrammed due to a generator load reject and turbine
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trip. A fault in the B phase current transformer in the main power
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transformer caused the load reject.
The unit returned to service on September 20, 1990.
On October 1, 1990 the cycled condensate gland water head tank overflewed resulting in a spill of approximately 150 gallons of potentially contaminated liquia.
The cause of the spill was due to a leaking normal makeup valve and lack of communications and control by radwaste operators.
On October 16, 1990 there was an ESF actuation when the control room emergency ventilation automatically startec'.
During this report period two examples of inadequate or incorrect procedures were found.
These are discussed in paragraph 9.
These findings, in addition to past history reviewed in preparation for the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report, appear to show a disproportionate number of procedural problems.
This apparent trend will be followed by the inspectors.
Performance for each of the areas listed is summarily expressed:
Plant Operations The licensee continues to operate in an above average manner with excellent response to events.
Maintenance / Surveillance The licensee continues to perform in an average manner with no significant trends noted. A number of improvement initiatives are being slowly implemented.
RadfationProtection No assessment.
Security No assessment.
Emergency Preparedness No assessment.
Engineering and Technical support The licensee has initiated a number of projects where station engineering, corporate engineering, etc. are working closer together. More time will be needed to evaluate the effectiveness of these initiatives.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification Design changes were not properly reported to the NRC, resulting in a no-response violation.
An additional unresolved inspection item resulted from the potential need for a Technical Specification Amendment.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
'G J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station
- W. R. Huntington, Technical Superintendent
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'C W. Schroeder Production Superintendent J. V. Schtneltz, Assistant Superintendent, Operations i
J. Walkington, Services Director T. A. Hammerich, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- J. A. Ahlman, Regulatory Assurance W. E. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance W. Betourne, Quality Assurance Supervisor J. A. Borm, Quality Assurance
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'J. Roman, Resident Engineer, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on October 22, 1990, and at other times throughout the inspection period.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
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employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, l
reactor and auxiliary (perators, shif t engineers and foremen, and electrical, mechar':a1 and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security personne
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. 2.
MeenseeEventReportsFollowup(92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of. records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
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action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had
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been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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The following reports of nonroutine events were reviewed by the
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inspectors.
Based on this review it was determined that the events were of minor. safety significance, did not represent program
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for.
These reports are closed:
373/90011-00 - Failure of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Line High Flow Static-0-Ring Differential Pressure Switch Due to Torn Diaphragm j
374/90004-01 - Local Leak Rate Test Minimum Pathway Leakage of l
Greater Than 0.6 La Limits During Third Refuel Outage 374/90010-00 - Reactor Scram on Generator Lockout During i
Surveillance Testing Due to Short to Ground on B Phase Current
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Transformer in the 2E Main Power Transformer
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In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
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Deviation Reports (DVR$) generated during the inspection period.
This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed to ensure that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedurec and the QA manual.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors verified daily,.nd randomly during back shift and on weekends, that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation. This was done on a sampiing basis through routine direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0AR), corrective action, and review of facility records.
On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);
including compliance with LCOs, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operator understanding, off-normal condition, and corrective actions being taken; examined nuclear instrumentation (NI) and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for
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abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant superintendents, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for operability.
During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note
.of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, general safety items, etc.
The specific areas observed were:
a, Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems-Accessible portions of.ESF systems and components were inspected to verify:
valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actustion on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if
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required by TS or FSAR; and the operability of support systems
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essential to system actuation or performance through observation of
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instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment.
The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, etc.
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Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were folloeing health physics
procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting,
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I etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration.
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Security
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L Each week during routine activities or tours, the inspector
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monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were bei>% impicmented according to their approved security
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plan.
The inspector rioted that persons within the protected area
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displayed proper photo-identification badges and those individuals requiring escorts were properly escorted.
The inspector also l
verified that checked vital areas were locked and alarmed.
l Additionally, the inspector also verified that observed personnel
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and packages entering the protected area were searched by appropriate equipment or by hand.
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d.
Housekeepina and Plant Cleanlineys The inspectes monitored the status of housekeeping and plant
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cleaaliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipeent from intrusion of foreign matter and general protection of equipment from hazards.
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-The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers,
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shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various
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chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review-results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.11.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems (71710}
During the inspection, the. inspectors selected accessible portions of several-ESF systems to verify their status.
Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical Specifications, Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Requirements (LC0ARs), and other applicable
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Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and
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supports; housekeeping; whether freeze protection, was installed and operational; valve positions and conditions; potential ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.; interior conditions of electrical breakers and control panels; whether instrumentation was properly installed and functioning and whether significant process parameter values were consistent with expected values; whether instrumentation was calibrated; whether necessary support systems were operational; and whether locally and remotely indicated breaker and valve positions agreed.
During the inspection, the following ESF components were walked down:
g Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray System *and Diesel Generator
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Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Spray System and Diesel Generator
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station mr.intenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical e
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Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from serd ce; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities wer= =ccomplished using approved procedures'and were
. inspected as applicable; irctional testing and/or calibrations were
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performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control. records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority.is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may af feet system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
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Unit-1 Standby Gas Treatment System-Lubrication and Test of Fans
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1B Instrument Nitrogen Compressor Repair
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Unit 2
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2B Instrument Nitrogen Compressor Repair
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The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified i
that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures and approved work packages, that applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of time.
No violatient or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was
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performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test
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instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation
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accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
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during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate i
management personnel.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
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Unit 1 i
LOS-DG-M3 Diesel Generator. Operability Test LOS-AA-51 Shiftly Surveillance for Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 During a review of LOS-AA-S1, Shiftly Surveillance for Operational
~ Conditions on Unit 1, the inspector noticed minor errors in the
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procedure. These errors were brought to the attention'of the licensee management.
There was no safety significance to the nature of the errors.
The concern was that the operator knew of the errors and no action was taken to correct them.
Unit 2 LIS-LC-401.
Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Main Steam Line Pressure Functional Test LOP-NR-06 Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) Automatic Operation-LTP-1800-14 Whole Core Base Distribution Update i.e. LPRM/ApRM Calibration i
No violations or deviations were identified, i
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7.
Training Ef f ectiveness (41400. 417_0,1)
The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the inspection period.
Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of training.
On October 18, 1990, the inspectors attended the quarterly shift engineer meeting.
Among other topics discussed were the findings of the Zion DET report and the findings of the 1990 INPO operations assessment at LaSalle. Written comments for consideration were requested from all present at the meeting.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Report Review (90713 and 92701)
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for September 1990.
The inspector confirmed that the informction provided met the requirements of Technical Specification.6.6.A.5 and Regulatory uuide 1.16.
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- The inspector also reviewed the following licensee's reports:
LaSalle County station Monthly Plant Status Report for September 1990.
- LaSalle Weekly Pro-Active Management Report
No. violations or deviations were identified.
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Events (93702)
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On September 12, 1990 at 3:05 a.m. (CDT) with Unit 2 at approximately 100'. power, the Unit 2 Nuclear Station Operator (NS0)
was performing operating surveillance LOS-TG-W1, Turbine Generator Weekly Surveillance.
Shortly after the NSO had taken the Generator Regulator Mode transfer switch back to the automatic position, a severe transient a s identified on various generator indications. A few seconds after the NSO noted the variations..the 2E main power transformer B phase differential current relay actuated.
This caused the Unit 2 main generator to lockout causing the main turbine to trip on load reject.
This, in turn, caused the Unit 2 reactor to trip. Scram recovery'was routine and the reactor was shut down and maintained in a stable condition.
There were several pieces of plant equipment that were reviewed for proper performance during the reactor trip and recovery.
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r First, upon receiving the transforner B phase differential curre nt
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trip, the Unit 2E main transformer fire protection deluge actua'ed.
This actuation of the deluge system is expected by design for a phase differential current trip.
Upon receiving the reactor scram, all eight intermediate range monitors (IRMs) were inserted into the core.
The E 1RM full-in indicatior, c1d not illuminate.
The Instrument Maintenance (IM)
Depmment found the IRM detector had been over-driven and stuck in past the full-in position.
The IMs corrected the problem and the E IRM had been cycled several times to assure repeatability without slippage.
During the scram, all' Group 1 safety relief valves ($RVs) actuated and three of the four Group 2 SRV's actuated.
The Group 2 SRV which had not lif ted was investigated for proper relief valve setting.
Proper relief setting and performance were verified.
The reactor _ recirculation (RR) pumps initially downshifted to low speed, as the result of the reactor scram, as designed. At approximately seven minutes after the scram, the 2B RR pump tripped off from low speed. The exact cause for the pump trip could not be determined. The breaker logic, relay contacts, tachometer power supply, and relay diodes were tested satisfactorily.
Successful pump starts into low speed were completed after circuit testing was completed. Because the downshift was successful during the initial event, the primary consideration of an acceptable plant response that does not complicate the transient for the operators was satisfied.
- The cause of this event appears to be a transient that was caused when the operator took the generator regulator mode transfer switch from the manual position back to the auto position.
It appears that this transient caused the B phase current transformer (CT) in the 2E
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main power transformer to short to: ground.
This ground on the CT feeding the differential relay caused the transformer differential relay to trip the generator lockout relay,
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A review of the maintenance history for the affected CT revealed that it had previously been isolated _ due to a _ cuspected ground.
When detailed troubleshooting had been performed during the-subsequent refueling outage,.no problems-could be found with.the CT.
The possibility that the CT could have weakened insulation or other-internal degradation is considered to be feasible.
Once the CT failure started (arcing), the NSO's observations would be expected.
No other apparent cause could be_found.
All systems functioned as' designed. The generator load reject-initiated the proper reactor scram.
The event was consistent with a similar event described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
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On September 20, 1990 all repairs to the transformer had been made
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and the unit was returned to service, b.
On October 1, 1990 the Cycled Condensate Gland Water (CG) Head Tank overflowed resulting in a spill of approximately 100-150 gallons of potentially contaminated water onto the floor and down to the level below. On September 27, 1990, during the afternoon shift, it was discovered that the normal makeup valve to the CG tank was leaking by v.r.en water loads on the tank were reduced.
A high level alarm was received in the Radwaste Control Room (RCR).
A work request was generated to repair the valve.
This information was turned over to the midnight shift Radwaste Operator.
During the turnover between the midnight shift Radwasts Operator and the dayshift, no mention was made concerning the CG head tank level alarm that was in the alarmed state at the time.
The dayshift operator noticed the alarm during panel walkdowns following the shi f t - turr.ove r.
The dayshift operator dispatched another operator to drain the tank level to clear the alarm.
Because water loads on the tank had in:reased, gland water usage was sufficient to compensate for the leakage through the normal makeup valve.
However, this condition was not known to the radwaste personnel at the time.
During the dayshift on September 28, 1990, radwaste m
supervisory personnel wrote in the Radwaste Daily Orders a warning about the CG head tank alarm and possible malfunctions of the level controller.
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On October 1,1990,.during the dayshift, the radwaste equipment condition was changed to reduce the water load on the CG head tank
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causing-the CG head tank level to rise.
The CG head tank level
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No CG head. tank audible or visual alare was observed in the RCR.
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Plant personnel in the area of the CG head tank noticed the tank overflowing and'es11ed the RCR. An operator was dispatched and was able to stop the overflow by closing the manual isolation valves for both the normal and emergency makeup valves.
The reason the alarm
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did not sound has not yet been determined.
r The inspectors toured the cleanup site.
The spilled water had been sampled and found to be uncontaminated.
The water was vacuumed up and the vacuum emptied into a catch basin which was draining through
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noticed that water was backing.up out of the floor drains indicating that the drain piping was clogged. The CG head tank overflow piping
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empties'into this same piping.
If this drain piping had not been
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clogged, it is unknown how long it would have taken until the overflow
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The inspectors also toured the RCR.
It was noticed that a large
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number of work requests existed on RCR panels. A concern was voiced to the licensee about the ability of the operators in the RCR to
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perform their duties with the amount of equipment out-of-service.
The licensee's response was that more attention would be given to the station work requests in the RCR.
The safety significance of the spill itself was minimal.
The greater concern in this event was the poor material condition of the equipment associated with radwaste collection and operation, inadequate turnover practices of the RCR operators, and the inability of the radwaste operators to recognize the potential problem, c.
On October 16, 1990 the control room emergency makeup unit fan auto started during _the performance of response testing and calibration of the control room HVAC air intake radiation monitors. An Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone call was made in a timely manner. The safety significance of the event was minimal.
The root CaJse was an inadequate procedure. An error in the attachment to the procedure, used to record the lifting and lant,ing of electrical leads to prevent the auto start of the fan, caus9d a lead to be landed out of sequence. The error would have caused the fan to auto start when the lead was landed had the fan control switch not been in pull-to-lock. When the control switch was returned to the auto position, without resetting the logic, the fan auto started.
The procedure did not require the control switch to be placed in pull-to-lock, it was done as an added precaution.
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concerns rising from this event are the inadequate review of this
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procedure and the repositioning of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) control switch outside of a procedure without documented control.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. Design Changes and Modification Program (37702)
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The inspectors ascertained that the licensee has.been implemanting a QA program relating to the control of design changes and modifications that is in conformance with regulatory requirements,- commitments in the application, and industry guides and standards.
'During.the inspection it was determined that procedures have been established for control of design and modification change. requests including:
a; idethod for initiating a design or modification change request, f
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Design change' request control form, or equivalent, with provisions
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for documenting completion of required reviews, evaluations, and approvals prior to implementing the change, i'
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Method for assuring that proposed change does not involve an
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unreviewed safety question as described in 10 CFR 50.59 or a change
in the Technical Specifications.
Through discussions with licensee personnel and review of records, 10 CFR
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50.59 safety evaluations and the annual report were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled and safety evaluations were completed properly.
l The following three modification packages were reviewed and it was
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determined that these changes were properly evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.
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M-1-2-88-034 Reactor Recirculating Pumps 2A/B Start Permissive Indicating Lights
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LOSR 90-014 Lest Recirculation Discharge Valve vise Insert
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LOSR 90-019 Unit Startup From LaSalle Unit 2 Third Refueling (L2R03)
Outage Modification M01-1-86-023 Standby 1.iquid Control System under Anticipated
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Transient Without Scram (ATWS) conditions was also reviewed.
The licensee committed to use enriched boron in response to the ATWS rule (10
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CFR 50.62) in letter dated May 24, 1988.
In this response, the licensee states,
" Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) has chosen the enriched boron solution alternative and followed the conditions set forth in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Safety Evaluation of Topical Report l
(NEDE-31096-P), Anticipated Transient Without Scram; Response to NRC ATWS Rule 10 CFR 50.62,_to satisfy the equivalency requirement."
It also states, "The Technical Specifications (TS) will be revised for sampling-of the enriched sodium pentaborate solution in accordance with the BWR Owner's Group recommendations at a later date."
The NRC safety evaluation for the Topical Report NEDE-31096-P states for
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enriched boron solution, " Surveillance and positive verification by periodic testing will be required to assure that the correct isotopic concentration is maintained." Both units have had enriched boron since startup after their second refuel outage and are now well pest their third refuel outage. There have been no TS changes submitted for enriched boron sampling and there has been no testing or procedures developed for isotopic concentration evaluation. The licensee contended that a TS revision was. not required based on previous verbal communications with NRC personnel, however, this had not been documented. This matter has been referred to the appropriate NRR review branch for further
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assessment. This matter is unresolved item 373/90021-01; 374/90022-01(DRP),
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Upon review of the annual report dated January 29, 1990, it was not clear
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whether these reports cover the 10 CFR 50.59 (s)(2) requirements.
Item E " Tests and Experiments Not Covered in the Safety Analysis Report,"
Item F, " Changes to Procedures Covered in the Safety Analysis Report,"
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and Item H,
" Summary of Safety Related Modifications," referenced some i
of the 50.59 criteria. Any change to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) affecting non-safety related items is not covered.
This report in Sections E F and H refers the reader to the monthly reports.
The monthly reports do not address non-safety related changes.10 CFR 50.59 (b)(2) requires the licensee to submit a report as specified in
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Part 50.4, a brief description of the changes including a summary of the i
safety evaluation.
Contrary 10 CFR 50.59, evaluations have not been reported and there has been no. Summary of the applicable safety evaluation provided of those changes that were reported.
In addition, the annual report was sent to the NRC Region III office and not the Document Control Desk in Washington. 0.C. with copies to the Region III office as specified in 10 CFR 50.4.
This is inadequete reporting and contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 (b)(2).
The failure to properly report 10 CFR 50.59 non safety modifications, the failure to provide a safety summary and the incorrect addressing are considered violations.
This is a violation 373/90021-02;374/90022-02(DRP).
It was later determined by review of subsequent monthly performance y
reports and interviews with licensee personnel that adequate corrective
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-action had been taken to correct this matter and prevent recurrene).
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Therefore, no formal response to this violation is necessary.
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'No deviations were identified in this area, however, one unresolved item and one violation were identified.
- 11. - Mainte_ nance Program (62702)
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A survey of maintenance program activities and inspection results was conducted to evaluate the LaSalle Station maintenance program relative to
the proposed NRC maintenance rule. Maintenance programs were discussed i
with the plant manager and various maintenance assessments were reviewed including-SALPs,' inspection reports, monthly plant status reports, the
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Maintenance Team Inspection Report, the 1989 corporate maintenance assessment and the June 1990 Quality Assurance audit. The NRC SAlp
evaluations have-found the maintenance program acceptable in the past and although weaknesses were found, none of the other assessments or trending data contradict this. There are many initiatives in progress including incorporation of a Nuclear Operation Directive (NOD) on the conduct of
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This is a three year effort scheduled for completion in 1991,
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As encouraged by the NRC, the licensee is using industry maintenance
guidelines for the program. Other initiatives involve reliability centered maintenance reviews and the implementation of this information, additional trending reviews, and initiation of Problem Analysis Documentation Sheets (PADS) to resolve maintenance issues. To deal with these initiatives, the staff of the Assistant Superintendent of Maintenance has been increased to approximately 14 people, in the area of Quality Assurance which audits maintenance, the licensee is initiating more performance based daily surveillances and audits.
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In regards to the Maintenance Team Inspection of May 1989, the licensee identified 32 weaknesses / concerns from the inspection report in addition to the violations. To date, corrective actions for the violations and all but eight other issues are reported complete.
The timeliness of completion of some of these initiatives appears long, however, generally on track with the industry and the rulemaking time table set forth by the NRC.
in the review of. monthly plant trends, it was noted that the backlog on non-outage corrective maintenance was trending up above the station goal of 800.
The licensee indicated that application of additional resources including contractor services were planned to address this.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
12. Meetings and Other Activities (30702)
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',$ite Visits by NRC Staff On October 12, 1990 Mr. H. Miller, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and members of his staff, Mr. R. Knop, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 3, and Mr. R. Pulsifer, LaSalle Licensing Project Manager, NRR, visited the site. They attended a presentation by the licensee'on corporate engineering and LaSalle Station Technical Staff organization and performance, toured the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room, and interviewed several-LaSalle Station Technical Staff engineers.
Management / plant Status Meetino A meeting was held on September 18, 1990 between the Station Manager, the NRR Licensing Project Manager (LPM), the Region III Project Director, and members of each of their staffs.
The purpose'of the meeting was for the licensee to provide an update on the status of Units 1-and 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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13. Unresolved Item
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is i
discussed in paragraph 10.
14., Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period on October 19, 1990. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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.L.,
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