IR 05000373/1997017
| ML20203K238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203K232 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-97-17OL, 50-374-97-17OL, NUDOCS 9803050029 | |
| Download: ML20203K238 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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REGION 111 Docket Nes:
50-373;50-374 License Nos:
NPF-11; NPF 18
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Report Nos:
50-373/97017(OL); 50-374/97017(OL)
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Com any r
Facility:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 arid 2 Location:
2601 N. 21st Road Marseilles, IL-61341 Dates:
October 20 - 24,1997; January 21-22,1998 Inspectore:
M. Bielby, Lead Inspector, Rill NRC D. Muller, Reactor Engineer, Rlli NRC Approved b;:
M. Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch Division of Reactor Safety
9903050029 990227 PDR ADOCK 05000373 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 NRC inspection Reports 50-373/97017(OL); 50-374/97017(OL)
This inspection report contains the findings and conclusions from the inspection of the li:ensed reactor operator and senior reactor operator requalification training prorsms. The irn.paction included a review of training administrative procedures; review of wntten and operating
examination material; observation and evaluation of operator performance and licensee evaluators during a requalification operating examination; an assessment of simulator fiilelity; an eva'uation of program controls to assure a systems approach to training; and a revieN of requalification training records. In addition, the inspectors observed routine activities in the control room. The inspectors used the guidance in inspection procedures 71001 and 71707.
Licensed operator requalification programs were generally implemented in accordance with 10 CFR Part 55 requirements.
Control room operators demonstrated appropriate knowledge of plant conditions and
equipment status, proper access control, and proper communications practices.
Crew and operator performance was poor during scenarios, and mcrginal during job
a performance measures (JPMs). Overall communications were inconsistent and sporadic. A lack of attention to emergency operating procedure parameters caused crew failures in the simulator. A number of operators had difficulty with a remote shutdown panel task. (Section 01.2)
Generally, the requalification examination material contained the necessary minimum
quantitative and qualitative attributes to provide an adequate evaluation of operator skills; however, the licensee needed to enhance pre-exam reviews of the examination f
material to ensure consistency of evaluations. (Section 05.2)
Licensee administration and evaluation of scenario performance was good; however,
the inspectors identified several deficiencies for administering and evaluating JPMs, including lack of quality verification and coordination of simulator JPMs. (Section 05.3)
Overall examination material security and control of examinees was good. No potential
examination compromise was identified. (Section 05.3)
The following requalification training program weaknesses were iderrfied: JPMs were
not used, mitigating operator actions based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Final Safety Analysis Report information had not been incorporated, and there were no formal lesson plans for management expectations. (Section 05.4)
Operator license conditions were in conformance with program guidance and regulatory
requirements. (Section 05.5)
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Reoorts Dews I. Operations
Conduct of Operc'lons 01.1 Control Room Obserations a.
IDsoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors noted that both units were shutdown in late September 1996 and remained shutdown throiigh the inspection period with one unit also defueled. The
- nspectors observed routine control room activities, performed panel walk-downs, and questioned operators about plant and equipment status.
b.
Observations and Findings Control rooni operators conducted themselves in a professional manner and were attentive to their respective panelindications. Access control to the main control room area and verbal communication practbes were consistent with management expectations and guidelines. The control room noise level was minimal and no annunciator alarms were left unattended or in a prolonged alarm state. Upon
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questionlog by the inspectors, the operators demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of plant conditions and equipment status, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that an appropriate level of awareness ex'sted in the control room to ensure safe and effective control of the plant and associated systems, 01.2 Ooeratcr Performance - Ooerating Examination a.
Insoection Scone (71001. 71707)
The inspectors observed the performance of two operating crews during the requalification examination. Each crew consisted of four licensed operators and one licenseo shift technical advisor (STA). Each operating examination cone!sted of routine and emergency activities evaluated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, three simulator Job Performance Mensures (JPMs) and ' - inplant JPMs.
b.
Observations and Finalngs Overall, the dynamic scenario performance of both crews was poor based on failure of at least one critical task in one of two scenarios. During routine activities, including the performance of surveillance testing and normal reactor power changes, both crews performed well. They demonstrated good self and peer checking techniques. Although crew briefs were gt-nerally timely and concise during abnormal and emergency
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operations, crew and individual performance was poor, Overall communications were inconsistent and sporadic. Sometimes orders were concise. other times they were lengthy. Sometimes repeatbacks or acknowledgments were dropped. However, the inspectors observed that the operators requested repeatbacks when they were dropped.
Although crew briefs were generally concle and timely, there were instances when they were untimely, and the unit supervisor (US) didn't wait for a complete crew response before the brief was started. Half of the operators received evaluation comments for various types of poor communications.
Command and control was considered pom at times because a lack of attention to major Emergency Oner* ting Procedure (FOP) parameters resulted in unsatisfactory crew performance. One crew was evaluated as unsatisfactory because they failed to direct emergen"y depressurization (ED) prior to drywell temperature exceeding 340 degrees Fahrenheit (F). The crew had correctly diagnosed increasing drywell temperature early in the event due to an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS),
and steam break with main steam isolation valves isolated. However, they did not remain cognizant of the increasing drywell temperature. Another crew was evaluated as unsatisfactory because they failed to direct ED after a loss of coc'. ant accident concurrent with loss of high pressure feedwater when reactor water level reached the top of active fuel,161 inches. ED was eventually directed after reactor water level reached -192 inches.
Basic individual operator diagnostic skills wero marginal. Example, w luded: failure to terminate and prevent feedwater injectan when required, failure to identify standby liquid control pump was running with no injection, failure to identify a residual heat removal (RHR) pump was running with no injection, and failure to restore control rod drive pump to operation when required. Only one licensed operator on each crew was evaluated as satisfactory in both scenarios.
Overall operator performance of JPMs was marginal, although some deficiencies could be attributable to the poor JPM quality verification and coordination, and a lack of JPM training (see Sections 05.3 and 05.4). One inplant JPM required the operator to obtain jumpers from the EOP locker. One operator could not find the actual inplant control room EOP locker; however, he noted that the simulator control room EOP locker was located in a different place.
A majority of the operator performance deficiencies were identified during performance of simulator JPM, S-RX-08, Revision 3," Shutdown of Suppression Pool Cooling, Startup B Residual Heat Removal in Shutdown Cooling," from the simulator remote shutdown panel (RSP). During performance of this JPM, the operators demonstrated poor operating practices and decision making. One of the initial conditions noted that control power had been transferred to the RSP. However, several of the RSP control power supply transfer switches were in the incorrect " NORMAL," vice " EMERGENCY,"
position. The,xse of these switches being in the incorrect position was to support the other JPMc (M.?re being conducted simultaneously from the simulator control room panels. One of the effects of the emergency transfer switches being out of position was that RSP reactor pressure and reactor water level could not receive inputs
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from the " actual" simulator control room parameters. The RSP reactor weter level had -
g been " frozen" at approximately 52 inches. A majority of the operators who performed i
the JPM were confused by the discrepancy between the JPM initial conditions and the actual RSP control power transfer switch positions of some switches. Regardless, the following performance issues were identified:
Only some of the operators questioned the position discrepancy of the RSP i
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control power switches.
The associated JPM procedure required reactor pressure to be less than 100
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psig prior to starting RHR in shutdown cooling mode (SDC). One operator
ignored the reacter pressure requirement altogether. Although ihe licensee had j
not intended for the operators to reposition any of the RSP control power transfer
switches, another operator repositioned the associated RSP reactor water level and pressure indication switch, and observed that RSP reactor pressure
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indicated 120 psig. Regardless, the operater still placed B RHR in SDC.
Although not originally part of the JPM, another operator observed the indicated i
e RSP reactor water level indication decrease from 52 to 5 inches while
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i suppression poollevel increased from 1 to 3 inches. The enluator cued the operator that reactor water level remained greater than 50 inches; however, the operator never questioned the suppression poollevel increase.
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While placing B RHR in SDC and adjusting the flowrate using valve "-F053B,"
i RSP flow indication became very erratic. The operator observed the flow but took no immediate action, such as tripping the pump, due to unexpected system response.
One of the initial cues identified that RHR system venting was amplete;
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however, one operator directed venting anyway.
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c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that both crews and individuals demonstrated poor
performance during abnormal and emergency plant operation during dynamic simulator i
scenarios. Additionally, during performance of JPMs, the inspectors observed a lack of procedural adherence, lack of questioning attitude, and unfamiliarity at performing JPMs. The inspectors concluded that the identified poor Operator performance needs improvement.
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Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Operatina History a.
lasoection Scoce (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the following to assess the licensed operator requalification training program's effectiveness regarding operator performance:
SALP 13 repot1 No. 50-373/374 96001.
- Resident inspector reports covering the time frame of 1996 through 1997.
- Licensee evu ' reports covering the time frame of 1996 through 1997.
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Licensed operator requalification inspection results contained in NRC integrated
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inspection report No. 50-373/374 96005.
High Intensity Training (HIT) Program inspection report No. 50-373/374 97014.
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b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors noted that operator performance errors as documented in the above reports were attributable, !n part, to a lack of procedural adherence and inadequate procedures. The inspectors noted that the licensee was continuing to take actions to improve operator performance pertaining to procedure usage. The licensee's action items centered around procedure use and compliance, and overall procedure development. Additional licensee efforts to identify, correct, and improve overall operator performance included implementation of the HIT Program in March 1997. The program rigorously implemented high standards for measuring crew performance during evaluations of dynamic simulator scenarios and resulted in the identification of additional operator performance deficiencies for emergency plan classification and reporting, command and control, ano.ommunications. However, the written examinations were of marginal quality, and the JPMs were not used to evaluate individual operator performance of safety significant tasks, c.
Conclusions Based on past inspection reports, the inspectors concluded that licensed operator requalification training had not been effective at reducing operator performance errors due to procedural adherence and inadequate procedures. The HIT program was effective at correcting some operator performance deficiencies; however, the combination of a marginal written examination and a lack of JPM usage decreased the effectiveness of an overall evaluation of individual operator knowledge and performance ability for important safety significant tasks. As a result, the licensee continued to correct recurring operator performance issues through its licensed operator requalification tiaining program.
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05.2 Reaualification Examination Material
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inspection Scope (71001)
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The in_spectors reviewed the written and operating examination material using the
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Appendix A checklists in Inspection Procedure 71001 = This review hcluded a
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- comparison of dynamic scenarios, written questions, and JPMs witt previously
administered examinations.-
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- Obaarvations and Findinas L
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L Overall, the scenarios were challenging, used integrated and rstated events, contained
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an adequate number of malfunctions after EOP entry, and did not repeat tasks between
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scenarios or JPMs. However, inconsistencies were identified between: the listed objectives and scenario content, and the identification and evaluation of scenario
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events.
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Some scenario guides listed emergency event classification as an objective while other p
scenarios required the classification, but omitted it as an objective, in one case, the objectives listed in the scenario guido did not match the events and expected operator
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actions,
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Some of the scenario guides omitted significant expected operator actions, such as
Inhibiting the Automatic Depressurization System, entering specific EOP procedures, or placing the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) in pull-to-lock prior
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to ED Operator performance could not always be evaluated, as listed in the scenario
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guide, because the associated events did not require verifiable operator actions. For
example, operator performance could not be evaluated for events with ADS responses that occurred as expected. Conversely, operator performance could have been i
evaluated if a mitigating action would have been required due to a failure of the
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automatic response. Sometimes the evaluation of individual operator competencies-listed in the scenario was lost because of the rapid sequencing of events. For example,
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j one sconario identified operator actions for entering Technical Specification (TS)
Limiting Condition for Operation for main steam tunnel delta-T inoperable, high drywell
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air temperature, and a loss of 136X switchgear. However, due to the rapid sequencing
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of these events, the operators never opened the TSs and the operators ability to use the
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. TSs was not ovaluated in that scenario. Several events were " double counted." For example, scenario Opexam 18A counts a loss of Station Auxiliary Transformer event as
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- a malfunction, a post EOP failure, and a major transient.'. Additionally, one scenario did not identify a critical task. Scenario Opexam 38A contained an ATWS event. The
success path required operator 'ction to insert control rods, but the action was not
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identified as a critical task.
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1The written examination was operationally oriented. Both the open reference and static g
examination portions had an adequate level of difficulty and sampling of topics. The.
L static portion made good use of the simulator to answer questions. Approximately a -
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' third of the open reference examination contained questions that could be considered
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" direct lookup" because the answers were taken directly from procedural steps or j
cautions.
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l The JPMs identified appropriate critical steps and termination criteria required for l
successful completion. Generally, the JPM difficulty level was appropriate; however,
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one of the JPMs only required event classification for a degraded DC power division in cold shutdown. The inspectors considered the JPM difficulty too low because it was almost a direct lookup. Another JPM initiating cue directed the operator to initiate shutdown cooling and establish a cooldown rate (CDR) not to exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit per hour (F/hr). However, the JPM did not contain criteria for establishing or
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maintaining the CDR. As a result, licensee evaluators terminated the JPM after f
operator; merely noted they would establish a CDR of 100 degrees F/hr without demonstrating the ability, or understanding, for establishing and maintaining the CDR.
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Conclusions i
The inspectors concluded that, in general, the requahtication examination material
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contained the necessary minimum quantitative and qualitative attributes to provide an adequate evaluation of operator skills. The inspectors determined that the licensee
needed to enhance pre-exam reviews of the examination material to ensure consistency of evaluatient, j
05.3 Reoualification Examination Administration and Evaluation Practices a.
Insoection Scoce (71001)
i The inspectors observed the licensee administer operating examinations and evaluated
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two operating crews' and individuals' performance during dynamic simulator scenarios and JPMs. Each crew consisted of five licensed operators including an STA. Each
j crew member was required to perform in two dynamic scenarios and a set of five JPMs.
l The inspectors attended the evaluator critiques of crew and individual operator performance after completion of the dynamic scenarios.
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Observations and Findinos
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Licensee evaluations of JPM performance was not complete at the conclusion of the
examination week. However, the licensee's evaluation team identified unsatisfactory l
performance by both operating crews and 8 of 10 operators during the simulator scenarios. After observing four dynamic simulator scenarios, the licensee evaluators noted the following deficiencies in operator performance: (1) inconsistent use of 3-legged communications, (2) poor command and control by the USs and STAS for not monitoring all significant EOP parameters, and (3) poor diagnostic skills (see Section 01.2 for further details). The inspectors agreed with the evaluations and noted that recommended remedial actions were being documented to deal with the deficiencias.
During the exit treeting, the licensee identified corrective actions to improve operator diagnostic skills through future requalification training.
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The inspectors observed several deficiencies during the licensee's cdministration of JPMs, including: inappropriate scheduling and coordination of JPMs, one case of a JPM evaluator repositioning switches during administration of a JPM, inconsistent evaluator cuing, and non-uniform test conditions due to a lack of established methods for control of plant parameters by the simulator operator. Additionally, some operator performance issues were not identified by the licensee evaluators.
A large number of the JPM administration deficiencies were identified during performance of JPM, S-RX-08, Revision 3, entitled," Shutdown of Suppression Pool Cooling, Stare i Residual Heat Removal in Shutdown Cooling," from the simulator remote shutos
. panel. During performance of this JPM, the operators were forced into poor operating practices and decision making, primarily due to inappropriate quality verification and concurrent performance of the JPM with other simulator control room JPMs that affected reactor water level and pressure as illustrated by the following observationa:
One of the JPM initial conditions noted that control power had been transferred
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to the remote shutdown panel; however, several of the remote shutdown panel control power supply transfer switches were in the incorrect * NORMAL," vice
" EMERGENCY," control power position to support the other JPMs that were being conducted simultaneously.
On one occasion, after an operator questioned the evaluator about the switch
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position discrepancy, the evaluator inappropriately repositioned an emergency control power supply switch to the " EMERGENCY" position. This action resultod in unplanned parameter indications for reactor water level and pressure.
After a licensee evaluator inappropriately repositioned the emergency control
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power supply switch, reactor pressure came on scale and indicated 120 psig.
Regardless, the operator continued on with the JPM, and the licensee evaluator failed to document poor operator performance based on a procedural requ!rement that reactor pressure be less than 100 psig for starting RHR in SDC.
Simulator JPM steps did not match the simulator procedure steps for LOA-RX-
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101, Revision 7, because the simulator procedure was out of revision.
On one occasion, the inspectors observed reactor water level indication
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decrease from 50 to 5 inches due to the reactor water level and pressure indication emergency control power supply switch being placed in the
"EMERGENCT position; however, the licensea could not explain a ccncurrent suppression pool level increase from 1 to 3 inches.
During the initial performance of simulator JPM, S-RI-09 Revision 4,
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" inadvertent Initiation of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)," RCIC could not be re-aligned for normal operation because the simulator malfunction still had an initiation signalinserted.
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Another weakness observed during JPM administration was inconsistent cuing by the
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JPM evalustors. There were ei amples of both good and poor cues. One example of a
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good cue was:
The inspectors observed an operator direct another operator in the field to vent i
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the RHR system that had been identified as completed in the JPM initial conditions. The evaluator (acting as the field operator) communicated back,"So, you want me to perform those steps again?" The operator then reviewed the
initial conditions and realized his error.
The poor cues observed by the inspectors generally provided information that either was not specifically asked for or did not eccurately represent system response. Examples of those poor cues included:
While placing B RHR In SDC and adjusting the flowrate using valve "-F053B",
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RSP flow indication became very erratic, The operator observed the flow, but trok no immediate action such as tripping the pump. After it was clear that the oprator was not going to take action, the evaluator told the operator that flow was 6000 - 7000 gpm (normal), instead of evaluating the operator's response.
In order to verify that no reactor recirculation pumps (RRPs) were running,
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operators requested jet pump delta pressures. On two different occasions, instead of providing the readings and letting the operator decide if the RRPs i
were running, the evaluator told the operator that "...no RRPs are running."
During performance of an inplant JPM for venting of a scram air header, en one
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occasion the evaluator cued the operator that the scram air header was venting and the hydraulic control unit accumulators were discharging even though the
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vent path 1 solation valve was still closed.
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The inspectors observed inconsistent control of plant parameters by the simulator operator. During the conduct of simulator JPMs, plant conditions were different for
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operators performing the same JPM. Plant conditions were dependent upon how long the simulator had been out of " freeze " and which JPMs were in progress. For example, during the conduct of JPM, S-RI-09, RCIC was to be secured after inadvertent initiation.
One operator experienced reactor water (evol decrease from 60 to 10 inches in about 15 minutes. The opetator was distracted by various low reactor water level alarms and engineered safety function actuations. Annther operator that performed the same JPM -
had reactor water level remain steady at 60 inchesi During performance of remote shuidown panel JPM, S-RX-08, some operators observed cupprecslon pool level and reactor water level remained steady. For other operators, reactor water level decreased
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and suppression poollevelincreased, which Indicated a possible reactor to suppression pool drain path. Due to the lack of a good quality verification and coordination of
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simulator JPMs, operator evaluations were inconsistent, and made it c'ifficult to identify the root cause for poor performance.
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Appropriate security measures were taken throughout the examination process.
Individual operators were sequestered and separated into appropriate groups during each portion of the examination process and examination material was well controlled.
No potential examination compromise was identified.
One new simulator fidelity issue was identified during the examination observation (See Enclosure 2, Simulation Facility Report),
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Conclusions Licensee evaluziors did a good job of documenting and evaluating both strong and weak scenario performance based on critical tasks and competencies. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's evaluations of satisfactory and unsatisfactory scenario performance.
The inspectors identified several deficiencies for adminir.tering JPMs. Tne quality verification and coordination of simulator JPMs led to inconsistent operator evaluation.e.
Licensee evaluators cuing was sometimes inappropriate. At times, licensee evaluators and operators were unfamiliar with the JPM format.
Overall examination material security and control of examinees was good. No potential examination compromise was identified.
05.4 Reaualification Training Program Deficiencies a.
Insoection Scoge (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the following training materials for quality and content, in accordance with the checklists contained in Appendix A of IP 71001:
The JPM exam bat k
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Examination sample plans
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Training schedules
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Annual operating tests administered during the current cycle
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ACMI, Revision 13 " Administration and Course Management Instruction for
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Licensed Operator Requalification Program" Licensee interviews.
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b.
Opservations and Findings Several deficiencies were noted in the overall content of the requalification training program, which included: (1) the infrequent conduct of JPMs during the training
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program, (2) the lack of a formal incorporation of PRA into the training program, and (3)
- he lack of formalized training and examinatio,. un management expectations, conduct of operations, and use of administrative. procedures.
During interviews with training staff, and based upon reviews of the licensee's requalification training procedere ACMI, Revision 13 " Administration and Course Management Instruction for Licensed Operator Requalification Program", ths inspectors determined that the licensee only conducted JPMs during the licensed operator annual operating examination. JPMs were not used during the remainder of the requalification training program. The inspectors considered the lack of training JPMs as a program weakness for three reasons: (1) operators did not receive individual training and evaluation on many safety significant tasks, (2) operators were not as well prepared for the JPM fccmat of the annual operating examination, and (3) the training staff was not as well prepared to administer the JPM format. The trairang staff asserted that a suff,cient number of safety-related tasks were performed during dynamic simulator training exercisas; however, based on the inspector's observation of operator performance and licensee evaluations during JPM administration (Sections 01.2 and 05.3) that assertion was not supported. The licensee acknowledged at the exit meeting that they will be incorporating JPM type tasks on an individual operator basis during the course of the next requalification training period.
The licensee acknowledged a lack of formal incorporation of PRA into the requalification program. In addition, operator actions identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as important to mitigating accidents also had not been incorporated into requalification training. At the time of this inspection, the licensee had completed a review, and prepared lesson plans and scenarios, to incorporate PRA and FSAR information into the next requalificatioq training cycle.
The inspectors also identified a lack of formalincorporation of training on conduct of operations, management expectations, and use of administrative procedures into the requalification training program. These topic areas contained no formal lesson plans or I.,rning objectives, and were infrequently trained and examined on during requalification training. They were trained on as a part of 'he HIT program; however, they were not incorporated into the licensed operator requalifics.tlon training program.
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Conclusions The licensed operator requalification training program has deficiencies that require attention. The lack of performing and evaiuating JPMs during normal requalification training can explain the poor operator performance and licensee evaluations on JPMs observed by the inspectors. The requalification training program was weak in that PRA and FSAR information and management expectations were not incorporated
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4 05.5 Conformance with Ooerator License Conditions a.
Insoection Scooe (71001)-
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. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's medical and operator qualification programs, and
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selected records to assess licensed operator compliance with regulatory requirements.
This review included a sampling (10 percent) of the available medical records.
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Observations and Findings The licensee maintained a copy of individual medical records at their corporate facility.
The inspectors determined the records contained appropriate documentation to validate operator qualifications to perform license duties. No physical examination dates
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exceeded the program-allowed date and no violation of regulatory requirements were identified.
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Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that the operators' license conditions were in conformance with orogram guidance and regulatory requirements stated in 10 CFR Part 55.53 and 10 CFR Part 55.21.
VI. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee mar:agement on February 3,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials held by the inspectors following the inspection could be considered proprietary. No proprietary :nformation was identified.
Attachment: Simulation Facility Report i
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- n PARTIAL tslST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Comed D. Farr, Operations Manager R. Fischer, License Requal Training G. Kaegl, Operations Training Supedntend67t
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D. O'Rourke, Corporate BWR Tralnh.g Supe visor H. Pontious, Regulatory Assurance -
W. Subalusky, Vice President Training NBC M. Huber, Senior Resident inspector LcSalle
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INSPECTION PitOCEDURES USED IP 71001," Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation" IP 71707, " Plant Operations" lTEMS OPENEU, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED None T.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram CDR Cooldown Rate DRS Division of Reactor Safety EOP Emergency Operating Procedure ED Emergency Depressurizailon FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
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HIT High Intensity Trainlog _
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JPM Job Performance Measure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR NRC Puolic Document Room PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RSP Remote Shutdown Pane l RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR Residual Heat Removal
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i RRP Reactor Recirculation Pump SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
STA Shift Technical Advisor TS Technical Specification
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.0 Attachment 1
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SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT-
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Facility Licensee: LaSalle Unit 1 and 2 '
Facility Licensee Dockets No: 50-373/375 Operating Tests Administered: October 22 24,1997
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This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, Indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or
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approval of the simulation facility other than to pravide information that may be used in future
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= evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
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While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed t
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(il none, so state):
IIEM DESCRIPTION B RHR SDC flow adjustment During performance of JPM, S RX-08, Revision 3, from the RSP.
" Shutdown of Suppression Pool Cooling. Startup B Residual Heat Removal in Shutdown Cw.ing," from the simulator RSP, RHR SDC flow became erratic while adjusting the flowrate using valve "-F053B."
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