IR 05000373/1998016

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Insp Repts 50-373/98-16 & 50-374/98-16 on 980626-0706.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observations of Crew Performance During Dynamic Simulator Requalification Exam
ML20236T799
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/23/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236T798 List:
References
50-373-98-16, 50-374-98-16, NUDOCS 9807290022
Download: ML20236T799 (9)


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.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlli

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Docket Nos:

50'-373; 50-374 License Nos:

NPF-11; NPF-18 Report Nos:

50-373/98016(DRS); 50-374/98016(DRS)

Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)

Facility:

LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2

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. Location:

2601 (! orth 21st Road '

Marseilles, IL 61341 Dates:

June 26-July 6,1998 '

Inspector:

D.' S. Muller, Reactor Engineer

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Approved by:

. Melvyn Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch

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Division of Reactor Safety-

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-9907290022 980723 l

PDR ADOCK 05000373 j.-

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Reports 50-373/98016; 50-374/98016 This inspection included three major elements: (1) observations of crew performance during dynamic simulator requalification examinations, (2) a review of licensee documents associated with the operator train'ing portion of the licensee's restart action plan, and (3) a review of the licensee's reactivity manipulation plan for operators with contingent licenses.

. Operator performance in the simulator had improved over the last 18 months. This

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assessment was based on the licensee's use of consistent evaluation standards and challenging examinations with significantly increased pass rates. The performance improvement in staff crews was not as marked as for the operating crews. (Section j

04.1)

The licensee's efforts to improve operator training, and conduct additional training as

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part of its restart action plan have been good. As discussed in section 04.1, there was an indication that over the past 18 months operator performance had improved. This was an indication of the effectivene s of the restart action plan's additional training. The i

licensee's significant events and startup training, which was still in progress, was

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appropriate prior to plant restart. The licensee's evaluation of operator performance in j

the simulator was critical and thorough. The licensee's activities were adequate to address the related NRC Restart Action Plan 0350, item C.3.3.c, effectiveness of control

room simulator training. (Section 05.1)

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The reactivity manipulation plan was properly developed and was consistent with NRC

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policy. The decision not to use non-licensed operators to perform reactivity manipulation during the initial criticality and plant heat up demonstrated an appropriate j

safety focus. Due to the relatively large number of significant reactivity manipulations i

and an appropriate manipulation plan, it appeared that the three operators with contingent licenses should satisfy their reactivity manipulation requirements based on the planned restart of unit 1. The licensee's activities were adequate to address the related NRC Restart Action Plan 350, item C.3.3.a, licensed operator staffing meets requirements and licensee goals. (Section 05.2)

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Report Details Background information Late in 1996, the licensee initiated an independent self assessment (ISA), which included a review of operating crew performance and training effectiveness. The ISA concluded, in pad, that operator performance and training effectiveness required significant improvements. The results of the ISA were one of the chief reasons that the facility entered an extended outage, which began late in 1996 and was ongoing at the time of this report. The licensee initially responded to the training and crew performance issues by developing startup readiness training (SRT). SRT was a three-week program which provided training on systems, procedures, management expectations, and standards. During the conduct of SRT, the licensee determined that the initial crews evaluated in the program demonstrated performance significantly below management expectations.

Based on the substandard initial crew performance SRT was halted, and evaluations were conducted in April of 1997. These evaluations were conducted on all the control room crews, to determine the extent of crew performance deficiencies. During these evaluations, additional crew performance deficiencies were observed. Based on these additional crew deficiencies, SRT was modified into a new program, entitled high intensity training (HIT).

The HIT program was a two-week program, which commenced on May 19,1997, and concluded on September 17,1997, for all licensed operators at the facility. Additional details about the HIT program can be found in NRC inspection report numbers 50-

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373/97014 (DRS); 50-374/97014 (DRS) and in the licensee's docketed restart action plan. In general, the NRC report concluded that the HIT program was an effective training program.

A summary of operator performance during SRT and HIT evaluations was as follows (for control room crews only):

  1. Ooerators # Simulator Exam Failures
  1. Written Exam Failures (Crew)-

(Individuals)

SRT Evaluations

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N/A l

HIT WEEK 1:

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7 HIT WEEK 2:

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6 licenses were terminated as a result of HIT week 1.

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37 individuals required short term remediation as a result of HIT and SRT.

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9 individuals required long term remediation as a result of hit and SRT.

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i L Operations

Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Crew Dynamic Simulator Performance a.

Inspection Scone (NUREG 1021)

l During the inspection period the inspector observed the performance of four different crews of licensed operators during dynamic simulator evaluations. The inspector also

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reviewed licerisee records of earlier crew evaluations, b.

Observations and Findings Each observed crew consisted of a shift manager, shift technical assistant, unit supervisor, unit nuclear station operator (NSO), and two assistant NSOs. The NSOs were licensed reactor operators. The shift manager, shift technical assistant, and unit supervisor were licensed senior reactor operators. Two of the crews observed were operating crews that routinely performed licensed duties in the control room. The two remaining crews were staff crews, composed of individuals who were normally assigned administrative duties.

Three of the observed crews performed satisfactorily. Minor weaknesses were observed in these crews' performances in the areas of communications and command and control. These crews generally demonstrated good procedural usage, and proper and timely responses to off normal conditions. In addition, these crews generally performed emergency operating procedures correctly, and properly mitigated the consequences of significant accidents.

One observed staff crew's performance was unsatisfactory. During a scenario involving an anticipated transient without scram, communications, control board operations, command and control, and procedure use were poor. Specifically, during this scenario the unit NSO lost control of reactor water level such that reactor water level dropped below the bottom of active fuel, and remained below the bottom of the fuel for 10 minutes. The unit supervisor failed to enter the reactor vessel flooding procedure. With water level below the bottom of the fuel and reactor vessel flooding not entered, inadequate core cooling occurred for approximately 10 minutes.

Prior to the inspection period, five crews had completed dynamic simulator evaluations.

Three operating crews passed the examination, one staff crew passed with remediation, and one staff crew failed the examination. Although all the operating crews passed, one operator on one of the operating crews failed the examination individually. For the three operating crews which passed the examination, the licensee's evaluations included minor weaknesses in communications and procedure usage. For the staff crew which

passed with remediation, all of the scenario critical tasks were completed satisfactorily.

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However, this crew had problems with controlling reactor water level, procedural I

adherence, communications, and command and control. For the staff crew which failed

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its examination, the crew did not perform the critical task of initiating an emergency depressurization when the plant radioactive release rate exceeded the general emergency level. Additionally, other deficiencies identified by the licensee included:

significant delays in responding to off normal events, difficulties with emergency operating procedure adherence, weaknesses in communications, and weaknesses in command and control.

Based on consistent evaluation standards and challenging exams, lower operating crew failure rates indicated that operator performance had improved over the last 18 months.

SRT had a 55% failure rate of dynamic simulator exams for operating crew members.

The failure rate for operating crew members during dynamic simulator exams was subsequently 17% during HIT week 1,24% during HIT week 2, and 7% during the current series of evaluations.

The inspector identified that staff crew performance had not improved in a manner comparable to the performance improvements noted with the operating crews. The majority of examination failures over the past 18 months appeared to be concentrated among staff crew personnel.

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Conclusions Operator performance in the simulator had improved over the last 18 months. This assessment was based on the licensee's use of consistent evaluation standards and challenging examinations with significantly increased pass rates. The performance improvement in staff crews was not as marked as for the operating crews.

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Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Eggtart Action Plan - Ooerator Trainina a.

Insoection Scoce (MC 0350)

- The inspector reviewed licensee documents and discussed the restart action plan concerning operator training with station personnel. The inspector reviewed and observed a portion of the licensee's significant events and start up training. The inspector also observed the licensee's evaluation techniques during dynamic simulator evaluations.

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Observations and Findinas The objective of the operator training portion of the licensee's restart action plan was to establish operator readiness to support safe unit restart and power operation by implementing a focused operator training program. The operator training portion of the licensee's restart action plan consisted of the following eleven major steps:

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Desenption p

6.1.1

' Define the training content (HIT).

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Develop the training schedule (HIT).

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' Develop the training program (HIT).

6.1.4 Implement the HIT program.

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6.1.5 Implement operator evaluations, and determine operator remediation: no remediation, short term remediation, or l

long term remediation (HIT).

6.1.6 Complete the HIT program, following incorporation of feedback and lessons leamed.

L 6.1.7 Identify requirements for significant events training.

L 6.1.8 ldentify requirements for start up training.

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6.1.9 Complete the significant events and startup training.

l 6.1.10 Evaluate training effectiveness.

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6.1.11 Training effectiveness results presented and accepted by senior station management.

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L Following the completion of the HIT program, the program was evaluated for training l-

. effectiveness. This review was accomplished by four methods: (1) operator feedback

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of the HIT program was reviewed, (2) the HIT exam results were reviewed, (3) a

. licensee self assessment of the HIT program's effectiveness was conducted, and (4) a

. group of independent nuclear industry peers conducted an assessment of the HIT program. Based on the findings of the above four methods, the licensee concluded that

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the HIT program was an effective training program.

L The inspector determined the licensee's evaluations of crew and individual performance L

in the simulator continued to be comprehensive and critical. Operation's department

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L management was directly involved in the evaluations. The inspector did not identify any significant additional performance deficiencies.

During the inspection period, significant' events and start up training was in progress.

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l-The development of this training, which occurred prior to the inspection period, l~

. completed action steps 6.1.7 and 6.1.8. Significant events and startup training was a

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one week course, consisting of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of simulator training and 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of classroom instruction.' Classroom instruction topics included: reactor theory, various industry

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- events, reactivity control systems, emergency operating procedure changes, and L_

technical specification changes. Simulator training was on plant startup activities, j;

including control rod withdrawals to criticality, plant heat up, main turbine roll and L

synchronization, and' power ascension. Significant events and start up training started

. June 8,1998, and is scheduled for completion on July 17,1998.- The inspector determined this training was appropriate.

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Conclusions i

The licensee's efforts to improve operator training, and conduct additional training as j

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part of its restart action plan have been good. As discussed in section 04.1, there was i

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an indication that over the past 18 months operator performance had improved. This was an indication of the effectiveness of the restart action plan's additional training. The licensee's significant events and startup training, which was still in progress, was appropriate prior to plant restart. The licensee's evaluation of operator performance in the simulator was critical and thorough. The licensee's activities were adequate to address the related NRC Restart Action Plan 0350, item C.3.3.c, effectiveness of control room simulator training.

L 05.2-Reactivity Manipulation Plan

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Inspecc icone (MC 0350)

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-The inspecter reviewed licensee documents and discussed with licensee personnel the implementation and scheduling of reactivity manipulations for the three operators y

granted licenses contingent on their performance of reactivity manipulations.

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Observations and Findinas

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Three licensee documents were reviewed conceming reactivity manipulations. The first L

document was a memo drafted by training department personnel, addressed to plant I'

management personnel.and to the three operators with contingent licenses. This memo provided guidance on how to conduct and document the completion of the operators'

o l-reactivity manipulations. The guidance provided in this memo was consistent with NRC policy for conducting proper reactivity manipulations for trainees.

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The second document reviewed was the facility's projected schedule of activities for unit I

1 restart and power ascension. The unit 1 restart and power ascension schedule contained approximately eight significant reactivity manipulations, utilizing diverse control systems, with each manipulation extending over multiple shifts.

~ The third document reviewed was the plan for the three operators' reactivity manipulations. The plan identified when significant power changes were projected to occur, described the manipulations, and assigned the operators to the manipulations.

L The reactivity manipulation plan was consistent with the power ascension schedule.

L The initial criticality and reactor heat up will not be performed by any of the three operators.

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Conclusions b

The reactivity manipulation plan was properly developed and was consistent with NRC-

policy. The decision not to use non-licensed operators during the initial criticality and

~ lant heat up demonstrated an appropriate safety focus. Due to the relatively large p

number of significant reactivity manipulations and an appropriate manipulation plan, it appeared that the three operators with contingent licenses should satisfy their reactivity manipulation requirements based on the planned restart of unit 1. The licensee's

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I activities were adequate to' address the related NRC Restart Action Plan

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0350, item C.3.3.a, licensed operator staffing meets requirements and licensee goals.

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V.' Manaaement Meetings t

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion ~of the inspection on July 6,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings

_ presented. No proprietary infonisation was identified during the inspection or the exit meeting.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED-Licensen F. Dacimo, Site Vice President

. D. Farr, Operations Manager G. Kaegl, Operations Training Superintendent

.T. O' Connor, Station Manager

' H. Pontius, Acting Regulatory Assurance Manager D. Sanchez, Training Manager NBC M. Huber, Senior Resident inspector M. Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, Region lli INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED NUREG 1021:

Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Interim Rev.8 IP 71001:

Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened None Cl0 Sed None Discussed None

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