IR 05000272/1988016

Insp Repts 50-272/88-16 & 50-311/88-16 on 880712-0822. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Including,Operational Safety Verification,Surveillance, Maint,Radiological Controls & Overtime Policy

ML18093B162
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	09/08/1988
From:	Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18093B160	List: IR 05000272/1988016 ML18093B158 ML18093B161
References
50-272-88-16, 50-311-88-16, NUDOCS 8809220315
Download: ML18093B162 (19)

Text

Report No License No Licensee:

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272/88-16 50-311/88-16 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:

July 12, 1988 - August 22, 1988 Inspectors:

Approved by:

R. W. Borchardt, Senior Resident Inspector K. Halvey Gibson, Resident Inspector N. F. Dudley, Project Engineer

~itz, S diation Specialist. Swetland, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:

Inspections on July 12, 1988 - August 22, 1988 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/88-16 and 50-311/88-16)

Areas Inspected:

Routine inspections of plant operations including:

operational safety verification, surveillance, maintenance, radiological controls, overtime policy, EOP review, Post Accident Sampling System followup, review of licensee event reports, and followup on outstanding inspection item Results:

Inadequate maintenance and procedure implementation with regard to the post accident sampling system is cited as a violation in this report (paragraph 9).

Also, paragraph 3 discusses a weakness in the licensee's program for review of surveillance test results and identification of defective equipmen Radiological controls preparations for the Unit 2 refueling ~utage were found to be adequate (paragraph 5).

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.

Operational Safety Verification_ (71707, 71709, 71881, 93702) Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, inspections were conducted to verify that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement The licensee's management control system was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and review of facility record The licensee's compliance with the radiological protection and security programs was also verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedures 71707, 71709 and 71881 and included weekend and backshift inspection.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2. Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the majority of the report period except as discussed belo On July 12, the licensee declared an unusual event and began preparations for a unit shutdown after the lC safeguard equipment control (SEC) system cabinet developed an auto test fault that could not be rese Technical Specifications (T.S.) require that the unit be placed in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after 1 of the 3 SECs become inoperabl The emergency classification guide requires that an unusual event be declared when a unit shutdown is required by a T.S. action statemen Repairs were completed and the unusual event terminated before the shutdown was commence On August 20, an Unusual Event was declared and a Salem Unit 1 reactor shutdown commenced due to exceeding ihe Technical Specification limiting condition for operation for No. 12 charging pump (high head safety injection).

Ongoing maintenance was completed on the speed increaser associated with the pump and post-maintenance testing was satisfactorily performe Later on August 20, the

• 2. Unusual Event was terminated and the unit, which had been reduced to approximately 38% reactor power, was subsequently returned to 100% powe Unit 2 Unit 2 entered the report period at 100% powe On July 30, Salem Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip due to the loss of the 2C vital instrument inverte The reactor operators identified the impending loss of the inverter and were in the process of reducing reactor power to below P-8 (36% power) to swap the instrument bus to its alternate power supply when the trip occurre At approximately 83% reactor power the inverter failed, resulting in No. 23 reactor coolant pump breaker open indication and the reactor tri All plant systems responded as designed and the unit was stabilized in Mode 3 (hot standby).

The licensee attributed the loss of the inverter to faulted diodes within the inverte The inverter was subsequently repaired and tested satisfactoril The unit was taken critical on July 31 and returned to power operation on August The unit operated at full power for the rest of the report perio No violations were identifie.

Surveillance Observations (61726) Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with technical specifications, licensee approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:

Procedure M3T Description Vital Bus Unqervoltage and Underfrequency Trip Check and Time Response

M3L-I T-211 2IC-2.9.176

Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (Reactor Engineering Manual, Part 6, Section 6.7)

21SJ45 Limitorque MDV Surveillance and MOVATS; motor load unit baseline data acquisition During performance of MOVATS on 21SJ45 the licensee determined that the "as-found" torque switch setting of 26,000-30,000 lbs. was outside of the calculated acceptance criteria of 21,200 lbs. maximum thrust needed valu The torque switch was reset and the MDV tested satisfactoril The licensee stated that MOVATS personnel performed the testing of 21SJ45 during the previous Unit 2 outage and differences in test equipment used could account for the discrepanc The licensee further stated that the high torque switch value would not affect proper operation of the valve because the valve is designed to withstand 77,000 lb thrus Excess thrust over that actually needed to operate the valve margin could, over a period of time, result in degradation of the actuator and/or the valve itsel The inspector concluded that performance of this activity was acceptabl FT-918, No. 22 SI pump discharge flow sensor calibration The inspector noted that several of the as-found data values were outside of the acceptance criteria which required the sensor to be recalibrate Following discussions with maintenance and system engineering supervision, the inspector determined that instrumen calibration data is not trende The inspector reviewed the ICD card for this sensor and noted that two of the past three calibrations had as found data outside of the acceptance criteri While a historical record of calibrations is maintained on the ICD card, the inspector is concerned with the apparent lack of supervisory or engineering review of the historical data in that recurrent out of specification as-found data may be indicative of an inadequate surveillance frequency or sensor degradatio The failure to perform an adequate technical evaluation of out of specification as-found calibration data appears to be a weakness in the licensee's program. *The insp~ctor

will continue to assess the significance of this issue in future surveillance observation No violations were cite.

Maintenance Observations (62703)

The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, technical specifications, NRC regulations, and industry codes and standard Work Order N Description Piping Repair at 2SW218 (No. 23 Charging Pump Room Cooler)

No. 12 charging safety injection pump; install rebuilt speed increaser, replace lube oil cooler, replace motor side high speed bearing, alignment and retest 2SW168, 22 Safety Injection pump lube oil cooler service water outlet control valve; r.epack, stroke test, set limit switches The inspector determined that the post-maintenance retest [an operability (00-10) test on the pump]

was inadequate to verify operability of the 2SW168 valv Shift supervision agreed, reentered the action statement and performed the retest in accordance with SP(0)4.0.5-V-SW-1 which specifies monitoring lube oil temperatures with the pump running to verify proper operation of the lube oil cooler and 2SW16 The inspector discussed this particular instance and control of post-maintenance retest activities in general with operations and station management. The need for improve-ment in this area is recognized by the licensee and corrective actions are in progres Corrective actions and estimated completion dates include:

Direct operators to specify in logs an exact description of retest performed (verified complete

- entry in night order book and implemented in recent log entries).

Rewrite and combine OD-10, maintenance procedure M23B, and the IST program into one document to more specifically delineate retest requirements for safety related equipment. (December 1988)

Operability retests will be a separate activity designated on the work orde Planning will use the document referenced above to predesignate retest requirements on the work order. (December 1988)

Staff the work control center with an SRO to verify the correct retest is specified and performe (December 1989)

The Shift Supervisor has this responsibility presentl The inspector will monitor licensee progress in implementation of the corrective actions and assess their effectiveness as they are being implemente No violations were identifie.

Radiological Controls (83729)

5.1 Outage Planning and Preparation The inspector reviewed licensee radiological control planning and preparation for the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outag The review was with respect to criteria contained in the following Salem Station Administrative and Radiation Protection procedures:

AP-2, Revision 4, Station Organization AP-7, Revision 12, ALARA Program AP-9, Revision 12, Maintenance Program RP-202, Revision 1, Radiation Work Permits Evaluation of licensee performance was based on discussions with personnel and review of documentatio The following areas were reviewed:

augmentation of staff to support outage activities establishment of outage organization supervisory and management oversight of ongoing activities increase in supplies for outage support involvement of radiological control group and knowledge of work to be performed minimization of radwaste and contamination planned special training including mock-up training provisions for radiological engineering controls hot particle controls

• ALARA considerations, including work package review by radiological controls personnel Within the scope of this review, no violations were identifie The licensee appeared to be performing adequate planning and preparation in the area of radiological controls for the upcoming outag The licensee was using lessons learned from the previous Unit 1 outage to plan for the upcoming Unit 2 outag The following positive findings were noted:

The licensee has established a procedure detailing planning and preparation for outage Procedure ODP-ZZ-001 provides, among other matters, guidance for organizational development, meetings, outage goals and development of an outage manua A second procedure under development and licensee review, Pre-Outage Guide, provides guidance as to the schedule for planning and preparation for outage The licensee reviewed overall performance during the last outage at Unit An action plan and followup improvement items were identified to preclude recurrences of problems which occurred at Unit The planning for the current outage commenced in January 198 The majority of work planning is complet Mock-up and enhanced training of personnel will be used where appropriate to reduce occupational exposur The licensee was in the process of revising their ALARA program to more closely reflect the way ALARA planning and controls are being implemente The following areas for improvement were identified and discussed with the licensee:

Methodology for performing supervisory oversight of outage activities is not well define Some job planners in the planning group do not appear to be aware of and implementing the guidance for performance of pre-job ALARA checklists specified in procedure AP-Licensee outage planning documents do not provide guidan~e for selection and qualification of personnel to fill outage positions (e.g. Containment Coordinators, Outage Manager).

There are no apparent procedures or guidance in place for set-up, testing, and periodic operability testing of temporary engineered ventilation system AP-2 does not reflect the current radiation protection organization structur The licensee indicated that these matters would be reviewed and addresse The inspector will followup on these items during future routine inspection.2 External Exposure Controls The inspector reviewed posting, barricading and access control to radiation and high radiation area The review was conducted with respect to applicable regulatory requirement Within the scope of the review, no violations were identifie.3 Corrective Action System The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the licensee's corrective action program for radiological controls deficiencie Within the scope of this review, no violations were identifie The licensee was found to be tracking and trending deficiencies identified via the Radiological Incident and Occurrence Report Progra The following items were discussed with the licensee:

There appeared to be minimal root cause analysis of individual and general groups of radiological deficiencie The inspector concluded that the licensee is aware of weaknesses in the root cause analysis and is in the process of enhancing the progra The criteria for identifying items as incidents or events for processing via the Radiological Incident and Occurrence Reporting systems is limite For example, an Incident or Radiological Occurrence Report was not written for an NRC identified violation of radwaste shipping procedures. Licensee personnel indicated that the scope of items designated for inclusion in the IR and ROR programs would be reviewed and addresse The inspector will review licensee action on these items during future routine inspection *

9 Review of Operations Department Implementation of Overtime Policy (71707)

The resident inspector reviewed station records and held discussions with licensee personnel to ascertain whether the use of overtime for Operations Department personnel is in conformance with regulatory requirements and to verify that deviations from maximum overtime guidelines were authorized in accordance with Technical Specifications and station administrative procedure The inspector reviewed the following:

Technical Specifications, Unit 1 and 2 Salem Station Administrative Procedure (AP)-5 Operations Department overtime records for October, 1987 and J~ne, 1988 for licensed reactor operators (RO) and non-licensed operators Overtime authorization records The inspector verified that the overtime guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 82-12 have been incorporated into the licensee's Technical Specifications and administrative procedure Generic Letter 82-12 delineates maximum overtime guidelines for plant staff who perform safety functions and requires that deviations from the maximum overtime guidelines shall be authorized by the plant manager, his deputy, or higher levels of managemen The inspector concluded that the Operations Department implementation of NRC Generic Letter 82-12 guidelines for use of overtime is acceptabl No violations were identifie Review of Actions Taken in Response to Identified Emergency Operating Procedure Weaknesses (25579)

During a Requalification Program Evaluation conducted the week of June 13, 1988, weaknesses were identified in the conduct of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EDP).

The licensee submitted a letter on July 1, 1988, which included short term and long term actions which were planned as a response t.o the identified weaknesse As part of the short term actions, the licensee committed to provide training to all licensed operators concerning the requirements for verbatim compliaDce, the authorization of deviations from. procedures, the handling of the Continuous Action Summaries, the performance of steps prior to their being required by the procedure, and the performance of the specific EDP step which was identified as a weaknes The long term actions included revision of this EDP step, revision of OD-15

"Use of Operations Department Procedures", and training of licensed operators on these revision The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness and completeness of these short and long term actions by interviewing instructors, licensed operators, operations engineers and managers, and by reviewing draft copies of OD-15 and proposed EOP changes. *As a result of the interviews, the inspectors determined that the short term actions have been effectively complete As a result of the review of draft documents, the inspectors determined that the licensee appears to be effectively addressing the major concerns and is proceeding in a timely manne No violations were note The inspectors discussed the following two areas of concern with the license The use of EOP~ had been addressed through a combination of specifi-cally designed methods and an evolution of methods which were developed during training because no definitive guidance from management was provide The lack of guidance on the implementation of some EOP steps appears to have been a result of insufficient management involve-ment in the development of EDP usage rules and philosoph It appears that these previous gaps in philosophy of use of the procedures are being eliminated through current corrective actions such as the development of EDP lesson plans and the revision of 00-1 During previous operator licensee exams, the NRC has noted limitations related to the assignment of responsibilities for the control room use of the EOPs and the location/access of the SRO relative to the control room prope For example, if the RO reading the EOP does not recognize the need for interpretation and decision making by the Shift Supervisor, the Shift Supervisor must actively intervene in the execution of the EOP In addition, if the SRO is not in the control room proper at the initiation of an event, the RO may be required to perform actions in the EOPs that have been defined as SRO responsibilitie The inspector reviewed these concerns with regard to the weaknesses observed during the 1988 Requalification Program Evaluatio It was determined that the above cited limitations would be effectively minimized by an enhancement of the EDP usage rules and philosophy which addresses the lack of SRO acknowledgement of required decision points and action to be taken when such acknowledgement does not occu The implementation and operator training with regard to the new EDP usage rules will be reviewed during subsequent inspections (272/88-16-10).

-

• 11 Review of Licensee Event Reports (90712, 92700)

Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed licensee event reports (LER) as well as other periodic and special reports submitted by the license The reports were reviewed for accuracy and timely submissio Additional followup performed at the discretion of the inspector to verify corrective action implementation and adequacy is detailed with the applicable report summar The following reports were reviewed during the inspection period:

Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report -

June 1988 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report -

June 1988 Unit 1 Special Report 88-3 concerns degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals which were impaired for greater than 7 day The fire areas involved are provided with fire detection capability and a roving fire watch which was posted previously for other concern The impairments will be repaired as part of the licensee's Penetration Seal Review Progra The inspector had no further tjuestions at this tim Unit 1 LER 88-012 T.S. 3.7.9 Non-Compliance Due to Inadequate Administrative Control LER 88-012 discusses a safety injection (SI) line snubber which was discovered missing during a QA system walkdown.. The snubber was apparently removed during design modification work and was not reinstalled due to inadequate administrative control of design change wor The licensee has taken the following corrective actions: installed a new snubber; performed an engineering evaluation relative to the components supported by the snubber which concluded that the missing snubber did not adversely impact piping or associated equipment; issued engineering administrative procedure DE-AP-ZZ-0003(Q)

11Modification Walkdown Program 11 which formalizes conduct of modification walkdowns; and design change packages now include checklists for piping support removal and reinstallatio The inspector determined that this constitutes a licensee identified violation of T.S. 3.7.9 for which no further action is require (272/88-16-09)

Unit 2 LER 88-012 T.S. Action 3.0.3 Entry - Both Centrifugal Charging Pumps Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Deficiencies

LER 88-012 discusses the inoperability of both centrifugal charging pumps (high head safety injection) due to separate equipment problems for each pum The equipment problems were subsequently corrected within T.S. action statement time limits and no reduction in operating mode was require The inspector had no further question Unit 2 LER 88-013 T.S. 3.3.2.1.b Action 13 Non-Compliance - 2B SEC Inoperable Due to Equipment Problems LER 88-013 discusses the failure of the licensee to promptly declare the 2B SEC inoperable and enter the applicable T.S. action statemen A violation was issued (311/88-14-02) for which inspector review and followup will be conducted when the licensee's response is receive Unit 2 LER 88-014 Reactor Trip/Safety Injection Due to Failure of the C Vital Instrument Bus I~verter LER 88-014 refers to a reactor trip/safety injection resulting from the failure of 2C vital instrument inverte This event was discussed in NRC Combined Inspection 50-272(311)/88-14 and the inspector had no further questions concerning the even Unit 2 LER 88-015 T.S. 3.0.3 Entry - Both Centrifugal Charging Pumps Declared Inoperable; Equipment Concerns LER 88-015 discussed the inoperability of both centrifugal charging pumps (high head safety injection) due to equipment problems individual to each pump and unrelated to the problems delineated in LER 88-01 The equipment problems were corrected within T.S. action statement time limits and no reduction in operating mode was require The inspector had no further question Unit 2 LER 88-016 Reactor Trip Due to "C" Vital Instrument Bus Inverter Failure LER 88-016 describes a reactor trip due to the failure of 2C vital instrument bus inverte This event is discussed in Section 2.2.2 of this repor Long term corrective actions relative to inverter failures resulting in reactor trips include *a design change to delete the "one of four" reactor coolant pump breakers open reactor trip logic (to be implemented during the fourth refueling outage for Unit 2 and the eighth refueling outage for Unit 1) and inverter replacement (fifth refueling outage for Unit 2 and eighth refueling outage for Unit 1).

The inspector had no further questions regarding the trip.

13 Post Accident Sampling and Monitoring Followup (92701)

During the week of November 26-30, 1984, a special announced inspection (50-272/84-45; 50-311/84-44) of the implementation of the licensee's commitments relative to post accident sampling and monitoring in accordanc with the specifications of NUREG-0737, Confirmatory Order dited March 14, 1983, and license conditions was conducted by the NR No violations were identified during the inspection, however several areas requiring improve-ment were note As per the inspection report cover letter the licensee was requested to respond with regard to the identified improvement items delineating their planned or completed corrective actions. PSE&G letter*

from E. A. Liden to Thomas T. Martin (NRC) dated March 6, 1985 documents the requested respons During this inspection period the inspector conducted a followup inspection to assess the status of the items opened as a result of the initial PASS inspection referenced abov In addition, the inspector assessed the acceptability of the licensee's response and verified the implementation of corrective actions as follows:

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-01; This item addressed two concerns: The inspection identified a concern with radioiodine plate-out due to a section of containment air sample line not being heat traced as indicated on the design drawing In their response to this item, the licensee committed to install the heat tracing and initiated design change (OCR) lEC-1866 to accomplish the tas Subsequently the licensee obtained clarification from NRC Region I regarding this issue and was informed that if quantification of iodine was not a requirement for core damage estimation, then heat tracing of atmospheric sample lines is not a concer Following determination by the licensee's engineering group that iodine quantification is not required for core damage assessment at Salem, OCR lEG 1866 was cancelle In addition, a precaution was added to the chemistry sampling procedure directing that iodine data should not be used for quantitative purpose The inspector determined that licensee's action on this item is acceptabl The inspector noted that the PASS procedures have been rewritten and restructured since the previous PASS inspectio In addition, a preventive maintenance and surveillance program document and an abnormal condition/troubleshooting guide have been compile The inspector found these documents to be

• comprehensive and the restructuring appears to have made them easier for the PASS operator to follo Licensee improvement of PASS procedures is continuin The inspection identified a cask/cart pressure indicator which was not functioning properl The licensee subsequently determined that the transducer was out of calibration and recalibrated it on Decemb~r 10, 198 However during inspector observation of PASS operations, the inspector observed that the PASS panel reactor coolant system (RCS) sample line flow (RC-FI-2) and pressure (RC-G-3) gauges have been broken since January 198 In lieu of these gauges, the PASS operator used a previously installed spare gauge which does not appear on design drawings and whose installation apparently was not documente It is not clear when the gauge was installed and/or what temporary modification controls may have been require This issue was brought to the attention of chemistry supervision who subsequently ordered the gauge remove PASS sampling was continued using the broken gauge Chemistry Procedures CH 3.1.025 PASS Startup, CH 3.1.026 PASS Sampling and Analysis, and CH 3.1.027 PASS Flushing and Shutdown delineate RCS sample flow and pressures to ensure proper sampling parameters and verify proper PASS operation and shutdow The inspector observed that procedurally specified RCS sample flow and pressure indication could not be set and/or verified by the PASS operator in accordance with the above procedures, in that RC-FI-2 was indicating incorrectly and RC-G-3 showed no respons The inspector also noted that the PASS Abnormal Condition/Troubleshooting Guideline which is referenced numerous times in the chemistry procedures listed above was in draft form, and not readily available to the PASS operator until the latter part of the inspection when it was formally issued by chemistry supervisio Salem Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.4 requires in part that the PASS program include procedures for sampling and analysis and provisions for maintenance of PASS sampling and analysis equipmen TS 6.8.1 also requires that procedures be established, implemented and maintaine Therefore failure to promptly repair PASS sampling and analysis equipment (Gauges RC-FI-2 and RC-G-3), failure to properly implement CH procedures for establishing RCS sample flow and pressure, and untimely issuance of the PASS Abnormal Condition/Troubleshooting Guide collectively represent a violation (272/88-16-01) of TSs.

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-02; The licensee was to make provisions for chloride analysis of a PASS grab sample as a backup for the in-line analyze The licensee 1 s response for this item and a similar item (84-45-04 pH analysis) concluded that grab sampling is not anticipated primarily based on their ability to repair the in-line instrumentation and on personnel exposure concern In review of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, Criterion 8 requirements, the inspector determined that action by the licensee is needed to ensure the capability of obtaining backup sample This item is unresolved pending licensee review of PASS in-line monitored parameters and making provisions for backup analysis capability including procedures and training (T.S. 6.8.4.e requirement) and integrated dose estimates (NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, Criterion 6).

(UNR 272/88-16-02)

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-03; Due to boron analysis result discrepancies observed during the 1984 inspection, the licensee was to improve the capability for an accurate analysis of grab samples for boron concentratio The inspector reviewed applicable chemistry procedures, observed PASS sampling and boron analysis, and reviewed boron comparison data for RCS and PASS sample The inspector determined that licensee activities in this area are satisfactory. This item is close (Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-06; This item contained four concerns addressed as follows: The inspector verified that an area radiation monitor (ARM 2R52) has been installed in the PASS room and has local indicatio The inspector was told that the monitor is set to alarm a red strobe light outside the PASS door at-lRe The inspector had several concerns relative to the control and testing of ARM 2R5 The range of the monitor is 0-10,000 The inspector questioned whether (1) electrical calibration, source checks and functional alarm testing are performed to verify operation of the monitor especially to verify accuracy at the low end of the scale (.lR - lR); (2) whether controls are implemented to ensure compliance with T.S. 6.12 requirements for high radiation areas; and whether ARM 2R52 is included in the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) program manua Control and testing of ARM 2R52 is unresolved pending licensee resolution of these issue (UNR 272/88-16-03)

• The inspector verified that the Emergency Plan procedures were revised to prompt the Senior Shift Supervisor/Emergency Duty Officer (for radiological emergencies) to direct chemistry to activate the PASS in the recirculation mod The inspector determined that the licensee's actions for this item are acceptabl The inspector verified that the Emergency Plan procedures were revised to prompt the Senior Shift Supervisor/Emergency Duty Officer (for radiological emergencies) to switch the auxiliary building ventilation to align PASS room ventilation for post-accident conditions (HEPA+ charcoal).

The inspector determined that the licensee's actions for this item are acceptabl The inspection identified PASS valve position indication problem The licensee submitted work orders to maintenance to upgrade and repair the valve position limitors as directed by an engineering evaluation of the proble Maintenance included adding lock washers and "lock tight" to the valve limitor No problems were noted in this area during recent PASS sampling activities indicating that the licensee's actions were effectiv However, the inspector requested that the licensee verify that work orders for all designated valves have been complete (UNR 272/88-16-04)

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-04; See Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-02 regarding backup analysis for p In addition, the inspector verified that the in-line pH probe calibration tolerance has been correcte This item is close (Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-05; The inspector verified that procedures for the acquisition and isotopic analyses of stripped dissolved gas samples have been developed and implemente The inspector witnessed performance ~f the procedures and reviewed isotopic and hydrogen comparison data for RCS and PASS sample The inspector determined that the procedure and isotopic analysis are acceptable, however it was noted that hydrogen comparison results between RCS and PASS samples are not consisten T~e licensee committed to investigate the reason for the inconsistency and resolve the proble The inspector will review the licensee's corrective action (UNR 272/88-16-05)

During followup of the previous items, the inspector identified one additional area relative to maintaining PASS sampling and analysis equipment which requires licensee review and actio The inspector noted that only one train of component cooling (CC)

water is available for sample coolers for the PAS During lengthy outages of the CC train the licensee rigs demineralized water to the sample coolers, but backup cooling provisions are apparently not made for short duration CC unavailabilit Provisions for implementation of a backup method for non-redundant isolated PASS support systems is unresolved pending licensee review and actio (UNR 272/88-16-06)

'

Additional items identified in NRC Inspection 50-272/84-45 and 50-311/84-44 and followed up in this inspection include:

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-09; Provide data to support EQ of containment high radiation monitor cable connector termination assembl The licensee has provided Safety Evaluation S-C-A910-ESE-0349-1 11Justification for the Use of BIW XLPE Insulated Coaxial Cable With the Victoreen High Range Radiation Monitor 11 dated May 7, 198 NRC review of this item will be included with the EQ inspection followup of a duplicate inspection findin (272/311/86-23-07).

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/84-45-10; NRR tq review acceptability of the location of containment high radtation monitor The inspector reviewed an NRC memorandum from H. Thompson, Jr. to R. Starostecki dated July-16, 1985 and NRR's 11Safety Evaluation Regarding the Location of Containment High Range Radiation Monitors at Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 11 which concluded that the location is acceptabl This item is close.

Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (92701)

(Closed)

II.K.3.5 Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps During Loss of Coolant Accident TMI Action Plan Item II.K.3.5 of NUREG 0737 required all licensee's to consider other solutions to the small-break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) because automatic tripping of the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) was not considered an ideal solutio On June 28, 1985 NRC approved the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) submittals relating to alternative RCP trip criteri Each individual licensee was then required to select from three alternate RCP trip criteria and submit additional information to the NR The licensee's submittal dated October 4, 1985 addressed the following areas:

Determination of RCP trip criteria Instrumentation Identification (redundancy and quality level)

Instrumentation uncertainties Analysis uncertainties Potential RCP problems Containment Isolation Impact upon RCP Operation Components required for RCP trip Operator training and procedures In a Safety Evaluation Report dated June 24, 1988, the NRC concluded that the licensee's actions and response to TMI Action Item II.K.3.5 was acceptabl The inspector performed a sample verification of the licensee's committed actions and found conditions to be acceptabl This item is close (Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 311/84-47-01; Review licensee supplemental report on turbine generator failur The inspector reviewed Supplemental LER 84-24-01 which attributes the cause of the turbine generator failure to the fracture of stator coils due to high vibratory stresses as a result of the installation associated with generator repairs made in 1983-8 This item is close (Closed)

Violation 272/87-11-01, 311/87-14-01; Preventive maintenance (PM)

was not performed on safety related motors in storage per licensee procedur The PM's were missed due to a misplaced work order during the transfer of responsibilities for stored equipment from station maintenance to site service The inspector noted that several additional PM's were missed subsequent to the inspection, but prior to the transfer to site services being complet Programs and personnel are now in place to ensure completion of the PM's on stored equipmen The inspector verified that site services is scheduling and completing PM's as required by procedure This item is close (Closed)

Unresolved Item 272/87-31-01, 311/87-32-01; Lack of timely response to NQA action request The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action which.consisted of placing NQA action requests on the Action Tracking System (ATS) and providing status and trending of overdue items to the Vice President and upper level managemen The inspector determined that the corrective actions have been effective in reducing the number of late action request response However, the inspector noted that the General Manager - Salem Operations has had one or more overdue NQA action requests listed on the past several months AT The inspector discussed this observation with the GM-SO who committed to ensure timely responses to NQA action request This will be reviewed in a future inspectio (UNR 272/88-16-07)

A

'

(Closed)

Unresolved Item 272/88-01-01, 311/88-01-01; Administrative controls for implementing changes to Technical Specifications (TSs).

The inspector had identified a problem with the licensee's method of determining implementation dates for TS amendment Subsequent license change requests and the resultin TS amendments now specifically state the required implementa-tion date or time perio The inspector will continue to monitor the implementation of future TS change (Closed)

Violation 272/88-09-01, 311/88-09-01; Failure to audit the meteorological progra The inspector reviewed the licensee*~

response to the violation, discussed the violation and corrective actions with the licensee and verified that appropriate corrective actions have been take The inspector determined that only the meteorological instrumentation calibration and preventive maintenance portion of the meteorological program, which is performed by a single contractor, had not been audite The inspector reviewed QA audit no. NM-87-36 Radiation Protection Services - Supplement dated April 18, 1988 which verified acceptable program implementation by the contracto The inspector noted that the licensee plans to revise the next Master Audit Plan (1989-1990) to include a functional audit of the Meteorological Program in addition to the organizational audit of Radiation Protection Services to ensure a complete audit is performed relative to this are The inspector will review the Master Audit Plan when complet (IF! 272/88-16-08)

(Closed)

Unresolved Item 272/311/88-11-01; Surveillance Test Schedulin As a result of continuing problems with the scheduling and completion of surveillance testing, the licensee was issued a violation in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/311/88-1 The licensee's response and corrective actions will be reviewed when receive This item is close.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with Mr. J. Zupko and other licensee personnel periodically and at the end of the* inspection report to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on Region I review and discussions with the licensee, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restrictions.