IR 05000272/1999002

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Insp Repts 50-272/99-02 & 50-311/99-02 on 990308-0418. Noncited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support.Also Inspected Status of Util Ongoing Cable Raceway Fire Barrier Project
ML18107A328
Person / Time
Site: Salem  
Issue date: 05/21/1999
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18107A327 List:
References
50-272-99-02, 50-272-99-2, 50-311-99-02, 50-311-99-2, NUDOCS 9905280239
Download: ML18107A328 (31)
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Docket Nos:

License Nos:

Report N Licensee:

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Location:

Dates:

  • inspectors:

Approved by:

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50-272, 50-311 DPR-70, DPR-75

REGION I

50-272/99-02, 50-311199-02 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 March 8, 1999 -April 18, 1999 S. A. Morris, Senior Resident Inspector F. J. Laughlin, Resident Inspector H. K. Nieh, Resident Inspector K. Young, Reactor Engineer, NRC Region I Glenn W. Meyer, Chief, Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

9905280239 990521 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Salem Nuclear Generating Station NRC Inspection Report 50-272/99-02, 50-311/99-02 This integrated inspection included aspects of operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of an announced inspection by a regional inspector reviewing the status of PSE&G's ongoing cable raceway fire barrier projec Operations

Observed operator performance was generally good, with some minor exception Operators appropriately responded to equipment challenges and adequately addressed equipment operability issues as they arose. (Section 01.1)

Operators safely and effectively removed Unit 2 from service for refueling. Shutdown cooling was properly established and maintained. With some noted exceptions, operations department personnel properly coordinated outage activities. (Section 01.2)

Containment ventilation isolation circuitry functioned as designed following an increase in radiation levels during removal of the reactor vessel closure head. PSE&G personnel responded appropriately to this event and implemented reasonable corrective action (Section 08.2)

Inadequate procedure reviews and operator inattention to detail resulted in an unplanned loss of all safety-related ventilation chillers. Operators did not recognize the improper sequence of procedure steps during the isolation of a service water header. No safety consequences resulted from this event, and PSE&G's corrective actions were appropriate. (Section 08.3)

Maintenance

Selected routine maintenance and surveillance activities were properly performe PSE&G personnel effectively coordinated main steam safety valve testing, with timely and appropriate corrective actions taken to address test failures. (Section M 1.1)

PSE&G personnel safely executed service water and 4 KV electrical distribution system outage maintenance activities, and implemented appropriate measures to minimize plant risk during the work. PSE&G's overall outage risk assessment was sufficiently detailed and properly focused on minimizing high risk plant equipment configurations. (Section M1.2)

Maintenance technicians failed to properly restore the electrical power supply to an auxiliary building ventilation fan following routine maintenance. Independent verification

_ of fan motor electrical lead installation, as well as subsequent post maintenance testing, ii

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failed to detect this error. As a consequence, operators returned the fan to service with it running in the reverse direction as part of an extended post-maintenance test. This caused a slight positive differential pressure to develop in the auxiliary building, a condition which is outside the system's design basis. PSE&G's initial corrective action implementation regarding this issue was not consistent with program guidance. Lastly, PSE&G's design basis evaluation for reportability of this event was not timely. (Section M1.3)

QA auditors thoroughly evaluated station performance during a 2A emergency diesel generator (EOG) maintenance outage. Though station personnel completed the EOG maintenance safely and within the allowed outage time, PSE&G continued to experience difficulties in meeting on-line maintenance outage objectives, in large part due to planning and work coordination deficiencies. These deficiencies led to unplanned increases in system unavailability time. (Section M7.1)

Inattention to detail resulted in the failure to test two component cooling water check valves in the station inservice testing program. Corrective actions for this licensee identified and corrected issue were appropriate. (Section M8.1)

Age-related "setpoint" variance resulted in seven of 20 Unit 2 main steam safety valves failing to lift within tolerances required by technical specifications. PSE&G's actions to address these test failures were timely and appropriate. (Section M8.2)

Engineering

The Salem units continued to experience frequent service water (SW) system train failures, though PSE&G's approach to addressing this issue improved since the previous report period. Immediate operator actions following the emergent SW train failures were timely and appropriate. SW-related maintenance activities were completed in an aggressive manner to minimize train unavailability and overall plant risk. Engineering personnel conducted appropriate SW system performance monitoring in accordance with the station's maintenance rule program. Corrective action program implementation and independent review of SW system activities also improved during the report perio (Section E 1.1)

System health reports were of good quality and provided an accurate assessment of overall status of the associated system. System managers responsible for preparing the reports were knowledgeable of their systems. (Section E4.1)

PSE&G engineering staff completed a thorough root cause assessment of the Unit 2 reactor coolant system instrument flow tubing failures, and developed comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the extent of condition and to prevent recurrenc (Section ES. 1)

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Plant Support

Radiological protection personnel properly performed selected surveys and appropriately posted surveyed areas based on established radiation and contamination level (Section R 1.1)

General housekeeping in the plant was good, and acceptable compensatory measures were maintained in areas with degraded fire barriers. (Section F2.1)

PSE&G's fire barrier testing approach was thorough. However, additional tests were necessary to select a suitable material for fire barrier replacement. The inspectors also concluded that PSE&G was appropriately considering the cable ampacity derating factor to be applied for the fire barrier materials being tested for use at Salem. (Section F3.1)

Modification package S98-002 properly addressed the removal of 3M FS-195 fire barrier material from cable tray 1A207 for testing purposes.. The modification package included appropriate instructions and drawings to perform the modification. Additionally, the package contained an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 applicability review. (Section F3.2)

A quality assurance assessment and an independent assessment appropriately reviewed fire protection program attributes and compliance with program requirement PSE&G properly addressed the audit findings and implemented timely corrective actions for identified deficiencies. (Section F7.1)

PSE&G met the early milestones of the three phase program for fire barrier resolutio (Section FS. 1)

PSE&G completed an analysis of the penetration seals thermal masses to verify that the as-built drawings were bounded by the test configurations for penetration seal PSE&G's approach to resolving this issue was acceptable. (Section F8.2)

PSE&G fire protection department personnel failed to identify an impaired fire detection system which resulted in a failure to establish the required compensatory measure Corrective actions resulting from this event were appropriate. (Section FS.4)

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  • TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................ -...... --......... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................ v I. Operations.................................................................. 1
  • 01 Conduct of Operations............................................. 1 0 General Comments......................................... 1 0 Unit 2 Refueling Outage Activities.............................. 2

Miscellaneous Operations Issues.................................... 3 0 (Closed) LER 50-272/99-001-00............................... 3 0 (Closed) LER 50-311/a9-004-00............................... 3 0 (Closed) LER 50-311/99-003-00............................... 3 II. Maintenance............................................................... 4 M 1 Conduct of Maintenance........................................... 4 M1.1 General Comments......................................... 4 M1.2 Unit 2 Refueling Outage Maintenance Activities................... 5 M1.3 Auxiliary Building Ventilation (ABV) System Maintenance........... 6 M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities... *.......... :.............. B M7.1 2A Emergency Diesel Generator On-line Maintenance............. B MB Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues................................... 9 M (Closed) LER 50-272/97-001-01............................... 9 M (Closed) LER 50-311/99-001-00................................ 9 Ill. Engineering.............................................................. 10 E1 Conduct of Engineering........................................... 10 E1.1 Service Water System Performance........................... 10 E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance........................ 12 E4. 1 Review of System Health Reports............................. 12 EB Miscellaneous Engineering Issues.................................. 13 E (Closed) LER 50-311/98-007-01.............................. 13 IV. Plant Support............................................................ 14 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls................. 14 R Radiological Surveys and Postings............................ 14 F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment...................... 14 F Facility Tour.............................................. 14 F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation....................... -. 15 F Fire Barrier Material General Testing Results.................... 15 F Review of Modification Package.............................. 16 F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities......................... 16 F7.1 The Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System (ERFBS) Project....... 16 F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues................................ 19 F Electrical Raceway" Fire Barrier System Project Status............ * 19 F (Closed) IFI 50-272; 311/97-09-01............................ 20 v

  • F Disposition of NRC Information Notice (IN) 99-07................. 21 F (Closed) Special Report 50-311/98-009-00..................... 21 V. Management Meetings..................................................... 22 X1 Exit Meeting Summary............................................ 22 X2 Management Visits.............................................. 22 X3 Miscellaneous.................................................. 22

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the period at 100% power and remained at full power.until March.18, 1999, when power was reduced to 80% because of an unplanned failure of a circulating water traveling screen. The unit was returned to full power on March 26, 1999, when traveling screen repairs were completed. The unit remained at 100% for the remainder of the report perio Unit 2 began the period at 100% power, where it remained until March 29, 1999, when operators began a load reduction to 75% for planned testing on main steam code safety valves. The unit remained at 75% until April 2, 1999, when operators commenced a further load reduction to begin the tenth refueling outage. The unit entered Mode 3 on April 3, 1999, Mode 4 on April 4, Mode 5 on April 6, and Mode 6 on April 10, 1999. The unit was defueled at the end of the report perio *

I. Operations

Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent observations of ongoing plant operations, including control room walkdowns, log reviews, and shift turnovers. The inspectors also performed numerous plant tours to observe equipment operation and nuclear operators working in the fiel Observations and Findings In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Nuclear equipment operators performed thorough tours. Unit 2 control room operators effectively coordinated a plant shutdown for refueling (see Section 01.2). However, the inspectors

.noted occasional instances of inattention to detail. For example, a Unit 1 control room operator inadvertently started an auxiliary feedwater pump during motor-operated valve surveillance testing, and poor communication during a tagging evolution contributed to Unit 2 reactor coolant system leak rate briefly exceeding technical specification limit PSE&G personnel appropriately documented and corrected each of these condition During the period, elevated river grass conditions frequently degraded operating service water (SW) and circulating water system components (see Section E1.1). Operators promptly and properly responded to these challenges in accordance with station procedure The inspectors reviewed a system operability assessment regarding a flaw identified on a portion of SW piping for a Unit 2 component cooling water heat exchanger. Operations department personnel thoroughly prepared the assessment, and utilized engineering

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support to analyze the issue. System operability was soundly supported using technical guidance contained in an applicable NRC generic letter (GL 90-05). Conclusions Observed operator performance was generally good with some minor exception Operators appropriately responded to equipment challenges and adequately addressed equipment operability issues.as they aros.2 Unit 2 Refueling Outage Activities Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed portions of activities associated with removing Unit 2 from service for refueling. Activities included plant manipulations to cold shutdown and coordination of various maintenance evolution Observations and Findings Observed portions of the unit load reduction and plant cool down were well coordinate Control room operators properly established and maintained shutdown cooling via the residual heat removal (RHR) system. Through field walkdowns, the inspectors verified proper alignment of selected RHR system components. Operations department personnel implemented appropriate means for maintaining redundant safety systems in an operable status. This defense-in-depth philosophy included obtaining control room supervisor permission before entering areas containing redundant safety system component Operations department personnel properly supervised and coordinated the reactor core off-load. However, during the removal of the reactor vessel closure head, an unexpected high radiation condition resulted in an isolation of the containment ventilation system (see Section 08.2). Additionally, operator inattention to detail contributed to an unplanned loss of two safety-related chillers during service water system manipulations (see Section 08.3). Conclusions Operators safely and effectively removed Unit 2 from service for refueling. Shutdown cooling was properly established and maintained. With some noted exceptions, operations department personnel properly coordinated outage activities.

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08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues 0 {Closed) LER 50-272/99-001-00: Reactor Scram as a Result of Turbine Trip This issue was described in detail in section 01.2 of NRC Inspection Report 50-272199-01, dated April 1, 1999. No new issues were revealed by this licensee event report (LER).

0 (Closed) LER 50-311/99-004-00: ESF Actuation: Containment Ventilation System Isolation During Reactor Vessel Head Removal Inspection Scope (92700. 92901)

The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the subject LER and verified selected corrective action Observations and Findings This LER documents the occurrence of a containment ventilation system automatic isolation during removal of the Unit 2 reactor vessel closure head. The automatic isolation resulted from an unexpected increase in containment radiation levels during the head removal process. All plant equipment functioned as designed to prevent a release to the environment, and no personnel over-exposures occurred. Immediate corrective actions included surveying and purging the containment atmosphere. Planned actions *

include revising the applicable plant procedure to isolate containment ventilation system manually prior to removing the reactor vessel hea Conclusions Containment ventilation isolation circuitry functioned as designed following an increase in radiation levels during removal of the reactor vessel closure head. PSE&G personnel responded appropriately to this event and implemented reasonable corrective action.3 (Closed) LER 50-311./99-003-00: Unplanned Loss of All Unit 2 Safety-Related Ventilation Chiller Units Inspection Scope (92700. 92901) The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the subject LER and verified selected corrective action Observations and Findings During the removal of a service water (SW) system header for maintenance, operators inadvertently isolated the SW supply to all three safety-related ventilation chillers. This event resulted largely from inattention to detail by plant operators and procedure reviewers. Specifically, the governing procedure incorrectly directed isolation of the SW

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header before realigning the chiller's SW supply to the alternate header. This error was not identified by PSE&G personnel during the preparation or review of the procedur The safety consequences of this event were minimal because ambient air temperature was far below maximum design temperature, and operators promptly restored the affected chillers within the time allowed by technical specifications (TS). Corrective actions (documented in corrective action request 990406091) included revising the affected procedure to incorporate the proper sequence of steps during the removal of a SW header and reinforcing the requirements for procedure reviews. Failure to establish and maintain appropriate safety-related procedures is a violation of TS 6.8.1. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-311/99-02-01) Conclusions Inadequate procedure reviews and operator inattention to detail resulted in an unplanned loss of all safety-related ventilation chillers. Operators did not recognize the improper sequence of procedure steps during the isolation of a service water header. No safety consequences resulted from this event, and PSE&G's corrective actions were appropriat II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M General Comments Inspection Scope (62707. 61726. 92902. & 40500)

The inspectors observed all or portions of several risk-significant maintenance and surveillance activitie Observations and Findings PSE&G personnel generally performed all observed maintenance and surveillance activities in accordance with station requirements. Minor deficiencies noted by the inspectors were promptly corrected by cognizant PSE&G staff. The inspectors selected a sample of safety-related equipment tagouts and verified that they were properly implemented according to station procedures. The inspectors also performed a detailed review of Unit 2 main steam safety valve (MSSV) testing. PSE&G and contractor personnel properly followed test procedures and coordinated their activities with control room operators. Seven of the 20 valves failed to lift at the required set point. For each failure, PSE&G personnel appropriately declared the affected valve inoperable and promptly adjusted the lift set point to within the acceptable range. All retests were performed consistent with applicable codes and standards. PSE&G issued a licensee event report (LER) documenting the test failures (see Section M8.2). The inspectors

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also reviewed the associated safety evaluation prepared for the MSSV test, and found it to be thorough and consistent with regulatory requirement Conclusions Selected routine maintenance and surveillance activities were properly performe PSE&G personnel effectively co0rdinated main steam safety valve testing, with timely and appropriate corrective actions taken to address test failure M1.2 Unit 2 Refueling Outage Maintenance Activities Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed risk-significant outage activities associated with the service water (SW) and the 4 KV electrical distribution system. The inspectors also reviewed PSE&G's outage schedule risk assessment and associated contingency plan Observations and Findings The inspectors verified that the equipment tagout for the 22 SW header outage was properly implemented. Appropriate isolation points were established and operators tagged the correct components in the proper position. Maintenance department personnel exercised appropriate foreign material controls during SW piping inspections at the intake structure. Engineering department personnel provided adequate support for the noted piping inspections, and discrepancies were appropriately correcte PSE&G technicians conducted maintenance activities safely, with sufficient controls in place to ensure that temporary power supply changes would.be restored to normal. For example, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance associated with the 28 4 KV bus outages. Technicians actively employed the required maintenance procedures at the work location, took the appropriate safety precautions to ensure equipment was de-energized before commencing work, and marked protected equipment to caution other plant personnel of its protected status. The inspectors also walked down the redundant vital switchgear rooms to observe the installation of alternate power supplies for the 22 spent fuel pool cooling pump and the 22 fuel handling building exhaust fa This abnormal line-up was completed in accordance with station operating and maintenance procedures, and administratively controlled using those procedure PSE&G's outage schedule risk assessment was thoroughly prepared and focused on minimizing high risk configurations during maintenance. For example, the outage schedule did not contain any plant configurations that would result in a "red" condition (core damage frequency at or above 1 E-4), and at least one component cooling water pump was scheduled to be. available at all times. PSE&G personnel analyzed the increase in plant risk associated with each system outage throughout the schedule. The inspectors did not note any configurations that would be prohibited by technical specifications. Additionally, the contingency plans that documented compensatory

  • measures during the 22 SW header and the 28 4 KV bus outage provided an adequate level of defense-in-depth for redundant operable components.

. Conclusions PSE&G personnel safely executed service water and 4 KV electrical distribution system outage maintenance activities, and implemented appropriate measures to minimize plant risk during the work. PSE&G's overall outage risk assessment was sufficiently detailed and properly focused on minimizing high risk plant equipment configuration M 1.3 Auxiliary Building Ventilation CABV) System Maintenance

. Inspection Scope (62707. 71707. 40500)

During routine rounds on April 13, 1999, an equipment operator noted that auxiliary building pressure was greater than the outside environment, an abnormal condition which is outside the design basis of the facility. PSE&G personnel subsequently determined the condition to be caused by the 12 ABV exhaust fan rotating in the wrong direction. At the time of the occurrence, the 12 ABV had been operating for approximately eight hours as part of a post maintenance test. PSE&G later attributed the cause of this discrepancy to technicians who had improperly connected the fan's electrical power supply following routine maintenance. The inspectors reviewed the causes and consequences of the maintenance error, and assessed the effectiveness of PSE&G's corrective action program implementation in this cas Observations and Findings Following discovery of the unusual auxiliary building pressure condition, PSE&G operators promptly stopped the 12 ABV exhaust fan to return building differential pressure to normal (slightly negative). Additionally, they initiated corrective action request (AR 990414125) to document the issue. The fan motor was properly rewired and placed back into service the next day. The inspectors noted that the fan motor wiring error should have been prevented by appropriate implementation of maintenance procedure SH.MD-AP.ZZ-0002, which provided an administrative control for lifted electrical leads. Specifically, the procedure directed technicians to independently verify that motor leads were properly installed during fan reassembly. However, PSE&G determined that this step was not successfully completed, which is a violation of Salem Unit 1 technical specification (TS) 6.8.1.a in that a required maintenance procedure was not properly implemented. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-272/99-02-02)

The inspectors judged that PSE&G inappropriately classified the above noted AR as a

"significance level 3" (i.e., minor significance), especially given the consequences of the error (plant outside design basis) and the fact that actions taken following a previous similar event in which the independent verification process failed were not sufficient to prevent recurrence. The previous event involved a failure to properly restore an auxiliary

feedwater pump discharge pressure transmitter following maintenance, which caused an undetected pump inoperability for 18 days (see NRC inspection report 50-311/98-09 section M4.1 ). In accordance with PSE&G's corrective action program, a level 3 AR only specified that the specific deficiency be corrected without any causal analysis. The inspectors compared the circumstances of this issue with the examples provided in the *

significance level determination process in procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0000, "Action Request Process, n and concluded that this issue met the criteria for at least a significance level 2 AR. PSE&G management later agreed with the inspector's evaluation and on April 21, 1999, elevated the AR classification to a level 2 which involved a cause determination. This Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI "Corrective Action" is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-272/99-02-03).

The inspectors also concluded that PSE&G failed to appropriately recognize that the auxiliary building positive differential pressure event resulted in a condition that was outside the design basis of the facility. As a result, the required one hour non-emergency event notification was not made in a timely manner, a violation of 10 CFR

  • 50.72(b)(1). The inspectors reviewed the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report which stated that the design basis of the ABV system was to maintain the auxiliary building at a slightly negative pressure with respect to the outside atmosphere during both normal and emergency operation to satisfy the criterion for preventing unmonitored releases of radioactivity. The operators stated that they believed that design basis requirements were satisfied because they had entered and remained in the applicable TS action statement (TSAS 3. 7. 7.1) throughout the period of time that the ABV fan was unavailable for maintenance (including the testing period). However, the inspectors determined that even though TSAS requirements were met, the ABV system was
  • operated outside its design basis when the auxiliary building exhibited a positive differential pressure with respect to the environment. Based upon further discussion with the inspectors, PSE&G management reached the same conclusion and issued an event notification report on April 23, 1999. This Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50. 72 reporting requirements is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-272199-02-04) Conclusions Maintenance technicians failed to properly restore the electrical power supply to an auxiliary building ventilation fan following routine maintenance. Independent verification of fan motor electrical lead installation, as well as subsequent post maintenance testing, failed to detect this error. As a consequence, operators returned the fan to service with it running in the reverse direction as part of an extended post maintenance test. This *

caused a slight positive differential pressure to develop in the auxiliary building, a condition which is outside the system's design basis. PSE&G's initial corrective action implementation regarding this issue was not consistent with program guidance. Lastly, PSE&G's design basis evaluation for reportability of this event was not timel *

M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M A Emergency Diesel Generator On-line Maintenance Inspection Scope (62707) Between March 9 -12, 1999, the inspectors reviewed the plan for and observed an on-line maintenance outage of the 2A emergency diesel generator (EOG). PSE&G quality assurance (QA) staff also observed and evaluated station personnel performance during the outage, and prepared a written report of their assessment dated March 24, 199 The inspectors reviewed the QA assessment document and discussed the various findings with the responsible individual Observations and Findings QA auditors prepared a detailed inspection plan and thoroughly evaluated station performance during the 2A EDG maintenanc.e outage. During the conduct of the actual work activities, the inspectors identified several minor discrepancies with respect to station work practices. All of these NRG-identified issues were also independently identified by the QA auditors, as well as several other concerns not detected by the NRC inspection staff. The inspectors noted that each of the concerns was appropriately entered into the station's corrective action program, and accurately prioritized for

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Though the EOG outage was completed safely and before the expiration of the technical specification allowed outage time, the results of the. QA audit indicated that PSE&G continued to experience difficulties in meeting on-line maintenance outage objective For example, pre-outage planning efforts failed to identify the need for critical spare parts availability. The lack of a spare EOG jacket water pressure switch resulted in a 24-hour delay in outage completion when technicians determined that the installed switch was

  • faulty. QA also identified work coordination errors with respect to safety tagging which led to a further unplanned increase in EOG unavailability time. Lastly, the risk assessment completed to justify the on-line work activity did not consider all of the station systems and components which could have affected the risk of conducting the maintenance. The inspectors detected many of these same deficiencies during their independent assessment bf the work activitie Conclusions QA auditors thoroughly evaluated station performance during a 2A emergency diesel generator (EOG) maintenance outage. Though station personnel completed the EOG maintenance safely and within the allowed outage time, PSE&G continued to experience difficulties in meeting on-line maintenance outage objectives, in large part due to planning and work coordination deficiencies. These deficiencies led to unplanned increases in system unavailability time.

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MB Miscellaneou~ Maintenance Issues M (Closed) LER 50-272/97-001-01: Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Testing of Component Cooling Water System Check Valves Inspection Scope (92700. 92901)

The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the subject LER and verified selected corrective action Observations and Findings During a review of the inservice testing (IST) program, PSE&G personnel determined that two component cooling water (CCW) system check valves were not being tested as required. The noted CCW check valves are American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code class 3 boundary valves, and were previously exempted from the IST program because they were isolated from active service. However, PSE&G later restored the check valves to active service as part of a system configuration change without considering the IST program requirements. Following identification, PSE&G tested the noted check valves satisfactorily, and appropriately changed the IST program scope to include periodic testing of these valves. Corrective actions for this event were documented in action request 970220076. This Severity Level IV violation of 1 OCFR 50.55a codes and standards requirements is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRG Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-311/99-02-05) Conclusions Inattention to detail resulted in the failure to test two component cooling water check valves in the station inservice testing program. Corrective actions for this licensee identified and corrected issue were appropriat M (Closed) LER 50-311/99-001-00: Main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test Inspection Scope (92700. 92901, 92902)* The inspectors conducted an on site review of the subject LER and verified selected corrective action Observations and Findings During testing of the Unit 2 main steam safety valves (MSSV), seven of the 20 valves tested failed to lift at the required setpoint (see Section M 1.1 ). Each failure was outside the technical specification setpoint tolerance of 1 percent; however, each failure remained within the 3 percent setpoint tolerance assumed in the accident analysis of the updated final safety analysis report. Therefore, no safety consequences existe PSE&G personnel attributed the cause of the test failures to "setpoint variance" due to aging, consistent with an NRG study (AEOD/S92-20) that yielded similar results for

  • components that remained unexercised for extended periods of time. As discussed in section M1.1, the affected valves were adjusted and retested satisfactorily. Additional planned corrective actions are contained within the subject LE Conclusions Age-related "setpoint" variance resulted in seven of 20 Unit 2 main steam safety valves failing to lift within tolerances required by technical specifications. PSE&G's actions to address these test failures were timely and appropriat Ill. Engineering E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Service Water System Performance Inspection Scope (37551. 62707, 71707)
  • Salem 1 and 2 experienced a combined total of ten individual SW pump train failures during the report period, largely due to the pump discharge strainers clogging with river grass and debris. The service water (SW) system is a risk-significant system that has

. had a recent history of unreliable performance during periods of high river grass concentration. River grass concentrations have historically been at their peak in the late winter/early spring months. The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the SW intake structure to assess the effectiveness of PSE&G's actions to improve the reliability of the SW system and to minimize the biological fouling of SW-cooled safety-related heat exchangers. During the previous report period, the inspectors noted several weaknesses in PSE&G's approach to resolving emergent SW system issue Observations and Findings Despite the frequent challenges, PSE&G's approach to addressing SW system performance issues improved since the previous report period. Operator responses to emergent SW train failures were timely and appropriate. For example, operators remained in abnormal operating procedure SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0003, "Component Biofou/ing," for the duration of the report period. The inspectors concluded that this latter action not only helped to maintain a strong focus on the increased potential for unexpected SW pump train failures, but also placed the system in a condition which minimized the likelihood of traveling screen failures and "carryover" of debris into the associated pumps and discharge strainers. Immediate actions to maintain adequate SW system flow following unexpected train failures were proper. Following each of these events, operators promptly identified the failures and effectively monitored SW system header pressure and placed alternate pumps in service when necessar In an enhanced effort to minimize train unavailability following unexpected failures, PSE&G initiated and completed SW-related maintenance activities in a more aggressive

manner, consistent with the system's 10 CFR 50.65 (maintenance rule) "a(1)" statu The inspectors witnessed good proficiency and procedure use on the part of the maintenance technicians who were working to repair the various affected SW

. components; additionally, frequent supervisory presence was evident in the field. No repeat work or failed post maintenance tests resulted from inadequate work practice PSE&G engineering personnel conducted appropriate SW system performance monitoring in accordance with the station's maintenance rule program. For example, the inspectors noted that engineering personnel frequently collected and evaluated SW-cooled heat exchanger data for indications of biological fouling. Secondly, the inspectors verified that SW train reliability and unavailability data was accurately derived and recorded following several of the emergent SW issues. However, the inspectors noted that control room narrative log entries which were used to derive the needed data were often inconsistent and sometimes incomplete, which frequently led to. difficulties in determining the proper times to record for SW train unavailabilit PSE&G engineers also maintained an appropriate long term focus on SW performance improvement in that they continued to propose and develop design changes in an effort to enhance the reliability of the system. For example, PSE&G management approved the acquisition of new SW intake structure traveling screens which incorporated*

improved internal spray wash patterns and modified screen baskets. These newly-designed screens were installed in both the 11 and 13 SW bays during the report period, but insufficient operating experience with the new screens was available to establish the overall effectiveness of this modification. Based on discussions with engineering staff and management, the inspectors learned that further SW system modifications were planned, which included a proposed change to the pump discharge strainers to minimize their susceptibility to river debris cloggin Corrective action program implementation and independent review of SW system activities also improved during the report period. Further, active management oversight of SW-related engineering and maintenance activities was evident. The inspectors noted that PSE&G personnel initiated SW-related corrective action requests that were more timely, accurate, and consistent with program requirements than was observed during the previous report period. Additionally, the inspectors attended a station operations review committee meeting during which committee members thoroughly questioned the engineering staff regarding recent SW system performance trends, planned maintenance activities, and design changes. Lastly, in an effort to minimize plant operating risk, station management frequently adjusted the preplanned on-line work schedule to account for emergent SW issues. Specifically, individual equipment outage "windows" were moved to ensure that redundant systems were not intentionally degraded simultaneousl Conclusions The Salem units continued to experience frequent service water (SW) system train failures, though PSE&G's approach to addressing this issue. improved since the previous report period. Immediate operator actions following the emergent SW train failures were

  • timely and appropriate. SW-related maintenance activities. were completed in an aggressive manner to minimize train unavailability and overall plant risk. Engineering personnel conducted appropriate SW system performance monitoring in accordance with the station's maintenance rule program. Corrective action program implementation and independent review of SW system activities also improved during the report perio E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E Review of System Health Reports Inspection Scope (37551. 62707)

To enhance work prioritization and system manager awareness of their associated systems, PSE&G engineering department personnel developed a system health reporting program. The inspectors reviewed the content of selected recent health reports for risk significant systems and held discussions with cognizant system managers. During the review, the inspectors focused on items such as 1 O CFR 50.65 (maintenance rule) implementation and backlogged corrective maintenance activities rather than on program administratio Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed health reports for the component cooling water (CCW), auxiliary feedwater, and containment spray systems. The reports were of sufficient detail to support an accurate assessment of overall system health and performance trends. From the review, the inspectors did riot identify any equipment operability issues, and noted that in each case maintenance rule data was appropriately collected and trended. The inspectors reviewed the corrective maintenance backlog for the Unit 1 and 2 CCW systems. Based on discussions with the associated system manager, the inspectors found that the items were adequately prioritized and that schedule dates had been assigned for most item System health reports were prepared quarterly by the associated system manager and reviewed by the system senior reactor operator. Overall health of the system was based on a combination of indicators including maintenance rule status, backlogged corrective maintenance activities, unplanned events and temporary modifications. The system health program was a relatively new concept, with the first reports issued in September 1998. As of the end of the inspection period, PSE&G was continuing to further refine the program and its uses. For example, system managers are currently using the reports to develop long term system goals for sustained good performanc Conclusions System health reports were of good quality and provided an accurate assessment of overall status of the associated system. System managers responsible for preparing the reports were knowledgeable of their systems.

I

ES Miscellaneous Engineering Issues E (Closed} LER 50-311/98-007-01: Reactor Coolant Instrument Line Through-Wall Leak Inspection Scope (90712}

The inspectors performed and in-office review of the subject LER supplement. This issue was originally described in NRC inspection report 50-311/98-08, section E2.2. The original LER was reviewed and closed in NRC inspection report 50-311/98-11. This supplemental LER describes the results of a vendor labqratory analysis of affected stainless steel instrument tubing samples, as well as additional corrective actions PSE&G proposed to address the newly acquired informatio Observations and Findings The PSE&G engineering staff completed a thorough root cause assessment of the Unit 2 reactor coolant system instrument flow tubing failures, and developed comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the extent of condition and to prevent its recurrence. An independent laboratory analysis attributed the cause of the through-wall leakage to transgranular stress corrosion cracking initiated on the outside diameter of the tubing surface. PSE&G surmised that tubing mechanical stresses in conjunction with external surface contaminants contributed to the cracking. All of the affected Unit 2 tubing was promptly replaced once identifie PSE&G indicated in their LER that potentially susceptible tubing at Salem 1 would be examined during a future unit outage of sufficient duration. The inspectors determined that such an opportunity was available during a Unit 1 forced outage between February 28 - March 3, 1999, following an unplanned reactor trip. However, PSE&G elected not to conduct this inspection, and instead deferred the activity to a subsequent outage. The inspectors discussed this conoern with station management, who stated that they considered adding the inspection to the forced outage but did not because, at the time of the reactor trip, they believed the outage would be shorter than it actually turned out to be. In short, management believed that they wouldn't have sufficient time to conduct an adequate inspectio *

PSE&G planned to evaluate other uninsulated tubing in the plant for the presence of contaminants, and conduct surface cleaning as needed. PSE&G also indicated that specific training regarding cleanliness requirements for stainless steel components would be provided to appropriate station personne Conclusions PSE&G engineering staff completed a thorough root cause assessment of the Unit 2 reactor coolant system instrument flow tubing failures, and developed comprehensive corrective actions to evaluate the extent of condition and to prevent recurrenc *

R1 R IV. Plant Support Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls Radiological Surveys and Postings Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspectors accompanied radiological protection (RP) department personnel during the performance of routine surveys in selected radiologically controlled areas. The inspectors also verified that appropriate postings were displayed based on survey result Observations and Findings c.

F2 F RP technicians performed the observed surveys for radiation and.contamination in accordance with station procedures. The technicians used appropriate survey instruments and properly documented the results on survey maps. No discrepancies were noted. The inspectors reviewed several recent survey maps, and verified that the associated areas were property poste Conclusions Radiological protection personnel properly performed selected surveys and appropriately posted surveyed areas based on established radiation and contamination level Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment Facility Tour Inspection Scope (64704)

The inspectors toured the Salem Unit 2 turbine building and switchgear rooms to inspect installed fire wrap and to assess the status of the Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System (ERFBS) project. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed compensatory actions for degraded fire barriers to determine if the barriers were adequately maintaine Observations and Findings The inspectors noted that the control of combustibles was good in the observed areas of the plan The inspectors toured areas where the degraded fire barrier materials were installed on cable, conduit, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) ducts in the various switchgear rooms. PSE&G personnel explained that there was a total of approximately 14,500 linear feet of 3M FS-195 material and approximately 5,230 linear feet of 3M E-50 material installed in the two Salem units. The inspectors verified that PSE&G was

evaluating these materials and others in accordance with their three phase fire barrier resolution plan, as further discussed in section F8.1.

. TheJnspectors reviewed excerpts of fire watch logs, observed areas where degraded fire barriers were.installed, and held discussions with PSE&G's Loss Prevention Coordinato The inspectors found that compensatory measures consisted of hourly roving fire watches in areas with degraded fire barriers. The inspectors also found that a sample of daily fire logs was complete and the observed fire areas were inspected in a timely manner. Based on these activities, the inspectors determined that PSE&G continued to

  • maintain adequate compensatory measures for the degraded fire barrier Conclusions f 3 F General housekeeping in the plant was good, and acceptable compensatory measures were maintained in areas with degraded fire barrier Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation Fire Barrier Material General Testing Results Inspection Scope (64704)

The inspectors reviewed the general testing documentation for two fire barrier material types to determine the adequacy of testing. The inspectors reviewed test report number *

14980-102954, "Fire Endurance Tests of Articles Protected with 3M FS-195 Fire Barrier System," dated July 14, 1998, and test report number 14980-104090, "Fire Endurance Test of Articles Protected with Selected Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems," dated March 3, 1999, to validate the fire resistance capability of the tested material Observations and Findings.

PSE&G *completed comprehensive testing for 3M FS-195 and 3M E-50 fire barrier materials. The inspectors noted that the test items protected with 3M FS-195 material did not meet the one hour fire barrier requirement. The inspectors also noted that the 3M E-50 material achieved or nearly achieved the one hour fire barrier requirement. The inspectors found that the tests performed were for general configurations and were not fully optimized for the installed plant configurations. PSE&G planned to evaluate plant configurations at a later date to determine the adequacy of the 3M E-50 materia PSE&G staff stated that they also had plans to test*several other materials (such as Darmat and Mecatiss) in an effort to determine what materials could be used as a suitable replacement for the 3M FS-195 material currently installed on electrical raceways and other plant configurations. The tests and material selections were being reviewed with consideration of the ampacity derating factor_of the materials.

  • Conclusions PSE&G's fire barrier testing approach was thorough. However, additional tests were

.. necessary to select a suitable material for fire barrier replacement. The inspectors also concluded that PSE&G was appropriately considering the cable ampacity derating factor to be applied for the fire barrier materials being tested for use at Sale F Review of Modification Package Inspection Scope (64704) The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of a modification package developed to remove a portion of 3M FS-195 material for testing purpose Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed minor modification $98-002, "Removal of Fire Wrap From Cable Tray 1A207" in Salem Unit 1. PSE&G developed this modification to remove approximately 95 feet of 3M FS-195 material for fire endurance testing. The 3M FS-195 material was obsolete and not available for procurement. The inspectors found that PSE&G had appropriately evaluated the removal of this material by reviewing their safe shutdown (SSD) analysis DE-PS.ZZ-0001 (Q), Revision 3, and determined that only two

  • of three divisions of power were required to achieve post fire safe shutdown in this area.

Additionally, the inspectors found that the minor modification package included adequate drawings, removal instructions, and an appropriate 1 O CFR 50.59 applicability revie The inspectors noted no discrepancies in the packag Conclusions Modification package S98-002 properly addressed the removal of 3M FS-195 fire barrier material from cable tray 1A207 for testing purposes. The modification package included appropriate instructions and drawings to perform the modification. Additionally, the.

package contained an adequate 1 O CFR 50.59 applicability revie F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities F The Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System CERFBS) Project Inspection Scope (64704)

The inspectors reviewed a quality assurance (QA) audit report and an independent assessment report regarding the ERFBS program.

17 Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed QA assessment report number 99-0034, "Salem Fire Wrap Project,. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R," dated March 3, 1999. The scope of the assessment included the following areas of the fire wrap project:

Verification that contracfor project instructions (Pis) were in accordance with bid proposal from contracto *

Verification that a selected draft fire area compliance assessment was in accordance with program instruction *

Verification of the adequacy of corrective actions for contractor QA internal audits of the projec *

Review of the open item list for compliance with procedures NC.NA-AP.ZZ-OOOO(Q), "Action Request Process" and NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0006(Q), "Corrective Action Program."

  • Verification of closure status of NRC inspection reports 50-272; 311/93-80 & 97-09 open item *

Verification that the fire wrap project had been assessed by Nuclear Engineerin The QA audit did not identify any technical or programmatic issues and all activities were being performed in accordance with the project plan and methodology. However, QA identified minor programmatic and procedural weal<nesses for two of the items described above. The inspectors found that these minor weaknesses were entered into PSE&G's corrective action program for resolution. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the interface between the contractor and the PSE&G fire wrap project team for controlling ERFBS project activities was adequat The inspectors also reviewed report number P1255-03-1, "Fire Barrier Wrap Reduction Project Salem Nuclear Generation Station," dated February 1999, prepared by an independent assessment team. This assessment evaluated the following aspects of the Salem Appendix R program and the ERFBS project:

consistency of assumptions, bases, and guidelines contained within the ERFBS project instructions with current NRC expectations for component selection, circuit analysis, and separation analysis;

conformance of the safe shutdown performance goals with 10 CFR 50.48 and 1 O CFR 50, Appendix R, Section 111.L;

validation of safe shutdown cable selection for a sample of the safe shutdown components;

  • determination that associated circuits by common power supply, by common enclosure and multiple high impedance faults (MHIFs) were appropriately addressed; and

evaluation of the feasibility of proposed strategies (if any) for wrap reductio The assessment team did not identify any deficiencies regarding the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R program. The assessment team found that the program assumptions, bases and guidelines contained within the ERFBS project appeared to be consistent with the current NRC expectation~.

The inspectors noted that audit scopes, findings, and observations were good and met the requirements of the ERFBS program. The inspectors determined that these assessments demon.strated good problem identification and clearly communicated findings in the reports. The inspectors verified that proper corrective actions were taken to effectively resolve identified deficiencies. The inspectors noted that several issues such as circuit analysis assumptions, MHIFs analysis, and fire effects on instrument sensing lines continued to be evaluated by PSE& As part of the review of the independent assessment, the inspectors also reviewed a sample of a SSD re-analysis for the 21 component cooling pump area. The inspectors found that the SSD re-analysis was separated into the following groups;

Fire Area Assessment Summary;

Fire Area Summary Report;

Affected Component Report;

Fire Area Cable Routing Report;

Fire Area Cable Assessment Report;

Wrapped Raceway Report by Fire Area;

Appendix R Manual Actions Report by Fire Area; and,

Logic Diagram *

The inspectors found the SSD re-analysis included and described various systems/equipment located in the fire area, impact of fire on components, suppression and detection systems in the fire area, SSD goals, and logic diagrams. The inspectors limited review of the SSD re-analysis identified no discrepancie PSE&G developed the SSD re-analyses using assumptions from their SSD circuit analysis project instruction (Pl) and assumptions contained in other Pis. The SSD Pis provided guidance for performing circuit analyses for SSD in a consistent and methodical manner. The Pl assumptions formed the basis for PSE&G meeting the SSD requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The inspectors reviewed a sample of Pl assumptions for the* re-evaluated SSD circuit analysis PI and found no discrepancie However, the inspectors did not review all Pis or Pl assumptions for the ERFBS program. The inspectors found that PSE&G had intended to issue additional Pis and revise current PI assumptions to address topics such as MHIFs and instrumentation

  • sensing lines. The inspectors noted that the Pis and the SSD re-analyses were not yet implemented at the sit Conclusions A quality assurance assessment and independent assessment appropriately reviewed fire protection program attributes and compliance with program requirements. PSE&G properly addressed the audit findings and implemented timely corrective actions for identified deficiencie F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues F Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System Project Status Inspection Scope (64704)

During previous inspections conducted in 1993 and 1997, the NRC identified concerns that one hour fire wrap materials protecting cable raceways and conduit were not qualified to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements. Subsequently, PSE&G committed (by letters LR-N97320, dated May 19, 1997, and LR-N97357, dated June 6, 1997 to the NRC) to develop and implement a three phase plan to resolve the NRC's concerns. The inspectors reviewed the three phase fire barrier resolution plan, including the project schedule, to assess the progress of the progra Observation and Findings The three phases of the resolution plan are:

Phase 1 - Review Plant Design (SSD Re-analysis and Installed Configurations)

Phase 2 - Engineer Resolutions

Phase 3 - Perform Modifications PSE&G planned to complete the project in the fourth quarter of 200 The inspectors reviewed the three phase plan documentation and discussed the project with PSE&G personnel. The inspector's found that the following schedule had been develope Phase 1 12199 (U2)

3100 (U1)

Phase 2 1/02 (U2)

7102 (U1)

Phase 3 5/02 (U2)

12/02 (U1)

  • The inspectors determined that PSE&G had completed their review of the SSD re-analysis for unit 2 only and had planned to perform configuration walkdowns of areas in unit 2 where degraded fire barriers had been identified. The walkdown plans were to ensure-that the installation drawings matched the as-installed configurations. The.

inspectors found that these tasks were a part of the requirements to complete phase 1 of the ERFBS project for unit 2. Additionally, the inspectors determined that general testing of various materials, as described in section F3.1, had commenced but was not completed by the end of this inspection. The inspectors noted that, while the program was in its early stages, PSE&G had completed one of the initial milestones of their plan and was working toward completing phase 1 of the three phase plan for unit Conclusions PSE&G met the early milestones of the three phase program for fire barrier resolutio F (Closed) IFI 50-272: 311/97-09-01: Penetration seal thermal mas Inspection Scope (64704) During previous NRC inspections conducted in 1997 and 1998, the inspectors found that the thermal mass of items that penetrated seals and the maximum free area of unsupported penetration seal material installed could not be readily determined for each penetration. Although it appeared to the inspectors that the as-built configurations were bounded by the tested configurations for the seals, this could not be verified because the as-built drawings did not identify cable size and cable fill for each penetration. The inspectors reviewed PSE&G's actions to evaluate the thermal impact of large masses on penetration seal performanc Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed evaluations SC-FBR-MEE-1321, "Qualifications of Maximum Free Area Limitations,n Revision 0, SC-FBR-MEE-1322, "Qualification of Cable Fill (Thermal Mass)," Revision 0, and Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) P.O. Number 93-H-72449, "Penetration Seal Fire Resistance Tests, 3-Hour Qualification," dated November 22, 1993. The inspectors found that PSE&G had reviewed approximately 13,200 penetration seals and verified that they were bounded by the tested configurations. PSE&G had performed analyses considering cable fill, thermal mass and reviewed testing conducted for GSU using 750 MCM power cable which was considered a "worst case" configuration for Salem. The inspectors found that the analyses were thorough and included appropriate assumptions for the evaluations. The inspectors also found that the analyses provided a suitable mix of instrumentation, control, and power cable in the cable trays to determine cable fill and thermal mass of analyzed configurations. Additionally, the inspectors found that the 750 MCM cables tested were larger than the common large size power cables (300 MCM) installed in Salem. Based on the above, the inspectors determined the as-built drawings were bound by the tested configurations of the penetration seals. The inspectors found the analyses performed by PSE&G to be acceptabl. '*

~.... *

  • **~¥);" ** ;-;..,;:...... ~.

21 Conclusions PSE&G completed an analysis of the penetration seals thermal masses to verify that the

. as-built drawings were bounded by the test configurations for penetration seal PSE&G's approach to resolving this issue was acceptabl F Disposition of NRC Information Notice (IN} 99-07 Inspection Scope (64704)

The inspectors reviewed PSE&G's disposition of NRC IN 99-07, "Failed Fire Protection Deluge Valves and Potential Testing Deficiencies in Pre-Action Sprinkler Systems." Observations and Findings Through discussions with PSE&G personnel and review of Action Request (AR) number 0090326267, "IN 99-07 - Fire Protection System Problems," the inspectors determined that PSE&G had appropriately entered this IN into their corrective action program for evaluation. PSE&G had not completed the evaluation of this issue by the end of this inspection. However, PSE&G stated that, while the specific valves discussed in the IN were not installed in Salem or Hope Creek, their evaluation was to include a comparison of the installed deluge valves design for common issues. Additionally, PSE&G had

planned to review deluge valve failure history, maintenance, and testing for Salem and Hope Creek. The inspectors found PSE&G's approach to resolve the issues in IN 99-07 acceptabl Conclusions PSE&G's approach to evaluating NRC Information Notice (IN) 99-07 for deluge valve issues at Salem and Hope Creek was acceptabl F (Closed) Special Report 50-311/98-009-00: Failure to Post Continuous Fire Watch as Required by Fire Protection Program Inspection Scope (92700. 92904)

The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the subject special report and verified selected corrective action Observations and Findings This special report documents a failure to post a continuous firewatch in an area with impaired smoke detectors. Upon discovery, PSE&G personnel immediately posted a continuous firewatch, in addition to a previously established hourly firewatch for degraded fire barriers. PSE&G attributed the cause of the event to human error, in that fire protection department personnel failed to recognize the impaired smoke detector No safety consequences resulted from the event. The inspectors verified that PSE&G

..

repaired the noted smoke detectors and returned them to service. This failure to adhere

. to PSE&G's fire protection program constitutes a violation of minor significance and is riot subject to formal enforcement actio Conclusions PSE&G fire protection department personnel failed to identify an impaired fire detection system which resulted in a failure to establish the required compensatory measure Corrective actions resulting from this event were appropriat V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary On April 23, 1999, the inspectors presented their overall findings and conclusions to members of PSE&G management led by Mr. F. Sullivan, the Director of System Engineering. The inspectors held separate exit meetings on April 16, 1999, and April 29, 1999, to present the results of the special fire protection system review. PSE&G management acknowledged the findings presented and did not contest any of the inspector's conclusions. Additionally, they stated that none of the information reviewed by the inspectors was considered proprietar X2 Management Visits On March 22, 1999, Mr. H. Miller (Regional Administrator, NRC Region I), and Mr. A. Blough (Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region I) conducted a routine management visit at the Salem facilitie On April 13, 1999, NRC Chairman S. Jackson visited the Salem station and conducted a brief press conferenc X3 Miscellaneous On March 19, 1999, a group of three NRC Region I-based inspectors completed an inspection of PSE&G's work management process implementation and corrective action program effectiveness. The results of this inspection will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-272&311/99-03.

IP 37551:

IP 40500:

IP 61726:

IP 62707:

IP 64704:

IP 71707:

IP 71750:

IP 90712:

IP 92700:

IP 92901:

IP 92902:

. IP 92903:

IP 92904:

IP 93702:

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Fire* Protection Plant Operations Plant Support Activities lnoffice Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine.Events at Power Reactor Facilities Plant Operations Followup Maintenance Followup

. Engineering Fo!!owup *

Plant Support Followup Event Followup ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened/Closed 50-311/99-02-01 NCV Failure to maintain safety-related maintenance procedur (Section 08.3)

50-272/99-02-02 NCV Auxiliary building exhaust fan maintenance error. (Section M1.3)

50-272/99-02-03 NCV Failure to adhere to corrective action program procedure and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. (Section M1.3)

50-272/99-02-04 NCV Failure to report condition outside design basis. (Section M1.3)

50-311199-02-05 NCV Failure to perform inservice testing for component cooling water system check valves. (Section M8.1)

Closed 50-272197-001-01 LER Failure to perform technical specification surveillance testing of component cooling water system check valve (Section M8.1)

50-272&311/97-09-01 IFI Penetration seal thermal mass. (Section F8.2)

50-311/98-007-01 50-311198-009-00 50-272/99-001-00 50-311199-001-00 50-311199-003-00

. 50-311199-004-00

LER Reactor coolant system instrument line through-wall leak (Section E8.1)

LER Reactor scram as a result of turbine trip. (Section 08.1)

LER Main steam safety valves failed lift set test. (Section M8.2)

LER Unplanned loss of all safety-related ventilation chiller unit (Section 08.3)

LER Engineered safety feature actuation: containment ventilation system isolation during reactor vessel head removal. (Section 08.2)

ABV AFW AR ASME ccw CFR EOG ERFBS GSU HVAC IFI IN IST LER MHIF MSSV NRC NRR PDR Pl PSE&G QA RFO RHR RP RP&C SSD SW TS TSAS

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Auxiliary Building Ventilation Auxiliary Feedwater Action Request American Society of Mechanical Engineers Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System Gulf States Utilities Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Inspector Follow-up Item Information Notice lnservice Testing Licensee Event Report Multiple High Impedance Fault Main Steam Safety Valve Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Public Document Room Project Instruction Public Service Electric and Gas Quality Assurance Refueling Outage Residual Heat Removal Radiological Protection Radiological Protection and Chemistry Safe Shutdown Service Water Techn.ical Specification TS Action Statement

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