IR 05000272/1988024
| ML18093B440 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1989 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093B438 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-88-24, 50-311-88-27, NUDOCS 8902130421 | |
| Download: ML18093B440 (14) | |
Text
Report N License Licensee:
Facility:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/88-24 50-311/88-27 DRP-70 DRP-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 December 13, 1988 - January 30, 1989 Kathy Halvey Gibson, Senior Resident Insp8ctor P. D. Swetland, Chief, Projects Section 2B
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection 50-272/88-24; 311/88-27 on December 13, 1988 - January 30, 1989 Areas Inspected:
Resident safety inspection of the following areas:
operations, radiological controls, surveillance testing, maintenance, emergency preparedness, security, engineering/technical support, safety assessment/quality verification, and review of licensee. report Results:
One violation was cited regarding failure to properly establish and implement procedures which resulted in the temporary unavailability of the lA emergency diesel generator (Detail 2.2.1.B).
Two licensee-identified maintenance procedure violations were noted (Details 5.2.B & C).
Licensee control of equipment setpoint and control data was unresolved pending further inspector review (Detaii 5.2.B).
DETAILS SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection period e~cept for three brief power reductions resulting from the initiation of reactor shutdowns on January 4, 1989, January 20, 1989 and January 21, 1989 as required by Technical Specification limiting conditions for operatio On each occasion, the problem was resolved and the unit returned to 100%
powe Unit 2 was shutdown for repairs to the main turbine gland seal and replacement of the main power transforme Reactor startup was initiated on January 9, 1989 and the unit was synchronized to the grid on January 12, 198.
OPERATIONS (71707) Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, the inspectors verified.
that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Limiting Conditions. for Operation, and review of facility record These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 71707 and included weekend and backshift inspection.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2. Unit 1 On December 20, 1988 the cap on a pressure tap on the bottom of the Unit 1 service water piping to the turbine building failed due to corrosio Turbine building service water isolation valve 1SW26 was closed to affect immediate emergency repair This resulted in a temporary loss of service water to the turbine building including turbine generator auxiliary system The isolation valve 1SW26 was reope~ed approximately 4 miniites after closure due to a rise in turbine generator lube oil temperature from 100 degrees F to 140 degrees The procedural limit for tripping the turbine was 180 degrees With service water restored, the lube oil temperature was decreased to approximately 100 degrees F and valve 1SW26 was closed a second time to complete the installation of wooden wedges under the pressure tap, which stopped the leak.
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Subsequently the leak reinitiated when a crack developed in the pressure tap pipin On December 21, 1988, the licensee made preparations to close 1SW26 to allow removal of the pressure tap piping and installation of a wooden plug and~ metal saddle to seal the one inch hole in the service water pip The Maintenance Department developed a Temporary Procedure and Work Order 88-12-20-132 which provided specific instructions for installing the temporary repai The Temporary Procedure specified a 4 minute time limit for completing the repair with 1SW26 isolated based on the previously observed rise in turbine lube oil temperatur Abnormal Operating Procedure ADP-SW~2, Service Water Turbine Header Leak provides guidance for operations personnel to monitor and control turbine generator (TG) parameters during service water header outage If TG parameters are not monitored and controlled closely, equipment damage and/or a turbine/reactor trip could resul Prior to the performance of the temporary repair, the inspector discussed with station management the adequacy of ADP-SW-2 in monitoring TG operational parameters during the repair As a result, the licensee identified that the lube oil temperature used in ADP-SW-2 as the action limit for manually tripping the turbine was not indicated directly in the main control roo The procedure was changed to include a limit of 210 degrees Fon bearing metal temperature which could be monitored by operations supervision on the control room compute The licensee was satisfied that the revised ADP provided sufficient guidance for the operators and the SW repair was accomplishe The inspector observed activities both in the control room and in the service water building and noted the following deficiencies relative to performance of the temporary repai The operating staff had not established a formal action plan/procedure to assure that the initial TG parameters were met prior to shutting 1SW2 Further, action points other than the 4-minute repair duration were not established tQ prevent ADP limits for a turbine trip from being reache These were left to the discretion of the Seni6r Shift Supervisor (SSS).
The inspector did observe general discussions between the SSS and operators in the control room concerning the need to reopen 1SW26 prior to reaching the turbine trip limit The pre-job briefing held by the Operations Engineer for operations personnel did not include all personnel important to control of the evolutio For example, the Unit 1 shift supervisor who was assigned to the service water building to direct and ensure the timely reopening
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of 1SW26 had already left for the SW building prior to the briefin No entries were made on operations supervisors' logs to record the operational aspects of the evolution, loss of service water to the turbine building and TG auxiliaries, entry into the AOP and pertinent changes in TG parameters observed and actions take Administrative control of the position of the chlorine header inlet valve 1SW27, which injects chlorine into to the service water piping above the pressure tap was inadequat The Unit 1 shift supervisor directed 1SW27 to be closed prior to closing 1SW2 Twenty-four hours later 1SW27 was still closed and was reopened only after the inspector questioned its proper positio Maintenance preplanning failed to identify that a hydraulic jack could not be used to hold the saddle in place and that the wooden plugs were too long to be inserted into the hole in the service water piping until the repair was in progress.
Although the temporary repair was completed successfully within the 4 minute time limit without exceeding the AOP TG parameter limits, the inspector was concerned that this high risk evolution which could have caused a reactor trip was not better
~ontrolled by operations managemen The lack of definitive guidance for establishment of initial TG parameters prior to shutting 1SW26, the lack of a set of definitive operational limits at which 1SW26 would be reopened, and the loss of control of the chloride inl~t valve are indications that improvements in control and documentation of operations activities in support of maintenance evolutions are neede (Closed) Unresolved Item 272/88-22-Dl; Fuel oil spill from the lA EOG day tank during calibration of the lC EOG day tank level instrumentatio The inspector discussed the incident with licensee personnel, reviewed the licensee's fact finding documentation and related procedure The EOG fuel oil system is designed so that the backup fuel oil transfer pump will start if the regular pump fails as indicated by day tank level reaching the low-low level setpoin During performance of the calibration, the equipment bperator (ED) apparently did not verify that one pump was selected to backu Both pumps were selected to 11 regular 11 and therefore started when the lC EOG day tank low level setpoint was reache The fuel oil flow which goes to all three day tanks exceeded the overflow capacity of the lA EOG day tank resulting in the fuel oil spill from the lA EOG day tan The lA EOG was taken out of service due to the
fire hazard resulting from the spilled fuel oi The inspector determined that an adequate procedure was not used by operations personnel for valve manipulations to.change the lC EOG day tank level and for manipulation of OG fuel oil transfer pump select switches in support of the maintenance calibration of the level instrumentatio Although a related operations surveillance procedure SP(0)4.8.l.1.3A specifies verifying that one diesel fuel oil transfer pump is selected to 11 regular" and the other selected to 11 backup 11, this procedure did not cover actuation of the low-low level setpoint and was not in use for this calibratio Failure to properly establish and/or implement procedures for surveillance, calibration or test activities is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. (50-272/88-24-01)
The licensee has not.determined whether the EOG fuel oil system is designed to handle two pump flow capacity, with flow isolated to one of the three OG day tanks as was the condition during the lC EOG day tank level calibratio The inspector was told that additional data will be taken during the next scheduled operational surveillance and analyzed by system engineering to calculate system capacity in various condition In addition, the licensee attributed the reported blockage in
}8 EOG day tank supply line to an apparent partially stuck closed swing check valv However, upon disassembly of the check valve, no material deficiencies were note Subsequent surveillance tests relative to filling the 18 EOG day tank were satisfactor One further item pursued by the inspector involved the cause of the lA EOG day tank*dike lea The licensee determined that the previously installed sealing compound around piping penetrations in the floor of the dike have degrade The licensee is preparing a design change package to rework the seal This item is close On January 4, 1989, an Unusual Event was declared and a Unit 1 shutdown commenced due to all three groups of containment fan coil units (CFCU) being inoperabl No. 12 Service Water (SW)
nuclear header had been previously removed from service on January 3, 1989 for planned maintenanc Isolation of No. 12 SW nuclear header resulted in a loss of cooling water to No and 15 CFCUs rendering two of the three CFCU groups inoperabl This condition is allowed by Technical Specifications (T.S.) for up to 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Later on January 4, 1989, a service water leak was discovered on the motor cooler of No. 11 CFCU which resulted in the third CFCU group being isolate In accordance with T.S. 3.0.3 a reactor shutdown was commence No. 12 SW nuclear header was restored to service after reactor power was reduced to 85%.
The two groups of
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CFCUs were declared operable following test runs on Nos. 14 and 15 CFC The Unusual Event was then terminated and reactor power returned to 100%.
Maintenance to repair the No. 11 CFCU SW leak was completed on January 8, 198 On January 20, 1989, an Unusual Event was declared and a reactor shutdown commenced due to the breaker position input to the reactor trip system for all four reactor coolant pumps (RCP) being declared inoperabl During a licensee technical specification surveillance review, it was determined that the RCP breaker position contact to the solid state protection system (SSPS) portion of the circuit had not been tested as required by T.S. 3.3.1.1, because the surveillance procedure which tests the rest of the circuit does not include the contactor functio Subsequently the licensee determined that the contact operability is verified during performance of channel functional test lIC-2.6.024, First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure, step 8. which verifies the reactor protection status panel lights for the RCP breaker open reactor trip These lights are powered from'the same contact The Unusual Event was terminated and the reactor, which had been decreased to 46% power, was returned to 100% powe The licensee has written a separate sur~eillance pro-cedure SP(0)4.3.l.1.l, RCP Status Indication Test, to clarify
- performance of the surveillance tes On January 21, 1989, an Unusual Event was declared and a reactor shutdown commenced in accordance with T.S. 3.3.2.1 Action b.13 due to the SSPS train A slave output relay associated with the lC safeguards equipment control (SEC) cabinet being declared inoperabl The condition was identified during performance of surveillance test SP(0)4.3.2.1.1 E-A, ESF - SSPS S1ave Relay Test - Train A, in which voltage was not indicated from the SSPS Train A to the lC SE Further investigation by the licensee determined that a test status light in the series circuit with the test point was burned out; and resulted in the no voltage indicatio The light bulb was replaced and the surveillance completed satisfactoril The Unusual Event was terminated and the unit returned to 100% powe Unit 2 On December 14, 1988, a reduction from Mode 4 to Mode 5 was completed in accordance with Technical Specifications (T.S.)
due to the inoperability of both service water loops resulting from Nos. 21, 23, and 24 service water (SW) pumps being inoperabl The inspector discussed the status of the service water system with station maintenance and planning personnel and determined that No. 21 SW pump was out of service for repairs, No. 23 SW pump failed its inservice test due to low
flow, and No. 24 SW pump motor had been previously removed for a scheduled inspectio Each SW pump was repaired by the licensee and the inspector verified that SW T.S. requirements were met for entry into Mode 4 on December 30, 198.
The Unit 2 reactor was taken critical on January 9, 198 The inspector witnessed the startup and approach to criticalit Licensee activities in this regard were accomplished in accordance with procedural and T.S. requirement The inspector observed portions of low power operation and the power ascension process, and noted that the licensee continued investigating methods to improve steam generator water level controls at low powe Previous feedwater control problems have resulted in a number of reactor trips, and-are discussed in NRC Inspection Report NO. 50-311/88-2 The inspector also observed that several procedure improvements suggested by the operators and supervisors during the unit return to service were promptly reviewed by management and incorporated into th~
procedure (Closed) Violation 311/88-14-02; Operating outside Technical Specification limiting conditions for operatio The unit was operated in Mode 1 for greater than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> with less than thre~ operable channels of the Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) syste The inspector,reviewed the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation and the revised Alarm Response Procedure for an "SEC Trouble Alarm."
The procedure has been revised to require the SEC cabinet to be declared inoperable upon determining that the alarm can not be rese The violation will be reviewed with the licensed operators during segment two of the 1989 Licensed Operator Requalification Cycl The inspector had no further question.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707) Inspection Activities PSE&G's compliance with the radiological protection program was verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings The inspector observed a maintenance activity relative to installation of a minor design change which replaced rubber tubing associated with the Spent Resin Storage Tank level indicating system nitrogen supply with stainless tubin The inspector noted that contamination controls displayed by the technicians appeared to be deficient in that their gloved hands and the stainless piping being fit up were crossing in and out of the designated contaminated area boundar The inspector
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- discussed this concern with the technicians and radiation protection (RP)
personnel and determined.that a pre-job survey found.the area to be free of contamination, but the boundary rope and sign had not been removed; The inspector further determined that the maintenance technicians were told by RP that the area was clea However, they were directed to use radiation work permit (RWP) No. 5 which requires lab coats and gloves and were not observing the posted contamination boundar RP supervision subsequently had the area resurveyed and unpasted, and the technicians completed the work on a general area RW The inspector concluded that pre-job planning and attention to deta11 in providing consistent radiological control requirements to workers in the field could be improve.
SURVEILLANCE TESTING (61726) Inspection Activity During this inspection period, the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 61726..
The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:
lPD-2.6.014 lPD-2.6.060 lIC-16.2.014 lFT-444 No. 14 Reactor Coolant Flow channel functional test lPT-544 No. 14 Stearn Generator Steam Pressure channel functional test 1N36-Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation channel functional test SP(0)4.0.5-P-SW(l3) Inservice Testing - No. 13 Service Water Pump Reactor Engineering Manual Part 13 Unit 1 Flux Map 4.2 Inspection Findings The surveillance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance progra Unit 2 LER 88-25 concerns a missed Technical Specification surveillance (4.3.2.1.1 Table 4.3-2 item 8F) which requires functional testing of the auxiliary feedwater system actuation on a
main feedwater trip to be performed every startup if not performed during the previous 92 day The deficiency was discovered during the licensee's T.S. audit project initiated as a result of a number of missed surveillance tests that resulted from inadequate administrative controls relative to surveillance schedulin The audit identified that Unit 1 T.S. requires performance of the AFW actuation test every 18 months, and the Unit 2 surveillance had been scheduled and performed at the same frequenc The licensee's computerized surveillance scheduling system and operations procedures for mode change have been changed to eliminate the discrepanc Failure to complete T.S. surveillances within the required time is a previously identified deficienc The effectiveness of licensee corrective action is being closely monitored by NR (UNR 272/311/88-11-01) MAINTENANCE (62703) Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry codes and standard These inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:
Work Order A0081244 880205093 A0090507 A0073062 Procedure
- M3Z M3E OP IV-5. SM-0536A 2IC-14.l.001 2IC-l.4.003 2IC-8.l.002 2PD~2.l.109 Description 281 28 Volt Battery Charger Voltage Swings -
investigate and repai Nitrogeh Supply to Spent Resin Storage Tank Level Indicating System - Replace temporary rubber tubing with permanent stainless tubin Individual Rod Position Indication - Rod 1D2 at minus 12 steps of group demand counter, troubleshoot and repai Steam dump controller setpoint spiking low in auto -
troubleshoot and repair.
890111126 A0092380 8901104141 890104090 881223078 Inspection Findings
OP-TEMP-8809-02 2PD-2.2.059 Code Job Package S-89-02 NDWP - 35 MllD M6K Code Job Package S-88-331 NDWP-35-2 NDWP-13-2 MllD Install brush recorder and monitor 23BF19 operatio No. 24 steam generator steam flow channel II indicating low - troubleshoot and repai Replace spool piece -
thruwall leak on service water return line from 11 CFCU motor coole AFP tappet nut repai CFCU repair leaking spool piec A, The inspector observed a disparity in the conduct of maintenance activities during the inspection perio For example, maintenance activities associated with 281 28 VDC Battery Charger and No. 24 SG steam flow channel were conducted with appropriate procedures in hand, the procedures were closely followed, documentation of the activity was adequate, and supervisory oversight was excellen Conversely, the inspector noted for other activities one or more deficiencies including: procedures (in one case a design change package) not at the work location and not referred to during the activity, inadequate documentation detailing the scope of all work performed (especially for troubleshooting type activities), and/or little evidence of supervisory oversigh Although no unsatisfactory results were identified, the inspector concluded that continued management attention is needed to achieve consistent performance in the maintenance are (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-311/88-24-01; Improper setting of feedwater control valve Unit 2 LER 88-24 discusses corrective actions planned-to ensure correct air supply regulator settings for BF19 feedwater control valve An incorrectly set (5 psi too high)
regulator to No. 23BF19 resulted in failure of the valve and eventually caused a reactor trip on November 28, 198 The licensee, in the LER, attributes the incorrect regulator setting to a maintenance procedure that did not adequately define how to set the regulator and committed to revise the procedure to ensure proper regulator setting * l
The inspector reviewed maintenance procedure IC-1.4.003 General Instrument Calibration Procedure for Field Devices and the Pneumatic Valve and Positioner Calibration Data card for 23BF1 The procedure states that the control air regulator is to be adjusted to the value recommended by the manufacturer of the valve or at 5 psig above the full stroke pressure of the valv The Valve Data section of the Calibration Data card specified the stroke pressure range of the valve as 18 - 80 psi and the air pressure supply value as 85 ps This appears to be consistent with procedural requirements in that the full stroke pressure of the valve is 80 ps Therefore, following the procedure and based on the calibration card data, the same value for the regulator setting should be obtaine Discussions with the licensee and review of historical calibration data cards for the BF19s indicates that the air supply value denoted on ~he cards has been changed over time, sometimes inconsistently between valves, so that following the procedure would not always result in the correct air supply settin The licensee is in the process of developing a specific maintenance/
calibration procedure for the BF19's and BF40's (feedwater control bypass valves) to ensure proper and consistent implementation of valve parameter Failure to properly implement and maintain procedures with regard to the BF19's is a licensee identified violation of T.S. 6.8.1 for which acceptable corrective actions are planned. (50-311/88-27-01)
However, the inspector is concerned with the apparent inadequate control of documents that provide equipment setpoint and control dat Controi of calibration documentation is unresolved pending further licensee evaluation and NRC revie (272/88-24-02; 311/88-27-02)
During Unit 2 power ascension on January 11, 1989, the reactor operator discovered that feedwater control valve No. 23BF19 would not open from the control roo Licensee investigation determined that the air supply valve was closed and the air regulator plug remove These deficiencies were corrected and the valve then operated satisfactoril Inspector followup determined that the air supply was previously shut off and disconnected from 23BF19 to provide an air supply for calibration of turbine bypass valve 21TB10 and was not reestablished following the calibration activit The inspector reviewed maintenance procedure IC-1.4.003 "General Instrument Calibration Procedure for Field Devices" used for the 21TB10 calibration activitie The procedure contains a note in capital letters which directs thai if an air signal was isolated prior to disconnecting the input tubing, the isolation valve should be reopened after the input tubing is reconnecte The techni~ian apparently did not follow this procedural ste Licensee corrective action consisted of disciplinary action and reinstruction of the I&C technicians concerning procedure adherence and locations of alternate air supplies available for calibration purposes rather than disconnecting one that provides a signal to a piece of equipment; The inspector concluded that failure to reestablish the air supply to 23BF19 constitutes a licensee identified violation of
T.S. 6.8.1 for which acceptable corrective action has been take (311/88-27-03) Inspector review of the completed work packages (8901104141, 890104090, and 881223078 above) noted improvements with regard to the quality of the information in the packages and the administrative control of the package content.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71707) Inspection Activity The inspector observed licensee actions with regard to the Unit 1 Unusual Event declaration on January 4, 198.2 Inspection Findings The inspector determined that the event was properly classified and appropriate notifications wer~ made in accordance with the Salem Generating Station Event Classification Guide and Appendice During the licensee's verbal notification to the NRC operations center via the ENS phone, the inspector observed that.the licensee communicator (a non-licensed equipment operator) miscommunicated information relative to the status of emergency core cooling system When the NRC Operations Officer (NOO) asked whether any ECCS systems were inoperable, the communicator replied no; apparently based on the fact that no ECCS equipment was out of servic However with No. 12 SW header out of service, one train of ECCS is technically inoperabl The Senior Shift Supervisor then took the phone to respond to further question The mistake, however, was not caught or correcte While this miscommunication was not significant relative to the particular event, the inspector discussed the problem with the operations manager stressing the need to ensure the accuracy of information provided to the NR.
SECURITY (71707) Inspection Activity PSE&G's compliance with the security program was verified on a periodic basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundarie.2 Inspection Findings The inspector determined that licensee activities inspected were effective in meeting the safety objectives of the security pla *
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13 ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT (92701)
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 272/311/87-35-01; Diesel Load Analysi The inspector reviewed the licensee's internal memorandum which summarized the results of a diesel generator loading analysis performed by ASTA Engineering, In The analysis evaluated the loading on each diesel gener~tor for the worst analyzed accident scenario with a concurrent single active failur The analysis showed that all diesel loads were below the half hour load limit of 3100 KW for all scenario The report concluded that all six emergency diesel generators are capible of supporting connected loads under all analyzed accident condition Diesel generators 18, lC, 28, and 2C were predicted to be below the continuous load 11mit of 2600 KW for all scenario Diesel generator 2A was predicted to exceed the two hour load limit of 2860 KW for 10 minutes during a loss of offsite power accident (LOPA) combined with a loss of
. coolant accident (LOCA) and loss of diesel generator 2 Diesel generator lA was predicted to exceed the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> load limit of 2750 KW for 40 minutes during a LOPA combined with a LOCA and failure of diese1 generator 1 The analysis also compared the loading steps and sequences of the worst case scenarios against the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to verify that the capacity of each diesel was not exceede The analysis concluded that the EOP are consistent with the load analysis and contain logic steps for manual loading of the generator The licensee has developed an emergency diesel generator database and requires that a review be ~onducted of any change or addition to loads affecting the diesel generator buse The inspector had no further question.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500, 92700, 92701) (Open) Unresolved Item 272/88-16-07; Timely response to Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) action request The upgraded Action Tracking System had incorporated all NQA items by July 1988 and became the sole tracking system for overdue NQA action item The inspector reviewed the ove~due task reports from the Action Tracking System for September 30 and December 20, 198 The Salem Operations Department had sev~n overdue items in September and ten
- overdue items in December including most of the previous seven item Several of these open items appear to have safety significance since they deal with the inability to verify compliance with Technical Specification requirement Licensee management stated that actions were underway to reduce the number of overdue action item The number and type of items on the overdue task report list continues to be a concern since it indicates a lack of timely response to Quality Assurance issue This item will be reviewed in future inspection *
14 (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item 272/88-16-08:
Review of meteorological equipment in the Master Audit Pla The inspector reviewed the draft copy of the Master Audit Plan wh*ich will be used for planning, scoping, and performing the audits required by the licensee's Nuclear Department Quality Assurance Progra The plan requires verification of activities for maintaining and calibrating meteorological equipmen This item is close.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) AND OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP (90712, 92700)
The inspector reviewed the following licensee reports for accuracy and timely submissio Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - November, 1988 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - November, 1988 The inspector noted that Unit 1 refueling outage schedule dates listed on the Operating Data Report page and the Refueling Information page were not consistent (April 9, 1989 vs April 15, 1989).
This wil; be corrected in the next monthly operating repor Unit 2 LER 88-24 discusses a reactor trip that occurred on November 28, 1988 due to low-low level in No. 22 steam generator (SG) as a result of the failure of No. 23 SG feedwater control valve (23BF19).
Inspector followup to this event is included in Inspection Report 50-272/88-22; 50-311/88-24 and continued during this inspection perio Refer to Section 5.2 of this repor Unit 2 LER 88-25 concerns missed Technical Specification surveillance 4.3.2.1.1 Table 4.3-2 item BF and is discussed in Section 4 of this repor Unit 1 Supplemental Special Report 88~3-5 addresses additional licensee identified fire barrier penetration seal impairments discovered as a result of the Penetration Seal Progra :
EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)
The inspectors met with Mr. L. Miller and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summa~ize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restrictions.