IR 05000272/1989026
| ML18094B270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1990 |
| From: | Kenny T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18094B269 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-89-26, 50-311-89-24, NUDOCS 9002060300 | |
| Download: ML18094B270 (14) | |
Text
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Report N License Licensee:
Facility:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/89-26 50-311/89-24 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 November 21, 1989 - December 31, 1989 Kathy Halvey Gibson, Senior Resident Inspector Stephen M. Pindale, Resident Inspector Chief, Reactor I~ I£,
~
Inspection Summary:
Inspection 50-272/89-26; 311/89-24 on November 21, 1989 - December 31, 1989 Areas Inspected:
Resident safety inspection of the following areas: opera-tions, radiological controls, surveillance testing, maintenance, emergency preparedness, security, engineering/technical support, safety assessment/
quality verification, and review of licensee report Results:
Two non-cited violations were identified relative to late reporting of ESF actuation Eighteen open items (violations and/or unresolved) were closed during the report period.
DETAILS SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS Unit 1 was operating at 100% at the beginning of the report perio On December 21, 1989, the unit was shutdown due to the inoperability of No. 12 charging pum The unit was returned to service on December 12, 198 Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection period,except for short periods of time for Surveillance Testin ?..
OPERATIONS (71707) Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, the inspectors verified that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verifi-cation of safety system status and Limiting Conditions for Operation, and review of facility fecord These inspection activities included 148 in-spection hours including weekend and backshift inspection on December 11, 1989 (4:00 a.m. - S:orr a.m.).
2.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2. Unit 1 On December 1, 1989, the unit initiated a controlled srutdown to Mode 4 (hot shutdown) due to nearing the expiration of the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> technical specification action statement for the No. 12 charging pump (high head safety injection).
The pump was removed from service on November 28, 1989 to troubleshoot and repair suspected service water low flow and a water to oil tube leak in the gear box oil coole The lube oil cooler was found to be clogged, however, the licensee could not determine the cause of the fouling, in the coole Because of measured we~r not related to the oil cooler fouling, the licensee took the opportunity to replace the high and low speed gears and bearings of the charging pum The oil cooler was replaced and the charging pump returned to service on December However, during the shutdown, on December 2, a containment inspection identified a body to bonnet leak on a safety injection check valv The 12SJ56 valve (one of four) is the first check valve upstream of the safety injection line tap to the reactor coolant syste The unit was cooled down to Mode 5 (cold shutdown) on December 3 to enable a freeze seal on the safety injection line to support the check valve repai The valve gasket, bonnet and disk were replace The unit was returned to service on December 12 and reached 100% power on December 14.
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- 2. Unit 2 On December 1, 1989 power was lost to the 2C vital bus due to the actuation of the differential protection relay The_ 2C diesel gene-rator (DG) automatically started, but did not close on to the bu The licensee entered the appropriate TS action statement The lic-ensee tested the bus for grounds and verified the bus loads for oper-abilit The vital bus and its loads were fully restored in about 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> The actuation of the differential protection relays was attributed, by the licensee, to vibrations caused by scaffolding erection ongoing in the area of the 2C bu Reportability of the 2C DG automatic start to the NRC is discussed in Section (Closed) UNR 311/89-01-01; Special Report 88-8 POPS actuation report inaccurat The inspector reviewed Special Report 88-8-1 dated September 6, 1989 whith adequately clarified additional details rela-tive to the POPS actuatio The inspector also noted that on Septem-ber 13, 1989 the licensee received a letter from the NRC 11 Report-ability of Actuation Events Involving the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS)
11 which stated that a special report is not required if a POPS actuation occurs during a planned evolution in which the POPS actuation is a recognized anticipated conditio The letter further states that such actuations should be recorded in nor-mal plant logs and reported in the monthly operating report to the NR The licensee incorporated-precautions into procedure *op II-1. RCP Operation 11 to inform the operator of the possible lifting of the POPS system during the performance of this planned evolutio The inspector has no further question This item is close.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707) Inspection Activities PSE&G's compliance with the radiological protection program was verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings The inspector routinely toured the radiologically controlled areas (RCA) and identified several discrepancies, such as tools, used rubber gloves and other trash littered throughout the RCA, a lab coat hanging on plant equipment just outside a contaminated area, appar-ently to be reused for routine entries, and numerous system leaks not tagged by the licensee's identification system for repairing the leak The individual concerns were brought to licensee management's
attention for resolutio The inspector noted to management an over-all degradation in housekeeping within the RCA as compared with pre-vious inspection On December 19, the inspector found a long extension cord (about 75 feet) routed from an electrical wall outlet to a portable radiation monito The cord was routed along two separate, independent exist-ing cable tray The inspector questioned the appropriateness of such a configuration with respect to cable separation requirement The licensee immediately removed the extension cord and relocated the radiation monitors and subsequently determined that both cable trays were non-safety related and the as-found condition was therefore acceptabl However, it appeared that appropriate administrative controls were not in place to preclude a similar configuration for safety related cable tray The licensee acknowledged the inspec-tor's concer Licensee action to preclude similar events will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio.
SURVEILLANCE TESTING (61726) Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in~progress surveillance testing, and re~
viewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance with Technical Specifica-tions, approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activi-ties were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 The following surveillance tests were revie~ed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:
SP(0)4.6.l.l.Al-I SP(0)4.6.l.l.Al-II Primary Containment Integrity Containment Isolation Valves The surveillance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance progra.2 Inspection Findings (Closed) UNR 272/87-15-02; Gauge calibration program (further con-cerns in NRC inspection report 272/88-22).
The inspector reviewed maintenance procedure MDP-ZZ-002, Gauge Calibration Program 11, Rev. 0, dated October 31, 1989, which documents the licensee's processes and program for maintaining and documenting the calibration of gauges in the plan The inspector concluded that the program, as documented in the procedure, is satisfactor The inspector will continue to
- monitor licensee performance with respect to maintaining the cali-bration of gauges in accordance with this new procedur This item is close (Closed) Violation 272/89-15-06; Missed TS Surveillance Test The inspector reviewed the licensee 1 s response (NLR-N89176 dated Septem-ber 6, 1989) and verified that the corrective actions as stated in the response have been implemented by the license This violation is closed, however, several TS surveillances have been missed due to various causes as discussed in NRC inspection report 50-272/89-21; 50-311/89-1 Further licensee corrective actions were discussed in that report and are being tracked as UNR 272/89-15-10 and UNR 272/89-21-0 (Closed) Violation 272/89-16-01; Failure to perform adequate response time testing of feedwater regulating valves (FRV) and failure to meet TS required response times when properly teste The inspector re-viewed the licensee 1s response (NLR-N89184 dated September 8, 1989).
The root cause of the inadequate testing was an inadequate surveil-lance test procedure which has since been revised to include testing from both SSPS trains independentl The inspector ~erified the appropriate revision to SP(0)4.0.5-V-MS-5 for both units and has wit-nessed subsequent testing per the new procedur The inspector also verified similar revisions to MSIV response time testing procedures SP(0)4.7.1:5 and SP(0)4.3.2.l.3 and witnessed testing using these new procedure Additional licensee corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence as stated in the violation response were reviewed by the inspector and determined to bP acceptable to resolve the con-cern This item is close (Closed) UNR 272/89-16-05; Licensee to determine cause and corrective actions for cross wired FRV solenoid valve The licensee determined that the cross wiring error was not immediately identified because the two trains 1 solenoids are functionally identical and the inade-quate surveillance test procedure as previously discussed, did not test the trains independentl The solenoid wiring was corrected and the surveillance test was revised to require independent train test-ing. This item is close (Closed) UNR 272/89-16-06; Failure to establish the as-found condi-tion of Unit 2 FRV The as-found testing was not performed due to ineffective communication between station management and the staf The licensee further stated that the FRVs were the only components where the frequency of preventive maintenance component replacement/
overhaul is the same as the TS surveillance frequency for that system. The licensee intends to lengthen the replacement interval (when determined) which will resolve the inspector 1 s concern in this are This item is closed.
...
6 MAINTENANCE (62703) Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industrial codes and standard These inspections were con-ducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 _Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:
Work Order Procedure Description 891128126 MP MP MllE Inspect, troubleshoot and repair No. 12 charging pump gear box and oil coole Ml4A3 MUE2 MllA Repair 12SJ56 body to bonnet lea Code Job Package 5-89-254 The maintenance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the maintenance progra.2 Inspection Findings (Closed) IFI 311/87-18-04; Licensee was to determine the cause of failure of Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Valve (2NT34).
The inspector discussed this issue with the system engineer and maintenance per-sonne The failures of 2NT34 have been attributed to galling of the plug and seat due to a valve binding problem caused by the small clearance between the cage and plu To ensure the operability of 2NT34 during power operations, and thereby avoiding a degraded con-tainment boundary condition, the licensee has instituted an outage preventive maintenance activity which includes replacement of the valve stem, plug and cage and verification of valve dimensions and alignmen The inspector verified that the recurring PM task is scheduled in MMIS and was last completed in September 198 This item is close (Closed) UNR 272/88-24-02; Review equipment setpoint data contro The inspector discussed the licensee's policy for control of equip-ment setpoint data with the maintenance manager and electrical super-visor. When a specific procedure is used for instrument calibration, setpoint data is specified in the procedure and a procedure revision is required to change the dat When a generic procedure is used,
the setpoint data is specified on an Instrument Calibration Data (!CD) card for the instrumen The licensee has also maintained in-strument setpoint data in notebooks for instruments whose setpoints change more frequently based on plant conditions (nuclear instru-ments, etc.). The inspector was told that the method for revision of setpoint values specified on !CD cards or notebooks consists of engineering disposition of an Action Request (AR) which would specify the new value Then the new values are manually entered onto the appropriate !CD card or placed in the data noteboo The licensee has identified weaknesses with the !CD card and notebook methods and has several actions in progress to upgrade their progra The ac-tions include eliminating the dat__a notebook concept and placing the calibration data within procedure The licensee is planning to com-puterize the !CD card~ in an effort to ensure better accuracy and control of dat Maintenance personnel are currently in the early stages of defining the process for how the data will be transferred between the cards and the computer including QA checks, et Once the process is defined, the maintenance manager has committed to in-form the inspector of a projected completion date for the projec The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions in this area are acceptabl This item is close.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Following two December 12 ESF Actuations (steam generator blowdown and control room ventilation isolations), the licensee properly re-ported the events to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) in accordance with JOCFR50.72 reporting requirement Con-versely, on December 15, an ESF Actuation (containment ventilation isolation) occurred at 4:20 a.m., but the 10CFR50.72 required 4-hour report was not made until 6:27 The failure to report was iden-tified by the inspector during a routine followu As a result of inspector discussions with licensee management, the licensee con-ducted shift briefings to reinforce the need for timely reportin The safety significance of this late report was minimal and a viola-tion will not be issued. (NCV 50-272/89-26-01)
NRC Unresolved Item No. 50-272/89-26-02 (previously 50-311/89-10-02)
identified potential programmatic weaknesses with respect to ESF re-porting, particularly of ESF Actuations caused by non-ESF designated instrumentatio Further, confusion existed as to which equipment constituted ESF components/system The inspector determined that further licensee programmatic reviews and enhancements are necessary to ensure timely compliance with 10CFR50.72 reporting requirement As a result item 50-311/89-10-02 will be closed and 50-272/89-26-02 will track the licensee's progres On December 15, the licensee identified the reportability of a Decem-ber 1, ESF actuation (Diesel Generator Automatic Start) due to per-sonnel erro See Section 2.2.2A for event descriptio The event was subsequently reported to the NRC via EN As discussed above, licensee continuing actions for ESF reportability determinations and the timeliness of such activities wi.11 continue to receive emphasis during NRC inspection (NCV 50-311/89-24-01) On December 19, 1989, the Senior Shift Supervisors (SSSs) at Hope Creek and Salem notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer that all Alert and Notification System sirens in New Jersey failed when teste The notifications were made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(l)(v).
The SSSs followed their Event Classification Guide correctly using Sec-tion 10.D and completed the associated Attachment 1 This report, while in order, was based on preliminary informatio The siren system did not fail; the siren testing system faile Details are given belo Sirens are tested in Delaware and New Jersey dail The tests are made by Salem County for all 34 sfrens located in Cumberland and Salem Counties, New Jerse One of three type of tests is mad The subject test is known as the 11 silent test 11 run 360 times a yea This test determines the operability of each Control Box or a com-puter which may also be used to activate the siren The box and computer may be considered parallel circuit element The failure of one will not fail the othe This is independent and redundant de-sig Shortly after 9:00 a:m., government officials in the Salem County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) noted siren failure indica-tion The licensee was notifie Upon investigation, the problem was recognized as a computer malfunction and not siren failure as originally reporte The cause was a faulty computer circuit boar A replacement circuit board was obtained and installed. The system was returned to normal status at about 2~30 While the computer malfunctioned, the Control Box could have been used to sound siren In addition, route alerting was another optio When the malfunction was recognized, the Salem EOC notified the New Jersey State Police Office of Emergency Management and Cumberland Count The Delaware State system was unaffected and an activating signal for all Delaware sirens was receive The inspector concluded that this was a satisfactory test of the system and licensee's ability to respond and take rapid corrective actio (Closed) IFI 272/88-23-01; TSC staff failed to recognize containment failure for 10 minute The licensee's performance in this area was observed to be acceptable during the October 1989 Graded Exercis This item is close **.1
SECURITY Inspection Activity PSE&G 1s compliance with the security program was verified on a periodic basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundarie These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection proc.edure, 7170.2 Inspection Findings (Closed) UNR 272/89-22-03; Overdue calibration of various security system power supply meters.. The licensee has determined that under their new gauge calibration program, the subject meters are required to be calibrated on a three year frequenc Work Request N A0077151 dated December 21, 1989 was written to have the current and voltage meters calibrated and a recurring task will be entered into MMIS (maintenance tracking system) for subsequent calibration The inspector also reviewed new maintenance procedure M4J-l, 30 KVA Security Inverter Preventive Maintenance Procedure and M4J-2, 30 KVA Security Inverter Surveillance Procedure and concluded that the lic-ensee1 s actions are acceptabl This item is close.
ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT (Open) UNR 272/89-16-04; FRV closure time criteria are inconsistent between unit Technical Specifications (TS).
The licensee plans to submit a TS amendment request to the NRC by February 1990 to make time response requirements consistent between the two unit This item will remain open until the TS amendment is received by the NR (Closed) UNR 311/86-35-01; Acceptability of mass point method for Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) calculation The in-spector reviewed lOCFRSO, Appendix J, Paragraph III.A.3.(a) which permits use of the mass point method when used with a test duration of at least 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The inspector verified that the test duration is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per the licensee's CILRT procedure M-9-ILP-CT-This i tern is c 1 o sed.* (Closed) UNR 311/89-10-01; Leakage of main steam safety valves and premature lifting of the Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs).
The lic-ensee has determined that the incorrect lift set pressures for pre-vious premature lifts of MSSVs was due to the valves being factory set in ambient air temperature surrounding The licensee had ob-served discrepancies between the set pressures based on factory tests performed during a refueling outage versus the licensee's tests per-formed on a hot syste The vendor (Crosby) concurs with the licen-see's determinatio To preclude the incorrect set pressures and premature lifts, the licensee plans to test the MSSVs in the field in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) prior to Unit return to servic The licensee
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also experienced premature MSSV lifts due to seat leakage which has been found to lower the lift pressure s~tpoint. The inspector learned that the system engineer monitors for MSSV leakage during
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plant operation and has the lift set pressures verified and adjusted if necessary when leakage is observe The licensee stated that an MSSV with excessive leakage would be gagged and the high power trip setpoint reduced as required by T The inspector had no further questions at this time and the item is close (Closed) UNR 272/86-14-01; (Open) UNR 272/87-38-01; Venting of con-tainment monitor channels (CMC) during CILR The licensee submitted letters to the NRC dated October 13, 1983 and November 8, 1984 re-questing clarification on the acceptability of considering the CMC as an integral part of the containment liner plat On November 17, 1989, the NRC requested additional information from PSE&G concerning this subjec Unresolved Item 272/86-14-01 is administratively close However, Unresolved Item 272/87-38-01 is open pending licen-see response to the request and NRC disposition of this issu.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500) (Closed) Violation 272/89-10-01; Failure to perform annual QA evalu-ation of package vendo The inspector reviewed the licensee's violation response (NLR-N89127 dated June 22, 1989) and verified that the c6rrectiv~ actions as stated in the response have been imple-mented. The inspector noted that the response indicated that QA pro-cedures M9-QAP 3-5 (Supplier Audits) and M9-QAP 6-1 (Quality Assur-ance Audits) would be revised to provide clarification regarding 10CFR71 supplier controls, however the actual revisions were made to QA procedure M9-QAP 3-2 (Supplier Evaluations).
The inspector determined that the alternate corrective actions were acceptabl The inspector discussed with licensing personnel that a revised violation response should be submitted when alternate cor-rective actions are taken in lieu of those stated in the original respons This item is close (Closed) UNR 272/89-11-04; Effectiveness of Salem Nonconformance Re-porting and Corrective Action Program The inspector reviewed sta-tion administrative procedure NA-AP.ZZ-006(Q),
11 Incident Report and Reportable Event Program 11 dated April 13, 1989 and QA procedure GM9-QAP 7-1, 11 QA/NSR Corrective Action Request System 11 dated January 30, 1989 and observed implementation of these programs during the inspection perio The inspector concluded that the licensee's per-formance with respect to implementation and effectiveness of these programs was satisfactory and improvin However, the inspector noted some delay in resolving technical issues in a timely manner due to an apparent lack of depth in the engineering group or a reluctance
to assign-problem resolution to an alternate engineer when the re-sponsible engineer is unavailabl This issue was discussed with station and engineering managemen The inspector had no further questions at this tim This item is close (Closed) Violation 272/89-15-09; Failure to follow procedure The inspector reviewed the licensee's violation response (NLR-N89176 dated September 6, 1989) and verified that the corrective actions have been implemented as stated in the respons The inspector has noted an increased emphasis with regard to procedure compliance by station management and an increased sensitivity to procedure use dis-played by station personne This violation is close One aspect of the corrective actions relative to TS amendment implementation remained open and is being tracked under UNR 272/89-15-1. (Closed) UNR 311/88-80-02; Adequacy of licensee's investigation into falsification of weld record The inspector reviewed two licensee reports regarding this issue including "SQA Investigation/Evaluation of NOE Records Associated With Design Change 2EC-2270 11 dated November 1, 1988 and "Investigation of Falsifying Weld History Records" dated November 18, 198 The investigations involved additional weld record reviews, interviews with associated personnel by a special PSE&G corporate investigative team and hand writing sample analysis by a NJ State Police Examine Although the results of the investi-gation were inconclusive, the licensee's investigation was thorough and complet This item is close.
FITNESS FOR DUTY ( 55104)
On December 14, the inspector attended Fitness for Duty (FFD) training sessions for 1) all station personnel, and 2) supervisory personne In addition, escort training was included in the station personnel sessio Both sessions were presented through a combined lectute/video/handout for-ma Details of the licensee's FFD program not specifically covered in the classroom sessions were provided in the handout Drug equipment dis-plays were provided, but were not specifically used or referenced by the instructor The inspector concluded that the sessions satisfactorily addressed the training objectives of 10CFR26, "Fitness For Duty Program".
1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) AND OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP (90712, 92700)
11.1 The inspector reviewed the following licensee reports for accuracy and timely submissio Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - November 1989 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - November 1989 Unit 1 Supplemental Special Report 88-3-13; Fire Barrier Impairment
- Unit 1 Supplemental Special Report 88-3-14; Fi re_ Barrier Impairment Unit 1 Supplemental Special Report 88-3-15; Fire Barrier Impairment Unit 1 Supplemental Special Report 88-3-16; Fire Barrier Impairment The supplemental reports provided fire barrier impairment status and up-dates as identified by the Penetration Seal Task Forc Unit 1 Special Report 89-6; Radiation Monitoring System Channel 1R44A Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days; This report was submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.18 requirements due to erratic operation on November 19, 198 The channel cable connectors were rebuilt and the detector was replaced and the channel was sub-sequently returned to servic Unit 2 Special Report 89-3; 28 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Valid Failure Due to an Equipment Failure; On September 9, during a one hour loaded surveillance run, the EOG was declared inoperable due to excessive leakage of chromated water from a cracked fittin The licensee subsequently replaced the cracked fitting and restored the EOG to operable statu The remaining EDGs were inspected with no deficiencies identifie Further, the surveillance frequency has been increased per Technical *specification requirements, and the Engineering organization is evaluating the feasibility of a system design change to preclude additional fatigue failure Unit 1 LER 89-032; Technical Speci'fication Noncompliance During Tur-bine Volumetric Flow Test; This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-272/89-2 Unit 2 LER 89-018; ESF Actuation - Containment Ventilation Isolation; On November 3, 1989, Radiation Monitoring System monitor 2R41C failed, resulting in the ESF actuatio See Section £.A for further qiscussion on event reportabilit Unit 2 LER 89-019; Technical Specification 3.Q.3 Entry Due to Two Steam Flow/Feed Flow (SF/FF) Channels Inoperable; On November 5, two SF/FF channels became inoperable on the No. 24 steam generato TS 3.0.3 was entered at 1:18 a.m. upon discovery and exited at 2:04 after the first channel was returned to an operable conditio The licensee attributed the event to an equipment proble Unit 2 LER 89-020; ESF Actuation - Containment Ventilation Isolation; On November 10, 1989, Radiation Monitoring System monitor 2R418 failed, resulting in the ESF actuatio See Section 6.A for further discussion on event reportability.
- Unit 2 LER 89-021; No. 21 RHR Pump Suction Piping Overpressurization; See NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/89-21; 50-311/89-19 for event description and followu Unit 2 LER 89-022; Licensee Identified Single Failure Vulnerability in RHR System Cold Leg Injection Valves (SJ49); This event is dis-cussed in detail in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/89-2?;
50-311/89-2 Unit 2 LER 89-023; ESF Actuation; Containment Ventilation Isolation; On November 16, 1989, Radiation Monitoring System channel 2R12A failed, resulting in the ESF actuatio See Section 6.A for further discussion on event reportabilit The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and the guidance provided in NUREG 102 In general, the overall quality of the LERs reviewed during this inspection was adequate, however, the inspector identified several deficiencie Unit 2 LER 89-020 was sub-mitted for information only when it should have been submitted in accord-ance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
Further, the LER text incorrectly states that the actuation of an ESF system from a non-ESF channel is not report-able.* The NRC is interested in ESF system challenges and licensee's are required to report such challenges per the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.7 The 4-hour report, required by 10CFR50.72 also was not made for this event (see discussion on this issue in Section of this report).
Unit 2 LER 89-021 incorrectly states that 11 the design basis was not ex-ceeded during the increased pressure", however, the documented FSAR design basis value in fact, was exceede The report was properly submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii), an event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plan Unit 2 LER 89-023 properly classifies the ESF actuation as a 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) reportable event, however, the LER does not document the failure to make the 4-hour required report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). See Section 6.A for further discussion on this topic.*
11.2 Reference to Open Items The following open items from previous inspections were followed up during this inspection and are tabulated below for cross reference purposes.
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
. VIO 272/89-16-01 UNR 272/89-16-05 UNR 272/89-16-06 UNR 272/87-15-02 VIO 272/89-15-06 Section 4. Section 4. Section 4. Section 4. Section 4..~.
Closed UNR 272/86-14-01 Section Closed UNR 311/86-35-01 Section Closed UNR 311/89-10-01 Section Closed VIO 272/89-10-01 Section Closed UNR 272/89-11-04 Section Closed VIO 272/89-15-09 Section Closed UNR 311/88-80-02 Section Closed UNR 272/89-22-03 Section 7. Closed I Fl 311/87-18-04 Section 5. Closed UNR 272/88-24~02 Section 5. Closed UNR 311/89-01-01 Section 2.2. Closed IFI 272/88-23-01 Section Closed UNR 311/89-10-02 Section Open UNR 272/89-16-04 Section Open UNR 272/87-38-01 Section.
EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)
The inspectors met with Mr. Mille~ and other PSE&G personnel periodi-cally and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activities.
Based on Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restric-tions.
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