ML18095A291

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Insp Repts 50-272/90-14 & 50-311/90-14 on 900501-04. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Radiological Controls,Organization & Staffing,Personnel Qualifications & Corrective Action Sys & Performance Monitoring & ALARA
ML18095A291
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/1990
From: Nimitz R, Pasciak W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18095A289 List:
References
50-272-90-14, 50-311-90-14, NUDOCS 9006200170
Download: ML18095A291 (7)


See also: IR 05000272/1990014

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report Nos.

50-272/90-14

50-311/90-14

Docket Nos.

50-272

50-311

License Nos.

DPR-70

DPR-75

Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

P.O. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Facility Name:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At:

Hancock~ Bridge, New Jersey

Inspection Conducted:

May 1-4, 1990

Inspectors:

Approved by:

R. L. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist

W. Pasciak, Chief, Facilities Radiation

Protection Section

c, - e:, - qo

date

Inspection Summary:

Inspection conducte~ on May 1-4, 1990 (NRC C6mbined

Inspection Report No. 50-272/90-14; 50-311/90-14).

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced Radiological Controls Inspection of the

following:

radiological controls -organization and staffing; personnel

qualifications and training; corrective action systems and performance

monitoring; ALARA; and external and internal exposure controls.

Results:

One violation was identified.

(Failure to follow radiation

protection procedures - Details Section 7).

~006200170 900611

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DETAILS

1.0 Individuals Contacted

1.1

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

  • L. Miller, General Manager, Salem Operations
  • J. Wray, Radiation Protection Engineer, Salem
  • D. Mohler, Manager, RP/Chem, Salem

_

  • T. Cellmer, Radiation Protection Engineer, Hope Creek

1.2

NRC Personnel

  • T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Denotes those personnel attending the exit meeting on May 4, 1990.

The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel.

2.0 Purpose and Scope of Inspection

3.0

This inspection was a ~outine, unannounced Radiological Controls -

Inspection during the Unit 1 refueling outage.

The following areas were

reviewed:

organization and staffing;

training and qualifications;

corrective action system;

external and internal exposure controls;

A LARA.

Organization and Staffing

The inspector reviewed the organization and staffing of the onsite

Radiation Protection Group with respect to criteria contained in the

following:

Technical Specification 6.2, Organization;

Regulatory Guide 8.8, Information Relevant to Ensuring that

Occupational Radiation E~posure at Nuclear Power Stations will be As

Low As Is Reasonably Achievable.

Evaluation of licensee performance in this area was based on discussions

with cognizant personnel, review of on-going work and review of

documentation.

Within the scope of the review, no violations were identified.

The

following positive observations were made by the inspector:

The licensee issued a Unit 2 Fifth Refueling Outage Organization

description on March 20, 1990.

The licensee identified each

position, its reporting chain and responsibility.

3

The licensee assigned dedicated crews and supervisors to oversee

major radiological significant work activities (e.g., steam generator

work activities).

Because of emergent work activities at Unit 1, the licensee

established a designated support group to assist in the oversight of

the Unit 1 activities.

4.0 Training and Qualifications

The inspector reviewed the qualification and training of members of the

Radiological Controls Organization with respect to criteria contained in

Technical Specification 6.3, Facility Staff Qualification.

The licensee's

performance in this area was evaluated by review of resumes and training

records and discussions with cognizant personnel.

The inspector's review in this area.focused on the qualification and

training of contractor radiological controls personnel hired to augment

the organization during the outage.

The inspector also reviewed the

adequacy and effectiveness of the performance of these personnel during

review of work activities.

Within the scope of this review, no violations were identified.

Contractor personnel appeared to have received adequate training and

qualification.

The inspector noted that the licensee provided special training for

personnel involved with steam generator work activities.

The licensee

sent personnel to a vendor facility to receive training regarding steam

generator repair activities.

5.0

ALARA

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the licensee 1 s ALARA Program.

The review was with respect to criteria contained in the following:

Regulatory Guide 8.8, Information Relevant to Ensuring that

Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be

As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable;

Regulatory Guide 8.10, Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational

Radiation Exposures As Low As is Reasonably Achievable;

NUREG/CR-3254, Licensee Programs for Maintaining Occupational

Exposure to Radiation As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable;

NUREG/CR-4254, Occupational Dose Reduction and ALARA at Nuclear Power

  • Plants; Study on High-Dose Jobs, Radwaste Handling and ALARA

Incentives.

6.0

4

Within the scope of this review, no violations were identified.

Inspector observation of on-going work indicated good overall ALARA

controls to be in place for in-field work.

The following positive observations were made:

The licensee provided special video taped training for steam

generator workers.

The station ALARA Committee reviewed out-of-scope steam generator

work.

The licensee closely monitored accumulated radiation exposure

relative to established goals.

The following matter was discussed with the licensee:

There appears to be a need to improve estimates of person-hours

needed to complete work activities.

The person-hours for some work

activities appeared to be overestimated while person-hours for other

work activities were underestimated.

The licensee indicated this matter would be reviewed.

Corrective Action System and Performance Monitoring

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the licensee's corrective

action and performance monitoring program.

Within the scope of this

review the following positive observations were made:

The licensee established and implemented Procedure SC.RP. TI.ZZ-1001(0),

Radiological Occurrence Investigation, to provide a consistent means

of documenting and reviewing radiological occurrences (e.g., radiation

protection violations).

A weekly summary of radiological occurrence reports (RORs) is

provided to station management.

A monthly summary and analysis is

also provided to station management.

The licensee tracks RORs by

computer.

The inspector noted that the licensee's attention to RORs

has-increased.

The following matters were discussed with the licensee:

A number of RORs appeared to contain an. incorrect identification of

root cause.

The root cause needs to be clearly identified in order

to provide for effective corrective actions.

The licensee indicated this matter would be reviewed .

7.0

5

The inspector noted that the licensee was using a radiological

assessor to review on-going work activities.

The findings were

reviewed by the licensee 1 s Radiation Protection Engineer.

External and Internal Exposure Controls

The inspector toured the radiological controlled areas of the plant and

reviewed the following elements of the licensee 1 s external and internal

exposure control program:

posting, barricading and access control as appropriate, to

Radiation, High Radiation, and Airborne Radioactivity Areas;

High Radiation Area access point key control;

control of radioactive and contaminated material;

personnel adherence to radiation protection procedures, radiation

work permits and good radiological control practices;

use of personnel contamination control devices;

use of dosimetry devices;

use of respiratory protective equipment;

adequacy of airborne radioactivity sampling and analysis to plan for

and support ongoing work;

timeliness of analysis of airborne radioactivity samples including

supervisory review of sample results;

installation, use and peri6di~ operability verification of

engineering controls to minimize airborne radioactivity;

bioassays and personnel airborne radioactivity intakes;

records and reports of personnel exposure;

adequacy of radiological surveys to support pre-planning of work and

on going work; and

hot particle controls.

The review was with respect to criteria contained in applicable licensee

procedures and 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation.

The inspector independently reviewed on-going work activities including

personnel entry into steam generators, various fan cooler work activities,

and safety injection pump work,

The inspector made independent radiation

measurements to verify adequacy of radiol.ogical controls.

Within the scope of the review one apparent violation was identified:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.11, Radiation Protection

Program, requires, in part, that procedures for personnel radiation

protection be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations

involving personnel radiation exposure.

Unit 1 RWP No. 901S00383, Revision 1, No. 11 SI Pump Mechanical Seals and

Rotation Element Replacement, was terminated on April 23, 1990.

Revision

2 of the same RWP was issued on April 23, 1990.

The new revision

required, in part, that respiratory protection be worn for system breach

and cleaning of pump internals.

  • '

.. ,

6

The.inspector noted that two individuals entered and worked under Revision

2 of the RWP but had not signed the RWP compliance sheet indicating that

they had read and understood the new revision.

The individuals made a

total of 15 entries between April 24, 1990 and May 1, 1990.

One indi-

vidual received 23 millirem whole body exposure while the other individual

received 84 millirem cumulative exposure during the entries.

Unit 1 and 2 Radiation Protection Procedure No. RP201, Revision 2, Access

Con~rol Point Management, provides instructions to radiation protection

personnel for control entry/exit of personnel and e*quipment to/from the

Radiological Control Area.

Section 7.2.1 of Procedure RP201, Revision 2,

requires that radiation protection personnel ensure that individuals

have read the applicable RWP and signed the RWP compliance agreement.

The inspection indicated that the failure of the radiation protection

personnel to verify that the above two individuals had read.Revision 2 of.

RWP No. 901S00383 and signed the RWP compliance ~greement is an apparent

violation of Technical Specification 6.11.

(50-272/90-14-01;

50-311/90-14-01)

During tours of the area outside and around the station at about 2:00

p.m., on May 1, 1990, the inspector identified a trailer with boxes of

reusable contaminated tools.

The back portion of the trailer had a

ramp leading inside the trailer to the boxes.

The sides of the trailer

were posted

11 Radi oact i ve

11 *

The in specter noted the boxes were 1abe1 ed

11 Radioactive

11 *

The boxes exhibited contact dose rates of 8 millirem/hr

and 14 millirem/hr, respectively.

The inspector questioned the licensee's

Radwaste Coordinator as to the reason for the boxes b~ing in the

trailer.

The Radwaste Coordinator believed the boxes came from the Unit

2 Containment but he was not sure.

He was unaware that boxes were being

removed from containment and were being placed in trailers within the

protected area.

The licensee's radiation protection procedure, RP 204, Posting of

  • Radiation Signs and Barriers, Revision 2, requires in Section 7.1.7 that

each room or area in which radioactive material in exces~ of 10 times the

amount specified in 10 CFR 20 Appendix C, is used or stored, shall be

posted as "Caution - Radioactive Materials".

The inspector noted that

the access ramp was not posted as a radioactive materials area and the

trailer contained in excess of 100 times the amount of Appendix C values

of radioactive material.

This is an apparent violation of Technical

Specification 6.11.

(50-272/90-14-01; 50-311/90-14-01)

The following additional matters were discussed with the licensee's

personnel:.

The radiation work permit (RWP) procedure does not provide

instructions or guidance for revising an RWP.

RWPs are not included in work packa*ges in the field.

This made it

difficult for Radiation Protection Technicians covering work to be

aware of RWP requirements.

. .

7

The radiation work permits do not describe dosimetry to be worn by

personnel entering the radiological controlled areas (RCA).

There was evidence (candy wrappers) indicating that personnel were

ingesting food in the RCA.

Improvement was noted in the licensee's control of steam generator

work activitie~. However, the following matters were discussed with

the licensee:

The licensee was using digital alarming, tele-dosimetry to

monitor personnel on the steam generator work platforms.

There

were no procedures for *use of the digital dosimetry.

The licensee used three methods of exposure control to monitor

steam generator worker exposures (timing entrjes, alarming

dosimeters and tele-dosimetry).

This was considered a good

initiative.

The inspector noted, however, that the results of

the three methods were not being inter-compared to check for

anomalies.

The licensee indicated the above observations would be reviewed.

The li~nsee's personnel dosimetry is appropriately accredited for

use.

Improvement was noted in the area of industrial safety.

Some

personnel were, however, observed not wearing safety glasses or hard

hats during the performance of their work.

Housekeeping had improved, but the inspector observed paper suits in

various areas of the Primary Auxiliary Buildings.

The paper suits

were found on junction boxes, welding machines and.on the floor.

Posting of radiological controlled areas outside th~ main station

buildings was in need of improvement.

Postings were inconsistent.

Also, some signs were observed-to be laying on the ground.

The gate to the Low Level Outdoor Waste Storage Area was broken.

Personnel could potentially gain access to High Radiation Areas not

exceeding 1000 millirem/hr (maximum of about 800 mR/hr near a resin

liner). A work order had been written on July 12, 1989, to repair

the gate.

The gate repair was given a very low priority.

10.0 Exit Meeting

The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 of

this report on May 4, 1990.

The inspector summarized the purpose, scope

and findings of the inspection.

No written material was provided to the

licensee.