IR 05000272/1990001
| ML18094B295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1990 |
| From: | Anderson C, Paolino R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18094B294 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-90-01, 50-272-90-1, 50-311-90-01, 50-311-90-1, NUDOCS 9002160162 | |
| Download: ML18094B295 (8) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- REGION I
_50-272/90-01 Report Nos. 50-311/90-01 Docket Nos. 50-272/50-311 License Nos. DPR-70/DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric & Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:
Salem Units 1&2 Inspection At:
Lower Alloways Township, New Jers~y Inspection Conducted:
January 8-12, 1990 Inspectors:
-Approved by:
R. ~ ;om: Reactor C. J.'Anderson, Chief, Plant Section DRS/EB Engineer-EB/PSS Systems-
- }- DI - 9 b date date Inspection Summary
Inspection on January 8-12, 1990 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/90-01 and 50-311/90-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection to review and determine the status of previously identified Appendix R issue Results:
The corrective action of seven Appendix R issues was reviewed and determined to be resolve These items are close ~----J
Deta i 1 s *
1.0 Persons Contacted Public Service Electric & Gas Company
- R. Baskell, Syste~ Analysis Supervisor
- A. Blum, Program Analysis Supervisor
- R. Braddock, Senior Staff Engineer - Fire Protection
- D. Dodson, Acting Principle Engineer P. Eldreth, Nuclear Safety & Fire Protection Manager
- G. Kapp, Project Manager - Fire Protection
- J. Kerin~ Se.nior Nuclear Fire Protection - Supervisor C. Langton, System Analysis Group I. Nag, Senior Staff Engineer - Electrical J. Quather, Senior Staff-tngineer - Fire Protection U. Reiber, System Analysis Group
- L. Reiter, Nuclear Safety & Fire Protection - Manager R. Rose, System Analysis Group D. Shumaker, Lead Engineer Program Analysis Group
- S. Smith, OSR - Lead Engineer R. Swart*zwelder, Senior Staff Engineer K. Wolf, Staff Engineer - Fire Protection
- Denotes personnel present at the exit meeting on January 12, J990 2.0 Status of Previo~sly Identified Appendix R !~sues (Closed) Unresolved. Item No. 272/83-37-03 pertaining to the installed automatic pre-action ~prinkler type suppression system in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Area (Fire Area 1 FA-AB-848) of the Auxiliary Building, elevation 84 10 11, which was not in accordance with NFPA-1 The existing sprinklers were located 416 11 below the ceiling and would not have been fully effective in quickly suppressing a fire. A time delay of approxi-mately 10 minutes in suppression system actuation could result from the lack of a solid surface within 12 inches above the sprinklers to transfer or collect the heat in the current location of the suppression syste The licensee issued a Design Change Package DCR-lSC-2157 which included additional sprinklers, heat collector and w~ter drip shields to improve the thel'.'mal sensing capability and provide adequate coverage for the area that meets the intent of NFPA-1 Modifications and the Safety Evaluation Report were done per Work Order (WO) No. 890517079 for Salem Unit L DCR-2SC-2157 and W.O. No. 890517106 were used to perform the identical task for Salem Unit This item is closed.
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-3 (Open) Unresolved Item No. 272/83-37-06-pertaining to the Auxiliary Building, elevation 84 10 11, 460V AC/230V AC Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1 (2) FA-AB-84A).
The 1 i censee had ori gi na lly ( 1 etter dated Decemb~r 28, 1983) requested an exe~ption for the use of a manual carbon-dioxide system instead of the automatic suppression system required by 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G. The licen~ee resubmitted this exemption request by letter dated July 15, 1988 asking for an exemption from Section_ III.G.2.C of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent that it requires separation of redundant sah shutdown equipment by one-hour rated fire barriers plus automatic suppression and_area wide detectio The licensee committed to protect one division of safe shutdown cables in a one-hour rated fire enclosure as described in the July 15, 1988 lette The existing manual carbon dioxide suppression system i_n this area will be -
changed to an automatic suppression syste The NRC determined that the existing fire barriers and the one-hour fire rated cable wrapping to be installed between the redundant shutdown systems would provide sufficient passive protect~on to provide reasonable assurance that one shutdown division would remain free of fire damag The lack of a complete barrier to protect these syitem ~as not considered safety significan Installation of the above m~difications is scheduled for completion-by December 1990~ The engineering design phase is _in process and nearing completion. This item remains open pending completion of licensee install~tion of the automatic fir~ suppression syste (Closed) Violation No. 272/83-37-07 pertaining to licensee failure to submit exemption requests within the specified schedule requirement of 10 CFR 50.4 Licensee request, dated January 31, 1984 for exemption from the requirements.of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G should have been submitted within 30 days of February 17, 1981, the effective date of the rul The licensee determined this to be an oversight on their par In an effort to prevent recurrences of issues similar to, and including the 10 CFR 50.48 scheduler violation, the licensee has taken the initiative to assure compliance with Appendix R regulations. A reorganization of the Engineering and Plant Betterment organization has resulted in consolidat-ing the fire protection program and technical expertise into one group which acts as the focal point for all fire protection issue New design control procedures (DE-AP.ZZ-0007[Q]) have been developed that identify fire protection interface requirements and technical standards (DE-P ZZ-0001[Q]-A3) for safe shutdown analysis which require that exemption requests be reviewed when design changes are reviewed to determine their impact on the safe shutdown analysi This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 272/83-37-09 pertaining to peripheral rooms located adjacent to and around the control room with walls and doors that are not one hour fire rate The licensee submitted an exemption request (License Exemption No. 2)
from meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section-III. The physical configuration of the control room complex, including perimeter construction, fire hazards, and existing fire protection features is described in Enclosure 1 of the licensee's letter of July 15, 198 Although the walls separating the control room are not fire walls, the doors leading to th~ control room are fire rated for 3/4 of an hou These doors are marked as fire doors and must remain shut per the Technical Specifications. This restriction is to pr~vent the propaga- *
tion of ~moke from one control ~oom to ~he other control roo The separate ventilation systems, for Units 1 & 2, are balanced to equalize the pressure in both co~trol room Tests have been conducted to confirm that smoke does not propagate between the control rooms for balanced ventilation system The licensee provided an adequate justifica-tion to the NRC to justify this.;xemption on the basis -of existing fire protection and the continued presence of control room operator.
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Exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section II for the Salem Unit 1 & 2 control room complex (Fire Areas 1 & 2 FA-AB-122A)
was granted by an NRC letter to the licensee dated July 20, 198 This item is clos.e (Closed) Deviation 311/87-29-02 pertaining to the deviation from the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), dated September 11, 1987 relating to a commitment to install automatic fire detectors.throughout the Reactor Plant Auxiliary Storage Area and in the Radwaste Storage Are Six areas were identified in the Reactor Plant Auxiliary Storage Area and the Radwaste Storage Area that did not have automatic fire detectio The licensee expressed their view that the term "throughout" used in the FHA commitment was inappropriat However, in response to the deviation the licensee committed to install automatic fire detection in the six areas of the Reactor Plant Auxiliary Storage Area. In the Fire Hazard Analysis, FHA, revision 3 dated April 11, 1988, the licensee stated that no automatic fire detection is provided in the Radwaste Storage Area due to the high ceilings and the low fire load. *The FHA indicates that fire suppression in the area is provided by a.wet pipe (fusible~link) sprinkler system to protect the area designated for storage of transient materials, the truck bay and the compactor are Portable extinguishers and a hose station are also provided for general area fire suppression. A manual fire alarm is provided in the area that annuciates in the control roo Actuation of the sprinkler system is indicated in the control roo DCR-2EC-2251A was issued to install the additional automatic fire detec-
tion in the six areas of the Reactor Plant Auxiliary Storage area This work was performed per work orders W.0.880226046, W.0.880226054, W.0.871231068 and W.0.87110213 This item is close (Closed) Violation No. 311/87-29-04, Item 7.0(A) pertaining to the potential loss of all service water supply systems as a result of a *fire in the service water pipe *tunnel, (Fire Area 12FA-PT-84).
The licensee requested approval of an exemption (Licensee Exemption No. 14) request from the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 to the.extent that it requires that redundant shutdown systems be separated by at.least 20 feet, be free of intervening combustibles and be protected by an automatic -fire detection syste The licensee's justification for exemption from the requirements in section III.G.2 for 20 feet separation be_tween redundant systems was based on limited fire loading, inaccessibility of the pipe tunnel and a proposed modification to install an automatic fire suppression syste Exemption from the Appendix R requirementsjn section III.G.2 for the 20 feet separation between redundant system was granted and documented.in NRC letter to the licensee dated July 20, 198 The licensee installed an automatic fire detection system in the s~rvice water pipe tunnel (Fire Area 12 FA-PT-84) as part of a Design Change Package DCR-2EC-2251 This work was performed with work order W.0.871231068 and completed in February 198 This item is close (Closed) Violation No. 311/87-29-04, Item 7.0 (B) pertaining to the potential damage to cables supplying power to the 11811 and "C" Emergency Diesel Generators from the 4160V Switchgear as a result of a fire in the fuel oil storage room (Fire Area 1 (2) FA-AD-840) causing a loss of emergency power required for shutdow The licensee issued Design Change Packages (DCR-1(2)EC-2248 to install 3M fire.wrap and completely enclose conduits.1(2) BDDA-B in a one hour fire barrier throughout the area to meet Appendix R requirement Work was performed per work order W.0.880406154 for Salem Unit 1 and W.0.880329091 for Salem Unit 2, These modifications were completed in May 1988 and September 1988 respecti~el This item is close (Closed) Violation No. 311/87-29-04, Item 7.0(C) pertaining to the potential loss of all emergency AC power to both diesel fuel oil transfer pumps as a result of a fire in the carbon dioxide equipment room (Fire Area FA-DG-84F).
The licensee issued a Design Change Package DCR-lEC-2284 to reroute and reterminate control circuits for the No. 11 and 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump In addition, each Fuel Oil Transfer Pump motor control center pan~l (located in the Diesel Generator Control Area) was modified to include a two position selector switch (normal-emergency), indicator light and a set of redundant control fuses to be used for "manual only" operation of one or both Fuel Oil Tra*nsfer Pumps in the event of a fire which results in the loss of both. Fuel Oil Transfer Pump control circuit The original design flaw in the automatic control circuit utilized to transfer one pump from the 11 regular 11 mode of duty to the 11backup 11 mode when the Qther is selected in 11 regular 11 has been eliminate Work was performed per work order W.0.880315077/880203104 for Salem Unit 1 and W.0.880315100/880203115 for Salem Unit This work was completed during March 1988 for both Unit This item is close (Closed) Violation No. 311/87-29-04 Item 7.0(D)(l) pertaining to redundant RHR room cooler cables located in a common panel in the Reactor
~lant Auxiliary Equipment area (Fire Area 1(2)FA-AB-64B).
OCR 1(2)EC-1608 was issued t6 move the solenoids and associated cabl~s and controls from Panel 119 to separate panels located in each of the RHR room Solenoid valve SV-783 and its associated regulator and controls were moved to Panel 101 located in the No. 11(21) RHR Pump rooms (Fire Area 1(2)FA-AB-45A)
and solenoid valve SV-784 and its associated regulator and controls were moved to Panel 102 in the No. 12(22) RHR Pump room (Fire Area 1(2)FA-AB-45B).
This work was completed per work order W.0.880523078 for Salem Unit 2 and W.O. 880523115 for Salem Unit This item is close (Closed) Violation No. 311/87-29-04 Item 7.0(0)(2) pertaining to redundant cables associated with Room Coolers and the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps located in a common area, the Upper Electrical Penetration Area (Fire Area 1(2)FA-EP-100G)
DCR-1(2)EC-2248 was issued to install fire wrap and completely enclose conduits 1(2)RPG5-AT with a one-hour fire barrier throughout the area. A localized fire detection system was installed in the area above all major equipmen Detectors were installed in the area where there is the potential for a fire to start or sprea The redundant Vital Vent Control Centers located in this area are separated by approximately 35 feet with negligible intervening combustible This work was performed per work order W.0.880406154 for Salem Unit 1 and W.0.880329091 for Salem Unit This item is close *
7*
(Closed) Violation No. 311/87-29-05 pertaining to the failure of the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) to review Procedure No. AOP-EVAC-2 entitled: "Control Room Evacuation Due to Fire in the Control Room or Relay Room, 11 and errors in tabulating document references to the "Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Operating Instructions. 11 The licensee provided documentation to show that the AOP-EVAC-2 procedure was generated from an existing procedure No. I-4.lOa, revision 3 which-was SORC approve AP-32, revision 3 "Implementing Procedures Program" provides instructions/responsibilities for implementing the procedures program and performing SQR reviews in lieu of a SORC revie The Station Qualified Reviewer (SQR) section ~.2 of AP-32, makes the initial determi-nation as to whether the procedure contains Significant Safety Issues (SSI), based on the guidelines provided in Attachment 4 of AP-32. This formed the basis for not submitting the AOP-EVAC-2 document for SORC approva,
Advanced Change Notices P-1 & P-4, dated December 12, 1988 were issued to correct the inconsistencies identified in tabulating document reference This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 311/87-29-06 pertaining to pertinent documentation confirming previous NRC approval of the use of jumpers in achieving a timely and orderly shutdown outside the control r~o Docum*entat ion was provided confirming NRC review of the post-fire shutdown capability for the Salem facilit An NRC letter to the licensee, dated May 31, 1982 addresses the additional information and clarification obtained in licensee letters to the NRC dated June 16, 1982 and December 22, 198 The NRC determined that the licensee had demonstrated that adequate redundancy and/or an alternative safe shutdown method exists for those systems required to assure safe shutdow Supplemental information was provided by the licensee in the June 1982 safe shutdown and interaction analysis included in enclosure 2 on the use of electrical and pneumatic jumpers in the licensee's alternate shutdown procedure In addition, the licensee developed a valve list for long-term hot shutdown and/or preparation for cold shutdown (8 *to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) which identifies the valve procedures indicating a preference for the use of electrical jumper The licensee's Procedure 1(2) AOP-EVAC-2 for "Abnormal Operating Procedures" addresses the use of individual valve procedures as applicable when maintaining the unit in Hot Standby or taking the unit to -
cold shutdown due to a fire in the control room or a fire in the relay roo This item is closed.
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3.0 Facility Tour The inspector performed a visual inspection of the Appendix R issues verifying the implementation of the licensee's corrective action for the items identified in Section 2.0 of this repor No violations deviations were identifie.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acteptable items, violations or deviation The resolution of unresolved items from previ-0~s inspections as discussed in Section 2.0 of this repor.0 Exit meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (Details, Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 12, 199 The inspector summarized the scope and inspection findings at that tim At no time during the inspection was writte,ll material provided to the licensee by the inspector.