IR 05000272/1990010
| ML18095A561 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1990 |
| From: | Albert R, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18095A560 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-90-10-MM, 50-311-90-10, 50-354-90-07, 50-354-90-7, NUDOCS 9011050416 | |
| Download: ML18095A561 (19) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Management Meeting Report No /90-10 50-311/90-10 50-354/90-07 Docket No License No DPR-70 DPR-75 NPF-57 Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company Facility Name: Salem and Hope*Creek Generating Stations Type of Meeting:
Management Meeting Meeting Date:
July 19, 1990 Prepared By:
Alber,.
Safeguards Inspector Approved By:
IC-* i;2-9 0 Date
/t:J- /.;< - 9 0 Date Meeting Summary:
A management meeting, requested by the NRC, was held at Artificial Island i~ Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey, from 9:30 a.m. to 2:00 on July 19, 1990, to discuss the findings of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD)
inspection (Inspection Nos. 50-272/90-10, 50-311/90-10, and 50-354/90-07) that was conducted March 12-15, 199 *
The agenda consisted of a 30-minute tour of the FFD testing facility and about a four-hour discussion on inspection fi~dings which the licensee questione The meeting concluded with*an undersia~ding that the NRC would take the licensee 1 s positions under consideration and prepare a written response to document the NRC 1s current position relative to the findings in question. This report contains that written respons PDR ADOCK 05000272 Q
PNU
DETAILS 1.0 Meeting Attendees Public Service Electric and Gas Company S. Miltenberger, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer C. Johnson, General Manager - Nuclear Support C. Munzenmaier, General Manager - Nuclear Services P. Moeller, Manager - Site Protection R. Mack, Nuclear Medical Director M. Walton, Medical Adminis~rator R. Brown, Principal Engineer - Nuclear Licensing W. Grau, Licensing Engineer B. Rakes, Licensing Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Commission M.. Knapp, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)
. R. Bellamy, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch, DRSS
.
R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS R. Albert, Safeguards Inspector, DRSS P. McKee, Chief, Reactor Safeguards Branch, NRR L. Bush, Chief, Program Development and Review Section, NRR T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector Summary Mr. S. Miltenberger, who was the senior licensee representative at the meeting, began with an introduction of licensee personnel in attendanc He then turned the meeting over to Dr. M. Knapp and Messrs. L. Bush and McKee, who spoke on behalf of the NR Dr. Knapp informed the licensee that the NRC requested the meeting to respond to the licensee 1 s questions concerning several of the inspection finding He stated that since the FFD rule was new to the industry and to.the NRC, it would involve a learning experience for bot Dr. Knapp said that the NRC was looking for feedback on the inspection findings and offered to discuss each finding to ensure that a clear understanding existed on the part of both partie Mr. L. Bush told the licensee that the NRC will reevaluate the FFD rule early next year based on experience gained through the inspection progra He further said that recommendations for changes based on the reevaluation would be published for public commen Mr. P. McKee expressed that the licensee had an excellent facility for FFD based on his observations during the tou He said the*FFD rule was new and that there were many ways to meet its requirement **
Mr. Miltenberger stated, in part, that:
there were some things in the inspection report Which raised*
concerns; the licensee 1s goal was to establish one of the premier FFD testing and collection facilities in the country; the licensee 1s primary concern is to strike a balance between safe plant operation and meeting the requirements of the NRC rule; the licensee must ensure.that personnel subject to the FFD program believe in the program and its credibility; and because implementation of the FFD rule is relatively new, he personally had a responsibility to his organization and the nuclear industry relative to the matters discussed during this meetin.1 Inspection findings Questioned by the Licensee Following are the inspection*findings which the licensee questioned and which were discussed during the meeting, the licensee 1s written response to each finding (as documented in a June 28, 1990, letter*to the NRC), the NRC 1 s discussion of each finding, and the NRC 1 s current position regarding each findin Additional information, provided by the licensee during the meeting, is also presente. Inspection Finding The licensee did not collect specimens over the weekends and between 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on weekday~. This predictable gap in scheduling diminishes the deterrent effect of random testin Licensee Response:
The licensee does test on some weekends and holidays and tests backshift personnel at the beginning or end of a shif The program contains reasonable measures for early detection of persons not fit to perform activitie This is accomplished by behavioral observation criteri The licensee contends its behavioral observation program is workin More rigid testing on backshifts and weekends will have its chief impact on alcoho In regard to employees being tested for alcohol at the end of a work shift, any level of alcohol detected will be treated as positive if the metabolic rate is calculated to show that the. blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was 0.04 percent at anytime during the individual 1 s work shift.*
The licensee reports that testing on weekends and backshifts is very labor intensiv It may take up to 100 telephone calls to contact five candidate The licensee contends that, by intervening at BAC below 0.04.-.
percent and that by treating a more limiting BAC as positive, requiring full sanctions, its testing practices meet the intent of the rul NRC Discussion:
The testing for drugs at the beginning or end of a shift is generally acceptable, however, a remaining issue is testing for alcohol because of alcohol's high rate of metabolism (0.015 percent per hour on average).
Using that metabolic rate, a BAC of 0.04 percent will be metabolized in less than 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Although the NRC staff endorses the procedure of calculating a BAC, it only fills some of the time gap, but not ~1 The staff also recognizes that behavioral observation, when properly performed, enhances the probability of detecting alcohol abuse in the workplace and has some deterrent valu The NRt accepts PSE&G's position on testing on weekends and holiday However, PSE&G's position on testing at the end of a shift to detect alcohol consumption is unacceptable because its metabolic rate would result in clear breath analysis results except in those cases where impairment would be obvious at the beginning of the shif Other licensees have devised methods to randomly test at various times, during back shift PSE&G should be able to do likewis The reference to not testing over the weekends is deleted from the revised inspection repor. Inspection Finding Custody of a blood specimen (a simulated specimen) was not properly maintaine The licensee took immediate corrective action by changing the procedur Licensee Position The licensee contends that the inspection finding is* incorrect in that the NRC inspectors questioned the pro~edur The procedure states specimens should be placed in a locked containe The technician placed the specimen in the wrong locked containe The licensee asked whether this action constituted a break in the chain of custod The licensee noted that the locked container never left the technician 1 s control and the technician maintained visual custody of the specime **
The licensee reported that there were no changes to its written procedur Steps were taken to ensure that technicians followed procedure Therefore, the procedural deviation which occurred 1n the laboratory does not constitute a lapse in chain-of-custod NRC Position As demonstrated to the inspectors, the blood specimen was put into a locked box normally containing urine specimens by the technician who collected the sampl Another laboratory *
technician picked up the urine specimen box and attempted to carry it into the lab for processing, which included signing the chain-of-custody form for the *urine specimens (not the blood specimen that had been placed in the container).
While the specimen box containing the blood sample was still in reasonable proximity to the tec~niciari who had collected the specimen, the other laboratory technician picked up the specimen box from another collection statio At that point, the inspectors interceded, and prevented the chain-of-custody from being broke The process, as demonstrated, indicated that there could be a discrepancy in the chain-of-custod The technicians indicated that the procedure would be change The inspectors did not review the procedur The licensee's corrective action to ensure that technicians followed the written procedure is acceptabl The reference to changing the procedur~ is deleted from the revised inspection repor.1.3 Inspection Finding The licensee permitted flexibility in scheduling random tests, allowing a supervisor to request postponement of the test until later in the day, if it would be a significant inconvenience or an interruption of important wor This program feature has the potential for abuse that could result in a delay of 8-12 hours in testin Licensee Position The licensee contends that test delays of several hours do not impact upon the detection of drugs included in the progra The behavioral observation program and any detection of blood alcohol considered positive with full sanctions applied meets the intent of rule and allows critical work to be conducte.1. 4
PSE&G contends that it reserve~ the right to have flexibility in schedulin However, the intent is to do. so in a designated time limi NRC Position The licensee may not have fully understood the commen The Key issue is not a time limit, but that the licensee's procedure (with which the NRC staff agrees in principle) could be improved to limit abus It was apparent that a delay of 8-12 hours was possible if the program feature were abuse The inspectors noted that, in practice, the licensee attempts to limit the time between notification and the tes *
The NRC believes that the licensee should review its procedure to assure that it provides a reasonable means of preventing, and for detecting, abuse. *
The inspection report will remain as writte Inspection Finding Several corporate and contractor personnel who have infrequent unescorted access were not subject to random testing while not working at the site and are not routinely rescreened after more than 60 days absenc Licensee Position The licensee contends that it meets the intent of the rule (FR/Vol. 54, No. 108, 24474) by returning the selected individual to the testing pool, reviewing for abnormal behavior, and evaluating the legitimacy of the absenc For NRC consideration, the licensee proposed to flag the badge of an i~dividual with infrequent access if the individual is not on site when ~andomly selected for testin When the individual does show up on site, a specimen would b~ col-lected prior to issuing an unescorted access badg However, the licensee would not await the results of the drug screen prior to granting the acces NRC Position This item was an unresolved item in the inspection repor Information provided by PSE&G in its written response and at the meeting did not dispute the inspectors' understanding of PSE&G's approach to testing people with infrequent acces The inspec-tion finding was that approximately 1,000 persons with infre-quent access to the site were a part of one pool from which all
- 2. *
persons are selected for random testin The departmental contacts are notified that a vendor/contractor employee under their sponsorship has been selected for testin When persons who have infrequent access are selected for random testing and the departmental contact ~etermines that they are not on site or in the vicinity of.the site, no effort is made to contact*
them or their employer, and they are not teste Their names are returned to the testing pool and someone else is selected and teste This results in persons who work on site being tested at a higher rate than those with infrequent acces Additionally, individuals with infrequent access are only at risk of being selected and tested on those infrequent occasions when they are on sit For eiample, a person who might visit the site for a day once every couple of months would only be at risk of being selected and tested for that brief duration when he/she was at the sit This approach allows persons with infrequent access to essentially be excluded from random selection and testing and establishes a predictability in testing that does not provide the deterrence of random testing as required by 10 CFR 26.24(a).
Finally, because those individuals not on site are not randomly tested, they are not covered by a program meeting 10 CFR Part 2 Therefore, when such individuals return to the site, pre-access processing is required by the rule (See item of NUREG 1385).
It should be noted that such testing is periodic in nature and highly predictable, rather than random and unpredictabl The licensee may accept the results of any test as the pre-access test a~ de~cribed in item 7.1 of NUREG 138 However, these tests may not be routinely used to maintain individuals with infrequent access in an eligible access pool without being subject to random testing. *
Although not addressed during the inspection, the licensee should evaluate its method of randomly testing personnel who are expected to respond during emergenctes, particularly to the Emergency Operations Facility (EDP), to ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 26.2(a) are being me The inspection report will remain as writte Inspection Finding While most staff members involved in the FFD program were found to be performing their jobs at a high level of proficiency, the possibility of inadvertent errors in the discharge of these duties is increased by the lack of detailed proced~res for some function The inspectors found that Section 8.2.2 of Vice President - Nuclear Procedure ADP-12, Revision 1, requires that
appropriate procedures for the FFD program be developed and.
utilized by those departments with specJfic program responsibilitie Procedures were not developed to a reasonably consistent level of qualit Specifically, higher order procedures (Vice President - Nuclear ADP-12 and NC-NA-AP.ZZ-0042) assigned responsibilities and established broad program objectives which covered the several areas required by the rul However, detailed implementing procedures for the appropriate depart-ments, in some cases, were not available, as required by Section 8.2.2 of Procedure VPN-ADP-1 Examples include elements of the selection and notification process, the appeals process (which was in draft format at the time of the inspection), and the process for evaluating program performanc Licensee Position The licensee contends that adequate procedures exist to effectively implement the FFD progra Additional procedures are not necessary because professional staff and consultants are hired to carryout the progra There has to be allowance for professional judgmen Personnel actions will be judged on a case-by-case basi PSE_&G reported that it had an appeals procedure in effect prior to its implementation of 10 CFR 2 The procedure was included in security procedure Since the inspection, a separate, detailed appeals procedure has been adde NRC Position Procedures for some day-to-day operations did not exist and raised questions about those activities being accomplished properly by 11 substitute 11 staf Further, the licensee did not present a clear appeals procedure as required by 10 CFR 26.2 The inspection report will remain as writte.1.6 Inspection Finding The fitness-for-duty program administrator was also the manager of Nuclear Human Resources and Administrative Service While it is desirable to assign management responsibilit~e~ to someone with the authority to take action to assure program success, the inspectors had some concerns that the program administrator was
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- at a level with so many disparate responsibilities that the administrator was not sufficiently aware of the day-to-day operation of the program to be able to effectively monitor and coordinate-program performance and identify program weaknesse Licensee Position The licensee contends that the Manager Nuclear Human Resources and Administrative Services has sufficient responsible personnel to administer the program and communicate problems and program performance to the appropriate administrative level to ensure an effective program that meets the rul NRC Position This was an observation by the inspector Their observations were based on the FFD Administrator not being able to answer some FFD program questions that the inspectors thought the individual* should be able to answe The NRC appreciates the licensee's position, but even though a program manager may have many responsibilities, a new program, in particular, requires a manager's close attentio The NRC staff was concerned that the FFD program would be properly managed from the outset..
The inspection report will remain as writte. Inspection Finding A strategy for assessing program performance and analyzing program performance data has riot yet been develope While the medical department has begun to trend and analyze data from the chemical testing program, workload pressures and other factors have inhibited the staff from pursuing its plan to develop an approach designed to identify program weaknesses, as required by 10 CFR 26.71(d).
Licensee Position The licensee reported that program performance is assessed through the proceduralized collection, evaluation and reporting of data, and that the conduct of periodic audits will also independently review the progra The licensee believes that these actions meet ~he requirements of 10 CFR 26.7 The licensee also believes that early in the implementation of the program, it was not poisible to track and trend program data because of insufficient data. Additionally, in the early stages, most of the emphasis was placed on ensuring proper implementation and not tra~king.
NRC Position 10 CFR 26.71 states:
11 Collect and compile fitness-for-duty program performance data... The data must be analyzed and appropriate actions taken to correct program weaknesses.
The NRC has an expectation that data will be collected and analyze While periodic audits provide a method of evaluating program performance, the part of the rule cited above refers to analysis that would be done outside an audit proces The licensee stated during the inspection that a program to analyze performance data.had not yet been develope The inspection report will remain as written..
2.1.8 Inspection Finding 2. Although the searching of persons, packages, and vehicles entering the protected area contributes to achieving the performance objective of a drug-free workplace, as stated in 10 CFR 26.lO(c), the licensee does not conduct searches of the workplace with drug detection dogs which could contribute to achieving that performance objective.
Licensee Position The licensee contends that the intent of 10 CFR 26.lO(c) is being met with the current progra The use of drug detection dogs, through previous licensee experience, will not appreciably assist in determining drug us~.
However, if warranted by circumstances, the licensee would consider the use of drug detection dogs or some other means of search to attain the go~l of a drug-free workplac NRC Position The NRC expects that licensees will consider preventive and reactive efforts to achieve the performance objectives of the rul When there is indication that established measures are not achieving that objective, the NRC expects that a licensee will take actions to assure the per.formance objective is me The reference to drug detection dogs is deleted from the revised inspection repor It was intended as an example of*a measure to achieve the performance objectives, not as a requiremen Inspection Finding The licensee's practices did not include certain actions that could be taken in response to confirmed positive test result *
These actions could include an attempt to identify the sources of the drugs consumed, and a review of previous wor Licensee Position The licensee contends that law enforcement agencies, with assistance from plant security, are the responsible organiza-tions to investigate the source of drug Current programs and procedures require sufficient independent review and quality assurance (QA) oversight to ensure that all safety related work is acceptabl However, the licensee will reevaluate its *
position on the need to conduct a review of work that had been done.by an emp 1 oyee who subsequently tested positive.for drug or a 1coho1.
NRC Position This item was an observation in the inspection report concerning actions relatively common to other licensees - in some cases very formalize The licensee 1s response and position regarding identification of sources is acceptabl Further, it is acknowledged that there is no regulatory requirement to interview a person who has tested positive for drugs relative to determining where he/she obtained the drug It should be noted that if drugs are found on site or information is obtained that the individual who tested positive obtained the drugs on site, the NRC would exp~ct this to be a matter of significant concern to the licensee and reported to the NR The inspection report will remain as writte.2 Incorrect Report Statements:
The licensee purports that the following implications in the inspection report or its transmittal letter are incorrec The NRC 1 s responses are. indicate.2.1 There was a discussion, commitment or change -made to the process of random testing of those persons who have infrequent acces (Transmittal letter, Finding No. 3, and Report Details, Paragraph 7.a.)
NRC Response:
See comments in 2.1.4 abov.2.2 The licensee did not c6llect specimens on weekend and holidays (Finding No. 4 and Report Details, Paragraph 7.b.)
NRC.Response:
See comments in 2.1.l above.
- 2.2.3 Custody of blood specimen was not properly maintained (Finding No. 5 and Report Details, Paragraph 7.~.)
NRC Response:
See comments in 2.1.2 abov.2.4 A strategy for analyzing program performance in accordance witn the requirement of 10 CFR 26.7l(d) has not yet been develope (Report Details, Paragraph 5.d.)
NRC Response:
See comments in 2.1.7 abov.3 Negative Tone of Report:
The licensee aiso contended that it 11 Consider(s) the strength of some negative statements to be excessive due to potential public misinterpretation on overall program effectiveness. 11 2. NRC Discussion An inspection report is not the means by which the NRC rates a licensee's performance.* Rather, it is a compilation of facts that are found during an inspection of a licensee's progra It would b~ unfortunate if a reader of the inspection report were to conclude that Artificial Island had a less-than-adequate FFD Progra Despite findings of the inspection, the inspectors all agreed that the FFD Program at Artificial Island is clearly soun At the ~tag~ of implementation of the licensee's FFD program during the inspection, even the best program could have been expected to have had minor flaw Comments concerning the flaws pointed out in the inspection report were intended to be constructiv Based on the licensee's comments on this report and other input we have received following inspections at other sites, we are considering some changes to the report format to reflect a more balanced presentation (strengths and weaknesses)
of the inspection finding.4 Conclusion of Meeting Mr. Miltenberger provided a summation for the licensee as follows~ Artjficial Island's FFD Program exceeded the requirements of the rul ~-
Implementation of the FFD Program required more resources than first anticipated.
- 13 Some gray areas in the rule need more dialogue between the nuclear industry and the NR The industry is looking to the Nuclear Management and Resource Council (NUMARC) to provide input to the NRC regarding FFD program implementation problem There has to be professional jud~ment and flexibility in regard to FFD issue Public perception of FFD must be a consideratio On behalf of the NRC, Dr. Knapp concluded that: Some issues raised by the licensee were vali *The NRC needed to do some homewor The NRC and the licensee were not yet in agreement on some issue The NRC would prepare a report of the meeting and would revise/
clarify any inaccurate statements contained in the inspection report by means of the Meeting Report.
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~~GEN DA MEETING WITH NRC ON INSPECTION REPORT FINDINGS FITNEss~FOR-DUTY PROGRAM July 19, 1990 TOUR M. Walton
- FACILITY
- - RANDOM TEST INTRODUCTION S.. Miltenberger DISPUTED NRC ITEMS OF CONCERN Dr. Mack PSE&G RESPONSE/POSITION Dr. Mack NRC FEEDBACK COMMENTS Dr. Mack OBSERVATIONS Dr. Mack SUMMARY AND CLOSING COMMENTS s. Miltenberger LUNCH *
MM2-1 ATTACHMENT (1)
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY* PROGR.. -\\~I INTRODUCTION S. Miltenberger.
- SITE WELCOME-INTRODUCTION OF PERSONNEL
- PURPOSE
- - CLARIFICATION OF PSE&G POSITION
- ADDRESS INACCURACIES OF REPORT
- ADDRESS ADDITIONAL NRC CONCERNS
MM2-2
- AGENDA-TOUR
- PSE&G PRESENTATION
- OPEN DISCUSSION
- LUNCH
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FITNESS-FOR-DUTY PROGRA~I ISSUES AND RESPONSES*
MM2-3 Dr. Mack
- RANDOM TESTING ON BACKSHIFTS/WEEKENDS
- SOME TESTING CONDUCTED
- BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION REPORTING
- POSITIVE BAC FULL SANCTIONS
- CUSTODY OF BLOOD SPECIMENS
- INACCURATE FINDING
- NO LAPSE OF CUSTODY
- TEST REPORTING TIME LIMITS
... DELAY DOESN'T IMPACT DRUG DETECTION
- BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION
- POSITIVE BAC FULL SANCTIONS
- CRITICAL WORK CONTINUES
..
..
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. ** FIT:\\"ESS-FOR-DUTY PROGR~-\\~I
- . MM2-4 ISSUES A.ND RESPONSES Dr. ~ack
- TESTING AND RESCREENING NON-SITE PERSONNEL
- RETURNED TO TEST POOL
- REVIEW ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR
- EVALUATE ABSENCES
- LACK DETAILED PROCEDURES-ADEQUATE TO IMPLEMENT.PROGRAM
- PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT-JUDGE PERSONNEL ACTIONS ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS
- EXCESSIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FFD ADMINISTRATOR-ADEQUATE RESPONSIBLE SUPPORT PERSONNEL
=PROBLEM Atll PERFORMANCE COMMUNICATION
- NO PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR TRENDING-ASSESSMENT BY DATA COLLECTION/EVALUATION
- PERIODIC AUDITS
.* FITNESS-FOR-DUTY PROGRA~I ISSUES AND RESPONSES MM2-5 Dr. Mack
- NO DRUG DETECTION DOGS
- DOGS NOT EFFECTIVE
- PROGRAM EFFECTIVELY DETERRS DRUG USE
- NO IDENTIFICATION OF DRUG SOURCE OR WORK REVIEW-LAW ENFORCEMENT IDENTIFY DRUG SOURCE
- INDEPENDENT SAFETY REVIEW
- GA OVERSIGHT
- INCORRECT REPORT ST A TEMENTS
- CHANGED PROCESS FOR RANOOM TESTING FOR INFREQUENT ACCESS-SPECIMEN COLLECTION ON WEEKENDS AND HOLIDAYS
- BLOOD SPECIMEN CUSTODY LAPSE-ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
- NEGATIVE TONE OF REPORT-POTENTIAL PUBLIC MISINTERPRETATION
- STRENGTH OF NEGATIVE ST A TEMENTS
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pi t
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FIT~ESS-FOR-DUrY PROGR~-\\),1 SU:\\iMARY.. L\\.ND CLOSING COMMENTS S. Miltenberger *
- REPORT FINDINGS HOLD PSE&G ACCOUNTABLE FOR CRITERIA NOT eONTAINED IN REGULATIONS-USE OF DOGS TO ACHIEVE A DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE-TRENDING METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE DATA
- REPORT HAS SOME INACCURATE STATEMENTS
- CHANGE TO PROCESS OF' RANDOM TESTING-NO COLLECTION OF SPECIMENS ON WEEKENDS AND HOLIDAYS.
-LAPSE IN CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY FOR A SPECIMEN e PSE&G HAS EXCELLENT PROGRAM THAT EXCEEDS RULE REQUIREMENTS
- FULL ON-SITE TESTING CAPABILITIES AND STAFFING-EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COVERAGE HM2-6