IR 05000272/1989020
| ML18094A708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1989 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18094A707 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-89-20, 50-311-89-18, NUDOCS 8909260320 | |
| Download: ML18094A708 (13) | |
Text
Report N License Licensee:
Faci 1 ity:
.Oates:
Inspectors:
Approved:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/89-20 50-311/89-18 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 July 25, 1989 - September 4, 1989 Kathy Halvey Gibson, Senior Resident Inspector Stephen M. Pindale, Reside t InsRector 1/tz/u Date Inspection Summary:
Inspection 50-272/89-20; 311/89-18 on July 25, 1989 - September 4, 1989 Areas Inspected:
Resident safety inspection of the following areas:
operations, radiological controls, surveillance testing, maintenance, security, engineering/technical support,. safety assessment/assurance of quality, and review of licensee event report Results:
Plant operators responded appropriately to separate occurrences of feedwater, circulating water and turbine electro-hydraulic transients; succeisfully stabilizing the units and avoiding plant trips (Sections 2.2 and 5.2).
Unit 2 reached its previous continuous run record of 81 days on September Unit 1 has run for 58 continuous days as of the close of the inspection period.
j
Details SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS Both units have operated continuously at or near full power throughout the inspection period with the exception of periodic power reductions, primarily due to equipment problem At the close of the inspection period, Unit 2 was operating at full power and Unit 1 was operating at 55% (feedwater system valve failure). OPERATIONS (71707) Inspection Activities On a daily basis through6ut the report period, the inspector~ verified that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement Public Service Electri*c and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Limiting co-nditions for Operation, and review of facility record These inspection activities fncluded 143 inspection hours including weekend and backshift inspections on July 29 (6:00 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.) and August 27 (12:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.) Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2. Unit 1 On August 25, problems were experienced with one of two electro-hydraul ic (EH) control system pumps (12EHPMP).
The pump was subsequently replaced on August 2 On August 28, plant operators attempted to place 12EHPMP in service, however, a loud noise was heard and both EH pumps automatically trippe Plant operators responded promptly and were able to restart llEHPMP, thereby restoring EH control system pressure and preventing a turbine/
reactor tri See Section 5.2 for discussion of licensee investigation concerning the EH pump trip On August 30, three of six condenser circulators became unavailable on Unit 1 while operating at 100% powe Plant operators responded immediately by commencing a rapid load reduction in accordance with station procedure The unit was stabilized at 57% powe The inspector observed operator actions in the control room and concluded that the load reduction was well controlled and supervised, and performed in accordance with station operating procedure Followup investigation revealed that the 13 KV underground cables which supply power to the three circulating water (CW) pumps had been cut by contractor workers while excavating
- *
-2-outside the protected area.. See Section 7.8 for details on the licensee's followup and corrective. action On September 3, 1989, the plant was operating at 56% power following EHC system repair During power ascension activities, and after returning the No. 12 steam generator feed pump (SGFP) to service, a 125 VDC ground was note The 12SGFP control breaker was suspected to be the caus The control room supervisor directed operators to remove the pump from service to investigate the groun As 12SGFP flow was reduced, the llSGFP feedwater flow ~ent offscale high and the steam generator (SG) levels began to decrease, apparently due to the flow reversing through 12SGF Plant operators then increased the speed of 12SGFP to raise feed flow to the SGs ahd restored SG level The licensee identified that both SGFP discharge check valves had faile There are two check valves on the MFP discharge line The first is a swing check valve and the second is a spring loaded check valv Plant operators speculated that both check valves on 12SGFP were potentially stuck open, thereby explaining the observed system operatio S-GFP control wa;; then placed in automatic and the llSGFP speed was decreased to ascertain whether a similat response would be observed, however, both pumps and the associated valves responded normall Operations management directed the return of llSGFP to automatic control and the manual closing of the spring-loaded check valve with 12SGFP in manual control and its speed reduced to a minimum valu When it was approximately one-third closed, the valve slammed shut due to the differential pressure created by the high discharge pressure of llSGFP. Plant operators verified the valve to be fully closed, and then manually tripped 12SGF Maintenance personnel subsequently determined that the swing check valve had failed because the hinge pin had sheare That, in conjunction with the spring-loaded check valve not closing, resulted in the reverse flow conditions while only the llSGFP was in servic The licensee noted evidence of erosion of the swing check valve internals, indicating that the failure may have occurred previousl A spare hinge pin could not be located, therefore, power was being maintained at 55% with only llSGFP in servic The licensee contacted the valve vendor to determine why the spring loaded check valve initially did not clos The ~endor speculated that the unique Unit 1 valve orientation (about 45 degrees from vertical vice normally 20 degrees from vertical), could possibly have caused sluggish valve operatio At the end of the inspection, the licensee and vendor were discussing actions, such as partially closing the spring-loaded check valve to assist in valve closure upon demand.
-3-At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was investigating whether; 1) the swing check valve could be repaired, 2) operation could continue with only the spring-loaded check valve in service on 12SGFP, 3) loose parts are inv-olved, and 4) any future actions/
inspections are required to assure check valve integrit Pending resolution of this issue, this item is unresolved. *
(UNR 50-272/89-20-01)
2. Unit 2 2. On August 20, Unit 2 control room operators initiated a rapid power reduction from 100% to about 80% power due to steam generator (SG)
water level control problem While operating at steady state
, conditions, the No. 24 SG experienced an anomalous, indicated steam flow greater than feedwater flow condition resulting in No. 24 SG water level quickly decreasin Plant operators immediately placed the associated feedwater regulating valve (FRV) and the No. 22 SGFP controllers in the manual control mode and stabilized the uni The plant load was later reduced to 46% power to repair an unrelated service water system leak on the No. 21 SGFP, and on August 21, the unit power leval was increased to 67% to investigate the feedwater system control proble Full power operation resumed on August 2 The inspector determined that operator response to the transient was both prompt and effectiv See Section 7.A for discussion of the SGFP troubleshooting activitie Both Units (Closed)
Violation 88-24-01; Procedure not used for EOG day tank level calibratio The licensee has committed to proceduralize operator actions to support maintenance activities by including the steps in the mainten~nce procedure Revisions to maintenance procedures will be made as necessary to accomplish this and in addition, the procedure upgrade program will also include a check to ensure required operations support is contained within the applicable procedure This violation is close (Closed)
Violation 89-03-03; Failure to meet SRG manning requirement The inspector verified that LCR 84-01, Revision 2 was submitted to NRR by the licensee on July 7, 198 This item is close.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)
3.1 Inspection Activities PSE&G's compliance with the radiological protection program was verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170 **
-4-Inspection Findings.1 On August 31, the 1 icensee identified that a master key mainta\\iined by a plant operator could open a high radiation area (HRA) fac A followup investigation revealed that additional HRA locks cowld be opened by the operations master ke Plant operators normally carry master keys for use on locked valve Operati-0ns and HRA lac~s are of a different type, however, with some manipulation, the HRA locks could be opened with the operator's key Although-there was no evidence that the opera~ions keys were ~sed in HRA locks, the Radiological Protection (RP) Department immediiilt.:ely verified all HRA locks to be in tact and locke RP also ins':t:G\\!Hed heavy duty ti ewraps on a 11 HRA doors to which were attached s;preci a 1 staging tags stating that the ti ewraps were not to be removed:..
Additionally, RP implemented shiftly tours to visually check a1l1l HRA doors, excluding those inside containment, to ensure the integrity of HRA locks and tiewrap The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and independently verified the integrity of the HRA doors during r0utine plant tour The licensee's corrective actions were prompt a~d:
effectiv The RP Department had previously ordered a new H~A\\ filey lock system, which is expected to be delivered on September 5. 1989.
Implementation of the new key lock system will eliminate the concer The inspector has no further questions at this time>.
SURVEILLANCE TESTING (61726)
Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 Th.e following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witr,re,s.sed by the inspector:
SP(0)4.4.6.2d SP(0)4.5.2d SP(0)4.8. Reactor Coo 1 ant System - Water Inventory Bal an.Ce'
Emergency Core Cooling System Subsystems -
Containment Sump Electric Power Systems - AC Distribution Inspection Findings
- .
-5-The surveillance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance progra *Inspection Report 272/89-15;. 311/89-14 discussed the failure of the 2A reactor trip breaker undervoltage trip attachment to meet the as-found output force measurement test acceptance cri~eria during a preventive maintenance/surveillance activity~ The report also discussed the licensee's followup to the failure which 1ncluded the identification of some differences between the licensee's PM procedure (M3Q-2) and a 1986 Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG)
document entitled "Westinghouse Maintenance Program Manual for the DB-50 Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers and Associated Switchgear".
The inspector held discussions with the licensee concerning the differences between the M3Q-2 procedure and the WbG recommendation The inspector reviewed the licensee's M3Q-2 pro6edure, the 1986 WOG document, and the licensee's commitments concerning RTB PM activities and the.vendor manual control progra The inspectoi determined that the M3Q-2 procedure was developed by the licensee in March, 198 In October.* 1983, a "Maintenance Program for DB-50 Reactor.Trip Switchgear" was issued by the WOG and subsequently endorsed by the NRC as an acceptable maintenance program for DB-50 breaker In res~onse to GL 83-28 and an NRC request for furthe~
information, the licensee documented that their PM procedure (M3Q-2)
includes all of the inspection and testing criteria of the 1983 WOG progra The licensee's response further stated that M3Q~2 is more conservative and restrictive than the WOG in that M3Q-2 includes additional maintenance activities beyond the WOG recommendations such as a 6 month vs 18 month PM cycle, performing multipl~ before arid after PM measurements, and performing shunt trip timing and breaker closure timing in addition to the. WOG recommended und~rvoltage trip timin Subsequently, NRC inspections and SERs concluded that the licensee's PM program for RTBs was acceptable with regard to GL 83-28 requirements and the 1983 WOG progra The inspector noted that the majority of the RTB PM activities and tests are specific requirements in the Salem Technical Specifications as well as the reporting requirement for any PM acceptance criteria failure The inspector further determined that the licensee's v~ndor manual control program, in general, is acceptabl However, the licensee does not consider industry information such as WOG documents as vendor manuals per se, and hence t'hey do not always go through the formal vendor manual control program for review and incorporatio Technical information supplied by other than the equipment vendor is tracked by the licensee's action tracking system and is reviewed and evaluated by the system enginee Any procedure changes are then incorporated at his discretio The second WOG program which
- superseded the 1983 document, was issued in 1986 and was reviewed by engineering when received by the licensee. It was concluded at that time (1986) that no significant differences existed between the M3Q-2 and the 1986 WOG recommendation In fact in some cases, as with the 1983 WOG program, the 1986 WOG program was less conservative than the M3Q-The licensee stated that since the M3Q-2 was developed, reviewed and approved under close scrutiny by Westinghouse and the NRC, and since many of the procedure requirements are also TS require-ments, they were reluctant to make unnecessary changes to the procedur However, since th~ UVTA output force measurement test failures that have occurred recently, the licensee has been in contact with Westinghouse representatives to identify the root cause of the problem recommended by Westinghouse in an effort to determine the root cause of marginal UVTA performanc As stated previously, these changes had little effect on the test results and the root cause of the decline in the margin of performance of the UVTAs is still unknow The licensee is continuing to investigate the UVTA problem and is also working with Westinghouse to evaluate accumulated data to justify changing their commitments with respect to RTB PM activities to be more in line with the WOG recommendations and the rest of the industr The inspector concludes that the licensee's actions with regard to this issue have been acceptable and had no further question (Closed)
Violation 272/89-01-01; Three examples of failure to follow surveillance procedures that resulted in safety system actuation The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and discussed the ongoing corrective actions to reduce personnel error, and improve attention to detail and procedure compliance with the VP -
Operations and Station manager The inspector concluded that the appropriate focus and attention is being given to those issues by licensee managemen This item is close.
MAINTENANCE (62703)
5.1 Inspection Activity During this inspection period, the inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry codes and standard These inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 **
-7-Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:
Work Order 890717138 890816135 890824103 5.2. Inspection Findings Procedure M7C-8 IC-14.3.025 Description Replace 22 Reactor Coolant Pump seal water injection filter Repair leaking union at 2NT31 Install/calibrate lA Emergency Diesel Generator switching tachometer The maintenance activities inspected above were eff~ctive with r~spect to meeting the safety objectives of the mainten~nce progra On August 28, 1989 when plant operators attempted to place 12.EH pump in service following repairs, a loud noise wa5 heard and both 11 and 12 EH pumps automatically trippe Followup investigation identified that the EH pump unloader was not set propetly, possibly resulting in the system perturbation when 12EHPMP was starte The licensee also stated that inadequate filling and venting of the'pump prior to return to service could also have resulted in the observed system respons The licensee found that a hanger had broken.on the discharge piping of 12EHPMP after the pump was starte Discussions with the system engineer revealed that the probable cause for both pumps automatitally tripping was the inadvertent actuation of the magnitrol that actuates upon a low.reservoir level condition which may h~ve occurred as a result of the mechanical shock to the syste Since the root cause was not immediately identifiable and due to the potential of creating another transient if both EH pumps tripped again, the licensee elected to reduce power level below 50% to perform the necessary system repair (Above 50% power, a.turbine trip results in a reactor trip.) The pump was filled and vented and the unloader valve was rese On September 2, the licensee reduced power to 35% and successfully tested the EH system pump The damaged hanger was previously replace The 11censee was conducting a review to further investigate the root cause of-the EH pump problem at the close of this inspection so that the appropriate corrective actions could be implemente **
-8- (Closed)
Unresolved Item 272/89-15-04; Unauthorized installation of a main steam drain valv The licensee determined that the valve was installed in accordance with a work order. and under the previo~s design change program wh~ch allowed work to begin on a design change during an outage with. the DCP documentation to follow prior to startu In this case, the DCP was never prepare The licensee 1 s present design change program requires the DCP to be developed and approved prior to work commencing thus precluding recurrence of a similar deficienc The appropriate.documentation and controls have been established for the main steam drain valv This ~tern is close.
.SECURITY Inspection Activity PSE&G 1s compliance with the security program was verified cin a periodi basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and selected physical boundarie.2 Inspection Findings (Open) Unresolved Item 272/89-11-02, Loss of power to the security computer; On Augu~t 22, 1989 a meeting was held with the.licensee in Region I to discuss their planned corrective actions for this ite The item will remain open pending the licensee 1s submittal of a security plan change to implement the corrective action.
ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT Following the August 20 rapid load reductio~ due to an unexpected feedwater system -0scillation, the Salem Technical Department (STD)
system engineers became involved in the troubleshooting activitie Minor system perturbations recurred on August 2 STD headed an investigation team in an attempt to identify the root cause of the transients.**
The inspector reviewed the group 1s action plan and found it to be.
. comprehensive and thoroug The steam generator level and main feed pump control systems, the feedwater regulating valves, and the feed pump were all addressed as potentially impacting the transient Several recorders were connected to monitor the affects of selected components on changing system parameter The trouble-shooting activi_t"ies continued for several day No specific probl~ms were foun The No. 22 main feed pump gain was adjusted (decreased) to provide a.more stable pump response because the governor controller response appeared to be overly sensitive to
-9-increasing demand input After holding power at ~everal predeter-mined power levels, *reactor power was escaiated to 100%.
Recorders remained connected for several days in the.event of another transien None occurred and the equipment was subsequently remove The inspector closely monitored the licensee's troubleshooting activities and concluded. that they were methodical and deliberat The inspector.had no further concern.
On Aug~st 30, a 13 KV cable power supply was inadvertently damiged by contract workers and resulted in the loss of 3 Unit 1 condenser circulators and a rapid power decreas The inspector discussed the event with the licensee and determined the followin Six CW pumps (three on each unit) are temporarily supplied electrical power from Hope Creek's Island Distribution Substation (13 KV ring bus).
The 1987 temporary modification was an interim measure to provide.
electrical power u~til a pe~manent modification could be complete Warning markings were provided at the substation that underground cables existe During ground excavation activities, the cables were severed by earth-moving equipment after only about 8-10 inches of dirt was remove The Unit 1 and Unit 2 - 13 KV cables were run*
without protection (conduit) or physical ~eparation. Only minor cable insulation damage occurred to the Unit 2 cable The machine operator was not injured when the energized cables were cu The Unit 1 cables were subsequently replace Two new, deeper (about two feet deep) trenches were made, one for each uni The damaged Unit 2 cables were repaire Scaffold boards were placed on top of the cables to provide additional cable protectio The licensee also issued a "Safety Alert" to station personnel to provide warnings to prevent a similar future occurrenc The licensee conducted a fact finding evaluation to determine the root causes of the event and to address plant and personnel
~afet It was determined that underground cable warning signs were posted prior to. the event, and contractor personnel were aware of the existence of the cabl However, the workers expected the cabls to be deeper in the ground, and only planned to excavate less than one foo The cable was cut while using the machine's bucket to smooth out the ground near the transformer as the cable began sloping upward toward the transforme At the end of the inspection, the licensee's evaluation was continuin The inspector expressed concern whether the cable was properly installed with respect to cable depth, protection and separatio The inspector will review the evaluation when it is completed and will.review compliance with the appropriate installation standard Pending resolution of the above, this item is unresolve (UNR 50-272/89-20-02)
-10- (Closed)
Unresolved Item 272/88-80-01; Provide a safety evaluation and maintenance instr'uctions for seal table room monorail :rnd t"'olley assembl The inspector reviewed the revised Design Change Package (DCP) 2EC-2232 lOCFRS0.59 safety evaluation and procedure MSC-RM and determined that they are acceptabl This item is close (Closed)
Unresolved 311/88-19-01 and 272/89-03-01; Determine the acceptability of DCP test procedure change revie The inspector reviewed procedure DE-AP.ZZ-0017(Q),
11Modification Concerns and Resolutions 11 and discussed the process of field requested DCP revis1on review and approval with engineering and licensing personne The inspector concluded that the licensee's program adequately provides for lOCFRS0.59 applicability review and documentatio This item is close.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500, 90712, 92701, 92?02) The inspecto~ reviewed four plant event independent review reports issued by the Salem Safety Review Group (SRG), dated June 26 (3/29/89 Unit 2 reactor trip), July 26 (6/10/89 Unit 2 reactor trip), August 2 (6/9/89 Unit 1 - safety injection/reactor trip), and August 3 (Unit 1 6/19/89 reactor trip).
The inspector found that the_quality of all.four review reports was very good, although the time period from event occurrence to report issuance was relatively long (about 2 months average).
The reports routinely provide recommendations to enhance station operatio They also identify w~aknesses with other previously completed event evaluations ( LERs).
The inspector noted that appropriate use of these types of reports can be a very effective tool in properly assessing and resolving plant events prior to restart of the uni However, it was apparent that these reports could not be used effectively in this regar A more timely report of this quality could improve the efficiency in correcting potential safety problem This issue was discussed with station managemen Station management informed the inspectors that they were concerned with providing in-depth reviews and evaluations in a timely fashion
_for significant event A 11Significant Event Response Team 11 (SERT)
concept was introduced to the station by managemen The SERT is composed of pre-appointed personnel whose charter is to systematically review in detail significant p~ant events, such as reactor trips. Their investigation results, conclusions and recommendations are intended to be available to management prior to plant restar Th~ SERT is to be used for both Salem and Hope Cree.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) AND OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP (92700) The inspector teviewed special, routine operating and licensee event reports submitted to the NRC Region I Office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the descrip-tion of cause and the adequacy of corrective actio The inspector deter-mined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicaied, and whether the event warranted onsite followu The following reports were reviewed:
Unft 1 Monthly Operating Report - July 1989 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - July 1989 Unit 1 Special Report 89-4; Inoperability of the automatic actuation feature for both fire pumps due to inadequate administrative contro Supplemental Special Report 88-3-11 a~d 88-3-12; Additional fire barrier penetration seal impairments not restored within seven day Unit 2 LER 89-011-01; TS Surveillance for MSIV functional testing historical non-compliance due to inadequate design revie This issue is discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-272/89-15; 50-311/89-1 The inspector has no further questions with regard to this supplement to LER 89-01 The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and the guidance provided in NUREG 102 In general, the overall quality of the LER reviewed during this inspection was adequat.2 Reference to Open Items The following open items from previous inspections were followed up during this inspection and are tabulated below for cross reference purpose Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed VIO 272/88-24-01 UNR 272/88-80-01 VIO 272/89-0101 UNR 311/88-19-01 UNR 272/89-03-01 UNR 272/89-11-02 VIO 272/89-03~03 UNR 272/89-15-04 Section 2. Section 7.C Section 4.2*.c Section Section Section Section 2. Section 5..
EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)
The inspectors met with Mr. L. Mil.ler and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restriction *