IR 05000272/1989023
| ML18094B153 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1989 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Oliveira W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18094B152 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-89-23, 50-311-89-21, NUDOCS 8911140064 | |
| Download: ML18094B153 (9) | |
Text
Report N Docket N License N Licensee:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/89-23 50-311/89-21 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge New Jersey 08038 Facility Name: Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge and Salem, New Jersey Inspection Dates: U:_mber 12-15: 1989 Inspector:. ~ ~
- OlfVei~ctor Engineer, DRS Region I Approved by:
OB, DRS N. J. Blumberg, Chief, Op rational Programs Section, Operations Branch, DRS, RI fol Jt(tr Date Inspection Summary:
Routine Announced inspection on September 12 - 15, 1989, (Report Nos. 50-272/89-23 and 50-311/89-21).
Areas Inspected:
Review of the licensee's compliance to the 10 CFR 50.62 Anti-cipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Rule as it pertains to the ATWS Mitigat-ing System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC).
Review was conducted in accordance with the guidance provided in NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/20, Inspec-tion to Determine Compliance with ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.6 Results:
Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, are in compliance with the ATWS Rule (10 CFR-50.62).
Verification of the systems approved in the respective safety evaluation reports show that engineering (design), procure-ment, installation, testing, training, operations, and maintenance of ATWS mitigating systems have been performed in accordance with approved procedures by trained and qualified personne No violations or deviations were identified and TI 2500/20 is closed for Salem Units 1 and PDR ADOCK 05000272 I
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted
- L. Deans, Quality Assurance Engineer
- J. Fitzgerald, Instrument and Control Engineer, Engineering and Plant Betterment (E&PB)
- L. Griffis, Systems Engineer, Instrument and Control (I & C)
- H. Gross, I & C Engineer
- B. Hall, Reliability and Assessment Manager
- R. Heaton, Systems Engineer, I & C L. Miller, Salem General Manager
- J. Musumeci, Operations Engineer
- P. O'Donnell, I & C Supervisor, E&PB
- A. Orticelle, Maintenance Manager C. Pinelas, Human Factors Engineer
- V. Paluzzi, Operations Manager
- F. Schnarr, Operations Assessment Manager
- W. Schultz, Stations Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
- C. :tephens, Maintenance Control Engineer
- R. Swartzwelde, Senior Licensing Engineer United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Gibson, Senior Resident Inspector S. Pindale, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting conducted on September 15, 198 The inspector also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspectio.0 Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2 ATWS Implementation (10 CFR 50.62)
- (IP 25020)
2.1. Background Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 50.62 specifies the ATWS mitigating system require-ments for the pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
Each PWR must have equipment from sensor output to final actuation device, that is diverse from the reactor trip system (RTS), to automatically initiate the auxili-ary feedwater (AFW) system and initiate a turbine trip Linder conditions indicative of an ATW This equipment must be designed-to perform its function in a reliable manner and be independent (from sensor output to the final actuation device) from the existing RTS.
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The Salem Generating Station (licensee) has an ATWS mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) system installed in each of their unit Westinghouse (NSSS vendor) designed and installed the AMSAC systems in accordance with the licensee's design change packages (DCP) lEC-2173 for Unit 1, and DCP lEC-2174 for Unit The systems became operational in December 1987 for Unit 1 and November 1988 for Unit A safety evalua-tion by NRC of the licensee's submittal for complying with the ATWS Rule was issued on December 23, 198 The evaluation concluded that the licensee was in compliance with ATWS Rule based on successful completion of human-factors engineering reviews noted in Section 5, 6, 7, and 12 of the safety evaluation report (SER).
This inspection was to verify compli-ance of the AMSAC systems with the ATWS Rul The documents reviewed during the conduct of this inspection are listed in Attachment.2 Scope The AMSAC systems were reviewed for compliance with 10 CFR 50.62 ATWS Rul This review included an asse~sment of the quality assurance (QA)
controls applied to the design, procurement, installation and testing, as well as the operational adequacy and reliability of the AMSAC system.3 ATWS Mitigation Systems Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) System 2. System De~cription The AMSAC provides a backup to the Reactor Trip System (RTS) and the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) for initiating turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater flow in the event of an anti-
. cipated transient (e.g., complete loss of main feedwater flow).
The AMSAC is independent of and diverse from the RTS and the ESFA With the exception of the final actuation devices, AMSAC is classified as non-safety related equipmen It is a microprocessor-based, single train system powered by a non-Class IE sourc The AMSAC continuously monitors water level in the steam generator During the anticipatory indication of *a loss of heat sink, AMSAC initiates protective functions when the level drops below the five percent narrow range level setpoint for at least 25 seconds in three of the four steam generators. These functions trip the turbine, initiate auxiliary feedwater, and isolate the steam generator blow-down and sample lines. These functions will also maintain Reactor Cooling System pressure below 3200 psi and prevent bulk boiling from occuring in the core.
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The AMSAC is designed to be reliable, resistant to inadvertent actua-tion, and easily maintained. Reliability is assured through the use of redundant circuitry and a continuous self-test feature. Inadver-tent actuations are minimized through the use of a time delay on low steam generator level and the coincidence circuit logi The AMSAC automatically performs its actuations when above a 40 percent turbine power level as determined from the turbine impulse chamber pressur AMSAC remains armed sufficiently long (260 seconds)
after that pressure drops below the setpoint* to ensure that its function will be performed in the event of a turbine tri Manual initiation of turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater flow can be performed by the operator in the control roo Review for Compliance to the ATWS Rule The inspector reviewed documentation of the AMSAC design, procurement, installation, and operation, and verified that the AMSAC systems ar~
in compliance with the ATWS Rul The review included:
Design Change Package (DCP) No. lEC-2173 for U~it 1 and DCP N lEC-2174 for Unit The packages included the seismic and safety (10 CFR 50.59) evaluation reviews, the procurement (supplier) requirements, work orders, startup and acceptance tests, and QA reviews and approval The inspector determined from review of the DCPs that the AMSAC systems do not compromise the safety feature of the RT The logic power supply, for example (shown in drawing 610508-A-1327-0), was verified to be a separate, uninterrupted, and independent power system from the safety parameter display system (SPDS) power panel (SPDSA2 for Unit 1 and SPDSB2 for Unit 2).
Six 90 day surveillance The licensee is awaiting NRC guidance for incorporating the surveillance requirements into the Technical Specifications (TS).
Pending review of the adequacy and effectiveness of the implementation of the NRC guidance for TS AMSAC surveillances requirements, this is considered an unresolved item (50-272/89-23-01 and 50-311/89-21-01).
Human-factor engineering reviews requested by the SE The reviews discussed with the human factors engineer were satis-factorily conducted in accordance with NUREG 0700, Guidelines for Control Room Design Revie The visual and audio human factors were satisfactorily demonstrated in the Control Room during a 90-day surveillance test and during the ATWS exercise at the Salem Simulator.
Selected material procurement and receipt documentation such as Purchase Order (PO) PI-192544 for the procurement of two cabinets to house Unit 1 and Unit 2 AMSAC System Installation drawings such as 601508-A-1327-0 to verify installation, separation, independence, diversity, and testabilit Training for Operations personnel such as lesson plan 302/304-145.12-AMSAC-OO cyclic trainin Training for the Instrument and Control (I & C) personnel was also reviewed such as three week course 0290-0075 given by Westinghous Training records indicate that operations personnel have been trained and are qualifie Alarm response procedures ARP-OHA-~27 (AMSAC Bypassed),
APP-OHA-A35 (AMSAC Trouble/Test) and ARP-OHA-F37 (AMSAC Actuation).
The procedures are clear, current and retrievabl Updated Final Safety Analysis Repor;;. (UFSAR) for Units 1 and The UFSAR did not address the AMSAC system The licensee will address the AMSAC systems in the next revision of the UFSAR scheduled for July 199 Licensee review of an AMSAC event at Beaver Valley 1 facility (LER 50-334/89-007-0).
The May 18, 1989 LER dealt with the loss of all input electrical power to the AMSAC pane The licensee received the Beaver Valley 1 LER on May 26, 1989, and initially determined that the event did not affect their AMSAC systems because the Beaver Valley 1 AMSAC system was designed and manu-factured by another vendo The in~pector questioned if the *
initial determination was based on the fact that Beaver Valley 1 AMSAC was designed and manufactured by another vendor, and not on the commonality of the Salem and Beaver Valley 1 AMSAC sys-tems. The licensee has agreed to review its initial determin-ation and has also requested assistance from the NSSS vendor in analyzing the impact the event has upon their system This is an unresolved item pending a review by the licensee of the impact of the Beaver Valley 1 LER 50-334/89-007-0 on the licensee's AMSAC system /89-23-02 and 50-311/89-21~02).
The following equipment was verif1ed to be configured and installed in accordance with DCP lEC-2173 and DCP lEC-2174, drawings and procedures:
AMSAC Test Pane On September 13, 1989, the inspector observed a 90 day surveillance being performed in accordance with proce-dure lC-18.1.01 The surveillance functionally verified the operability of the AMSAC Test Pane Following the observation
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of the surveillance test, the inspector selected and reviewed surveillance records from the previous 90-day The inspector noted a remark written by the technician in the surveillances performed on September 5, 198 The remark indicated that the technician did not perform steps 8.1.2, 8.3.1, 8.3.2. and 8. of the procedure because Unit 1 and Unit 2 AMSAC systems were already in the bypass mode prior to conducting the surveillanc Operations told the technician that they had placed the systems in bypass and he proceeded to perform the surveillanc Upon successfully completing the surveillance, the technician returned the systems to normal (operational) mode and notified Operations in accordance with procedure IC.18.1.01 When the inspector informed management of this fact, management began an investigation as to why the systems were in the bypass mode prior to the surveillance test and not in the normal (opera-tional) mode as required by* Integrated Operating Procedure-This is an unresolved item pending the results of the inves-tigation and subsequent corrective action:
50-272/89-23-03 and 50-311/89-21-0 Salem Simulato T~~ inspector witnessed an ATWS exercise, and the AMSAC system responded satisfactorily to an ATWS actuation and safely shutdown the plan AMSAC cabinet 856-1 (Unit 1) and 856-2 (Unit 2). The cabinets were installed in accordance with Unit 1 drawing nos. 202-079-A-8727-IR-lEC-2173 154/0 and Unit 2 drawing no. 202-079-A-8727-IR lEC-2174-I-154/ Components in the cabinets that were verified include: 12 point terminal block, Str.uthers-Dunn relays, Output Relay Panels, Test/Maintenance Panel, and the metal barrier to reduce electrical interferences and isolate inputs from the processing areas of the cabine During the walk down, the plant engineer noted that the Unit 2 Output Relay Panel A had the outputs labelled No. 11 AFWP and No. 13 AFW The plant engineer instructed the I & C technician to correct the labels to read No. 21 AFWP and No. 23 AFWP respectively. The mislabel-ling was corrected and is considered to be an isolated case since the walkdown did not identify any other deficiencie Overhead Alarms and annunciators (drawing 218161 B 9783, procedures ARP-OHA-A27, ARP-OHA-A35, and ARP-OHA-F37).
Solid State RPS Train A and B Output Cabinet (drawing 232020 for Train A, and 232421 for Train B).
The review indicates that the activities, except where specifically noted, were performed and documented in accordance with approved procedures by trained and qualified personnel.
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2.4 QA/QC Interface QA was involved in the review, approval and sign off of the DCPs, the pro-curement packages, receipt and disposition of material, work orders, spec-ial start up and acceptance tests. The AMSAC effort was surveilled by QA/QC during the installation and test phase as evidenced by review of ten selected station surveillance report The surveillances were conducted and documented in accordance with QA procedure GM9-QAP-5-Similarly, one Receiving Nonconformance Reports (RNR) was processed in accordance with GM9-QAP4-The RNR was written because the vendor did not provide the certificate of compliance for the electric switche The AMSAC effort was not specifically audited by QA, however, QA/QC coverage was evident as indicated abov.5 Conclusion The Units 1 and 2, AMSAC systems are in compliance with the ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62, except for the unresolved items discussed in paragraphs 2. The AMSAC design changes and plant modifications, including procurement, installation and testing were conducted in accprdance with approved procedures by qualified personne The AMSAC systems were verified by the inspector to.be operable by: walkdowns of the systems; observing a 90 day surveillance; and reviewing surveillance records, QA/QC records, and personnel training record.0 Management Meetings Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspect-ion at the entrance interview on September 12, 198 The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the September 15, 1989 exit interview (see paragraph 1 for attendees).
-At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspecto The licensee indicated no proprietary information was involved within the scope of this inspectio ___
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ATTACHMENT A Regui rements
10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Test and Experiments
10 CFR 50.62, ATWS Rule
10 CFR Appendix B, Quality Assurance Program
- Technical Specifications
NRC Safety Evaluation Report of December 23, 1988
- Design Change Packages lEC-2173 (Unit 1) and lEC-2174 (Unit 2)
NUREG 0700, Guidelines for Control Room Design Review (1981)
- Updated Final System Analysis Report Procedures
- Alarm Response Procedure ARP-OHA-A27, AMSAC Bypass, Rev 4
- ARP-OHA-A35, AMSAC Trouble/Test, Rev 4
- ARP-OHA-F37, AMSAC Actuation, Rev 4
IC-18.1.014, AMSAC Test Panel, Rev 0
GM9 QAP 5-1, Surveillance of Station Operations Program
Integrated Operating Procedure (IOP)-4, Power Operations, Rev 4 (Unit 1)
IOP-4, Power Operations, Rev 4 (Unit 2) Drawings
- 610508-A-1327, Safety Parameter Display System Power Components Connection Diagram
- 202079-A-8727-IR-lEC-2173-I 154/0, No. 1 Unit Control Room Area
- 202079-A-8727-IR lEC-2174-I 154/0, No. 2 Unit Control Room Area
- 601366-b-9980-IR-lEC-2173-I 143/0, Unit No. 1 Control Room Area, AMSAC Cabinet-Rack 856
218161 B 9783, Control Room Annunciators
- * Drawing Nos. 232020 (Train A) and 23421 (Train B)
Solid State RPS Train A and B Output Cabinet
.... * Station Surveillance Reports Nos. 87-0928, 0999, 1173, and 1393; 88-0664, 0668, 0797, 0843, 0848, and 0866
Receiving Nonconformance Report MC-87-0412 Miscellaneous
Purchase Order Pl-192544, AMSAC System,
Lesson Plan 302/304-145.12-AMSAC-OO, ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC)
- Training Course 0290-0075, AMSAC System
LER 50-334/89-007-0, AMSAC Loss of Power at Beaver Valley, Unit 1