IR 05000272/2023003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000272/2023003 and 05000311/2023003

ML23317A218
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/13/2023
From:	Brice Bickett NRC/RGN-I/DORS
To:	Mcfeaters C Public Service Enterprise Group
References
IR 2023003
Download: ML23317A218 (1)

Text

November 13, 2023

SUBJECT:

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2023003 AND 05000311/2023003

Dear Charles McFeaters:

On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 26, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with David Sharbaugh, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555- 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 -0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Brice A. Bickett, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000272 and 05000311 License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000272 and 05000311

License Numbers: DPR-70 and DPR-75

Report Numbers: 05000272/2023003 and 05000311/2023003

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-003- 0033

Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC

Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Hancock's Bridge, NJ

Inspection Dates: July 01, 2023 to September 30, 2023

Inspectors: J. Dolecki, Senior Resident Inspector E. Garcia, Resident Inspector R. Clagg, Senior Project Engineer B. Edwards, Health Physicist E. Eve, Senior Project Engineer A. Kostick, Health Physicist

Approved By: Brice A. Bickett, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.

Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Properly Implement Procedures for Maintenance Activities that Can Affect the Performance of Safety-Related Equipment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.2] - 71152A Systems NCV 05000311/2023003-01 Evaluation Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs, when PSEG failed to properly implement procedures and instructions for maintenance activities that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, PSEG did not implement work instructions and procedures to replace the 2C emergency diesel generator (EDG) service water inlet valve, 23SW39, and associated solenoid, 2SV592. As a result, the solenoid caused a ground to become present on the 2C EDG control system which, coupled with another intermittent ground on the 2C 125 volts direct current (VDC) bus, resulted in the 2C EDG being unavailable on April 10, 2023.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On August 31, 2023, Unit 1 commenced coastdown in preparation for the planned refueling outage 29 (S1R29). Unit 1 was at approximately 83 percent rated thermal power at the end of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.

Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on -site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2, 21 steam generator feedwater loop during elevated vibration readings, July 13, 2023

(2) Unit 1, 12 residual heat removal while redundant train was unavailable, August 30, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater pumps area 84' elevation, FP-SA-1453, July 10, 2023

(2) Unit 2, service water intake structure, FP-SA-2651, July 13, 2023

(3) Unit 1, 460 volts alternating current switchgear room 84' elevation, FP-SA-1541, July 19, 2023

(4) Unit 2, turbine generator 140' elevation, FP-SA-2181, July 27, 2023

(5) Unit 2, relay and battery room, FP-SA-2551, August 14, 2023

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during Unit 2 control rod exercises and associated activities to address a control rod receiving inadvertent additional rod withdraw demands on August 1, 2023.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification annual operating test simulator scenario involving nuclear instrumentation failure, accumulator gas leak, loss of off-site power, and loss of all vital buses on September 6, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Units 1 and 2, 125 VDC system batteries and battery chargers

(2) Units 1 and 2, station blackout (SBO) air compressor and portable diesel generator

(3) Units 1 and 2, fire protection system

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 2, risk assessment and management prior to restoration of 2C vital instrument bus inverter with 2C 230 volts alternating current train protected and 2C 125 VDC batteries out of service, during week of April 11, 2023 (Work Order (WO) 50242982)

(2) Unit 2, emergent work due to 22 motor generator set for rod control system output breaker tripped and removed from service, July 17, 2023 (Notification (NOTF)

===20940826/WO 60158120)

(3) Unit 2, emergent work due to 21 chiller tripped due to over-cooling of condenser heat exchanger from degraded service water valve, 21SW857, August 8, 2023 (NOTF 20943440/WO 60158243)

(4) Unit 1, elevated online risk (Yellow) and emergent work due to 1B EDG declared inoperable and unavailable after abnormalities observed on speed control, September 5, 2023 (Order 60158439)

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01)===

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1, boration flow path due to not allowing flow through control valve 1CV172 and check valve 1CV173 during routine dilution from control room, June 29, 2023 (NOTFs

===20939911 and 20927479)

(2) Units 1 and 2, SBO air compressor due to air dryer not cycling during testing, July 5, 2023 (NOTF 20831992)

(3) Unit 2, 21 safety injection pump due to flow transmitter, 2FT922, not having appropriate correction factor applied, July 19, 2023 (NOTF 20940950/Order 70230579)

(4) Unit 1, noble gas activity monitor, 1R41, not indicating properly, July 20, 2023 (NOTF 20941038/Order 60158082)

(5) Unit 2, shutdown bank 'D' and control bank 'D' due to inadvertent rod withdraw demand and group demand counter displaying elevated steps, August 1, 2023 (NOTF 20942854)

(6) Unit 1, 1B EDG due to synchroscope and governor displaying suspected abnormalities prior to loaded testing, September 5, 2023 (NOTF 20944485)

(7) Units 1 and 2, fire protection following #2 diesel-driven fire pump being non-functional due to failure of surveillance caused by overheating, September 15, 2023 (NOTF 20944298)

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

=

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Units 1 and 2, boron injection tank abandonment Permanent Modification - Design Change Package (DCP) 80123786

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) Unit 2, 21 chiller following biofouling flush preventive maintenance on condenser inlet valve, 21SW857, July 5, 2023 (WO 30370458)

(2) Unit 2, 22 rod control motor generator set after replacement due to bearing failure, July 24, 2023 (NOTF 20940826/WO 60158120)

(3) Unit 1, 12 residual heat removal heat exchanger flow control valve, 12RH18, pre-outage inspection and stroke testing, September 7, 2023 (NOTF 20899136/WO

===30367975)

(4) Unit 2, 23 charging pump following replacement of relief valve, 2CV141, and use of freeze seal, September 29, 2023 (WO 60158483)

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01)===

(1) S1.MD-FT.4KV-0003, "ESFAS Instrumentation Functional Test 1C 4KV Vital Bus Undervoltage," August 16, 2023 (WO 50243807)

(2) S2.OP-ST.CVC-0004, "Inservice Testing - 22 Charging Pump," September 13, 2023 (WO 50244415)

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) S1.OP-ST.CS-0001, "Inservice Testing - 11 Containment Spray Pump," on August 3, 2023 (WO 50243439)

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine drill involving a simulated main generator relay failure, failure to manually trip the reactor from the control room, a steam generator tube rupture, and stuck open atmospheric relief valve, resulting in a General Emergency declaration on August 17, 2023.

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) A simulator scenario involving loss of off-site power and all alternating current power vital buses and the associated emergency classification on September 6,

71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:

(1) Unit 2, Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) #1R20B in use inside the radiologically controlled area

(2) Unit 2, ARM #2R34 in use inside the radiologically controlled area

(3) Unit 2, 3030P "Frisker" #308749A staged for use inside the radiologically controlled area

(4) Unit 2, Continuous Air Monitor #0676 in use inside the radiologically controlled area

(5) Unit 1, ARM # 1R4 in use inside the radiologically controlled area

(6) Unit 1, ARM #1R6A in use inside the radiologically controlled area

(7) Unit 1, ADM-616 ARM #1R18 in use inside the radiologically controlled area

(8) Unit 2, containment high range control room display #2R44A Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (13 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:

(1) Mirion Telepole 2 #TPOLE2S-001

(2) Eberline E-520 #E520E4199

(3) Mirion Telepole 2 #TPOLE2S-008

(4) Mirion Teletector #TELEES5759

(5) Eberline E-520E520E3891

(6) Ludlum 9-4 #LUD9H316385

(7) Ludlum 9-4 #LUD9S316366

(8) Eberline RO-2A #RO2AE1861

(9) Mirion Telepole 2 #TPOLE2S-002

(10) Eberline RO-2A #RO2AE2796

(11) Ebeline RO-2A #RO2AE3033

(12) Ludlum 9-4 #LUD9S316430

(13) Eberline RO-2 #RO2H2953

Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:

(1) Unit 1, liquid radioactive waste monitor #1R18

(2) Unit 2, effluent gas monitor #2R41

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Review of licensee's actions associated with the implementation of a license amendment to permit the use of temporary diesel generators to allow a 14-day limited condition for operations for EDGs inoperability (NOTF 20944485)

(2) Review of licensee's actions associated with the installation, repair, and subsequent failure of the 2C EDG service water inlet valve, 23SW39, that resulted in inoperability and unavailability of 2C EDG, April 10, 2023 (NOTF 20933380)

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Properly Implement Procedures for Maintenance Activities that Can Affect the Performance of Safety-Related Equipment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.2] - 71152A Systems NCV 05000311/2023003 - 01 Evaluation Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs, when PSEG failed to properly implement procedures and instructions for maintenance activities that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, PSEG did not adequately implement work instructions and procedures to replace the 2C emergency diesel generator (EDG)service water inlet valve, 23SW39, and associated solenoid, 2SV592. As a resul t, the solenoid caused a ground to become present on the 2C EDG control system which, coupled with another intermittent ground on the 2C 125 volts direct current (VDC) bus, resulted in the 2C EDG being unavailable on April 10, 2023.

Description:

Salem has three EDGs per unit that are called upon to restore safety -related power. Cooling water for the Salem Unit 2, 2C EDG is supplied by the service water (SW)system through 2C EDG SW inlet valve, 23SW39.

23SW39 is an air - operated valve controlled by solenoid, 2SV592, that opens (circuit de-energizes and solenoid vents) to supply cooling water to the jacket water and lube oil systems.

On April 4, 2023, as part of a planned preventive maintenance activity in accordance with WO 30317553, 23SW39 and 2SV592 were replaced, with validation signoffs of proper installation.

Due to a breaker tagout, the post - maintenance test was not performed until April 8, 2023.

On April 8, 2023, at the time of the planned 2C vital bus restoration, PSEG operators identified a ground on the 2C 125 VDC bus. PSEG updated corrective action program NOTF 20854531, a NOTF written in June 2020, to capture this ground. During post - maintenance testing on April 8, 2023, 23SW39 failed to open on the start of the 2C EDG. PSEG initiated NOTF 20933380. The inspectors reviewed NOTF 20933380 and noted that it documented that the 2SV592 solenoid appeared to be blowing air, but the valve remained closed. PSEG isolated the air, and the valve was able to be failed open. PSEG conducted troubleshooting using NOTF 20933380 and stated that the solenoid was found to be ported differently from the original but with the same body configuration. PSEG conducted repairs on 2SV592 and on April 9, 2023, 23SW39 and 2SV592 post-maintenance testing was satisfactory.

The inspectors also noted that on April 8, 2023, at the time of the planned 2C EDG post -

maintenance testing, PSEG operators identified a ground on the 2C 125 VDC bus and documented this condition in NOTF 20854531 which also documented a grounded condition identified in June 2020.

On April 10, 2023, while Unit 2 was shutdown for the S2R26 refueling outage, the 2C EDG experienced an electrical lockout while in standby mode and was declared unavailable.

PSEG initiated NOTF 20933599 and conducted a prompt investigation which determined that the 2C EDG auxiliary generator differential relay had tripped. PSEG initiated troubleshooting activities and generated WO 60156992. Troubleshooting determined that the relay actuated appropriately for a grounded system and was not the cause of the lockout. A second troubleshooting activity was then performed on the 2C 125 VDC bus that provides power to the relay to find a ground on the system. PSEG initiated this troubleshooting referencing NOTF 20854531 stated above. Subsequent investigation identified spliced wires on 2SV592, but although it was concluded that this was not the cause of the ground, PSEG made the decision to replace the wiring and 2SV592. On April 11, 2023, PSEG replaced the solenoid for a second time, the ground was cleared, and the EDG was declared operable following a satisfactory post-maintenance test.

Inspectors reviewed WO 30317553, WO 60156992, NOTF 20854531, NOTF 20933599, and other documents associated with the maintenance on 23SW39 and 2SV592. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures SC.IC.PM.ZZ-0008(Q), Maintenance of Bettis Actuator (Model CB), and MA -AA-716-100, Maintenance Alteration Process, for the valve replacement and installation between April 4 and April 6. The inspectors noted these procedures included independent verifications and supervisor signoffs that work was performed correctly and according to the procedures. The inspectors determined that during maintenance on 23SW39 and 2SV592 between April 4-8, 2023, PSEG induced a ground on the 2C 125 VDC bus that ultimately led to the 2C EDG being unavailable on April 10, 2023. The inspectors also determined that PSEG improperly concluded the ground on the 2C 125 VDC bus identified on April 8, 2023 was the same ground identified in June 2020. The inspectors concluded that PSEG failed to adequately implement procedures to replace the 23SW39 and 2SV592.

The inspectors also noted that, contributing to the lack of clarity in what occurred during the repair activities, PSEG did not perform a corrective action program evaluation to understand the human performance and work processes aspects that contributed to the

(1) improper installation and

(2) correlation made between a 2C 125 VDC ground identified in June 2020 and April 2023.

Corrective Actions: PSEG replaced 2SV529, cleared the ground on the 2C 125 VDC bus, and was able to demonstrate operability of the 2C EDG through a satisfactory post-maintenance test. PSEG also initiated NOTFs to determine if a causal analysis was required by their corrective action program procedures and to capture the inappropriate correlation made between the 2C 125 VDC grounds identified in June 2020 and April 2023.

PSEG generated NOTF 20945605 to capture the performance deficiency and initiate corrective actions.

Corrective Action References: 20854531, 20933380, 20933599, 20945605, 20947509

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the failure to properly implement procedures for maintenance activities on safety -related equipment was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the 2C EDG being unavailable and PSEGs shutdown risk classification changing from Green to Yellow on April 10, 2023. The inspectors also noted that the performance deficiency was similar to Example 4.m, of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Specifically, PSEG failed to adequately implement procedures and work instructions for work on 23SW39 and, as a result, was unable to demonstrate operability and unavailability and had to replace damaged equipment. The inadequate implementation of work instructions led to inadequate maintenance being performed and regardless of the final operability, PSEG had to replace equipment because of damage.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because, the degraded condition does not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk analysis function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than three days.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors determined that PSEG personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the installation of 23SW39 and 2SV592, as evidenced by independent verification not identifying issues and inappropriately concluding the 2C 125 VDC grounds identified in June 2020 and April 8, 2023, were the same.

Enforcement:

Violation: Salem Unit 2, TS 6.8.1(a), Procedures and Programs, requires in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced in RG 1.33, Appendix A, Revision 2, February 1978.

RG 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9.a, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions.

Contrary to the above, from April 4, 2023, until April 11, 2023, PSEG failed to adequately implement procedures, SC.IC-PM.ZZ-0008(Q), Maintenance of Bettis Actuator (Model CB),

MA-AA-716-004, Conduct of Troubleshooting, and MA -AA-716-100, Maintenance Alteration Process, and work instructions for maintenance activities on 23SW39 and 2SV592 resulting in the 2C EDG being unavailable.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Review of Actions Associated With the Potential Use of Temporary 71152A Diesel Generators During Loss of Off-Site Power or to Allow a 14-Day Limited Condition for Operations for EDGs Inoperability On May 2, 2023, the NRC issued a safety evaluation report approving the revision to Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, TS Action 3.8.1.1.b.4, to extend the allowed outage time (AOT) for an inoperable EDG from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 14 days (ML23081A466). This license amendment permitting the extension of the AOT beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is contingent on availability of a supplemental alternating current power source (i.e., the "AOT diesels") to provide power to the 4kV electrical bus associated with the inoperable EDG in the event of a loss of off-site power and subsequent failure of one of the remaining operable EDGs. Within the safety evaluation report letter, the NRC stated the "license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of the date of issuance." On July 13, 2023, PSEG amended TS Action 3.8.1.1.b.4 and the corresponding TS Bases. On August 30, 2023, PSEG revised procedure S1(2).OP-AB.LOOP- 0001, "Loss of Off-Site Power," to include directions on staging and establishing the AOT diesels in response to a loss of off-site power event.

Inspectors reviewed PSEG's actions related to implementation of the license amendment and actions required to use the AOT diesels. Specifically, inspectors reviewed the commitments made related to the license amendment, PSEG's required actions necessary to ensure the AOT diesels can be appropriately staged, and connections established to the 4kV electrical bus by qualified personnel in a specified timeframe. Inspectors reviewed, in part, actions taken or planned for procedure revisions, operator training, and modifications.

As a result of the review, inspectors determined PSEG has not completed actions to permit the use of the AOT diesels. Specifically, the AOT diesels cannot be utilized (i.e., stated to be available) until PSEG has, in part, validated that the AOT diesels can be staged, connected, and backfed to the impacted 4kV bus in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> or less. PSEG performs time validation in accordance with OP-SA-102-106, Salem Operations Master List of Timed Actions. The inspectors determined PSEG is in compliance with their TS because the use of the AOT diesels is contingent on their availability; however, the inspectors observed that PSEG still has a number of outstanding actions without clear milestones of expected completion dates that prevents the station from declaring the AOT diesels available if needed.

This inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency or violation of more than minor significance.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 26, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to David Sharbaugh, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On August 10, 2023, the inspectors presented the IP 71124.05 radiation instrumentation inspection results to David Sharbaugh, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04 Corrective Action 20944275 12 RHR Flow Control Valve 12RH18 Boric Acid Evaluation 08/31/2023

Documents and Planned Work Order

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 205232 Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal 40

71111.11Q Corrective Action 20942857 Shutdown Bank C "Off Top" Alarm Plant Computer 08/01/2023

Documents 20942859 Entered S2.OP-AB.ROD-0001 08/01/2023

Procedures S2.OP-AB.ROD-Immovable/Misaligned Control Rods 11

0001

S2.OP-AB.ROD-Continuous Rod Motion 25

0003

S2.OP-ST.RCS-Reactivity Control System Rod Control Assemblies 28

0001(Q)

71111.12 Corrective Action 20831992, SBO Air Compressor Air Dryer Not Cycling, UNSAT During

Documents 20674156, and SC.OP-PT.CA-0001 Performance

20662439

20843096 NRC Identified Trend of SBO Diesel Battery Failures 01/10/2020

20851116 Surface Corrosion on SBO Air Compressor Air Line Piping 04/30/2020

20863946 Battery Specific Gravity Greater Than Acceptance Criteria 11/03/2020

20894639 #1 Diesel-Driven Fire Pump Started During 1FP132/1FP66 01/01/2022

Repair Work Due to 1FP236 Valve Significantly Leaking By

20906463 Battery Capacity Does Not Meet Criteria 09/14/2022

20918724 1A 125 VDC Battery Cells 15 and 52 Have Hairline Cracks 10/12/2022

20919341 Unit 1 125 VDC Battery Charger Performance Monitoring 10/24/2022

Group has Been Exceeded

20925869 Leak From #1 Diesel-Driven Fire Pump Air Release Valve, 01/22/2023

Valve Stuck Open

20930449, Diesel-Driven Fire Pumps Shafts Needs Serviced Because it 03/15/2023

20930451 was Oscillating More Than Tolerance and There is No PM

20939884 During WO 30330540, SBO Battery Replacements UNSAT 06/28/2023

20942827 Through Wall Leak on FP Piping on 84' of Auxiliary Building 07/30/2023

20944291 Trend in Damage, Degradation, and Corrosion to Fire 09/06/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Protection System and Piping

Engineering 70210190-0060 Predefine Change Request for SBO Diesel Battery

Evaluations and -0070 Replacement PMs

211168-0010 MRule(a)(1) Evaluation of SBO Power Supply 06/17/2020

214836 Revise Existing Maintenance Plans 179797-179800 and

179791-179796 for Replacement of Safety-Related 28 VDC

and 125 VDC Batteries from 17 Years to 16 Years

Procedures S1(2).OP-SO.PC-Switchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation, 21

0001(Q), Temporary Cooling to 124 VDC Battery Rooms

S1(2).OP-ST.125-Electrical Power Systems 125 VDC Distribution 13

0001(Q)

Work Orders 30254880, 125V DC Battery Bank Replacements (16.5-17 Year

255201, Frequency)

255202,

255203,

255204,

255205,

30319483, and

30375433

279113, SBO Battery Inspection and Replacement

30330540

71111.13 Corrective Action 20943458 21SW857 Valve Found in Unexpected Open Position 08/08/2023

Documents 20943481 21SW857 Valve Soft Seat Material From the Disc and Seat 08/11/2023

Missing, as Noted During Valve Removal

20944284 PRA Color Changed to Yellow Due to SBO Diesel Generator 09/05/2023

Being Tagged Out and Unplanned 1B EDG Inoperable and

Unavailable

Corrective Action 20944653 Failure to Perform As-found Testing in Accordance with MA- 09/26/2023

Documents AA-716- 004, Conduct of Troubleshooting, for 21 Chiller trip

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering 80111049 Unit 1 Chiller Replacement Modifications 6 and 7

Changes 80123152 Unit 2 Chiller Replacement Modifications 3

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Engineering 70215962-0170 PM Change Request to Remove 14-Day Biofouling Flushing 10/12/2022

Evaluations of SW857 Valves

Procedures S.OP-PT.SW-Service Water Fouling Monitoring Chiller Condensers 17

0008

71111.15 Corrective Action 20831992 SBO Air Compressor Dryer Not Cycling During Performance 08/31/2019

Documents of SC.OP-PT.CA-0001 Resulting in Unsatisfactory

Performance

Corrective Action 20942816 Failure to Revise S2.IC-SC.SJ-0174(Q) Procedure After

Documents Replacement of Flow Transmitter, S2SJ -2FT922

Resulting from 20944524 EDG Rooms Temperature Control Calibrations for 08/30/2023

Inspection Ventilation Control

20945117 Daily Status Report vs Fire Protection Status of Hope 09/21/2023

Creek/Salem Cross-Tie Valve, 1FP30

Engineering 70230329 No Flow During Normal Boration 07/26/2023

Evaluations 70230579 Failure to Revise Procedures After 21 Safety Injection Pump

Discharge Differential Pressure Transmitter, 2FT922,

Replaced in 2011

Procedures S2.IC-SC.SJ-Safety Injection Pump Discharge Flow 7

0174(Q)

S2.OP-PT.SJ-Safety Injection Pump Flow Test Modes 5-6 6

0002(Q)

71111.24 Engineering 70213313-0010 11 Chiller SW Control Valve Adjustment Screw Broke During 05/05/2020

Evaluations Biofouling Test

Procedures S2.OP-PT.SW-Service Water Fouling Monitoring Chiller Condensers 17

0008(Q)

SH.MD-SP.ZZ-Use of Rigid Superfreeze SF-2500 Freeze Seal System 2

0012(Q)

71152A Corrective Action 20944485 1B EDG Synchroscope / Governor Hunting 09/05/2023

Documents

Engineering 80131437 Salem EDG AOT LAR

Changes 80134926 Salem AOT Backfeed Authorization 0

Miscellaneous ADAMS Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - 05/02/2023

Accession Issuance of Amendment Nos. 346 and 327 Re: Revise

Number Technical Specifications to Extend Allowable Outage Time

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

ML23081A466 for Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator

Procedures LS-AA-101 License and Technical Specifications Amendment Process 6

OP-SA-102-106-Master List of Timed Actions 7

F1

OP-SA-108-116 Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program 2

S1(2).OP-Loss of Off-Site Power 37

AB.LOOP-0001

15