IR 05000272/1988008

Insp Repts 50-272/88-08 & 50-311/88-08 on 880216-0321.Two Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Including Operational Safety Verification,Surveillance, Maint,Review of Special Repts & Assurance of Quality

ML18094A323
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/25/1988
From:	Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18094A322	List: IR 05000272/1988008 ML18094A321
References
50-272-88-08, 50-272-88-8, 50-311-88-08, 50-311-88-8, IEIN-83-11, IEIN-84-83, IEIN-85-074, IEIN-85-74, IEIN-86-037, IEIN-86-37, NUDOCS 8904170245
Download: ML18094A323 (82)

Text

Report No Docket No License No Licensee:

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272/88-08 50-311/88-08 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050272-880211*

050272-880218 050272-880224 050311-880208 050311-880213 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:. Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:

February 16, 1988 - March 21, 1988 *

~::::r:~: 4~ctor

~Sw~nd, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 28, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:

34s-~~g~

• date Inspections on February 16, 1988 - March 21, 1988 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/88-08 and 50-311/88-08)

Areas Inspected:

Routine inspections of plant operations including:

operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, 1 icensee event followup, storage battery adequacy audit (temporary instruction 87-07), and assurance of qualit The inspection involved 105 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspecto Results:

This report documents a Unit trip on Unit l during physics testing and the apparent failure of a reactor trip breaker on Unit The report also documents the results of a battery adequacy audi Two *licensee identified violations were noted in Section 6 involving not staggering surveillance tests for redundant components, and missed grab samples for steam generator blowdown discharge ~17021~ 880325 F'Uf*<

ADOU:.. 05000272 Q

PDC

• DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of 1 icensee management and staf.f as necessary to support inspection activit ~

Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709, 71710 and.71881) Documents Reviewed Selected Operators( Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log

.Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)

Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)

Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 2:2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).

During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C),

mechani~s, security personnel, supervisors, and plant managemen The inspections were conducted in* a'ccordance with NRt Inspection Procedures 71707, 71709, 71710, and 71881 and affirmed the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, License Conditions, and Administrative Procedure No violations were identifie. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown: (71710)

The inspectors verified the operabi 1-i ty of the se 1 ected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm tha{ system l~neup ~rocedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio This ESF system walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentatio~ is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Intermediate Head -Safety Injection System (Unit" 2) and Auxiliary

• Feedwater System (Unit 1) were inspecte No deficiencies were identifie :.-.. -*:

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• .

3 Inspector Comments/Findings:

The inspector selected phases of the units' operation to determine co~pliance with the NRC 1 s regulation The ihspector determiried that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions dfd noi constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:

2. 3.1.

Unit 1 The refueling outage was completed and on February 2; -.

1988, the unit was brought critical to conduct low power physics testin On February 19, 1988, the licensee* identified a lower than normal megger reading (resistance to ground_) on rod drive mechanism 1SA2 (a rod in Shutdown Bank A).

The rod was operable and the licensee decided to proceed with physics testing in order to complete the outag It was antici-pated that the rod drive mechanism would be replaced at a later dat On February 24, 1988, at 4:36 a.m., the reactor tripped from 2% power due to a high flux trip on channel N35 (intermediate range).

The trip signal was caused when an instrument technician failed to follow a procedure and pulled the fuses on that channel before placing the trip channel in bypas The technician had been working on channel N35 prior to *

the trip and spikes were seen on the average reactor coolant temperature reference signal in the control roo The Shif~ Supervisor directed the technician to*

investigate the relationship between the work being perfbrmed on channel N35, and the Taye deflections.* The technician failed to follow the procedure to plac~ the trip channel.in bypass prior to removal of the fus Subsequent investigation produced the following facts:

The experienc~d technician was preoccupied with th~

Tave interference with channel N35 and was trying to figure out the connectio He admitted to having the procedure but not returning to the correct step in the procedure, "Place the channel in bypass" and proceeded to remove the instrument fuses thus causing the trip.

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.. '. ~ :-, *-.

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. *... '_

2. *

The licensee is committed to the INPO Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) to investigate plant occurrences. *This was the first case to be evaluated and will be reviewed by the resident inspector when availabJ The spikes in the Tave program were subsequently attributed to a faulty RTD in No. 13 hot le The RTD's, which were installed during the outage have two elements (primary and secondary).

The primary was found deficient and the secondary was connected in its plac The system has functioned normally since the change was mad Thi~ item remains unresol~ed pending completion of these actions and NRC review of the Licensee Event Repor (UNR 272/88-08-01)

During the shutdown, rod drive mechanism 1SA2 was replace The unit was taken critical on February 26, 1988, and returned to service on February 28, 1988 following the completion of low power phy~ics testin On February 29, 1988, a primary to secondary leak was discovered in the No. 13 steam generator: Power ascension was stopped and power was stablized at 80%.

With steady state conditions, the: leak rate was calculated to be between 40 and 50 gallons per day (gpd).

The unit resumed power ascension to full power at a rate of 1% per hour with close monitoring of the leak rat The leak rate stabilized at 150 gpd at 100% power with the licensee sampling the blowdown on a two hour basi As of March 21, the leak rate has decreased to 25-50 gp Blowdown and air ejector monitors have remained constant throughout this perio The licensee is continuing to sample the steam generator and evaluate the result Procedures are in place to define a course of action should the leak propagat At the end of this report period the unit was at 100%

powe Unit 2 The unit began this report period at 100% power and continued operation at full power throughout the perio At 11:25 a.m. on February 17, 1988, the licensee made a one hour notification to the NRC, stating that 11 8 11 reactor trip breaker did not open within 10 cycles during the performance of a monthly surveillanc The undervoltage trip attachment would have opened the breaker in 83 cycles, but the shunt attachment opened the breaker in 2 cycle The breaker

• 2. was replaced with 11A 11 bypass reactor trip break.er which had tested satisfactoril The licensee then declared 11811 reactor trip break.er operable at 12:47 p.. m. on February 17, 198 Subsequent investigation by the licensee, as observed by the resident inspector, indicated that the breaker func-tioned properly, but the computer time sequencer may have

• printed an erroneous reading on the sequence of events recorde The licensee performed the following:

M3Q3 Maintenance Procedure to test DB-50 Westinghouse breaker The test was performed three times and the results were the same as the 11 as left" condition of the break.er recorded from the previous test, which had b~en pe~formed one month earli~ Tests to try and duplicate the sequence of events from

-~

the computer were unsuccessful, however, the licensee removed the card, cleaned and tightened the connectors,.

and replaced and tested the car All tests were inconclusive a~ to why the computer or break.er had failed the test so the licensee replaced the undervoltage trip device and retested the breake Both Units On February 16, 1988, Mr. Steven E. Milteriberger relieved*

Mr. Corbin A. McNeill *as Chief Nuclear Office M Miltenberger will assume the title of Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer and will report to PSE&G chief executive officer, Mr. James Ferland, on nuclear operation matter Mr. McNeill has taken a position with the Philadelphia Electric Compan No violations were identifie.

Maintenance Observations (62703)

The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that tne replacement parts and Quality Controls utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee 1 s QA progra.

Unit 1 Work Order N0mber 880108061 Unit 2 Work Order Number 880217714

Maintenance Procedure lPD-14.1.003 Removal and Replacement of necessary equipment from the reactor vessel head to replace 1SA2 Magnetic Jac lPD-8.2.001 Electron~c check (megger) of newly installed Magnetic Jac ICl.4.003 Rod Testing and IRPI Check M~intenance Procedure M3Q-2 Reactor Trip Breaker Lubrication and Testing All-1 Calibration Verifi-cation of the Shore Stake tool (crimping tool).

Descri p_t ion Replacement of Magnetic Jack for rod 1SA Description Replacement of the undervoltage coil and retesting of reactor trip breaker 11 8 11 SN 02YN219-No violations were identifie Surveillance Observations (61726)

During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector. verified that the surveillances were performed irt accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed:

Unit 1 SP(0)4.7.6.la Control Room Ventilation - Tests and verifies the Emergency Control Room Area Air Conditioning System in accordance with (IAW) Technical *specification 4.7.6.l.

SP(0)4.8. l. l. lb SP(0)4.8.2. Unit 2 SP(0)4.0.5-P-RH (21)

SP(0)4.3. Bus Transfer - Tests the operability of the bus transfer device from the vital bus source to.the alternate source, IAW Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.l DC Breaker Alignment - Verifies the three DC busses'

breaker alignment, !AW Technical Specification 4.8.2. Tests the operability of No. 21 Residual Heat Removal Pump, IAW Technical Specification 4. Post Accident Monitoring - Tests and verifies post accident monitoring instrumentation operable, !AW Technical Specification 4.3. No violations were identifie.

Review of Periodic and Special Reports (90713)

Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:

inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and p~rformanc~ specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:

Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - February, 1988 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - February, 1988 Special Report 88-02, Unit This report documents the licensee's a*ctions connected with the 11811 reactor trip breake This incident is disc~sied in Section 2 of this repor The inspector has no further questions at this tim No violations were identifie.

Licensee Event Report Followup (90712)

The inspector reviewed the following LER's to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification. :~::

• Unit 1 88-001-00 Diesel Generator Day Tanks Do Not Meet Seismic Criteria This LER discusses th_e discovery and repafr of improperly welded -

diesel generator day tank During a system wilkdown for the

,.-

preparation of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), it was discovered

-~

that the structural welds that attached the day tank to the base were not properly mad The welds were not long enough to satisfy the seismic criteri The welds were subsequently repaired and are now in compliance with the seismic criteri The licensee is in the process of :identifyihg how the discrepancy occurre Unit 2 tanks were checked, and they were within specification The inspector has no f~rther questions at this tim Tavg Deviation on All Channels Due to Design This LER discusses the discovery and repair of a manufacturer's design modification of a component used with RTDs recently installed for measuring reactor coolant temperature. When the RTDs were placed in service, a 5 degree F deviation was noted which caused the licensee to enter technical specification action statement 3.0.3 (motherhood) for forty minute The subsequent investigation revealed the following:*

All of the RTDs utilized a low level amp which compensates for signal loss due to hundreds of feet of cable iosse The low level amp had a-pre-installed jumper across the temperature compensation circui This circuit was not identified to the license The 5 degrees F difference in readings between wide range and narrow range reactor coolant temperature did not become evident until temperature went above 530 degree~ F which is the beginnin~

of the narrow rang~ readin All RTDs had been replaced during the refueling outage, and all tracked togethe Testing prior to heatup was done with the RTD and compensator disconnecte This is a normal practic The licensee removed the jumper in the -low level amp, and the component responded properly and tracked with narrow range temperatur The licensee has corresponded with the Manufacturer, informed other utilities through INPO 11 note-pad 11, modified the.design prior to ~nstallation into Unit 2, informed maintenance personnel and updated their ordering system for replacement part *

The inspector has no further questi.on Reactor Trip on a False Intermediate Range - High Flux Si gna 1 Due to Personne 1 1Error This LER event is discussed in Settion 2 of this repor The inspector has no further question Unit 2 88-003-00 Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3-12 Action 27 Not Complied With Due To Personnel Error This LtR discusses missed periodic samples of the radiation monitoring system (Blowdown From 11 C 11 Steam Generator) as required by an action statement.' The cause was identified as a commtinication and training problem between an instrument technician and the shift superviso The technician had discovered, while working on the high pressure regulator in the system, that the low pressure regulator was also inoperabl He failed to communicate this properly to th~ shift supervisor and did not inform his imm~diate superviso As a result, the system was returned to service without the lbw pressure regulator in service, thus there was no flow through the detecto This is not evident in the control room area and the system appeared norma During-the period with no samples, downstream detectors in the main blowdown header did not detect any radioactivit The licensee has conducted 11workshop 11 type training sessions with I&C technicians to discuss the event and operations management has ~eviewed the event with shift supervisors. The licensee is also investigating the need to change applicable procedures to prevent recurrence of the even The inspector determined that this event represents a licensee ide~tified violation of TS 3.3-12, for which no further action is require (NV4 311/88-08-02)

88-004-00 Technical Specification Surveillance 4.3.2.1.1 Not Performed on a Staggered Basis~ Inade~uate Administrative Control This LER discusses the lack of staggering of testing of relays within the safeguards equipment cabinet as per technical specification Technical specifications require staggering to minimize the probability of multiple failure during accident condition The licensee performed the tests on both A and B trains and did not stagger the testin The root cause has.been identified in the computer system that is to date -incapable of scheduling staggered surveillance The licensee has identified other syst~ms that require staggering and will address them manuall The licensee is also investigating the feasibility of changing the computer program to accommodate the required scheduling.. The i.nspector determine that this event represents a licensee identified violation of TS 4.j.2.1(1), for which no further action is require (NV4 311/88~08-03)

10 Region I Temporary Instruction 87-07, Storage Battery Adequacy Audit (71707)

This instruction was issued to gather information on storage batterie The following are the questions asked the licensee and their response The following format lists the questions as a group, followed by the licensee's respons General Battery Information Document the below information for batteries which carry vital load ( 1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

A. l Qualified, or design, seismic life Qualified, or design, electrical life Age Time in service Plans for replacement

Nuclear Environmental Qualifications Report QR-2-27504

dated June 1984 describes the method used for the qualification of Salem's batteries and battery rack (See Attachment 1).

The qualification of the battery's electrical life is described in the same re~ort mentioned in A.(l).

Qualified and design electrical life is based on previous natural and accelerated aging tests conducted on type L. e. cells of identical and similar material and desig All accelerated (thermal) aging was conducted at a controlled test chamber temperature of 160 degrees F +/- 2 degrees The test cells were float charged during the accelerated aging proces~.

The qualified electrical and seismic life is more than 20 years based on this repor The age of the oldest cells contained withi~ each of the class IE batteries is as follows:

lA 22 voe 17 years lB 22 voe 17 years lA 125 voe 3 months lB 125 voe 1 month le 125 voe 4 years

2A 28.VDe 2B 28 voe 2A 125 voe 2B 125 voe 2e 125 voe

16 years 16 years*

17 years 16 years 3 years Although the time in service is less than the actual age of the batteries, the licensee assumes the two to be the same since this gives a conservative _estimate of battery service tim As can be seen in answer 1-3; 4 batteries have already been replaced within the last 4 year The rernairiing batteries will be replaced within the n~xt 2 refueling outages for each uni * Previous Licensee Actions Identify actions taken on the following IE Information Notices:

83-11, Possible Seismic Vulnerability of Old Lead Storage Batteries; 84-83, Various Battery Problems; 85-74, Station Battery Problems; and 86-37, Degradation of Station Batterie Attachment 4 contains PSE&G 1s responses to these IE Notice Seismic Lifetime and Qualification For batteries supplying vital loads, identify the following informatio (1)

Licensee and/or manufacturer 1 s establishment of seismic lifetim This maybe through documentation allowing verification by competent personnel other than the qualifiers and containing design specifications, the qualification m~thod, results, a~d justifications (ref: IEEE 535-1986)~

(2)

Seismic qualification maintenanc Identify how the criteria for assuring that the battery and rack will maintain seismic qualification are defined, available, and used for periodic inspections and cell replacement Identify the criteria for determination of seismi~ end of life based upon the inservice condition of the batter Wyle Test Report N ~1 for Le-33 (see Attachment 1) cells seismic qualification test indicates that these batteries, afte being subjected to a multi-frequency qualification test (5 O.B.E, prior to one 0.8.E), has proven that their rated capacity was well above 80~ throughout the test program.

12 Seismic qualification documentation plus visual inspection of the battery cells on a weekly and quarterly basis provides adequate assurance that the battery cells are*

seismically qualifie Also, if visual examinatibn bf.the rack shows no signs of deterioration due to corrosion and if all nuts, bolts, clamps and miscellaneous hardware are tight, the battery rack is assumed acceptable based on the.-

original seismic qualification repor If visual damage of the battery rack or battery is found, either a replacement of the damaged component wo~ld occur or a safety evaluation by a qualified engineer would be necessary for continued us See Attachment 2 fof a safety evaluation exampl D. - Electrical Sizing and Qualification For batteries supplying vital loads, identify the following inf6r~atio (1)

Confirmation that the battery size is sufficient to handle the load profile with a suitable margi (2)

The means of tracking and control of battery loads such that the batteries and their replacements will have sufficient capacity throughout design lif This should assume that worst case electrolyte temperature and other worst case conditions exist when the battery is called upon to perform its design functio (3)

The ~revisions for consideration*of the effect of jumpered out cells upon the ability of a battery to perform under

. worst case condition Preliminary calculations have been completed by the Engineering and Plant Betterment Departmen Final calculations by Ebasco are in progres Presently there isn't any formal method of tracking and controlling battery ioads, other than the design change process which would require any changes to be compared with current specifications to en~ure that the design loading is not

_exceede A computerized DC bus load monitoring system, where l-0ads and margins will be available on demand, is presently being develope Engineering Safety Evaluation S-2-E200-NSE-221, (Attachment 3) indicates that the No. 28 125V DC battery will operate as required with cell No. 36 jumpered ou (%capacity for battery with cell No. 36 out of service is 101%).

The final Ebasco battery capacity calculation mentioned in 0.(1) will also address this issu *

13 Battery Ventilation and Protection From Ignition Hazards For batteries carrying vital loads, identify the followin (1)

The provisions for assuring adequacy battery ventilation during normal operation, outages, charging, and dischbrg (2) Adequacy of checks of battery ventilation flo (3)

Adequacy of controls over battery ventilation impediments such_ as enclosing the battery space or its ventilation with plastic sheeting, or any other ventilation obstructions, duri~g outages and other period (4) -Adequacy of hydrogen detection equipment and its calibration and use, or of the technical justification for not.using such equipmen (5)

Knowledge of the hydrogen hazard on the part of plant management, operating shift management, and personnel who access the_ battery space (6), Prohibition of hot work and smoking in battery spaces, including checking the spaces for the residue of such activit (7)

Assurance that battery cells are secured, with ~ost-to-case and top-to-jar seals tigh Thefmometers should not be left in cells after temperatures are measured. - Caps on the filler openings should be properly secured when not required to be of (Cells.should be vented only through the flash arrestors.)

(8)

The means bf assuring proper elimination of water-carrying pipes (e.g., HVAC lines) from battery spaces, especially those which may carry salt wate (9)

The means of positive control over the quality of water added to the batteries to assure that the manufacturer's

_recommendations or an appropriate licensee standard are met or exceede (10) The assurance of elimination of combustibles, and loose equipment and conductors, from* battery space The following calculations demonstrate the size of the fan required in each battery room in order to prevent 1% of hydr6gen (H2) accumulation during the following conditions:

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I I

14 Charging the battery Normal operation c

Discharging the battery Maximum release of H2 per cell Maximum release of H2 per hour per per hour= 0.0112 CF 60 cells= 0.0112 C.F.H x

Maximum release of H2 per hour per 60 cells -

.672 C.F.H of H2 Amount of fresh air needed X =.672 C. = 67.2 C..01 In minutes X = 67.2 C.F.H = 1;12 C.F.M OF

fresh air All battery testing and maintenance procedures instruct personnel to periodically check exhaust fan operation while working on batterie As part of the license requaiification training, licensed operators are instructed on the -importance of battery room ventilatio In addition, the operators log the operation of the battery room exha~st fan~ on a daily basi Maintehanc~ personnel are guided by maintenance procedures which mention the importance of maintaining battery room ventilation..

All other personnel that may be exp6sed to storage batteries are given the opportunity to use the Nuclear Depart~ent Safety Manual which has a section on safety considerations when dealing with storage batteries: Existing plant procedures do not call for the use of hydrogen detection equipmen Existing procedures call for maintaining ventilation equipment in an operable condition to guard against hydrogen gas buildu One fan wiih a 400 CFM displac~ment ca~a~ity is installed in 3 of the battery room A fan with a 250 CFM di s'p l atement is installed in the fourth battery roo The calculations i~ E.(1) indicate that the installed battery room fans with a 400/250 CFM capacity displacement are more than adequate to ventilate the room Therefore, hydrogen detection capability is not necessar E.5 *As previously discussed in Item E.(3), *plant personnel who work with the batteries are given the necessary training.to ensure that they are aware of the importance of proper ventilation to eliminate the possibility of explosion from a hydrogen buildup concurrent with a spark.

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15 There are red warning signs in each of the battery rooms prohibiting sparks or open flame The battery maintenance procedures warn against smok1ng/sparks in the battery area and also require _a check for cleanlin~ss, and cleaning if necessar When hot work is to be performed in the battery room, only qualified personnel are allowed to conduct this type of work with the ventilation fan in operatio The battery maintenance procedures require visual ins¢ection of all battery cells for cracked or leaking jars, and any signs of electrolyte wetting at the battery post* sea Inspection of the class IE battery spaces has indicated that there are no water carrying pipes in any of these area An adjacent room for the non-class IE 250 VDC battery has an eyewash station which has a water supply lin When water is required to be added to the battery cells to maintain the proper level, it is taken from the station demineralized water syste Attachment 5 shows the Salem Station Water Quality St~ndard for demineralized water and the frequency of sampling to ensure these standards are me Power System Inc. (battery manufacturer) will be contacted to make sure these standards meet or exceed the manufacturers*

requirement E.10 All battery maintenance procedures call for the elimination of non-essential materials and cleaning of the battery area when require The most frequently performed procedure is M3M which is done on a weekly basi Electrolyte Temperature Control For batteries supplying vital loads, identify.the adequacy of the

• followin (1)

Avoidance of localized heat sources such as direct sunlight, radiators, steam pipes, and space heater (2)

That the location/arrangement provides for *no more than a 5

• degree F difference in cell temperaturer as confirmed by measurements representative of operating condition If this is not the case, then the licensee and manufacturer should have identif~~d the consequent impact on expected battery and individual cell capacity and life, and surveillance procedure should reflect the additional allowable.temperature variatio **

16 None of the Class IE battery space~ have contact with localized heat sources such as direct sunlight, radiators, steam pipes and space heater The service and capacity test maintenance procedures have demonstrated that individual cells do not experiente gre~ter than 5 degrees F difference/cell during float operation prior to discharg Charging For batteries carrying vital loads, identify the adequacy of the followin (1)

Provi~ion for a freshening charge after more than 3 months of being on open circuit, unless determined by the manufacturer to be unnecessary to assure rated capacity throughout lif (2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Accomplishment of equalizing charges at 18 month intervals,

.and when the corrected specified gravity (SG) of an individual cell is more than 10 points (0.010) below the average of all the cells, and when the average corrected SG of all cells drop more than 10 points below the average

• installation value, and if any cell voltage. is belo~ 2.13 (Specific manufacturer 1 s provisions and assessment may allow the non-performance of some of these recommended charges, or may provide differ~nt criteria.)

Control over battery water quality such that specified purity is confirmed before addition, that water added just prior to charging is added only to bring the electrolyte up to th~ prescribed minimum (to prevent overflow during charging),

and that water* added after and between charges does not bring the level above the prescribed maximum (unless manufacturer 1s instructions provide for other water addition measures).

That routine float and final end of charge SGs not be taken before 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of float operation after completfon of the charge and the last water addition, unless the manLlfacturer 1s instructions provided otherwis (The need is for measurement pf ~epresentative cell level~ and average them).

Establishment and maintenance of float voltage in accordance with the man~factur~r 1 s instructions.

(6)

Assurance that single-cell charger use does not violate Class lE independence from non-class lE equipmen The battery manufacturers' recommendat~ons are followed for maintaining a cell which has been shipped to the -site but has not yet been put in servic An rifficial station procedure to govern this activity does not presently exist and the licensee recognizes this to be a deficiency that requires correctio * An equalizing charge is performed at least every eighteen months as part of.the battery service or capacity tests. -An equalizing charge could be performed on a more frequent basis if require All battery cells are monitored on a, quarterly basis for determining cell voltages per technical specifications are at least 2.13 V per cell under float charge with no cell less than.27 volts below the original acceptance tes Also, the specific gravity corrected to 77 degrees F and full electrolyte level, is verified not to be less than 1.200 and shall not have decreased by more than.02 from previous reading as required by technical specification The battery service and capacity test maintenance procedures provide guidance for the addition of demineralized water to

'cell Cell level adjustment is made 24 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after equalize charging to replace electrolyte lost during recharge and to help precJude the chance of overflow during the equalize chargin The existing battery service test procedures require 24 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ~f float charge before taking SG 1 s and ICV 1 s while our exist~ng capacity service test procedures requires 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> before taking SGs and ICVs, The licensee currently has developed a draft procedure for the battery service test which will require 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of float charge before taking SGs and IVe The battery maintenance procedures list the nominal float voltage per cell to be 2.20 voe to 2.25 vo The existing single cell battery charge maintenance procedure does* not give specific instructions regarding channel separatio This subject will be further reviewed so that the appropriate action can be take Performance Tests and Replacement Criteria For batteries carrying vital loads, identify the followin (1)

Initial accepiance testing which demonstrates the ability of the batteries to meet the manufacturer 1 s ratin l

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(2)

Service testing which demonstrates the ability to carry the load profile with an appropriate margin for worst case conditions, including end of life loss of capacity under the worst case electrolyte temperatur (3)

Accomplishment of a performance test (capacity test discharge) within the first two years of service and at 5 year intervals until signs of degradation are evident or 85%

of the qualified service life is reache (4) Annual performance testing of batteries which show signs o-f degradation or which have reached 85% of the qualified service life ts reache (5)

Ena of electrical lif~ criteria which consider the rapid end of life drop-off in capacity, worst case state of charge during float service, worst case electrolyte temperature, current DC loads, and the time needed to replace the battery while it can still handle worst case condition All class IE battery acceptance tests have shown 100% or great~r capacit The existing service testing of station batteries is in the midst of being upgraded although the existing service test demonstrates the battery to be capable of performing its required functio Technical specification changes may be required to support the ~ervice test r~visio The battery capacity maintenance procedure M3A did not address acceptance testing although records indicate acceptance testing has been done in the pas Tests are directed to be done every 60 month~ until capa~ity is less than.90% at which time the ~ystem ~ngineer should be notified so that the appropriate action can be take If capacity is less than 85%, the senior shift operator as well as the system engineer are notifie Maintenance procedure M3A will be revised to include the requirement for acceptance testin Since the system engineer by procedure has been notified when battery capacity has reached 90%, he woul~ consult IEEE Standard 450 for other informatio IEEE 450 states that perfofmance testing should be increased to once a year for a battery with 85% capacit Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that this approach would be taken unless the vendor recommended otherwise.

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19 An initial study was recently completed by the Engineering and Plant Betterment Department (E&PB) on battery*capacity b_ased on aging degradation and temperature correction. It was determined that adequate capacity existed on class IE system A more det'ailed study is curr*ently underway.-. Other Safety-Significant Wet Cell Batteries For safety-significant wet cell batteries not used for vital loads, show how the,maintenance program periodically determines the ability to perform the design function and provides for ti~ely replacement of batteri~s and for maintaining associated equipment (e.g., chargers).

I.l Other safety significant batteries such as the bne used for the security_ system are currently being studied by E&P.

Assurance of Quality

,

During this inspection period assurance of quality was ~videnced-by the Quality Assurance inspectors that witnessed the installation of the new control r6d drive mechanism (1SA2) and the testing and refurbishment of 11 B 11 reactor trip breaker. *Both maintenance evolutions were completed properly the first time and tested by the procedure successfull Quality assurance was also evident in the

.licensee*~ responsible approach and reporting of primary to seco*ndary leakage (identified in Section 2 of this report).

The leak was reported promptly and monitored in accordance with procedure A clear and concise record has been kept for ins~ector audit Some personnel errors have been identified within this report and this areas continues to be an area of concer However, the licensee has acted on correcting the communications and personnel error problems by first instituting the INPO Human Performance Evaluation System which will identify what the licensee can do to further reduce the aforementioned problems; and second, by conducting counseling and enhancing training in the personnel and communication~ area.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, deviations or violation Unresolv~d items are discussed in section 6 of this repor '1 Exit Interview (30703)

At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An.exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia.-

---***. IALLIE*** -0. -~ir~cHMENT 1 (NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENTAL o..uAuncAnoN * RE:P_ORTJ

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TABLE O!' CONTENTS..

!~":'RODUCTION tESC?IPTION OP' EQUIPMENT PERF'OR.VJ.NCE REQUIREMENTS *

ENVIRONYZNTAL Q~LIP'ICATION 4., Elect.!"ica.l *

~.2 Battery Life 4,, Seismic '!'"!lting TEST RESULTS CONCLUSIONS JUSTI!"ICATIONS 7.,

Battery 7.2 Battery Rack LIST OF RE1!F::NCES Page*

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,6 ATTACHMENT 1 - Pre-1ei1mic and Po1t-1ei1.m1c Capacity Di1oh&rge Teat ~e1ult1 ATTACHMENT 2 - WTLI LABORATORIES Tran1mi11ibil1 ty Plot.1, DBE TRS, Equipment Lilt, and Sei1mic* Tes Procedure tor Report No. 4'450-1 ATTACHMENT 3 - WTLI LABORATORIES Tr1.n1m111ibility Plott, DBE TRS, Equipment Li*~. and Sei1mic Teat Procedure for Report. No~ 46661-1 Page _!..!._

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1. 0 M1£$$§Jl£Ri$iA )>>C:&~a;mzw_ a EE INTRODUCTION This report presents the Nuclear tnvironmental Qualification of C & D POWER SYSTEMS LC-33 stationary battery and two step battery rack for the Salem Nuclear Generating Statio Qualifi~ation is provided in accordance with Public Service Electric & Gas Co. P.O. No. 923023 and 932407 requirements as well as the guidelines set forth in IEEE Standards 323-1974, 344-1975 and 535-197 The basis.for qualification is a review and analysis of previous test data; including the results from thermal and natural aging, seismic test *and analysis,)

and battery capacity test Pa~ __ 1 __

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4LLIEI> ~rSystems DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT The equipment qualified by this report is the 125 volt de LC-33 batte~y and two step battery*

racks for the Salem Nuclear Power Statio.1 *The LC-33 battery cell consists of pasted plates wiih lead calcium alloy grids* encased in a vented containe Sixty individual two-volt cells, series connected* with bolted conn-ectors, comprise the 125 volt batter The electrolyte is a sulfuric acid and water solution with a nomin~l fully charged specific gravity of 1.210 +.010 at 77° The LC-33 battery cell is iu~ther described in C & D BATTERIES Drawing No. K-5103 and Section 12-333 which appear in Figures 2.1 and.2 The two step battery racks consist of steel support frames of welded angle construction, insulated steel cell support and restraint rails, flat steel cross braces and Grade 5 hardwar The battery rack and cell arrangement is fully described in Drawing No. M-8586 which appears in Figure Po;* _ 2 __ _

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4LLIED. ~rSystem1.The LC-33 battery and two step battery racks must be installed and operate in accordance with the requirements set forth in C & D BATTERIES Section 12-:800, "Stationary Battery. Installation and Operating Instructions, and IEEE Std 484-198.4 Periodic maintenance and testing shall meet the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 450-198 Po;*...-3 __ _

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--*- ----*--- PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS The battery, when installed and maintained in accordance with the guidelines eet for~h in C & D BATTERIES' Drawings an~ Ine~ructione, and the IEEE Standards 450 and 484, shall remain functional for -a period of 20 years from the date of shipmen The battety shall, at any time during ite qual-ified life, be capable of supplying the specified design loads without the voltage at the battery terminals falling below 105 volte while exp~r iencing any single o' combination of the follow-ing environmental con~ition Ambient temperature range of +77°F to +90°F and an annual average temperature of +80°F or lee Relative humidity from 0'1. to 100' Seismic events of the apecified intensitie * 3.2*

The battery racke shall be capable of aupporting

~he battery celle and their interconnecting Page _._7 __

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• (Continued)

devices without damage or interruption of circuit continuity, and ehall maintain structural integrity

~nd eupport function throughout the life of the battery, and during and following specified Operating Basia and Deeig'n Basie Earthquakes *

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• • • ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION Electrical Since battery capacity is increased ~t temp-eratures above 77° F, and decreases at temper-atures below this value, the worse case conditio for the battery to deliver the specified design currents is at th~ minimum battery ~oom.ambient temper at u re of 7 70.F *

The battery must also be capable of supplying the design loads throughout its qualified life, and therefore must have adequate design margin so that if capacity has de1raded to 80~ of the original published ratings (erid of service life), the desi~n loads will still be supplied for the pre-s~ribed tim~s without battery voltage falling below the min{mum specified value ~f 105 volt Battery sizing t~lculations are shown in Figure 4.1, and show the LC-33 battery has adequate margins to ~eet these requirement For ref-ete~ce, the LC-33 celi discharge characteristics are shown in Figure 4.2, and selected capacities

~o 1.75 average volts per tell are given in TABLE Page _-..9 __

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I (\\LLIED ~_systems RESERVE TIME 8 Hr 6 Hr 3 Hr 2 Hr 1 Hr 1 Min TABLE l AMP HOUR DISCHARGE CAPACITY AMPERES 2320 290 2196 366 1857 619 1610 805 1163 1163 3,7 2 2 2 7-Discharge Capacities and Rat~s for the LC-33 Batt~ry to 1.75

. Average Volts per Cell *

Page _.-12~-

• Battery Life Twenty year qualified life is based on previous natural and accelerated aging tests concucted on LC cell types of identical and similar material and desig All accelerated (thermal) aging.was conducted at a controlled test chamber* temperature of 160°F

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The test cells were float charged at this

~emperatur~ for a period not less than 200 days, which i~ the equivalent of 20 years service at a 77°F operating temperatur This is in accord-ance with the IEEE Std 535-1979 aging factor of 10 days equals one iear for le~d calcium cell After thermal aging of the test cells, capacity testing was conducted at discharge rates identical to those prior to agin Capacity at th~ end

~f the thermal aging program remain~d greater than soi of the initial published ratings for all cell Original C & D BATTERIES test data, as summarized in TABLE 2, confirm these aging fa~tor The tests were performed on new and field service lead calcium battery cells during a period Pa~ _...1 ---

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between 1959 and 1967 and confirm the temperature versus life. relationship for the lead acid, lead calcium alloy batter A graph depleting batteri life versus electrolyte temperature ls drawn from*

this test data and is shown in Figure Included as part of the qualification ~r~gram that forms the basis of this report were naturally aged (25 years of service) lead calcuim cell,

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The construction and o~erating characteristics of

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For the purpose of this report we will compare test data fr~m two previously conducted seismic qualification test ~rogram The battery cell types seismically tested are listed in TABLE Po~----

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WYLE TEST NO. 43450-1 CELL.TYPE CAPACITY RATE 4LCY--ll (unaged)

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1500 AH 8 Hr LC-25 (unaged).

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1330 AH 1 Hr-CT-1440 (25 yr natural)

1440 AH 8 HR WYLE TEST NO. 46661-.l LC-33 (unaged)

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• SAN is Styrene~acrylonitrile PC is Polyc_arbonate TABLE 3 LC Type Cells Seismically Proof Tested i~ Two S~ep Racks JAR MATERIAL *

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4LLIED ~rSystems Seismic Testing (continued)

The CT-14~0 cell type referenced *in TABLE 3 was a 29 plate cell, 25 yea~ old at the time of the seismic test, that was manufactured lri 1951 as part of a 60 cell lead calcium batter At that time, the cells were encased in hard rubber jars and had a nomenclature of RCT-1680 rated 1680 ampere hou~s at ~he 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> rate of discharge t6 1.75 average volts per cel The battery was purchased by the BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM and install-ed in their Pennypacker Exchange Office in Phila-delphia, PA as an emergency power source, where the battery operated fer 17 trouble-free years *

In 196~, when the Ex~hange was being enlarded, the battery was re-aquired by C & D BATTERIE It was stored for one year until the Plymouth Meeting, PA headquarters building was completed, and, in the spring of 1910, it was installed there for use as an emergency lighting system~

For the purpose of this test and for future visual observation, the elements of two cells were removed from their original containers and placed in transparent plastic containers with plastic covers, and a bottowm plate support system similar to that employed in currently Po;* __ 2_2 __

. * *

-* *

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4LLIED ~systems Seismic Testing (continued)

4. produced LC type cell~~ In or~er to facilitate the jar transfer, two positive plat~s and two negative pl,ates were removed, de-rating *the cells from 1680 AH to 1440 AH capacit The seismic t~st results as they ~pply to this report are discussed in the following section Effect on Battery Capacity The IC type battery cells, including the LC-33, seismically tested w~re subjected to capacity tests prior to, *and following the seimic test program These capacity tests were* performed in accordance with the applicable precedures described in IEEE Std 45 All unaged cells were at 1001~ or greater, rated capacity prior to the start of the test progra and remained so throughou All aged cells retained capacities. greater than 80% of publi~hed ratings throughout the test program *

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4. Effect on Battery Caapcity (continued)

ATTACHMENT 1 includes the pre-seismic and post-seismic capaci~y test results for each of the cell types teste. Sesimic Test Procedure Sixteen cells, from the largest to the smallest of the LC type, including the naturally aged CT-1440 cells were mounted in the nor~al manner and-connected in series on a two step battery rac This battery arid rack assembly was then subjected to simulated seismic testing at WYLE LABORATORIES in Huntsville, AL, with results as given in WYLE Test Report No.- 43450- Twelve LC-33 cells were mounted and interconnected in the normal manner in a two step battery rac The cells were then subjected to simulated seismic testing at WYLE LABORATORIES in Huntsville~ AL, with results as given in WYLE Test Report.No *

. 46661-Each of the test racks were mounte~ dir~ctly to the WYLE test table:

For WYLE Test No~ 43450-1, the rack assembly Po;*. 24

• 4LLIED ~Systems 4. Seismic Test Procedure (continued)

was bolted directly to the test table at each*

bolting location in the rack foundation using 1/2 inch SAE Grade 5 bolt This piocedure was used f~r each test orientatio ~hotograph 1 shows the test rack and cells as mounted on the WYLE test tabl For WYLE Test No. 46661-1, the rack assemtly was ~elded to a separate WYLE tube steel test frame using 3/16 inch welds 4 inches long or shorte There were 24 welds on the rack base using E-7018 low hydrogen electrodes.* The test frames were welded to the seismic table with their longitudinal axis at 45 ° to the table's direction of motion and were symmetric with the table's r

cente Reference Photograph 2.*

One vertical and one horizontal control acceler-ometer were mounted on the test tabl T*RS p 1 ots we r e t a k en f r om tl, e s e c on t r o 1 a c -c e 1 e r o in e t e r s a t the time of the tests for each axi The battery rack and battery cells were instru-mented with horizontal and vertical response accelerometers in various locations to determine.

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~LLI. Power Systems PHOTOGRAPH l SPECIMEN MOUNTED ON THE TEST TABLE FOR SIOE-TO-SIOE/VERTICAI.. BIAXIAL TESTING

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The battery cells were connected in seri~s to a resistive load of approximately 20 amperes during all phases of the seismic 'test The battery output voltage and current were recorded on an oscillograph.recorder during the seismic test program These monitoring channels were used to determine electrical continuity, current and voltage levels, and to det~ct any spurious operation before, during and after the test programs *

Testing consisted of a low-levEl resonance search, follow~d by random multifrequency qualification

'

test Qualification tests consisted of five (5) Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) tests prior to one (1) Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) tes The duration for each test was 30 second ATTACHMENT 2 contains the WYLE Test Procedure, Transmissibility Plot, DBE Test Response Spectrum a~d Equipment Calibra~ion LLst for WYLE Test No. 43450- Po;e ___ _

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ATTACHMENT 3 contains the WYLE Test Procedure, Transmissibility Plot, DBE Test Response Spectrum and Equipment Calibration List for WYLE Test No. 46661-Po;e. __ 29..;..._

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The battery cells and the ~attery rack successfully completed the simulated seismic test prograro Test results and post~test inspection showed thai they vossessed sufficient integrity to withstand, wi~hout compromise of structure of function, the seismic test environment The oscillograph records did not indi-cate ~ny spurious or improper operation or deviation in the output voltage/current levels of the battery,.

either during of after the seismic excitatio Post-seismii.capacity tests conducted on the battery cells yielded capacities essentially identical to

'

those reco~ded prior to the seismic test program Unaged cells retained ~apacities of 100% or greate The 25 year old naturally aged test cells delivered capacities over 80% of their ratin Although these qualification programs were not specifically performed as proof tests for the Salem battery and battery rack, its applicability is demon-strated due to the identical design of all LC type battery cells and two step battery racks.*

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The WYLE seismic Test Response Spectra (TRS) from Report Nos. 43450-1 and 46661-1 completely envelop the Salem R~quired Response Spectra (RRS) at all test frequencies, therefore these tests will serve as a qualification for the LC-33 battery *and two step battery rac Figures 5.1 through 5.4 show the DBE horizontal and vertical TRS from both WYLE tests versus the Salem RRS *

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• CONCLUSIONS The 125 volt, 60 cell LC-33 battery and two step battery _racks are envir6nmentally qualified for a period of 20 years, when maintained in accordance with recommende~ and approved*procedures, for

~ervice in a mild environment outside primary containment areas of the Salem Generating Plan Previous Nucl£ar Environmental Qualification testing of LC type battery cells and two ste~ battery racks demonstrate that they possess sufficient design margin and integrity to withstand without compromise of structure or electrical function, the environment of the Salem Nuclear Generating Statio.

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4LLIEL> ~rSystems JUSTIFICATIO~S Battery The Salem LC-33 battery is qualified by similarity based on type test~ng and by actual testing of the LC-33 batter The test programs included unaged and aged battery cell TABLE 4 shows the physica) similarity of the plates of all the test cells *

PLATE llOKEllCLATUltE CT LC LCY TABLE 4 PLATE BEICHT

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All test cells were constructed with lead calcium grids and employed equal or identic~l construction materials and feature Comparing the Salem LC-33 battery with any of

.the LC type cells and pariicularly with the naturally aged CT-1440 t~st cells is justified because degradation (e~brittlement} of the positive plates is the predominant failure mode in lead ac*i~ storage batteries; and since the float charging current is proportional to positive plate capacity -

and life.is pro-portional to positive p~ate thickness -

the corrosion rate of the plate grid structure will be identical and the CT-1440 and LC-33 battery will degrade at the same rate since both posi-tive plates are the same material ~nd desig The thickness of the CT positive plate is less than that of the LC positive plate, therefore, the ability of a naturally aged CT-1440 battery to successfully withstand a seismic test demon-strates that a naturally aged LC-33 would be able to withstand the same seismic loads since the CT plates are in a mechanically weaker

' conditio The testing of unaged LC-33 cells

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pl~tion of the seismic test by the *ged CT-1440 battery cell Non-metallic components:

polycarbonate cell cont~iners, ~tyrene cell covers, polystyrene flame arrestor vents and cell spacers, poly-ethylene rack rail cov~rs, ~nd the 600 volt 900c rated neoprene insula.tion of the interstep cable connectors are judge~ to be age-insensitive to the mild environrr.ental conditions of the Salem battery room,.and will have a qualified life e~~al.to that of the battery plate Metallic tomponents such as the steel battery rack members, the coated and insulated copper connectors ind the co~necting hardware are known to be age-insensitive to the specified environment and will have a qualified life exceeding that of the battery plaie.2 Battery Rack Qualification of the Salem batter~ rack i Page __ 5_9_

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b a s e d on s i m i 1 a r i t y to a -rep re s e *n ta t i v e r a c k previously teste Justif icat~on fo~ testing a two~bay r~ck to qualify a six-bay rack is accomplished by.show-ing the structural behavior ~f a ~wo-bay model to that of a five-bay mode The results from two finite analyses from Reference 4 are com~

pared to demonstrate seismic equivalence between typical two-bay and five-bay rack The finite element analysis were performed using ~he com-puter program STARDYNE *

STARDYNE is a well known, well documented proprietary computer program widely accepted for this type of analysis by both industry and tte Nuclear Regulatory Commissio The results of the analyses compared are the equipment natural frequencies and beam stresses from statically applied 1.0 g seismic loads in each of the three direction These results are chosen for comparison because they present the dynamic and structural response of the math-imatical model The complete results, *with a description of the analyses are co~tained in Reference,

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I 1*.2 Battery Rack (continued)

Figu~es 7.1 and 7.2 present the natural freq-uencies of the two-bay and five-bay mathematical model The natural fr~quencies closely agree, and thus, the battery racks for the Salem Gen-erating Station will have natural frequencies equal to the tested rac TABLE 5 presents a comparison of the beam member stresse The three directions of seismic loa~

were combined by the SRSS m~tho No appreciable difference in stress occurs b~tween the two-bay model and the five-bay mode Each bay has identical bracing in each directio Additional bays_ provide their own bracin The WYLE TRS are shown to completely envelo~ the Salem RRS, therefore, the two-bay rack is structurally adequate and represents accurately the behavior of the six-bay Salem Genera~ing Station battery rac Po~ ___

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. BEAM Frame

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BEAM STRESS (PSI)

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4LLIED ~rsystema LIST OF REFERENCES l~

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO., Purchase Order No. 923023 dated 22 May 1984; Specification No. 72-1308 dated 27 December 1972; Specificatio~

No. 68626 dated 15 November 196.

WYLE LABORATORIES, Seis~ic Simul~tion Ttst Report

.No. *43450-1, 7 December 1976, "Seismic Simulation Test Program On A Battery Rack And Batt*eri.es". WYLE LABORATORIES, Seismic Simulation Test Report No. 46661-1, 17 March 1983, "Seismic Simulation Test Program On Two Battery Racks". CORPORATE CONSULTING & DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD.,

Report No. A-379-81-01, 20 May 1982, "Seismic Qualification Report of 3DCU-5,

~C-19 and LC-25 Battery Racks and Cells for Susquehanna s; Units 1 &

0 2 ". C & D BATTERIES, Batt~ry Laboratory Test No VL-765-03, 2049, VL-762-02, VL-762-03, 1996, V78-14, and 282 * IEEE Std 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying*

Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Station.

IEEE Std 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practices fer Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment (or ~uclear Power Generating Station.

IEEE Std 450-1980, IEEE Recommended Practices for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Stora~e Batteries for Generating Stations and Substati6ns *

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~LLIED ~rSystems LIST OF REFERENCES (~ontinue~) IEEE Std 484-1981, IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation of Large lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substation.

IEEE Std 535-1979, iEEE Standard for Qualification of Class lE Storag~ Batteries for Nuclear Power Generating Station.

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & "GAS CO., PURCHASE ORDER No. 932407 dated 14 NOV 84s Specification No. 72-1308 dated 27 December 1972: Specification No. 68626 dated 15 November 1968 *

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• ATTACHMENT 1 (Contin.,)

TO:

~.-Rosenzweig QA Engineering & Procurement Engineer FROM:

R. F. Crapo Principal Engineer -

Civil Group SUBJECT:

QUALIFICATION REPORT OF CLASS lE STATION BATTERIES AND BATTERY RACKS SUBMITTED BY ALLIED C&D POWER SYSTEMS, REPORT NO. QR2-27504 DATE:.

January 28, 1985 The Civil Group has review:d and appr~ves the above vendors'

• report and finds that their input and methodology meet all required sei~rnic ~riteria for ~alem Units 1 and 2 and the conclusions seem reasonable and correc RFC:cbp C:

J. Hannwacker R. Gura CARMS -

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S-2-E200-NSE-222-Page 1 of 1 Date Sept. 29, 1983 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge t-Jew Jersey 08038 Nuclear Department SEISMIC CAPABILITY OF EMERGENCY BATTERY RACK WITH 1 CELL REMOVED.FROM UPPER TIER 1. 0 -

PURPOSE The purpose ~f this.safety evaluation is to.document the continued seismic capability of the ~mergency batt~ry.racks after the removal of a single battery from one of the _upper

• rack.0 REFERENCES Deficiency Report MD 83-3018 C & D calcium battery type LCU-33 (Wgt 400 lbs.} and C&D two step battery rac * DISCUS8ION Removal of a battery in the upper tier of a two tier rack does not impair its ability to resist seismic i ndu.ced stresse Rather, it lowers the stresses in the rack by removing the mass

• (400 lbs~) from the top of the r~ck, which is t~e position which induces the highest str~sses in the rack~

Howe~er, since the space left op~n by the removal of a battery would allow the remaining batteries to possibly shift horizon-*

tally on the racks during a seismic event, ~he space should be filled by a dummy battery of the same physical dimensions (it could be made of wood) and any filling between b~tteries re-insert~d in order to provide laterial restraint to all the remaining.batteries on the upper tie~ of the particular rack in questio * CONCLUSION Battery can safely be rem.oved and left out pr*oviding lateral restraint to the remairiing batteries in the rack is provided *

. 5.0. REVIEW AND APPROVAL RFC/cbp EN8 o~~

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OPS~G S-2-E200-NSE-221 Page 1 of 2 Date 10/3/83 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Ha.ncocks Bridge. New Jersey.08038 Nuclear Department TLE: ENGINEERING SAFETY EVALUATION VERIFICATION OF INTEGRITY OF NO. 2B 125V BATTERY WITH CELL #36 REMOVED FROM SERVIC. 0 PURPOSE:.

To verify that No. 2B 125V Battery retains its integrity with cell #36 removed from servic.0. SCOPE:

This safety evaluation applies only to No. 2B 125V Batter.0 REFERENCE: Technical Specification~ section 4.~.2..

Maintenance Procedure M3A, Battery Discharge Test for

• 125V DC.Battery, Technical Specification 4.8.2.3.e, dated January 9, 1981 (attached). Deficiency Report -

DR No. MD83-3018, dated 9/20/8.

Engineering Safety Evaluation - Seismic Capability of*

Emergency Battery Rack with 1 Cell Removed from Upper Tier (attached). DISCUSSION, DESCRIPTION, TEST, ETC.:

During the startup of Unit 2, cell 136 of the 60 cell No. 2B

• 12sv Battery was found to have developed a hair line crack of approximately two inches on the underside of the jar causing electrolyte to seep through (Ref. 3) and making it necessary to remove the cell from the batter The resulting space shall be f ill~d with a suitable *wooden form approximating the outline dimensions of the cel A seismic evaluation (Reference 4) was performed on.the 59 cell battery configuration and the result showed that the seismic integrity is maintaine CEl

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p;. e 2 Of 2 Date:

10/3/83 The electrical integrity of the-59 cell battery

_, configuration is substantiated as follows:

Enclosure 3 of Reference 2 indicates the individual cell voltages after performing the prescribed discharge test on the subject battery.-

At the end of 120 minutes (Column 12)

the overall battery voltage was found to be 107.33 voits:.

with the corresponding volta_ge of cell t36 to be 1. 80.

volt Subtracting cell 136 voltage from.the measured*

terminal voltage results in a new* battery voltage of 105.53 volts which fulfills the requirements of Ref~rence 2 (105 volts), and therefore No. 2B 125V Battery will operate as required with cell. 136 out of servic % Capacity = Time in minutes to reach low limit x K-1. 2 Where K ii the temperature cori~ction factor (Reference 2).

% Capacity For battery with cell i 36 = 120 x 1.01 = 101%

out of service JH:dh/dl Verifier o.'"* l~ 10.+*Vl O~iginator's Group Head CEl

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Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation..... *. __ _

FROM:

A. Nassman Acting ~dnager - Plant Engineering

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ENGINEERING EVALUATION FOR INFORHATION Nb.TICE***--.... -*-. --

IEN-84-1'9, 15-74 f VARIOUS BATTERY PROBLEMS-*---

AND. 86-31 DEGkADATION OF STATION BA'I'TERIES ~

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SUBJECT:

DATE:

September 11, 1986

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Attached is the Engineering Department's

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Evaluation for the above referenced Information Nc;;t-fc~*;-** -1~-=--*--***-.'

is for your use and information *

WDG: ld Attachment

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C 1 General Manager - Nuclear Quality Assurance 1 General Manager -

Nuclear* services 1 General Manager - Salem Operations 1 Assistant General Manager - Project Services l Manager - Nuclear Systems Engineering - Salem 1 Manager Plant Engineering l Manager - Engineering l Manager - Nuclear Engineering Design 2 Manager - Engineering ' Plant Betterment Controls l On-Site Safety Review Engineer - Salem 1 Manager - Station OA - Salem l Salem Operations Response Coordinator l TO cdWGD/l

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• 0 PS~ S-C-VAR*EEE-0128-0 Page 1 of 5 Date 8/26/86 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge. New Jersey 08038.

Nuclear OepaJODent TITLE:

E~GINEERING *EVALUATION _FOR INFORMATION NOTICES IEN 84-83, 85-74:

VAiHCUS L- -----------------

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The purpose of this Engineering Evaluation is to document the Nuclear Engineering Department's response to the above referenced Information Notice.0 SCOPE The scope of this Engineering Evaluation covers the Salem Unit l a~d 2 Battery system.0 REFERENCES Information Notice IEN l4-83 and 85-74, Various battery problem.2 Battery discharge test maintenance procedure M3.3 Surveillance testing and preventive maint~nance of station batteries maintenance procedure M3 ~4 Single cell battery charge maintenance procedure M3M-. 5 Battery 18 month surveillance maintenance procedure M3V *. Information Notice IEN 86-37:

Degradation of Station Batterie.0 DISCUSSION The f~ject Information Notices express concerns about the

~ for-aignif icant degradation of safety associated w

1C)U~*-i>attery related problem The p

/r~solutions are as follows:.

.

.;. *.

• ~~~rloading DC Buses - the addition of new loads to

~

the de system reduced the batter~ capability to provide power for eight hours as specified by the Technical Specification *

ee/wd2 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

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8/26/86 Page 2 of 5 PSE&G Response - Overloading DC Buses: _Per the Technical Specification, an eight (8) hou~ service test is required to be performed on the 125 VDC and 28 voe batteries at* least once every 18 months shutdow The battery capacity is to be adequate to supply and maintain in operable statu~ all of the actual emergency loads for a minimum of eight (8)

. ~hours *

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~,r-~hlt:its testi.n1. o~ a tat~'=!C"'l if other batteries of the same voltage do not meet the requirements of the Technical Specification In addition,_ the procedure provides directions on securing the test for reasons other than re~ching the eight (8) hour limi.1. 2 If.the test is secured for any reason other than the successful completion of the test, a* Deficiency Report is written addressing the proble Based upon successful completion of their tests, it has been proven that the station batteries have

~dequate capacity to handle the actual loads that~

would be required in an emergenc ~

....

Solvent Induced Case Cracking - cracking attributed*

to the use of a solvent trichloroethylene used to clean the battery part of anticorrosion (.no-oxid

"A") greas The application of a hydrocarbon-based grease to the vinyl straps on the battery racks caused the battery

• case to crac PSE'G Response - This problem is addressed in Field Directive No. S-C-E200-EFD-0318-Inspection Criteria and Required Corrective A~tion for Station Batterie Section 4.0 point of inspection, item 4.2.4 "NOTE:

Never use any solvents, cleaning

• • • ~:-~ compounds, oil, waxes, or polishes_ to clean the

• **'~;~:~.-ttery containers or covers or to remove_ NO-OX-ID

"~--gr**** or contamination from post or con~ectors. *

-~,.~.. :licensee had no reco~ds of. battery charging

~ftOllowing the completion of battery discharge test

:'*_.* **arid consequently the time and date the batteries were returned to service -could n~t be determined.*

The licensee also failed to cQrrec~ specific gravity measurements for electrolyte temperature and leve EDD-7 FORM l REV 0 l0SEPT81

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8/26/86 PSE&G Response - Maintenance procedure M3V-Battery 18 month surveillance has sign-off blocks for all crit~cal steps1 the date and time are also procedure requirement The procedure corrects for specific gravity, temperature and electrolyte levels as

~equire The licensee had no written*procedures for condu~tino charges *ot_* the.stati*;n '":.::tterit:-. ;

_PSE&G Response..; t1ainten3nce r,r~*-:-:'._'.t:~*~

~! :::-l-Single Cell Battery Charc;e addresses tb:: cl1arr,,; iny of a single cell (28, 125, and 250Vt batter The battery performance discharge test was performed improperly because the test was stopped before reaching the minimum specified voltag PSE&G Response -*Battery Discharge Test procedure M3A eliminates the possibility of this occurrin Item 9.2._6 states that *The discharge is to be maintained until one of the following limits is reached:

Low Cell Voltage - 1.25 VDC Low Battery Voltage 28V 22.8v 125V

. 'IO'SV 250V 2lOV

-.

It also notes th~ following, *the discharge is to be stopped immediately when the limiting voltage is reached*.

~

The procedure has sign-off blocks for these step There were no station procedures for maintaining station batteries.in ac~ordance with the battery_

~endor's manual or IEEE Std. 450-1975 *

-

• PSE'G Response - All the aforementioned. procedures

Are utilized to maintain the station batteries1 the

~PJ::pc*~ures were developed from manufacturers

-~t'ion manual and IEEE standard 450-1975

~~'irement *

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4. The intercell resistance values of the batteries were not compared with the previous values to determine when corrective ac~ion was require EDD-7. FORM-1 REV 0 10SEPT81 r

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- -- -Page 4of s Date: -B/26/86 PSE&G Response - Battery 18 month surveillance procedure -

M3V requires cell to ~ell and termin*l connection resistance to be recorde The

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4. resistance values must be less than or equal to the established acceptance criteria_ of.01 ohms *

The licensee did.not always conduct equalizing charges when requiied; nor did the licensee have

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PSE&G Response ~ The weekly preventive maintenance and surveillance requirements of maintenance procedures M3M and the 18 month surveiilance procedure M3V assure that the batteries are adequately charged. If a battery cell requires charging maintenance procedure M3M-l will be

/*

invokedt this procedure monitors the progress of the_

charge and determines when the charge is sufficien.1.9 * Surveillance procedtires for the 60-month rated-capacity discharge test did not conform to _

IEEE std. 450-1975 because the test was terminatel at the end of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, instead of when the terminal voltage fell-to the minimum specified value (usually 1.75 volts per cell).

PSE&G Response - Same response as item 4.1.5 *

4.1.10 The licensee's procedures did not require that the average specific gravity -t>e calculated and compared*

to the technical.specification acceptance criteri PSE&G Response - Maintenance Procedure M3M

(Reference No. 3.3) requires that the Technical Specification acceptance criteria be met; the requirements are incorporated into the* procedure as surveillance requirement.1.11 The battery capacity tests required by the Final

--f-8~,Analysis Report (FSAR) and IEEE Std. 450-1980

~re not performed *

PsE5G.Response - The battery capacity test

---requirement is covered in maintenance procedure

MJA-Battery Discharge Tes.1.12 The pilot cells were not being changed on a yearly basis, as recommended by the vendor's technical instructions *

EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81 I

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8/26/86 Page 5 of 5 I *

4.1.13 PSE&G Response - Pilot cell maintenance is covered in our surveillance testing and preventive.

• maintenance (M3M) procedure. *The procedure details -"/

weekly and quarterly preventive maintenance and surveilianc The station engineer responsible for the technical aspects ~f battery operation, maintenance, and surveill~~c~ did not receive s~~voillance results and aata s11ts on a routine *~asi:;. *

PSE&G Response - The PSE&G maintenance department retain files on all battery test and inspection.1.14 Station batteries exhibited flaking of the cell plates and flaking of the plate's hook area where the plates connect to the cell post.0 CONCLUSION PSE&G Response - This pr6blem is addressed in Field

. Directive No. S-C-E200~EFD-0318 Inspection Criteria and Required Corrective.Action for Station Batteries, Section 4, Item 4.2.7 addresses this proble *The cell shall be.checked for flaking *

positive plates and straps.~.The cell.shall be

~

inspected to determine if any flaking has bridge~

the plates.*

The aforementioned battery maintenance procedures provide the guideline for surveillance, testing, and preventive maintenance of station batterie These maintenance procediires eliminate the occurrence of the outlined problem There is no action require.0 SIGNATURES Date Mil'nager -

Date Plant Engineering

'Date

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DISCIPLINE( SI: MECi:__ fl./U,C1 _){__ S'm.CT:

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CIUGINA'.Iat S SI~lURE 7/r:J/St?

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- Date O Design *ieview/D:lclnent Review O Identica.l to Pr.... icusly Verified Dlt*i~n (Identify)

D Altei::nate ca1cu1ation D !:iimilar to ~ia.ly 'Jlarified DHieJn (Identify).

0 Qualification Testin:i 0 Nev (no identic:&l or: aimilar deaianl EU\\ IT~ VEl\\H:IED BY l:ESI~ REVIE:W, O!EIJ< l:IEU.lol,

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10. Material ~tibility

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3. °"' Requi niments?

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.j Cl:Jdes, standa.ra5, 1119Ulatory

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Criteria? / COnstruc:tiai and ~ratil"l,I

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16. ficyjling, Stor8,1*, ClMni ng Wa:1 Uesi~n Interface Requi remmts?

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~-EXP-006 Exhibit l (Rlrv. 1 NEIV5 i2*-13 Pa99 l of 2 Rn'. l

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1 *. DESIGN REVIEW QUESTIONS WERE THE INPUTS CORRECTLY SELECTED,AND INCORPORATED INTO DESIGN?

ARE AtM.ff'PTIONS NECESSARY DEScaJalD AND. REASONABLE?

IDENT!rl!D FOR SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES ARE COMPLETED?

TO PERFORM THE DESIGN ACTIVITY ADEQUATELY WHERE NECESSARY, ARE THE ASSUMPTIONS REVERIFICATIONS WHEN THE DETAILED DESIGN Alt£ THE.APPROPRIATE QUALITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED?

.

ARE ~~E ~~?~!:~BLE ~~~ES, STANDA~DS A~O REGULATORY REOUI~EMES~S INC:;;:nNG ::s:.:E.\\ND <'LuOC:SCA ?ROPERLY IDEST!Fr:::c.\\lliu A.iU: ':'iiE:.R REQUIREMEN73 fOR DESIGN MET? HAVE APPLICABLE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATING EXPERIENCE BEEN CONSIDERED? HAVE THE DESIGN INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS BEEN SATISFIED?

7~

WAS AN APPROPRIATE DESIGN METHOD USED?

• IS THE OUTPUT REASONABLE COMPARED TO INPUTS? ARE THE SPECIFIED PARTS, EQUIPMENT, AND PROCESS~S SUITABLE FOR THE 1.

1.

1 REQUIRED APPLICATION?

ARE THE SPECIFIED MATERIALS COMPATIBLE WITH EACH OTHER AND*THE DESIGN ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS TO WHICH THE MATERIAL WILL BE EXPOSED?

HAVE ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE FEATURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEEN SPECIFIED AilD ARE ACCESS IBIL"ITY AND OTHER DESIGN PROVISIONS ADEQUATE FOR PERFORMANCE OF NEEDED MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR?

.

HAS ADEQUATE ACCESSIBILITY BEEN PROVIDED TO PERFORM THE IN-SERVICE INSPECTION EXPECTED TO BE REQUIRED DURING THE PLANT LIFE?

HAS TH! DESIGN PROPERLY CONSIDERED AI.ARA REQUIREMENTS REGARDING RADIATION EXPOSURE TO THE PUBL,IC AND PLANT PERSONNEL?

ARE THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA INCORPORATED IN THE DESIGN boCUMENTS \\

SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW VERIFICATION THAT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY* ACCOMPLISHED?

1 RAVE ADEQUATE PU-OPERATIONAL AND SUBSEQUENT PERIODIC TEST REQUIRE-MENTS BE!N APPROPRIATELY SPECIFIED?

1 ARE ADEQUATE HAllDLillG; STOit.AG!, CLEANING AND SHIPPING REOUIREMENTS SP!CirlG?

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1 REQUIREMENTS SPECIFI!D?

1 PREPARATION, REVIEW, APPROVAL, RETENTION, Conaideration1 for determininQ credit to be taken for similar or identical standardized or proven d**ions (See Sections 6.8 and 8.1.3)1 The pertinent des ion inputs, includinQ environmental conditions, of the standardized/proven desion are applicable to the current"desi;.

Known problems affectino the standardized/proven design and lheir effects on other features have been considere * The standardized/proven design and associated verification are adequately documented and filed vith the current d*sio NED/S 14 Page 2 of 2 bv. 1

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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT DATE:

April 13, 1983 RESPONSE DUE:

N/A E ** A. Liden Manager -

Nuclear Licensing and *Regulation L. A. Reiter Manager - Nuclear Systems Engineering SUBJECT:

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE*J-11'

POSSIBL°E SEISMIC VULNERABILITY OF OLD LEAD STORAGE BATTERIES Discussion:

.

.

As s_ummarized in the above Information Notice, no seismically induced battery failure has occurred to dat The NRC is considering research that will define the seriousness of age related seismic vulnerability of lead storage batteries *

A~ this time, sufficient information is not available to determine either the seriousness of battery seismic vulnerability or a course of corrective action and/or plant specific pattery vulnerability evaluation processe *

Further regulatory guidance on the issue is require ~

A copy of this notice is being forwarded to Plant Engineering for informatio t!i 'I'

REF:tap CC:

R. L. Gura A. Korn ffiioli{;.l:t:1 N:JCi.C:i\\i\\ UtE~!~-lNil At;'; n:c.m.A TIOH

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D. K. Harding tiDTED ****. SAG Fi le -

IE Not ices GM7 l

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.MAN.tGER

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Salem Generating Station April 8, 1983

. ANJ REGULATION

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~.' 1 5 1983.*. *4.

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To the Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Review Fl

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IE NOTICE 83-11, POSSIBLE SEISMIC VULNERABILITY OF OLD LEAD STORAGE BATTERIES The Maintenance Department performs inspecti_ori.of batt~ries in accordance* with the*. following schedul month 18 month 18 month 18 month 90 day 7 day Test discharge of 28V - 12SV batteries Test discharge of 2SOV batteries Visual inspection of plates - ali cells 28V, l25V and 2SOV 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> connected load service test -

28V and l25V Test all cells 28V, 12SV and 250V batteries Test of pilot cells only 28V, 12SV and 2SOV batteries There have been no failures attributable to the causes* identified in this IE Notice, however, we have.changed cells due to individual cell.voltage and specific gravity problem No. 2 2SOV battery presently has a cell jlimpered out due to low individual cell voltag *

Maintenance Procedure M3-M specifica*11y states that a visual-inspection for any abnormalities and*deterior~tion shall be performed in accordance with the above* schedule of inspection KW:kls The Energy People General Manager -

Salem.Operations

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