IR 05000272/1990005

Insp Repts 50-272/90-05,50-311/90-05 & 50-354/90-03 on 900213-0316.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint/Surveillance Testing,Emergency Preparedness,Security & LER Followup

ML18094B402
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	04/04/1990
From:	Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18094B400	List: IR 05000272/1990005 ML18094B399 ML18094B401
References
50-272-90-05, 50-272-90-5, 50-311-90-05, 50-311-90-5, 50-354-90-03, 50-354-90-3, NUDOCS 9004180203
Download: ML18094B402 (63)

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No /90-05 50-311/90-05 50-354/90-03 License No DPR-70 DPR-75 NPF-57 Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facilities:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Hope Creek Generating Station Dates:

February 13, 1990 - March 16, 1990 Inspectors:

Approved:

Thomas P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector David K. Allsopp, Resident Inspector Stephen M. Pindale, Resident Inspector Stephen T. Barr, _Resident Inspector

~L~~~fu Inspection Summary:

Inspection 50-272/90-05; 50-311/90-05; 50-354/90-03 on February 13, 1990 -

March 16, 1990 Areas Inspected:* Resident routine safety inspection of the following areas:

operations, radi'<~logical controls, maintenance & surveillance testing, emergency prepaiedness, security, engineering/technical support, safety assessment/quality verification, and licensee event report and open item followu Results:

The inspectors identified one violation with two examples at the Salem Statio An executive summary follow _.

• EXECUTIVE SUMMAR I DETAILS SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS 1.1 Salem Unit.2 Salem Unit. 3 Hope Cree.

OPERATIONS SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS 1.1 Salem Unit 1 Salem Unit 1 began the report period operating at full powe The unit remained operational throughout the inspection perio Power reductions occurred to accommodate maintenance and testin.2 Salem Unit 2 Salem Unit 2 began the report period operating at full powe The unit remained operational throughout the inspection perio Power reductions occurred to accommodate maintenance and testin. 3 Hope Creek The unit began the report period at 98% and remained operational throughou Power was limited as the 11 lC 11 and 11 2C 11 feedwater heaters were isolated due to a leak in the "2C" feedwater drain coole.

OPERATIONS (71707, 71715, 93702) Inspection Activities The inspectors verified that the facilities were operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facilities, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Limiting Conditions for Operation, followup to events, and review of facility record These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedures 71707, 93702 and 7171 The inspectors performed sustained control room and plant observations (shift coverage) per inspection module 7171 Hope Creek observations were performed during the period 11:00 p.m. on February 12 through 11:00 p.m. on February 15, 199 Salem observations were performed during the period 3:00c,.a.m. on February 20 through 11:00 p.m. on February 22, 199 The follo~t~g operational activities were reviewed:

operator attentiveness and alertness, plant evolutions and testing, procedural adherence, equipment status and operating conditions, plant instrumentation, log keeping and shift turnover, and equipment operator tour *

3 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2. Salem Operations 2.2. Salem Shift Coverage Operator Attentiveness and Alertness Control room licensed operators were observed during operating conditions. *Selected reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor operators (SROs) were interviewe Operators were noted as being alert and attentive, knowledgeable, cooperative, and professiona RO and SRO manning was consistent with Technical Specification (TS)

requirement Control room access was noted as being forma During the shift coverage, the inspectors reviewed licensee implementation of 11at the controls 11 policy for ROs/SROs per NRC Regulatory Guide 1.114, Revision Licensee administrative procedures AP-5 and 00-19 define control room areas and state that the RO 11at the controls 11 must be within the control board horsesho The second RO on the unit must be in the control room which is defined as the area encompas~~d by the controls area, the instrument rack room and the computer roo The inspectors verified that the ROs on each unit met these requirement The inspector also noted that no map exists in these procedures that precisely depicts these area The inspectors observed that the RO 11at the controls

constantly monitored control room panels and indications with a high level of ~ttentiveness. This was noted on all observed shifts and was considered a strengt TS manning requires three SROs on shift for the two unit The licensee meets this requirement with a Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) and two unit Nuclear Shift Supervisors (NSSs).

The licensee has one or two additional supervisors on each shif In addition, one of the unit NSSs is also the Shift Technical Advisor (STA).

The inspectors noted that at times only one SRO was in the control room area (inside the security door).

The inspector questioned whether having one SRO in the control room for the Salem units~.. meets the intent of TSs, Regulatory Guide 1.114, and 10CFR55".54 requirement The licensee's interpretation was that these.requirements are being me Additional licensee actions to address this item include:

(1) providing an information directive to capture the emphasis of these requirements; (2) working towards a goal of two additional SROs per shift (one field NSS and one work center NSS); (3) placing an NSS/SRO desk in each units' control room

c~s part of th~ control room phase-three human factors upgrade);

and, (5) developing a common administrative procedure (NA.AP.ZZ-005)

that addresses all of these requirements and standardizes control room activities at both Hope Creek and Salem.

• Based on a review of regulatory requirements, the licensee's interpretation and future planned actions, and on discussions with other plants, the inspectors concluded that one SRO in the control room is acceptabl The inspectors reviewed operator overtime for the month of January 199 RO overtime was noted as being 23% and the inspector stated this appeared to be hig The licensee agree The licensee stated that the cause of this overtime was two RO vacancies, and also was due to vacation schedules and sick time during January 199 Licensee actions to reduce this overtime include filling the RO vacancies and implementing a staffing plan with a combined two unit goal of five SROs and five ROs per shif The inspectors verified that overtime was controlled and documented in accordance with Administrative Procedure.

Plant Evolutions and Testing The response to plant alarms, the conduct of plant evolutions and surveillance testing (ST) was overall very goo For example, containment ventilation isolations caused by radiation monitor 1R41e failures on February 20 and 21, 1990 were adequately responded to and reported (ENS) by the shift. Appropriate TS actions were also take Also, on February 21, 1990, number 12 heater drain pump was returned to service. This evolution was well coordinated between the control room and the field, and excellent Shift Supervisor

• oversight was provided in the control roo STs observed during the control room observation period are included in section 4.2 of thij repor The *inspector observed SP(0)4.0.5P-SW22 (inservice testing of the number 22 service water pump) on February 22, 199 The equipment operators did not know where to monitor vibration on the pump and no sensing points were marked, nor did the procedure address the exact point This was discussed with operations managemen The licensee committed to addressing this issue by March 31, 199 Their actions will be to paint a mark on affected pumps and provide specific instructions in appropriate procedure At 3:-40 p.m. on February 21, 1990, Unit 1 experienced a letdown isola.tion when a blown fuse caused valves to close in the letdown portibn of the chemical and volume control system (eves).

Operators placed excess letdown in service and reduced charging flow to m1n1mu Pressurizer level increased from 52 to 70%.

An electrician found the blown fuse and it was replace eves was subsequently returned to service. Overall, operator response was adequate.

• 5 Procedure Adherence Operator procedure adherence was reviewed and determined to be goo This includes implementation of system operating procedures, surveillance test procedures, abnormal and annunciator/alarm procedures, and administrative procedure One exception, however, was associated with procedure 00-33 regarding control room instruments (see section 2.2.1.1.E). Equipment Status and Operating Conditions The inspectors noted that equipment was adequately tracked in the operator's logs when removed from servic Technical Specification action itatements and limiting conditions for operations were correctly implemente The inspectors reviewed the work control center operation and it appeared to function adequatel On February 22, 1990, the inspector observed clearing and removal of tags for the 218 circulato No unacceptable conditions were noted with this proces During the shift coverage, the inspectors noted that two Unit 2 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), 21MS167 and 23MS167, drifted off their full open.positio Operator response was to verify adequate main steam flow and to then depress the open pushbutton to fully open the MSIV The licensee has attributed the MSIV drifting to leaking vent valves on the steam cylinder operato Repairs are scheduled for the upcoming Unit 2 outag Plant Instrumentation The inspectors reviewed control room instruments and annunciator alarm statu The shift tracks out of service instruments and alarms per OD-33, Rev. 5, "Operations Log 13 - Inoperable Control Room Instruments Tracking Program".

The inspector noted that Unit 1 had 25 inoperable instruments and Unit 2 had 2 The inspector verified that TS instruments were given appropriate attentio However, the number of out of service instruments appears to be too hig The licensee agreed and stated that actions had been taken to addr_eJs-this issu The"'inspector also identified some other minor deficiencies in procedure OD-33 implementatio Section 5 of the procedure requires inoperable bezel alarms to be placed out of service by using a clear plastic button face held down by a block strip. Modifications to the bezels prevent this actio Operators used a button face wedged in and depressing the alarm acknowledge butto Also, the inspector noted two cases wh~re Log 13 (per OD-33) was not initialed by the

• shift superviso The licensee stated they would take action to address these two minor deficiencies, and would revise procedure OD-3 The inspector had no further questions at this tim Logkeeping and Shift Turnover Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) logkeeping was reviewe Logs were well written, accurate and in accordance with procedure The inspector noted that the SRO logs do not include event times in the narrative sectio Technical Specifica-tion action statement entrances and exits, and load changes do have event times include RO and SRO shift turnovers including briefings/meetings were evaluated to be satisfactor Information was adequately exchanged, control room board walkdowns were performed prior to turnover, and supervisor briefings were goo Equipment Operator (EO) Tour~

The inspectors accompanied several EOs during periodic tours of the auxiliary (primary EO) and turbine (secondary EO) building The EO tours, conducted in accordance with operations directives, were thorough, methodical and professionally conducte EOs displayed a high knowledge level and were determined to be very capabl Abnormal and unusual equipment conditions were noted, the control room was adequately informed, and conditions were appropriately evaluated and followe Summary

• Licensed operators were-noted as being alert, attentive and knowledgeabl Periodic control board walkdowns were frequent and thoroug Operator overtime was noted as being hig The licensee is taking action to formalize guidance for the operator (RO and SRO)

11at the controls" and in the control roo Operator procedure compliance and response to events was evaluated to be goo The licensee has taken actions to reduce the number of out of service control room instrument Equipment operator tours were evaluated as effectiv.2. Salem Engineered Saf.ety Features (ESF) Actuations Caused By RadiaMon Monitoring Systems (RMS)

Numerou*s ESF actuations and reportable events occurred during the inspection period caused by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RM Attachment 1 is a summary listing of these ESF actuation In each case, the licensee adequately responded to the event, acknowledged the isolations, repaired or restored the RMS instrument as appropriate, made an emergency notification system (ENS) call, and informed the resident inspecto.2. Salem Unit 1 Service Water Leak Event On March 1, 1990 at about 11:00 p.m., leaks in the Unit 1 number 11 service water (SW) nuclear header inside containment occurre The licensee determined that the leaks were associated with the number 11 and 12 containment fan cooling units (CFCUs).

The licensee was in the process of placing the system into service after maintenance per operating procedure II-16. Containment sump pumpouts were noted to be abnormally high and the licensee entered primary containment to inspect the affected area Service water leaks from the CFCU were observed and the components were subsequently isolate The licensee entered the Technical Specification action statement associated with service water components and containment 1 eakag The licensee initiated an incident report and root cause analysis per NA-AP.ZZ-000 The licensee concluded that the CFCUs probably drained during maintenance on the 11 SW heade When the SW system was returned to service, air in the system caused a pressure spike resulting in leaks in both the number 11 and 12 CFCUs~ The licensee repaired the affected components, returned the systems to service, inspected containment and cleaned up all leakag Corrective actions also included modifying operating procedures to ensure that the CFCUs (and other components) are filled and vented after maintenanc The inspector followed up on this event by checking logs; reviewing the incident report; discussing the event with operators and management; and verifying Technical Specification action statement conformanc The inspector did not identify any additional concern The inspector concluded that licensee actions were appropriate and performed in a timely manner, and agreed that procedures were deficient in that the CFCUs were not filled and vented prior to being returned to servic.2. Control Room Drawings The inspectors noted that each Salem control room area contained

"Information Only 11.system drawing A controlled drawing set for eac~runit is maintained in the Nuclear Shift Supervisors* offic On several occasions the inspectors found the uncontrolled drawing sets* opened to specific system When questioned by the inspectors, control room operators and operations management stated that the uncontrolled drawings are a quick reference and are not used for safety related activitie Controlled system drawings reflect current configuration of plant systems, including any modification There could potentially be an adverse safety impact if plant operations are taken using the

"Information Only 11 prints. This was discussed with the licensee,

2.2. who stated that they would review thts matter further to determine if further action is necessar The inspector will review the licensee's followup during a future inspectio Initiation of Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications On March 15, 1990, while operating at 92% reactor power, the licensee initiated a controlled plant shutdown to comply with Technical Specification (TS) 3.3. During the performance of surveillance test lIC-18.1.009, 11Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Function Test - Train 8 11, the one hour allowed by Action 20 of TS 3.3.2.1 to bypass the affected channel was exceeded due to problems with high electrical ground nois The Action specifies that with the affected channel inoperable, the unit must be in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testin TS 3.3.2.1 Action 20 was entered at 10:48 a.m. due to the performance of lIC-18.1.009 (channel in bypass).

At 12:20 p.m.,

following the electrical noise problems, plant operators commenced a unit shutdow Shortly after the initiation of the unit shutdown, technicians corrected the problem by using shielded coaxial cable Apparently nothing had changed since the critical test except the use of shielded cable The surveillance test was then satisfactorily completed and SSPS Train 8 was returned to servic The unit shutdown was stopped at 89% and TS Action 20 was exited at 12:50 p.m. and reactor power was returned to 92%.

The inspector reviewed the licensee 1*s activities immediately following the even The licensee reported this event to the NRC via ENS and they plan to implement procedural changes including the use of shielded cables to prevent recurrenc The inspector found the licensee's response to be acceptabl. Hope Creek Operations 2.2. Hope Creek Shift Coverage Operator Attentiveness and Alertness Control room licensed operators were observed and selected operators were interviewe Operators were noted as being very professional, alert, and knowledgeabl Operator interactions concerning ongoing activities and interfaces with the inspectors were characterized by frank and open discussion On February 13, 1990, during dayshift, timely operator observation of an increasing motor temperature on the service air compressor resulted in a quick respons Operators adequately responded to all alarm condition At 12:40 a.m. on February 15, 1990, the shift entered procedure OP-AB.ZZ.131, 11 Loss of Instrument Air, 11 when an air compressor tripped. Actions taken were appropriat During the shift coverage, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the "at the controls 11 policy for licensed

"

_,.operator The licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide 1.114, Revision 1, November 197 The licensee implements these requirements in procedures SA.AP.ZZ-002 and OP.AP.ZZ-00 A map defines the 11controls area 11 where the reactor operator (RO) must remai Regulatory Guide 1.114, Revision 2, dated May 1989, further defines senior reactor operator (SRO) responsibilities for being either: in 11 sight or sound 11 of the RO or control room inst~uments/alarms. The licensee has not implemented this guidanc For'example, if the SRO were to enter the computer room he would still technically be in the contro 1 room; however" not within 11 sight or sound 11 *

When pointed out by the inspectors, the licensee initiated a night order entry (February 23, 1990) restricting the SRO from entering the computer room when only one SRO is in the control roo The inspectors did not observe any instances where the only SRO in the control room entered the computer roo Another potential weakness identified by the inspector concerning 11at the controls 11 requirements concerns the RO response to a radiation alarm on the remote RM-11 consol This console is outside the 11controls area 11 and the RO cannot respond to an alarm by himsel The RO must get the second RO to respond to the alar This is a known problem and the licensee has initiated a design change to relocate the RM-11 console to within the 11controls area 11 *

Also, the inspectors noted that at times one of two ROs would leave the control room to hand out routine work assignments for EO The licensee stated they would stop this practice and issue assignments from the control roo Another observed weakness concerned the frequency of periodic board walkdowns by reactor operators (ROs).

The inspectors noted periods of up to ten minutes during which ROs were eating or completing paper work and they did not scan the panels in the control roo On one crew, the ROs constantly scanned the panels and never took their eyes away from the panels for more than a minute or two, while on another crew the scanning frequency was more on the order of once every five to ten minute The inspectors noted significant diffe~~nces in the periodic control board attentiveness of the two crews\\\\ At no time were the ROs inattentive and at least one RO was in the, "controls area" at all time ROs were always available to immediately respond to alarm The licensee agreed and responded to this concern by providing guidance that at least one of the two on duty ROs should be periodically monitoring the status of the control board The control boards should be scanned periodically throughout the shif Gaps of ten minutes where the control boards are not scanned should not occu When one RO is eating lunch or engaged in paperwork the other RO should monitor the control board *

The licensee discussed these concerns with all licensed operators and indicated that they would be addressed in new Hope Creek and Salem common administrative procedure NA.AP.ZZ-005 which is scheduled for implementation in May 199 The inspector reviewed the. licensee's actions and had no further questions at this tim.

Plant Evolutions and Testing

. The response to plant alarms, the conduct of plant evolutions and surveillance testing (ST) was overall very goo For example, the switching of turbine auxiliaries cooling system from the 11811 loop to the 11A 11 loop of the safety auxiliaries cooling system on February 13, 1990, was well coordinated with no effect on plant operatio STs observed are included in section 4.2 of this repor One concern noted was during performance of test OP-IS.BC-OOl(Q) on the residual heat removal pump AP20 Initially, lt appeared that an instrument valve was left close This was identified by another equipment operator who subsequently opened the valv The licensee reviewed this event, and determined that the ED performing the test was somewhat inexperience He did not realize that the valve was normally closed, and was only to be opened as directed by the tes No other concerns were noted with respect to this test performanc Procedural Adherence Operator procedure adherence was reviewed and determined to be goo This included implemeritadon of system operating procedures, surveillance test procedures, abnormal and alarm procedures and administrative procedure Equipment Status and Operating Conditions The inspectors noted that equipment was adequately tracked when taken out of servic Procedure OP.AP.ZZ-108 addresses Technical Specification action statements (TSASs) and TS limiting conditions for=()p.eration (LCO).

The licensee uses a 11tracking 11 LCD for certain TSAS'S~~~. In this case the equipment either remains operable or may be out~*of* service and not be required for the currently operating plant conditio OP.AP.ZZ-108 does not address the use of the 11tracking 11 LCO for TSAS The licensee stated that the procedure would be revised to address this ite The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was removed from service at 2:00 a.m. on February 14, 1990, for planned corrective and preventive maintenanc An apparent conservative 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ENS call was made at 4:45 The tagout was verified to be consistent with SA.AP.ZZ-015 and the appropriate TSAS 3.5.2 was entere HPCI was returned to service on February 15, 1990 per procedure

OP.SO.BJ-00 This was well conducted with good oversight provided by the shift superviso Plant Instrumentation F. A noticeable decrease in lit control room annunciators was observe During the shift coverage, as few as 5 alarms were lit. This is much lower than the number in the past few month Continued aggressive management attention has been successfu Operators were knowledgeable of all lit annunciators either due to being inoperable or due to testing in progres A review of the 11 Inoperable Instrument/Alarm Log 11 per OP.DL.ZZ-010 was performe Four steam jet air ejector instruments (non-safety related) were noted as being out of service since August 198 The licensee committed to reviewing this issu The 11Daily Surveillance Log 11 per OP.DL.ZZ-026 was reviewed and no unacceptable conditions were note Logkeeping and Shift Turnover Reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) logkeeping was reviewe Logs were well written, accurate and in accordance with procedure RO, SRO, and senior nuclear shift supervisor (SNSS) shift turnover was monitore Information was adequately exchanged, control room boards were walked down prior to turnover, and SNSS shift briefings were complete and informativ Equipment Operator (EO) Tours The inspectors accompanied several EOs during periodic tours of the reactor building, turbine buil~ing and diesel/control buildin The EO tours were conducted per OP.DL.ZZ procedures and were determined to be thorough, methodical and professionally conducte EOs displayed a high knowledge level and were evaluated as being very capabl Abnormal and unusual equipment conditions were noted, the control room was informed, the condition was evaluated and followup adeql:t~_tely performe Duri~g;* reactor building tours, the inspectors noted poor housekeeping and cleanliness in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) systems* room The rooms apparently were not aggressively cleaned up after planned outage Both rooms were contaminated and required the EO to dress out in protective clothing in order for him to take readings and to checkout equipmen The licensee stated the the HPCI and RCIC rooms were scheduled for decontamination and painting in April 199 An apparent low level oil contamination in the floor is preventing the uncontrolled release of the room.*£!

12 Summary Licensed operators were noted as being alert, attentive and knowledgeabl However, minor weaknesses in periodic control board walkdowns and in proceduralization of 11at the controls 11 were note Operator response to alarms and the conduct of testing was very goo Procedure adherence was also evaluated to be goo Aggressive management attention has reduced the number of lit annunciator alarm Equipment operator tours were noted as being thoroug.2. Hope Creek Turbine Building Fires (Allegation RI-90-A-0001)

The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding an allegation that fires had occurred in the Hope Creek turbine building during the second refueling outage that *were not properly reporte This period was September - November 198 The inspector reviewed a* printout of licensee incident reports by the site fire department for the period September - December 198 These incident reports included medical, fire, investigative, rescue, and hazardous material report Each incident was responded to by the site fire department and documented in a.lo Further licensee followup and documentation of these events included initiation of an incident report with its associated review proces During the period of concern, a number of fires and related investigative incidents occurre The majority of these incidents were related to faulty fire detectors and invalid fire alarm A number of actual fires were caused by authorized hot work (welding and burning) associated with the Hope Creek outag The incidents that occurred in the turbine building were further reviewed by the inspecto This included interviewing fire department and Hope Creek personnel, and reviewing selected incident report The inspector expressed concern over this high number of fire related incident The licensee stated that this was not unusual due to the high level of work associated with the Hope Creek outag The inspector did not find any fires that occurred in the Hope Creek turbine building that were not reported to the site fire departmen In addftion, the inspector did not note any fires that were reportable to the NR The.inspector concluded that the allegation is unsubstantiated and is considered closed.

• .1

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)

Inspection Activities PSE&G's conformance with the radiological protection program was verified on a periodic basi These inspection act1vities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings and Review of Events 3. Salem 3. Gas Decay Tank (GOT) Releases The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures and process for releasing GDT The inspector reviewed UFSAR section 11, the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) section 11, operating procedures, and Technical Specification (TS) sections 3/4.11 regarding radiation effluent The inspector also discussed the process with the licensee and with NRC Licensing personne The SER states that a 45 day decay period is required prior to releasing a GO The inspector noted that the licensee does not allow for this decay perio Based on discussions with licensee and NRR personnel, the inspector concluded that the process for GOT releases was consistent with TS 3/4.11 which was revised in December 5, 1984, with license amendment's 59 (Unit 1) and 28 (Unit 2).

These amendments were approved by the NRC with an associated SE Thus, the original SER with a 45 day decay period has been revise The inspector had no further questions and did not identify any unacceptable condition Hope Creek Torus Room Tour The inspectors toured the Hope Creek torus room on March 13, 199 The torus room is a locked high radiation and contamination are *The inspectors verified that proper radiation protection (RP)

measures were in place for the torus roo An RP technician accomp~nied the inspector The Radiation Work Permit.was checked for adequac General area housekeeping was also checke Some water:was noted on some areas of the torus room floo Licensee actions to clean this water up was planne Two Technicians Overcome While Decontaminating the HPCI Room (Allegation RI-89-A-0130)

An allegation was received at the NRC Region I office which stated that at the end of the last refueling outage at Hope Creek two radiation protection technicians were taken to Salem Hospital after they had improperly used a toxic substance in an unventilated are * The alleger stated he was concerned for the protection of other workers involved in similar situation The inspector discussed the matter with the Hope Creek radiation protection manager and also with the radiation protection technician who was the duty supervisor the day the event was alleged to have occurre The inspector determined that on November 9, 1989, two contractor employees reported feeling ill. They had been decontami-nating the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room with a product named 11 Clearall 11 *

The two contractors had completed the work in the HPCI room and _had already left the Radiological Controls Area when they reported feeling nauseated and dizz The contractors' licensee supervisor directed both individuals to the Hope Creek first aid office where, after resting, both employees reported feeling bette When the contractor site coordinator was informed of the circum-stances, he took both technicians to the Salem Hospital where, after receiving outpatient care, both were released that same evenin The licensee has suspended the use of 11Clearal1 11 and presently uses a different grease removing agen This allegation was substantiated and, as a result of the contractors' recovery and the licensee's corrective actions, the allegation is considered closed.

Chemistry Department Overtime Concerns (Allegation RI-90-A-0017)

The NRC was contacted with a concern that the chemistry department technicians were being asked or forced to work excessive overtime hour Specifically, the concern was with the potential negative impact the long hours would have on employee health and/or the performance of procedures or safety-related system In response to these concerns, the inspector interviewed the chemistry department supervisor who had been responsible for managing and assigning the departments overtime for the previous mont As part of the interview, the inspector reviewed the department's overtime records for the past six month These records included the procedures for assigning overtime and the daily records kept of the overtime worked by each chemistry technicia The chemistry department supervisor was aware of the Hope Creek TechnJcal Specification limits on overtim A laminated copy of that:;_p_art of the Technical Specifications is included in the same notebook as the overtime record During his review, the inspector found no instances where the Technical Specification limits had been exceeded and found the overtime records to be thorough and complet As a result of the inspector's review, and because no instances of Technical Specifications violations were noted, this allegation was found to be unsubstantiated and is, therefore close *

4-.

MAINTENANCE/SURVEI LL.ANGE TESTING ( 62703, 61726)

4.1 Maintenance Inspection Activity The inspectors observed selected maintenance activities on safety-related equipment to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industrial codes and standard These inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:

Unit Work Order or Procedure Description Hope Creek Various HPCI oil change, valve replacing, valve work Salem 891011029 No. 1 diesel fire pump engine inspection Except for concerns associated with the_ Salem diesel fire pump (section 4.3.1), the maintenance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the maintenance progra.2 Surveillance Testing Inspection Activity The inspectors performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspectors verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance wifh T~chnical Sp~cifications, approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:

Unit Salem 1 Salem 2 Procedure N IC4.2.066 SP(0)4. 6.1. 3A SP(0)4.4.6.2d 2IC-2.6.009 Test 1R41C Functional Test Containment Airlock Pressure Seals Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Loop 23 Reactor Coolant System Delta-temperature, Tavg Protection Channel III

• Hope Creek

SP(0)4.8.l.l. C Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Test SP(0)4.0.5.P-SW22 22 Service Water Pump Inservice Test SP(0)4.4.7.2d Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate IC-FT.BG-002 OP-ST.GK-001 IC-FT.AB-018 OP-IS.BC-001 IC-CC.BF-006 OP-IS.BJ-101 OP-ST.KJ-004 OP-IS.BD-101 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Logic 118 11 Control Room Emergency Filtration Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Logic Test Residual Heat Removal Pump AP202 Test Scram Discharge Volume Water Level Trip High Pressure Coolant Injection System Valves - Inservice Inspection 11D 11 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Test Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Valves - Inservice Inspection The surveillance testing activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance testing progra.3 Inspection Findings 4. Salem Unauthorized Design Modification to Both Diesel Fire Pumps The inspector observed portions of the 18 month preventative maintenance activities on the number one diesel fire pum The inspector noted an unauthorized design modification which had been implemented in the local control panel for each diesel fire pump but whtf~h~d not been processed as a formal design chang This design modification prevented the fire pumps from starting weekly as originally designed by an automatic time The design modification involved cutting an electrical lead to a solenoid and wrapping the lead with electrical tap The licensee determined that this design modification did not adversely impact the operability of the fire pumps, and intends to permanently disable the timer start command by processing a formal design change packag. The licensee's review of documentation indicates that this modification was implemented when the fire pumps were initially installed in 1976 for Unit 1 and 1980 for Unit 2 pum This design modification was only visible when the local control panel access door was ope The design modification had been previously identified as a deficiency by the licensee and was entered into the equipment malfunction identification system (EMIS).

Although this deficiency was entered into EMIS before July 6, 1988, the problem was not properly resolve This item was subsequently removed from the EMIS with no work order written to correct the problem.*

Technical Specification 6.8.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires that administrative procedures be established, implemented and maintained including applicable procedures recommended in Appendix 11A 11 of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, 197 Appendix 11A

of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, 1978, recommends that procedures be written to cover the control of modification Nuclear Administ-rative Procedure No. 8 (NAP-8), "Design Change, Test, and Experiment Program" requires the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) to review all Design Change Packages for 10CFR50.59 concerns in accordance with the provisions of section 6.0 of the Technical Specifications prior to their implementatio The failure to properly implement a desig~ change without complying with NAP-8 constitutes a violation (50-272/90-05-01).

Hope Creek Routine Observations Other than the weakne~s aisociated ~ith performance of OP-IS.BC-OOl(Q)

(see section 2.2.2.1.B), no other concerns were identified during routine maintenance and surveillance observation Improper Pe~formance of Local Leak Rate Tests (Allegation RI-89-A-0051)

An individual contacted the NRC Region I office and expressed concerns that containment leak rate testing was not being performed properly at Hope Cree The regulations addressing containment leak.age< testing are set forth in 10CFR50, Appendix This regulation discusses the testing in terms of Type A, B and C test The Type A test'. fs a measurement of the overall integrated leakage rate of the primary containmen Type B and C tests are local leak rate tests designed to detect and measure local leakage across each pressure-contai ni ng or leakage-limiting boundary of primary containmen The alleger stated that PSE&G was performing repairs and adjustments before conducting Type A tests without properly adjusting the Type A test results for the Type B and C leakage rate The consequence of this would be that the "as found" condition of the primary containment would not have been properly determine The inspector contacted a lead engineer from the Hope Creek Inservice Inspection (ISI) group and reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for conducting containment leakage test The inspector determined that the Hope Creek containment leakage rate test program is performed in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix J requirements, and that Type A, B and C tests are performed in the correct sequenc The inspector was provided with and reviewed the Hope Creek ISI Test Report, which was current through February 16, 199 This report contained results for all leakage rate tests performed at Hope Creek since the plant began operation in 1986, and the inspector found the required tests to have been carried out in a timely and satisfactory manne Particular attention was paid to the Type A test performed during the last refueling outage in November 1989, and it was determined that the Type A test results had been properly corrected with all required 11as found 11 and 11 as left 11 Type C test result The inspector also noted that a failed leak test for a specific penetration was followed by maintenance and a successful retes As a result of the discussions with licensee ISI engineers and a review of current leakage rate test results, the inspector concluded that this allegation was unsubstantiate This allegation is considered close.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71707) Inspection Activity The inspector reviewed PSE&G's conformance with 10CFR50.47 regarding implementation of the emergency plan and procedure In addition, licensee event notifications and reporting requirements per 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73 was reviewe.2 Inspection Findings Unusual Event Due to Low River Level The Hope Creek station declared an Unusual Event at 7:00 p.m. on February 25, 1990 dua to a low river level of 82 feet. A combination of high winds fromjhe northwest and a low tide, resulted in a sensed low river leve The~-licensee classified this condition per emergency classifica-tion guide (ECG) section 1 The Salem Station measured river level remained at 84 fee Their entry condition is 83 feet per ECG section 1 The Hope Creek event was terminated at 7:02 p.m., when level exceeded the setpoint criteria of 82 fee The inspector reviewed the control room tide ch.art recorders, incident report 90-15, ECGs, control room logs and discussed the event with both Hope Creek and Salem operator The inspector concluded that the unusual event declaration was consistent with procedural requirement The

inspector questioned why a 2 feet level difference existed between the two station Licensee station and emergency preparedness personnel stated that the difference was due to river level sensors' location and geometry of the rive However, they would review these differences and the associated ECG The inspector had no further questions at this tim Salem Emergency Drill A periodic emergency plan drill was conducted at the Salem Station on March 7, 199 This was the first time the licensee utilized the Salem simulator for drill conduc The inspectors observed a portion of the drill at the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Cente No unacceptable conditions were note.

SECURITY (71707) Inspection Activity PSE&G's conformance with the security program was verified on a periodic basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundarie These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure (TI 2515/102)

The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedur The licensee's procedure details short-term actions that could be taken to protect against attempted radiological sabotage involving a land vehicle bomb if such a threat were to materializ The procedure appeared adequate for its intended purpos No discrepancies were noted and the temporary inspection (TI 2515/102) is close Fitness For Duty (FFD) Event On March 6, 1990, the licensee notified the resident and made an ENS call to report~a FFD program violation per 10CFR26.7 A contractor individual tested pQSftive during a random drug tes When the results were reported to medicaj~on March 5, 1990, the affected individual was told to report to the medical~ department (outside the protected area).

Medical released the individual and he subsequently returned onsite (in the protected area) at 1:45 p.m. on March 5, 199 Medical failed to communicate the positive test result to security until 2:30 Subsequently, the individual's badge was pulled and he was removed from the site at 2:57 p.m. on March 5, 199 The individual was working on the Salem switchyard and associated fence modification Further licensee followup is ongoin The licensee stated that this had no effect on plant safety and believes they made a conservative 10CFR26.73 repor *

The inspector reviewed the licensee's action and determined it to be consistent with regulatory requirement Security Program Review The inspector reviewed the Salem/Hope Creek security program including facilities and staffing on March 14 and 15, 199 The inspector observed licensee performed walkdowns of security alarm status, perimeter boundaries, detection systems and entry/exit area Licensee security management and guard force personnel were interviewe No unacceptable conditions were note The inspector noted the security force to be competent and enthusiasti.

ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT (71707, 60705, 92701) Salem Unit 2 Refueling Preparations The inspector reviewed the licensee's preparation for the Salem Unit 2 fifth refueling outage beginning on March 31, 199 This wis done in accordance with inspection module 60705.

The inspector reviewed the following documents:

Key events listing, Design change list with maintenance department support identified, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level schedule, Equipment hatch schedule, Industrial safety plan,

Outage implementation procedure ODP-ZZ-001, Revision 1, Operating procedures to support refueling, RCS component elevations and midloop operations information; Current forced outage list, and'

Major system window and critical path schedul The inspector also attended selected outage meetings and met with licensee personne Major work items during the outage include:

ins~n,~tfce inspection of RCS components, steanh.generator eddy current testing and U-bend heat treatment, and p 1 uggJhg,' (if required),

hydraulic snubber testing, local leak rate testing, core refueling, 30 design changes, and miscellaneous corrective and preventive maintenanc With the exception of some possible equipment delivery delays, the inspector concluded that the licensee was adequately prepared for the outag *

21 Cable Separation Deficiencies During the last NRC resident inspection (50-272/90-04; 50-311/90-04),

several potential cable separation deficiencies were identified by the inspecto During this inspection period, the inspector met with licensee representatives from the Technical Department to review the status of their evaluation of the specific potential separation deficiencies for permanently installed cable The licensee's cable separation requirements are implemented through Design Specification CD-S-1, 11Design Criteria for Independence and Separation of Safety Related Instrumentation, Controls and Protection Systems 11, Salem Design Memorandum No. 30 (Revision 5) and Salem Maintenance Procedure M3K, 11 Electrical Cable Installation/Pullin Two of the approximately ten items previously identified by the inspector and evaluated by the licensee are potential violations of the licensee's separation requirement Specifically, safety related cable No. 2EPXZ-ET (Channel B), located in the Unit 2 Switchgear Room (El. 84 1 ); was not properly separated from. safety related cable (Channel C) exiting conduit No. 2C6Y-A similar example was identified in the control room area where two unlabeled cables had exited a safety related Channel B cabinet and crossed over the top of a safety related Channel D cable tray (No.

1C427) with insufficient separation. A third apparent separation problem was subsequently identified by the inspector, located in the Unit 2 Switchgear Room (El. 84).

A safety related cable (Channel C) was closely routed to a non-associated non-safety related cable (Channel G) located in cable tray No. 2C05 The above discrepancies, including other identified separatiofi deficiencies in the control room areas concerning the routing of wiring associated with a temporary modification, are considered unresolved pending further li~ensee review to determine whether safety evaluations existed to justify deviation of cable separation requirements and NRC review of the licensee's evaluation (UNR 50-272/90-05-02).

Im.proper Control of Combustible Material During routine plant tours, the inspector identified several examples of combustible materials abandoned in safety related cable tray Specifi-cally, ther.e-.were (1) three plywood cable tray covers installed (each approximat~*ly three feet long) on cable trays in the Unit 1 mezzanine area, above the battery rooms; (2) four similar wooden covers atop cable trays in the Unit 2 relay room; (3) several (about four or five) wooden tray covers wrapped in 11Herculite 11 plastic in the overhead of the Unit 2 safety injection pump roo Only the Unit 2 relay room area evidenced recent work since scaffolding was installed, however, the inspector noted that no work had been in progress for several day The licensee sometimes uses wooden covers, constructed with fire retardant wood which is combustible, to protect uncovered cables during work in the area, however, they are* required to remove the combustible materials while not in us * *

Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that procedures be established, implemented and monitored including applicable procedures recommended in Appendix 11A 11 of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, 197 Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, 1978, recommends that procedures be written to cover the plant fire protection progra Station Administrative Procedure No. 25 (AP-25), "Fire Protection Program", requires that combus-tibles resulting from work activities shall be removed from the work area immediately following work completion or at the end of each shift by the department performing the work, whichever comes firs Failure to comply with the requirements of AP-5 by leaving unauthorized combustible materials in safety related areas and thereby possibly compromising the design fire loadings is a violation (50-272/90-05-03).

The inspector identified the areas of concern to Site Fire Protection personnel, who immediately initiated action to resolve the deficiencie Specifically, a fire protection impairment was documented for the Unit 2 relay room, and the remaining wooden cable protectors were remove Further, instructions have been provided to fire protection personnel to provide extr~ attention to combustible loading, especially for Unit 2 outage related activitie Followup licensee reviews identified that the actual fire loading in the areas involved did not exceed the design requirement Further, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 relay rooms were impaired for other reasons and the appropriate fire watch was implemente The licensee could not identify when or why the wooden covers were installed in the Unit 2 safety injection pump room, however, design fire loading was not exceede The inspector concluded that there was minimal safety impact of the three examples described above, however, there appeared to be a lack of administrative control of the transient combustible The licensee stated that ongoing revisions to AP-25 will include long range corrective measures for th~ abcive concerri including specific documentation of use/storage of transient combustibles in the various safety related areas to determine whether the areas become impaire The inspector concluded that the licensee's response to this concern were prompt and effectiv Open Item Followup (Open) Unresolved Item 50-272/90-04-01:

This item addressed the identification of potential cable separation deficiencies with respect to control oe:extension cords and telecommunication cable routin This item also*'*addressed other cable separation concerns which were subsequently further evaluated by the licensee and reviewed by the inspector (Section B. above).

The inspector met with licensee representatives from the Technical Department to discuss the previously identified concern The licensee agreed that there was an apparent lack of control of extension cord and telecommunication cable routin Recently developed Work Standards document that extension cords are not to be run through or over cable tray Interviews with station personnel, however, identified that some were not fully aware or did not fully recall the specific requirement or its purpos. '

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Technical Department personnel informed the inspector of their proposed corrective actions for the above concern The Engineering and Plant Betterment Department is currently developing a Telecommunications Installation Standard (no formal standard currently exists) to control and maintain proper routing and separatio The licensee stated that wiring for installed equipment will be made to conform with the new standard upon issuanc With respect to control of extension cords, the licensee is considering issuing additional guidance to site personnel on this subjec The inspector will review the licensee 1 s progress on the proposed corrective action during a future inspectio Pending completion of the above activities, this item remains ope.2 Hope Creek High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Room Temperatures The licensee conducted HPCI room thermography in order to determine the source of elevated room temperature (NRC Inspection 50-354/90-01, section 2.2.4.8).

Thermography report number 731178 dated February 22, 1990, concluded that several areas were radiating excessivel These include the drain pot, steam pipe, flange for auxiliary steam and steam admission valv The licensee has initiated action to replace the drain pot level switches and to insulate these hot spot The inspector concluded that the licensee has taken appropriate action.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500, 35502)

8.1 Salem Procedure Two Year Review Status During NRC review of plant Emergency Operating Procedures (NRC Inspection Report 50-272/90-80) it was identified that many Abnormal Operating Procedures had not received the required biennial revie Further inspection noted that the station was generally not completing two year procedure reviews as required by Technical Specification 6.8.2 and Administrative Procedure No. 3 The inspector determined that preliminary information indicated that as many as 933 procedures could be late for their two year revie This includes the following overdue procedural~reviews:

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Instrument and calibration - 485 out of 718 procedures Operation - 373 out of 953 procedures Maintenance - 75 out of 251 procedures Additional licensee review to take credit for all procedures which satisfy the AP-32 review process may significantly reduce the actual number of overdue proceduralize review A significant number of Salem 1 s two year procedure reviews went overdue after the station decided to shift emphasis from reviews to the procedure upgrade progra The

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station intends to change their AP-32 procedure review periodicity from two years to five years in the n~xt several months pending NRC's approval of the chang This item will remain unresolved until an accurate assessment of the state of procedure reviews is available and this issue is evaluated during future NRC inspections (UNR 50-272/90-05-04).

8.2 Hope Creek Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The licensee performed an assessment of 1989 Hope Creek LERs which was completed March 6, 199 The licensee noted a decrease in total LERs since 1988 (26 versus 36).

This is mostly attributable to a decrease in reactor water cleanup isolations due to design change Also, since 1986, the overall LER trend has shown to be decreasin A slight decrease in personnel errors was also note However, the number of Technical Specification related LERs has not decrease The inspector reviewed the assessment and discussed it with licensee engineers.* The inspe~tor concluded that the assessment report was a thorough analysis and it appeared to accurately depict current trend.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LER), PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS ACCURATELY, AND OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP (90712, 90713, 92700) LERs and Reports PSE&G submitted the following licensee event reports and, special and periodic reports, which were reviewed for accuracy and adequacy ~f the evaluati*o The asterisked(*) items identify reports which involve licensee identified Technical Specification violations which are not being cited based upon meeting the criteria of 10 CFR 2 Appendix Salem and Hope Creek Monthly Operating Reports for January and February 1990 were reviewed and no unacceptable conditions were note Hope Creek Annual Report of Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Challenges dated February 21, 1990, reported that two SRVs (H and M) opened on December 30, 1989, during a reactor scram caused by a turbine trip (Reference LER 89-25 and NRC hfspection 50-354/89-20).

The licensee also reported that 8 of 14 SRVs that were removed in 1989 exceeded the 1% setpoint toleranc The inspectorquestioned licensee engineers regarding this issu Licensee engineers stated that regarding the 8 SRVs the following lift setpoint data was obtained:

5 were between 1-3%, 2 were approximately 4%, and 1 was non-conservative at about 12.8%.

The licensee has apparently experienced other SRV setpoint drifts in the non-conservative direction..

During the first refueling outage, 12 of 14 SRVs exceeded the 1% setpoint with 11 greater than 3%.

The inspector noted that the licensee is testing all SRVs each refueling outag The licensee continues to pursue this area with the BWR owners group and NR The inspector had no further questions at this tim This area will be reviewed in a future inspectio *

Salem LERs Unit 1 LER 90-02 The LER concerns several containment isolations caused by 1R41A and 8 radiation monitor spikes during the period January 17 to February 1, 199 The licensee has determined the root cause to be system design problem These events were reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-272/90-0 No inadequacies were noted relative to this LE LER 90-03 and LER 90-04 The LERs concern containment isolations caused by 1R41C radiation monitor spikes on January 22 and 24, 199 The licensee has determined the root cause to be system desig These events were reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-272/90-0 No inadequacies were noted relative to these LER LER 90-05 The LER concerns two containment isolations caused by 1R41C radiation monitor spikes on February 20 and 21, 199 These events are reviewed in section 2.2.1 of this repor No inadequacies were noted relative to the LE Unit 2

• LER 90-02 LER 90-0~F~~+- *

The LER concerns an entry in Technical Specification 3. and initiation of a Unit 2 controlled shutdown due to the identification of a math error which resulted in slightly higher flow rates for both high head charging pump This event was discussed in NRC Inspection 50-311/90-0 This LER was found to be of very good quality, with a particularly thorough assessment of the event and root cause determinatio The failure to meet the surveillance flow rate requirements of TS 4.5.2h constitutes a licensee identified violation for which no Notice of Violation will be issued since the criteria of 10CFR2, Appendix C have been satisfied (NCV 50-311/90-05-01).

The LER concerns a Unit 2 shutdown on January 17, 1990 when Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered due to an inoperable high head injection system caused by a leak on a boron injection tank wel The event was reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-311/90-0 The licensee determined the root cause to be a weld defect in the root pas No inadequacies were noted relative to this LE LER 90-06 LER 90-07 LER 90-08 and LER 90-09 LER 90-10 Hope Creek LERs LER 90-02 9. 2 Open I temsi>

The LER concerns a control room radiation monitor spike (2R1A) and automatic switching of the ventilation system on January 17, 199 The licensee determined the root cause to be system design concern The event was reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-311/90-0 No inadequacies were noted relative to this LE The LER concerns a main steam line isolation during surveillance testing in hot shutdown on January 17, 199 The event was reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-311/9,.Qc:0 The licensee determined the root cause to be an inadequate procedur No inadequacies were noted relative to this LE The LERs concern containment isolations due to radiation monitors 2R41B and C spiking on January 20, 23 and 24, 199 The root cause was determined to be equipment desig These events were reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-311/90-04 and no inadequacies were noted relative to these LER The LER concerns containment isolations caused by a 2R12B radiation monitor spike on February 16, 199 The licensee's actions were appropriate and no inadequacies were noted relative to this LE The LER concerns a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)

isolation on a ventilation high differential temperature on January 19, 199 The event was reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-354/90-0 The lic~osee determined the root cause to be a malfunctioning reactor building temperature control loop which required isolating heating ste~m to th~

reactor building_ ventilation syste This combined with cold outside air, resu.lted in the isolatio The licensee's cofrective actions we~e evaluated and determined to be satisfactor The licensee intends to perform thermography of the HPCI room to determine the sources of heat which is causing ttle apparent higher than normal room temperature The following previous inspection item was followed up during this inspection and is tabulated below for cross reference purpose Salem Section

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Status 272/90-04-01 7. 1. 8/7. 1. D 90-05-0

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1 MID-SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP) REVIEW (35502)

10.1 In~pection Evaluation, and Review Process The NRC conducted a mid-SALP review and evaluation of licensee performance including quality assurance program effectiveness in accordance with inspection module 3550 This performance review was conducted for both the Salem and Hope Creek Stations. A meeting was held at NRC Region I on February 26, 1990, to discuss licensee performance, to determine if any changing trends exist, and to define inspections to be conducted for the remainder of the SALP perio These meetings were attended by resident and specialist inspectors, NRC Regional Management and representatives of NRC Licensin Subsequent to these NRC meetings, presentations were made to discuss license~ ~erformance with PSE&G managemen The meeting with Hope Creek was held on February 28, 1990, and the meeting with Salem was held on**

March 2, 199 Attachments 2 and 3 include meeting attendance, respectivel At the Salem meeting on March 2, 1990, the licensee gave a presentation regarding their'initiatives and a self-evaluation of their performanc Attachments 4 and 5*of this report are the licensee's handouts from this meetin.2 Inspection and Evaluation Findings The NRC did not identify any significant declining trends in Salem or Ho~e Creek Station performanc Specific strengths and weaknesses were identified, and were discussed with licensee managemen Licensee self-assessment of their performance was *consis,tent with NRC assessment The NRC did not make apy changes in the current'9'1te inspection plan.

EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)

The in specters met with Mr. L. Mi 11 er and Mr. J. Hagan and other PSE&G :::7 personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection acttyitie ~*

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Based off Region I reviW;'and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this~.report does not con*tain information ~ject to 10 CFR 2 restrict ions*.

• ATTACHMENT 1 SALEM RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM ENS CALLS Date Time Unit Rad Monitor 2/16/90 10:53 a.m. 2 2Rl2B 2/20/90 1:08 a.m. 1 1R41C 2/21/90 11:07 p.m. 1 1R41C 3/1/90 9:19 R41C 3/1/90 10: 00 a. R41C 3/2/90 2:14 R41C 3/2/90 5:52 R41C Effect/Cause Channer failed low causing containment ventilation isolation Ch~nnel failed resulting in containment ventilation isolation - channel declared inoperable and placed in block Channel failed resulting in containment ventilation isolation - channel declared inoperable and placed in block Radiation moticitor spike and containment isolation signal Channel failed low

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causing containment ventilation~c isolation

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• -Radiation monitor failed high causing contaipment v~ntilation isolatf6n/ pressure relief~inservice valves close~

loose wires found inside monitbr Radiation monitor failed high following satisfactory completi~~ of channel failed test

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• ATTACHMENT 2 LIST OF ATTENDEES - NRC & PSE&G MEETING HOPE CREEK MID-SALP FEBRUARY 28, 1990 Nuclear Regulatory Commission T. S. D. Glenn Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector Pindale, Resident Inspector Allsopp, Resident Inspector Tracy, Region I Reactor Engineer Public Service Electric and Gas Company Robert Hovey, Operations Manager - Hope Creek Richard Griffith, Station QA Manger - Hope Creek Jim Clancy, Radiation Protection/Chemistry - Hope Creek*

Steve Funsten, Maintenance/Planning Manager John Nichols, Technical Manager Dick Beckwith, Station Licensing Engineer Mark Shedlock, Outage Manager Mike Sesok, Site Representative, Atlantic Electric

• ATTACHMENT 3 LIST OF ATTENDEES - NRC & PSE&G MEETING SALEM MID-SALP MARCH 2, 19907 Nuclear Regulatory Commission William F. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects A. Randy Blough, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects Paul Swetland, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects Thomas P. Johnson, Senior.Resident Inspector James Stone, NRR-PDI-2 S. M. Pindale, Resident Inspector D. K. Allsopp, Resident Inspector Lynn Kolonauski, Project Engineer Public Service Electric and Gas Company Steven Miltenberger, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Tom Crimmins, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Stan LaBruna, Vice President - Nuclear Operations Joseph J. Hagan, General Manager - Hope Creek Lynn Miller, General Manager - Salem Operations Art Orticelle, Maintenance Manager - Salem Vince Polizzi, Operations Manager - Salem Bruce Preston, Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation G. Chris Connor, General Manager - Nuclear Services Ralph Donges, Senior Staff Engineer*

Dave Dodson, Acting Principal Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Tom DiGuiseppi, Site Emergency Preparedness Manager Pell White, Technical Manager - Salem W. R. Schultz, Station QA Manager - Salem David Mohler, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager - Salem Other Pat Patnaik, State of NJ - Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of NucJear Engineering Suren Singh, s*tate of NJ - Department of En vi ronmenta l Protect.i:On Edward Krufka, Atlantic Electric - Onsite Representative - Salem Kennard M. Buddenbohn, Delmarva Power and Light Ted Robb, Philadelphia Electric C *

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SALEM GENERATING STATION NRC MID-SALP PRESENTATION MARCH 2, 1990 L. K. MILLER GENERAL MANAGER -

SALEM OPERATIONS

SALEM GENERATING STATION MID-SALP PRESENTATION AGENDA

• AREAS FOR CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT

• CURRENT CHALLENGES

• AREAS FOR CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT

• MANAGEMENT TEAM DEVELOPMENT

- CULTURAL TRANSITION

• ELEVATE WORK STANDARDS

- WORK STANDARDS/WRITIEN INSTRUCTION GUIDELINES

• MATERIAL CONDITION/HOUSEKEEPING

- IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCIES

- LIVING ENGINEERING PLAN

- IMPROVED WORK PLANNING/

SCHEDULING

• ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION-AWARENESS-TRAINING

- SPECIAL EVENT RESPONSE TEAM (SERT)

• STARTUP FROM REFUELING OUTAGES

- ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

- DEFENSIVE PLANNING

- READINESS OF PLANT SYSTEMS l

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CURRENT CHALLENGES

• IMPROVE WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT

- CURRENT BACKLOGS

- COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT

- PRIORITIZATION OF WORK

• MAINTAIN MOTIVATED WORKFORCE

- EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT

- COMMUNICATIONS

- SUPPORT EMPLOYEE TRAINING

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• UPGRADE MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS

- TRANSITION TO RELIABIL TY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE

- MATERIAL & PARTS AVAILABILITY

- REPETITIVE MAINTENANCE ITEMS

• IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

- ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES/

PROGRAMS

- IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING/

SCHEDULING