IR 05000272/1988003
| ML18093A714 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1988 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093A713 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-88-03, 50-272-88-3, 50-311-88-03, 50-311-88-3, NUDOCS 8803150087 | |
| Download: ML18093A714 (55) | |
Text
,.
Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/88-03 50-311/88-03 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR.:.75 050272-871113 050311-880112 050311-880113 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
January 1, 1988 - February 15, 1988 Inspector:
Approved by:
P. D. Swetland, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
Inspections on January 1, 1988 - February 15, 1988 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/88-03 and 50-311/88-03)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, drug testing, assurance of quality, and followup to reactor vessel head leak The inspec-tion involved 90 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspecto Results:
This report documents the closure of an open item regarding steam enclosures relating to high energy line breaks and discusses the licensee's drug and alcohol progra No new open items or violations are discussed in this report.
8803150087 880307 PDR ADOCK 05000272 Q
{.
DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed)
Unresolved Item (272/87-32-02); This item was opened when the inspector identified vent paths from an enclosure that had been designed for protection against steam flooding should a steam break occur in the auxiliary feedwater syste The licensee has responded to the NRC via supplements to the original LER 87-01 Although the licensee could not determine the reason these vent holes were present, the holes were repaired, an analysis was performed and corrective action was initiated to review similar structure (See Section 7 of this report for further details.) This item is considered close.
Operational Safety Verification Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, tech-nicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, security personnel, supervisors, and plant managemen The inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedures 71707, 71709, 71710, and 71881 and affirmed the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR Technical Specifications, License Conditions, and Administrative Procedure No violations were identifie *
[
3. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown:
The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio This ESF system walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The containment spray system was inspecte No deficiencies were identifie.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units* operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1 s regulation The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee 1 s actions did not constitute a health and safety_hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
3. Unit 1 The unit was in a continued refueling outage at the beginning of this inspection period with repairs and cleanup continuing on the No. 1 service water bay which was flooded on December 22, 198 A special team inspection was conducted by Region I with regard to the flooding even The results are documented in combined Inspection Report 272/88-02; 311/88-0 There was also a team inspection conducted January 4-8, 1988, to assess the licensee 1 s readiness to restart the unit following a refueling outag The results are documented in combined Inspection Report 272/88-01; 311/88-0 On January 6, 1988, the unit entered Mode 3 and was conducting hydrostatic testing of the reactor coolant system (102% of operating pressure in accordance with ASME Section XI, following repairs on the system).
The licensee identified three leaks on the spare control rod drive mechanism (CROM) penetrations at the lower canopy seal weld The licensee cooled down the Unit to Mode 5 to facilitate repair A detailed inspection by the licensee found evidence of three additional pin hole leaks on the lower canopy seal welds of these spare CRDM 1 This was confirmed by dye penetrant testin The licensee made a decision to perform a repair on all spare CRDM 1 s and the remaining spare ihstrument penetratio Five of six instrument penetrations had been removed and capped during the outag More details concerning the repair can be reviewed in Section 10 of this repor *
3. On February 11, 1988, the licensee reported that welding deficiencies were discovered on the diesel generator day tanks for Unit Unit 2 welds were in tac The welds in question were stitch welds along a U channel where the tank attaches to the foundatio The licensee declared the diesel generators inoperable and entered the action statement (isolate containment) for Mode The welds were repaired and the diesels were returned to operable status upon the completion of the weld The licensee discovered the discrepancy while doing engineering walk-downs for the preparation of a Probabilistic Risk Assessmen The licensee is also performing an investigation into how the missed welds were discovered and reported and how the welds were missed during the construction phas The resident inspector will review the licensee event report when issue The unit remained in Mode 5 for the remainder of this report period with repair work being performed on the CRDM's and the the cavity seal mating surfaces which had been identified in combined Inspection Report 272/87-28; 311/87-3 Unit 2 Except for power changes to facilitate testing and the repair of a hydraulic oil leak on the main turbine, the unit operated at 100% power for the duration of this report perio No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved procedures, and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard The inspector also verified that the replacement parts and Quality Control utilized on the repairs were in compliance with the licensee's QA progra Unit 1 Work Order Number 871130206 Maintenance Procedure MllE Meehan i ca 1 Equipment trouble-shooting and repair Description Repair of oil leaks on fuel oil, 1 ube oil and jacket water on No. lA diesel
- 871006181 870617063 870801092 Unit 2 Work Order Number 871207127 871209064 No violations were identifie.
Surveillance Observations
Pneumatic Valve and Positioner Calibration Data Sheet S-87-134 Code job package with repair instructions and department control of code work; Welding procedure specifica-tion and NOE (Dye (Penetrant) result Entir~ controlling package under master procedure M6 Reactor coolant pump seal disassembly, inspection and repai Maintenance Procedure M3Q-6-230 and 460 Volt ITE K-Series breaker preventative maintenance MP6.l Boric Acid Transfer Pump Removal and installation 1CV55 - charging control valve stuck open due to loss of control air because of a bent valve positioner ar Replaced with new arm Repair of tubing for charging valve 1CV256 Inspection and replacement of seal in No. 12 reactor coolant pump Description Troubleshooting and repair of spent fuel p;'t pump motor circuit breaker Replacement of seal in No. 21 boric acid transfer pump During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance *
The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 1 Inservice testing of service water pumps SP(0)4.0.5-P-SW (14-16)
verifies operability of the service water pump in accordance with (IAW) Technical Specification 4.0.5 and ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section X Emergency Core Cooling ECCS Subsystems SP(0)4.5.2.C verifies no loose debris present in containment which could be transported to the spray pump section during a LOCA IAW Technical Specification 4.5.2. Containment Systems - Spray System SP(0)4.6.2.l(A) verifies containment spray valve lineup IAW Technical Specification 4.6.2.1.a and 4.6.2. Auxiliary Feed System SP(0)4.7.l.2.b verifies operability of Auxiliary Feed System IAW Technical Specifications 4.7.1.2. and 4.3.2.1.1 table 4.3-2 Step No violations were identifie.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - December 1987 and January, 1988 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - December 1987 and January, 1988 No violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accord-ance with Technical Specification *
Unit 1 87-017-02
Discovered Leak Paths From 13 (23) AFW Pump Compartments - Control of Design Requirement This second supplement to the LER which describes an identified leakage path from No. 13 (23) Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump Compartment delineates the results of a safety evaluation performed, by the licensee, to determine the severity of the resulting environment on surrounding equipment during a postulated pipe break in the pump compart-men The report delineates the pressures and temperatures that could be reached at the surrounding equipment and concludes that equipment adjacent to the compartment, which is necessary for normal plant operations as well as those necessary to mitigate a design basis accident, would not have been affected by the postulated steam supply line brea The licensee has sealed the holes on both units and i'ntends to issue a directive identi-fying similar structures that are designed to contain the effects of a pipe ruptur The intent of the directive will be to insure similar structures continue to meet their design requirement The inspector had no further questions in this are Unit 2 88-001-00 T.S. Action Statement 3.3.3.8 Performed Late Due to Inadequate Administrative Controls Late Sampling of Containment Fan Cooler Unit effluent with detector 2Rl3C inoperabl On January 9, 1988 at 9:45 a.m., the detector was declared inoperable which required an action statement be entered that required daily samplin On January 9, 10, 11 and 13, the sample was taken at or
, near 9:45 However, on January 12, 1988, the sample was taken at 1:45 p.m. due to a misinterpretation of the action statemen The chemistry department personnel interpreted the drawing of the sample to be a sur-veillance test and applied the 25% allowable flexibility criteria thus causing the delay in samplin The late sample was within discharge tolerance The detector was restored to service on January 13, 198 The licensee has issued clear direction to the chemistry department to prevent recurrenc The inspector determined that this event represented an apparent licensee identified violation of the T.S. Action Statement requirements, for which no further action is require (NV5 311/88-03-01)
88-002-00 Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry - 4 SW Pumps Inoperable Due to an Equipment Failure The licensee entered action statement 3.0.3 (Motherhood action statement)
when 22 Service Water (SW) Pump was declared inoperable, due to excessive seal leakage, and the other SW header was inoperable for maintenance and surveillance testin The cause of the excessive seal leakage on 22 SW pump was attributed to a dislocated tube tensioner which supports the
shaft seal operatio The pump has been replace The action statement 3.0.3 was entered at 1:14 p.m. on January 13, 1988, and exited at 1:33 on January 13, 1988, when the 26 SW pump, which had been out of service to support required preventative maintenance silt inspections, was returned to servic The licensee acted promptly and all applicable technical specification action statements were satisfied regardin~ the operation of the SW syste The inspector had no further question No violations were identifie.
Assurance of Quality The assurance of quality was evidenced by the comprehensive management involvement in the repairs on the reactor head spare rod drive penetrations, including the licensee's presentations to Region I and Headquarters which described their repair program and concern for the repairs with regard to the ASME Cod The Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QA/QC) personnel were directly involved in all aspects of the spare rod drive penetration repairs; for example QC directly in~pected dye penetrant examinations, stud cleaning and replacement, and welding observations. QA/QC involvement was also witnessed in the performance of surveillance and maintenanc Region I Temporary Instruction 88-01 Fitness For Duty (Drug Testing)
Information and Reporting Followup The purpose of the temporary instruction was to followup and document the licensee's approach to the fitness for duty progra The following are the questions asked to the licensee and their responses: Who has the responsibility or authority to determine that a chemical test for drugs or alcohol wil 1 be performed 11 for cause 11 ?
2.
All individuals badged for site access are subject to 11 For Cause Fitness-for-Duty Examination" which may include drug urinalysis under the following circumstances:
The tests may be ordered by the individuals' immediate superviso When reliable information, such as a report of an arrest or indictment' gives the Company reason to believe an employee may be illegally involved with drug When aberrant behavior is evidence When patterns of unsatisfactory availability, misconduct, or deteriorating job performance is evidence A serious accident where the employee appears to be at faul What threshold limits are used for 11 positive 11 tests (screening and confirmatory) for the following:
THC (marijuana); cocaine; amphetamines; barbiturates; opiates and PC Drug Testing Cutoff Levels Profile Amphetamine Barbiturates Benzodiazepines Cannabinoid Cocaine Methaqualone Opiates Phencyclidine Methadone RIA - Radio Imuno Assay EIA - Enzyme Imuno Assay
RIA/EIA 1000 200 300
300 750 300
300 GCMS - Gas Chromatography Mass. Spe All measurements are in nanograms per ml of urin GCMS 300 200 150
150
100
10 Is the Fitness for Duty Program publicized so that workers are likely to be aware of it?
How is this accomplished?
Yes, by memos to all employees from the General Manager and at the pre-employment physica.
What actions are taken if a chemical test for drugs is positive (for employees and contractors)?
PSE&G Employees Preemployment Evaluation - Offers of employment are contingent on successful completion of a background investigation and the medical evaluation which includes physical, psychological, and drug testin If any determination indicates that an applicant is not suited for site access, the offer for employmen~ is rescinde Annual Requalification Evaluation - All individuals badged for site access must successfully complete an annual medical evaluation, which includes drug testin If at any time an employee 1 s test is positive (confirmed by GCMS) the employee's site access is placed on "Medical Hold 11 and the employee is suspende The employee is encouraged to participate in the Personnel Guidance Program (the licensee 1 s
employee assistance program).
If upon further testing, continued positive or re-use is indicated the employee may be terminate In all cases, the employee is re-reviewed with respect to his/her access authorizatio Any employee who is returned to work following a drug violation is placed in a three year random testing cycl The Re-employment Program is available at management's discretio *
Contractors/Consultants Initial Access Evaluation - All contractors/consultants applying for unescorted site access are screened under the Personal Access Program (PAP) which includes a background investigatio Additionally, all contractors/consultants must successfully complete the medical eval-uation which includes physical, psychological, and drug testing. If any determination indicates that the individual is not suited for site access, the individual is denied access privilege Annual Requalification Evaluation - All individuals badged for site access must successfully complete an annual medical evaluation, which includes drug testin If a contractor/ consultant evaluation reveals a positive drug test, (confirmed by GCMS) the contractor/
consultant 1s access is denie.
With respect to the licensee 1 s experience with chemical testing for drugs over the last year (1987) for employees and contractors: How many tests have been given for each category of testing (i.e., pre-employment, annual physical, for cause, etc.)?
How many tests were performed as a result of a supervisor referral based upon observed performance? How many tests in 11 a 11 were positive?
Fitness-for-Duty Results 1987 PSE&G Employees Pre-employment Annual Requalification 11 For Cause
Contractor/Consultant Initial Access Annual Requalification 11 For Cause
Med. - Medical rejection Psy. - Psycological rejection DIA - Drug/Alcohol rejection Total 315 1893
Total 3276 504
Me Me Ps DIA
7
3
Ps DIA
121
2
- 11 Are positive screening tests always confirmed by more accurate testing?
If not, why not?
Yes (See question 2, table).
For the back-up testing Gas Chromatography Mass. Spec. is use See attached Attachment 11A' 1 for a recent letter relating to Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy issued by the General Manager of Salem Statio No violations were identifie.
Licensee Actions Regarding Repairs of CROM Spare Penetrations During the performance of a reactor coolant hydrostatic test, performed following modifications to the reactor coolant system, the licensee identified small leaks on the canopy seal weld of three spare control rod drive penetrations within the reactor hea There are twelve spare control rod drive (CROM) penetration The leaks are similar to those found on a Unit 2 instrument penetration in August 198 The licensee identified and evaluated the leaks and entered an Unusual Event at 4:30 a.m. on January The reactor coolant pressure was reduced to 1500 PSIG to allow engineering time to take pictures, and assess the weld leak and locatio At 2:18 a.m. on January 9 the reactor was in Mode 5 and the Unusual Event was terminate The licensee brought the NSSS Vendor (Westinghouse) and a metallurgical consultant (MPR) to the site to assist in developing* a repair procedur Upon further investigation by the licensee, additional pin hole leaks were discovered on three other spare CRDMs by observation of boric acid deposits and subsequent dye penetrant inspection The identification of the additional leaks prompted the licensee to perform weld repairs on all twelve of the spare CROM penetration The weld repair was a weld buildup techniqu On the spare instrument port, the licensee installed a canopy seal similar to the one installed on Unit 2 in August of 198 The licensee also detensioned, removed, inspected and reinstalled nine reactor vessel head studs, one at a time, to insure that any boric acid that came in contact with the studs was resolved in accordance with the applicable codes and standards for reactor vessel head stud No violations were identifie On February 5, 1988, the licensee traveled to the Region to present their weld repair rationale and the results of their investigation into the cause of the leak Attachment 118 11 delineates the meeting attendees and the topics discussed.
I f
1 Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia *
APPENDIX A Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station To All Employees DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE POLICY SALEM GENERATING STATION February 4, 1988 Public Service Electric and Gas Company is committed to providing reasonable assurance that all persons granted access to its Nuclear Department facilities are mentally and physically capable of performing their duties in a safe and reliable manne An essential component of the VPN-ADP-12, "Fitness for Duty Policy",
is the requirement that all persons involved in nuclear power plant activities be drug tre Your attention is directed to the Company's policies and procedures with respect to alcohol and drug abus Detailed information is presented in the booklet, "Employee Information on Alcohol and Drug Abuse", which is available, upon request, from the Office Administrato The following is a summar~ of the Company's policies and procedures in cases involving employee alcohol and drug abus Employees found to be unlawfully in possession of, selling, or using drugs or in possession of, selling, or using alcohol on Company property or during work hours, will be disciplined up to and including discharg I Employees who are deemed by Company management to be unfit for work, or who are found by medical examination to have drugs in their system, shall not be permitted to remain on the job or on Company propert.
Employees will be subject to a fitness for duty examination which may include a drug urinalysis under the following circumstances: Annual Physical Examinations The Energy People
APPENDIX A
'"
r
,To All -Employees-2-2/4/88 When reliable information, such as a report of an arrest or indictment gives the Company reason to believe an employee may be illegally involved with drug When aberrant behavior is evidence When patterns of unsatisfactory availability, misconduct, or deteriorating job performance is evidence A serious accident where the employee appears to be at faul I When it has been established that an employee will be subject to a fitness for duty examination, he/she shall be directed to submit immediately to a medical examination which may include drug urinalysis following which he/she will be suspended without pay pending the examination result Employees who refuse to submit to a drug urinalysis when so ordered, or who submit a false specimen, will be considered insubordinate and subject to discharg V Employees found to have illegal drugs in their system will be suspended and subjected to retesting as follows:
Marijuana - Retesting may be done any time at an employees'
option during the 21 day retesting period after the initial tes However, the 14th day after the initial test and the 21st day after the initial test are mandatory test date If at any time during the testing period the results show 1 an increased level, indicating drug reuse, the employee will be discharge Other Drugs - If the initial urinalysis indicates the presence of drugs other than marijuana, the employee will be suspended and given a second test four days after the suspension, or earlier at the employee's optio If the results of the second urinalysis are positive, the employee will be discharge Alcohol - Employees found to be unfit for duty because of alcohol use will be suspended and will be disciplined up to and including discharge *
, APPENDIX A
.. To All Employees-3-2/4/88 Non-Company personnel who are deemed by Company management to be unfit for work and/or who are found by medical examination to have drugs in their system, shall not be permitted to remain on the job or on Company propert Personal Guidance Program Any employ~e who might be in need of assistance in the area of drug and/or alcohol problems is encouraged to contact the Personal Guidance Counselor on Salem extension 507 In accordance with the requirements of the Personal Guidance Program, any contacts between an individual and counselor are maintained on a strict confidential basi Salem Operations AWM:dmh CC:
Local IBEW Representative
- Name NRC w. w. J. E. P. p. J. T. R. H. H. PSE&G J.. G.. N. Other M. R. M. Jenny Wanda
/
Kane Johnston Durr Wenzinger Swetland Eapen Strosnider Kenny Summers Ker ch Kaplan Zupko, J Perkins Roggio Strong, J Tren ka Cavalier Harris 01 i veri Moon Cristali ATTACHMENT B LIST OF ATTENDEES SALEM UNIT 1 HEAD LEAKS MEETING Title Director, Division of Reactor Projects Director, Division of Reactor Safety Deputy Director (Acting), DRS Chief, Project Branch 2 Chief, RPS 28, Chief (Acting), Engineering Branch, DRS Chief, Materials & Processes Section Senior Resident Inspector, Salem Project Engineer, RPS 28 Senior Reactor Engineer Reactor Engineer General Manager - Salem Operations Manager Station QA - Salem Station Licensing Engineer - Salem Maintenance Engineer - Salem Project Management Salem Site Representative - Atlantic Electric NOE Technician NOE Technician NJ DEP NJ DEP
Jl.GENDA c
BRIEF OVERVIEW
~
EVENl DESCRIPTION
~
SALEM PASl EXPERIENCE
~OUl CAUSE EVALUAlIONS
ENGINEERING CRITERlA FUR SEAL WELD lORRECTIVE ACTION
IMMEDIATE ACTION PLAN/
RESOLUTION
LONG lERM ACTIVITIES J. Zl!PKO D: STRONG H. TRENKA H. lRENKA H. TRENKA D. STRONG H. TRENKA
-
J
VESSEL PENETRATION REPAIR SALEM - UNIT 1 PROJECT TEAM REPRESENTATION PROJECT LEADS - ONSITE - D. STRONG - SALEM MA.INTENANCE
- OFFSITE - H. TRENKA - PROJECT MANAGEMENT E&PB PROJECT MEMBERS
- PROJECT MANAGEMENT - E&PB
- MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT - SALEM
- MECHANICAL ENGINEERING - E&PB
- SYSTEM ENGINEERING - TECHNICAL DEPT. - SALEM
- STATION PLANNING DEPARTMENT - SALEM
- RADIATION PROTECTION - SALEM
- SITE MAINTENANCE - WELDING ISi - SITE SERVICES
- WELDING SERVICES INC
- RADIATION SERVICES
- QUALITY ASSURANCE - SALEM
- LICENSING - L&R
- CONTRACTS, COST & SCHEDULING - E&PB
- R&D DEPT. - PSE&G
- RESEARCH LAB - PSE&G
- SAFETY REVIEW
- CONSULTANTS WESTINGHOUSE MPR OTHERS
'.
EVENT DESCRIPTION PLANT CONDITION
. - l/7/8g
- MODE 3
- 2300 LBS, INITIAL INSPECTION - DUE To HYDRO ON TC MODIFICATION
- INSPECTION DOORS USED
- 3 LEAKS FOUND LOCATION OF LEAKS
- ES, E7, G7 - (SPARE PENETRATIONS)
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE - DEPRESSURIZE, COOLDOWN
- FORM PROJECT TEAM INDEPTH VISUAL
- 1/22/88, WITH SHROUD REMOVED *
- 100% VISUAL INSPECTION, 79 PENETRATIONS
- BORON INDICATION FOUND ON 3 SPARES
- 2 PROBABLE WEEPERS
- l POSSIBLE WEEPER LOCATION OF WEEPERS - JS, J7, J9 (SPARE PENETRATIONS)
- SALEM PAST EXPERIENCE
UNil l
-
Nu PREVIOUS SEAL WELD LEAKS
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THERMOCUUPLE CT/CJ CULUMN
UNIT 2 P~NETRATIONS CUT AND CAPPED OCTUBER 1987
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TIC COLUMN PENETRATION LEAK AUGUST ng7
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REGION 1 PRESENTATION SEPlEMBER '87
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CANNOPY WELD REPAIR
-
FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
° CRDM COOLING SHROUD INSPECTION DOORS
INSPECTIONS AT MODE 3
REMOVE & INSPECT REPAIRED PENETRATION
BOTlOM MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION
-
DECIDED IN MID - 1986
-
CONCERN/EXPERIENCE ON CONOSEAL LEAKAGE ON HEAD A FACTOR
,*
ROOT CAUSE EVALUAJIONS
~*
PENETRATIUNIADAPTcR CONF lGl 1RATIUN THREADS FOR STRUCTURAL STRENGJH
-
St AL WE Lli F 0 R LE AK l I G HT NESS
-
SAME CONF If11JRA1 ION FljR ALL HEA~ ~ENETRAl lUNS e
M.L\\JtRlAL REVIEW
-
DlFFERENJ SUURLES
-
ND APPRECIABLE DlfHRtNCES
WELDING REVIEW
-
PRlJCtlJlJRE SAME
-
WELDING RECORDS
-
WESl lNGHOlJSE SUPERVISION, LOCAL CRAFT INDUSTRY tXPERIENCE
-
9 UF 41 WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS
-
1% UF SEAL WELDS
-
MOSTLY SPARE CRDM'S llC PENETRATIONS
-
WESTINGHOUSE FORMING TASK FORCE
-
WOG (J NOT GENERIC u
FP&L PRESENTING OVERVIEW (J FAILURE MECHANISMS
-
PIJRGE HOLE OR LOCAL REPAIR
-
LACK OF FUS I ON ON CON Sl!MABLE IN SE RT
WESllNGHOUSE EXAMINATION OF UNIT 1 NON-LEAKING TIC PENETRATIONS
PSE&G CONSULTANT, MPR, PROVIDED UVERVIEW/INDEPENDENJ EVALUATION
-
UNIT 2 TIC PENETRATIONS LATE '88 j
,
...
-
CANOPY SEAL Wf.LD REPAIR HISTORY Utility/
Penetration Repair Option Selected Option Root Cause Reportability Relevant Repair Vendors Operatinq Status Station Location considered (and basis)
Analysis (Licens.inq issue)
Data (code, equip. etc) (Repair
~ Analysis (any future commitmts?)
Con. Ed/
4 Spare Pen-
-overlay Weld overla*y -
-Automatic remote weld-
-Welclinq Services-Fix considered re r et rations-Replacement-since no work on No -
Tech Spec inq & setur-Westinqhouse (no repair Indian (Head Adaptor in-kind Press. Roundary &
NONE defines seal weld -Remote NOE fatigue concern-No future commitmt Point -
2 Plugs)
-Cut and cap Head Removal not as non-PB leak-ASMf. Sect. IX for the overlay)
-monthly walk down (?)
1 Instrmn mandatory Penetration-Conoseals-Capping Conoseals repaird Root Cause-Automatic welding for Westinghouse/
Permanent repair FP&L/
2 Spares capped Anal d~H1e caps after manual setup Power Cutting-Spare pent rs -Weld overlay Split canopy seal on spares NO-Manual welding being (leak detect. sy Turkey Pt ( 2)
weld repair being -Defect weld considered tor curr..
under consideration -
-
3 & 4-Split canopy considered for-Insuff purge CROM lea no decision on date)
-STD CROM ( l)
STD CROM-Corrosion-ASME :-;ection. XI l PLCRDM Pin-Repair Weld-One PLCRUM cut Westinghouse CPL/
hole leak and capped Manual Repairs by (Split Canopy recurring 6x Split Clamp-One split canopy NONE Utilit Seal)
H. in 7 yrs-5 new canopy Robinson (Mid-Bundle)
Remote Tooling seal welds Remote Tooling by 1 Spare on for Cut & Cap Westinghouse & owned by Periphery
CPL NSP/
4 Inst. Port-Repair Weld overlay on Converted leakinq spare Columns on welding Inst. Ports Yes -
lie ad to RV LIS Con Westinghouse Last problem in '84 Prairie Periphery Adaptor Manual Techniques elev-
&
Island Spare Pens-Cappinq Caps on Spares pluq uneven NO eloped case-by-case up Self (75-77)
thermal to 3 layers used -
qrowth pu rqe/dry i nq/LP Exam critical to overlay succes Comm. Ed/ l Spare P Manual over-Repaired Pinhole l?e Yi phe:ry lay in '78 leaks @ 2R NON~;
Self ( '78)
outage (1978)
Zion
- -
ENGINEERING CRITERIA EUR SEAL WELD CORRECTIVE ACTION
WELD FUNCTION
-
NUT A SlRUCTURAL WELD
-
FAILURE RESULTS IN LEAKS
OBSERVED << 1 GPM
TOTAL FAILURE 2 - 3 GPM
LEAKAGE IS NOT A PRECURSOR OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
-
SECTION XI CODE CASE INTERPRETATION
WELD INTEGRITY IS HIGHLY DESIRED
WELDING
-
QUALIFIED WELD PROCESS
ANALYSIS OF MODIFIED CONFIGURATION
-
CUDE ANALYSIS BY CE
-
GOOD FOR 40 YEARS
-
ASSUMED FLAW, DOES NOT PROPAGATE
-
VOLUMETRIC EXAMINATION
NOT MEANINGFUL
-
MUST BE DONE REMOTELY
UNCERTAIN OF MEANINGFUL
BEING PURSUED
-
VISUAL
THROUGH VIDEO CAMERA
° FACTOR OF EIGHT MAGNIFICATION
-
HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TEST
VISUAL EXAMINATION FOR BORON INDICATION
BEST INDICATION OF SEAL WELD LEAKAGE
USED TO LOCATE J-5, J-7, J-9 WEEPERS
-
OTHER
WESTINGHOUSE INVESTIGATING ECT
NOT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE
NOT LIKELY TO INDICATE PIN HOLE *
INTERPRETATION:
SUBJECT:
DATE ISSUED:
FILE:
XI-1-83-28 SECTION XI, DIVISION 1, IWA-4400 HYDROTESTING OF NON-PRESSURE RETAINING WELDS OCTOBER 31, 1983 BC83-344 QUESTION: Is THE REMOVAL OF A SEAL WELD, THAT IS BETWEEN THE BODY AND BONNET OF VALVE AND IS NOT PRESSURE RETAINING, AND ITS SUBSEQUENT WELDING BACK (AFTER SERVICING THE VALVE INTERNALS),
CONSIDERED A REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT UNDER THE RULES OF IWA-4000 OR
. IWA-7000 OF THE 1980 EDITION OF SECTION XI, DIVISION l, WITH ADDENDA UP TO AND INCLUDING THE WINTER 1981 ADDENDA?
REPLY: No.
ACTION PLAN/RESOLUTION OPTIONS CONSIDERED - SPLIT CANOPY (LIKE UNIT #2)
- MECHANICAL SEAL
- SPOT RE.PAIR
- INSIDE HEAD PLUG
- REPLACEMENT OF CANOPY SEAL
- CUT AND CAP
- WELD BUILDUP
ALARA CONSIDERATIONS CUT AND CAP VERSUS WELD BUILDUP FOR 6 PENETRATIONS CUT AND CAP - MANUAL AND SEMI AUTOMATIC
- HEAD DISASSEMBLY AND REASSEMBLY - 8 MAN REM
- OTHER ACTIVITIES - 17 MAN REM
- TOTAL JOB MAN REM 151 WELD BUILDUP - REMOTE OPERATED, SEMI AUTOMATIC
- BUILDUP - 19 MAN REM
- CLEAN 9 STUDS - 6 MAN REM
- OTHER ACTIVITIES - 17 MAN REM
- TOTAL JOB MAN REM 42 CUT AND CAP
- 151 WELD BUILDUP -
- 109 MAN REM SAVINGS WITH WELD BUILDUP
l
WSI EXPERIENCE DATA SHEET PLANT DATE OF SERVICED SERVICE *
BABCOCK & WILCOX 7-85 LAWRENCE, MAS BABCOCK & WILCOX 1-87 BARBERTON, OH BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR 1982 PLANT UNIT 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
. BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR 1983 PLANT UNIT 1 TVA BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR 1984-85 PLANT UNIT II TVA BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR 5-85 PLANT UNIT II TVA CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT I 11-85 BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC C LUSBY, MD
<Two Joss)
CONNECTICUT YANKEE WINTER-85 POWER PLANT CONNECTICUT YANKEE SPRING-86 POWER PLANT JAMES A. FITZPATRICK 1984
. NUCLEAR POWER STATION NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY OSWEGO, NY JAMES A. FITZPATRICK 4-85 NUCLEAR POWER STATION NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY JAMES A. FITZPATRICK 3-87 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NEW YORK PLANT AUTHORITY TYPE OF SERVICE BOILER TUBE OVERLAY OVERLAY BOILER TUBE PANELS WITH INCONEL WELD REPAIRS ON RECIRCULATION PIPING SYSTEM OVERLAY SWEEPOLET TO HEADER AND FRACTURE MECHANICS WELD OVERLAY REPAIR AND FRACTURE MECHANICS OVERLAY PIPING SYSTEM TWO (2) OMEGA SEAL WELDS DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL REMOTE OMEGA SEAL WELD HEAD OMEGA SEAL WELDS (2) WELD OVERLAY OF RECIRCULATION PIPING WELD OVERLAY SERVICES CORE SPRAY REPLACEMENT AND WELD OVERLAY J
...
WSI EXPERIENCE (CONTINUED)
PLANT DAIE OF SERVICED SERVICE GILBERTON PLANT 8-87 FRACKVILLE, PA EDWIN I. HATCH 1984 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT GEORGIA POWER Co, EDWIN I. HATCH UNIT I 1984 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT GEORGIA POWER Co, EDWIN I. HATCH UNIT I 85-86 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT GEORGIA POWER COMPANY BAXLEY, GA INDIAN POINT 10-87 NUCLEAR STATION UNIT #2 BUCHANAN, NY MERCER GENERATING STATION 1984 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC &
GAS Co, TRENTON, NJ MERCER GENERATING STATION 10-85 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC &
GAS, C TRENTON, NJ MILLSTONE II 3-85 NORTHEAST UTILITIES WATERFORD, CT SHEARON HARRIS I 8-82 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT Co.
TYPE OF SERVICE HARDFACE WELD OVERLAY OF TWO FLUIDIZED BED BOILERS 28" WELD OVERLAY TEST PROGRAM WELD OVERLY REPAIRS OVERLAY WELD REPAIRS OVERLAY CANOPY SEAL WELDS BOILER TUBE OVERLAY BOILER TUBE OVERLAY 2 OMEGA SEAL WELDS C.R.D.M. INSTALLATION WELDING/CUTTING
_*......1
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WELD BUILDUP WELD PROCEDURE - QUALIFY REMOTE WELD PROCESS ON MOCKUP
\\~ELDERS
- TRAIN AND QUALIFY ON MOCKUP DRY
- GREATER THAN 500°F
- 16 HOURS MINIMUM BUFF CLEAN
- VISUAL INSPECTION WELD BUILDUP
- 24 HOURS
- 4 LAYERS ACCEPTANCE
- VISUAL INSPECTION
-
INFORMATIONAL PT
-
INSERVICE HYDRO AT 102%, 10 MINUTES
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RELATED TASKS
- CLEAN BORON FROM HEAD
- CLEAN BORON FROM PENETRATION COUNTERBORES
- CLEAN 9 STUDS
..
LEAK DETECTION RllA - CONTAINMENT PARTICULATE MONITOR REACTOR LEAK RATE - TECH SPEC LIMITS
- 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED VISUAL INSPECTfON - IN MoDE 3 TRIAL LEAK DETECTION SCHEME - SAMPLE FROM CRD PLENUM
- DETECT R b8 s As A PRODU.CT OF K r8 8 DECAY
..
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LUNG TERM FOLLOW UPS u
R~MOVE & EXAMINE UNITS
~ TIC PENETRATIONS
INVESTIGATE CiTHtR SEAL WELD FIXES u
PURSUE RUOT CAUSES THROUGH WESTINGHOUSE TASK FORCE, WU G., AND I DR 1 ND ll ST R~ C 0 NT ACTS u
SPECIAL REPORT TO THE NRC
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