IR 05000272/1988023
| ML18093B348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1988 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18093B347 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-88-23, 50-311-88-26, 50-354-88-26, NUDOCS 8812290156 | |
| Download: ML18093B348 (6) | |
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Report No Docket No License No DPR-70 DPR-75 NPF-50 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
REGION I
Priority -
Priority -
Priority Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas P.O. Box 236 Aancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-4800 Facility Name:
Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
November 29 to December 2, 1988 C-.~r~~;/~
C. G. Amato~Regional team Leader, Emergency Preparedness Section, FRSSB, E. Fox, Sr. EPS, EPS, RI K. Halvey-Gibson, RI, Salem C. Gordon, EPS, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS S. Peleschak, EPS, EPS, RI DRSS Category C Category C Category C Inspection Summary:
Ins ection on November 29 to December Ins ection Re ort No Combined Areas Inspected: Routine, announced, emergency preparedness inspection of the licensee's annual, full-participation,emergency exercise conducted on November 29 to December 2, 198 The inspection was performed by a team of five NRC Region I personne Results:
No violations were identified. Emergency response actions were adeguate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
8812290156 881221 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
PNU
DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following Public Service Electric and Gas and Atlantic Electric personnel attended the exit meetin C. Adams, Manager, Emergency Preparedness C.. Banner, Lead Engineer, Emergency Preparedness R. Burricelli, General Manager, Engineering and Plant !etterment M. Cavalero, Representative, Atlantic Electric J. Kerin, Sr. Supervisor, Fire Protection, Artificial Island S. LaBruna, Vice President, Nuclear Operations L. Miller, General Manager, Salem Operations L. Salamon, Manager, Nuclear Public Information J. Schaffer, Lead Engineer, Emergency Preparedness W. Weckstein, Trainer, Nuclear Training Center P. White, Manager, Maintenance, Salem Operations The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personne.0 Emergency Exercise The Artificial Island announced, full participation exercise was conducted on November 29-30, 1988, 4:00 p.m. to 12:30 Subsequently, the States of Delaware and New Jersey and four Counties participated. The State of New Jersey participated in a 50 mile ingestion pathway exercise on November 30 and December 1, 198 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observed off site activitie.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on August 18, 1988 were reviewed and, following revision, determined to be adequate to test the licensee's -Emergency Pla On October 5, 1988, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenari As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Artificial Island Emergency Plan and Procedures and also provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on November 29,198 Suggested NRC changes to the scenario made by the licensee were discussed during the briefing. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disruption to normal plant activities *
- Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events:.....
1.
1.
Failed fuel; Seized Reactor Coolant System pump resulting in fuel damage; Boric acid storage tank leak; Helicopter crash within the Protected Are Rotor fragments pierce the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
causing a low rate leak; Injured helicopter crash victims; Large break Loss of Coolant Accident; Loss of containment spray; Drainage of the RWST; Inability to initiate Safety Injection and activate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system; Core uncovery leading to fuel over-heat, release of the gap fraction and metal water reaction producing hydrogen; Hydrogen detonation within the containment producing a pressure pulse greater than the design pressure; Containment spray piping weld cracks outside the containment; Release of radioactive material to the environment; and Restoration of core cooling, core recovery and termination of the environmental releas.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, seven NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation -and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff and actions of ERO staff during operation of the ERF The following activities were observed:
4 Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; Activation of the Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Response Facility; Direction and coordination of emergency response; Assessment of plant conditions; Communications/information flow, and record keeping; Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant status information; and Calculation of projected doses and consideration of protective action.o* Exercise Observations 3.1 Exercise Strengths The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency Response Or~anization, Emergency Response Facilities, and use of these facilities were generally consistent with their Nuclear Emergency Response Plan The NRC team also noted the following actions that provide strong indication of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:..
Selection and use of the correct Abnormal Operating Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures throughout the exercise; Correct Emergency Action Level classification and timely notification to off site authorities; The Technical Support Center staff CTSC) responded quickly and correctly to control room requests for core damage assessment, confirmation of shut-down margins, applied probabilities in an attempt to locate the containment breech and accurately assessed core conditions at scenario end; and The Emergency Response Manager briefed State representatives promptly on arrival at the Emergency Operations Facility (EDF)
- and actively involved them in accident classification and protective action development conference.2 Exercise Weaknesses An exercise weakness is a finding that the licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness could have precluded effective implementation of the emergency plan in the event of an actual emergency in the _
area observed.
The NRC team identified the following exercise weaknesses which need to be evaluated and corrected by the license The licensee also conducted an adequate self critique which included identification of these activitie.
The TSC staff did not recognize containment failure *for an hour and 40 minutes following the containment hydrogen detonation when a pressure spike was produced, containment pressure dropped and release of radioactive material bega (50-272/88-23-01 and 50-311/88-26-01}
Toward the end of the exercise, the EOF manager failed to communicate to the EOF staff recognition of core conditions which indicated core recovery, adequate cooling and release termination. - This information and conclusions based on it, had been communicated to the EOF by the TSC staff and discussed by the EOF Technical Support Manager and the senior New Jersey representative at the EO (50-272/88-23-02,50-311/
88-26-02 and 50-354/88-26-01}
3.3 Areas for Improvement The NRC team identified the following areas for improvemen Although these findings did not have a significant negative impact on overall performance during the exercise, they should be evaluated and corrected by the licensee. The licensee also conducted an adequate self critique which included identification of these activitie.
The Emergency News Center (ENC} staff was told of the containment hydrogen detonation within minutes of it's occurrence but did not tell the press representatives of this until two hours.late.
Operational Support Center (OSC} staff did not always adhere to established radiation protection practices as indicated by failure to follow step off pad practices and handle contaminated parts correctl.
There was a reduction in effective exercise control at the EOF toward the end of the exercis.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items The following item was identified during the previous exercis Based upon observation made by the NRC team during this exercise, review of the scenario and information provided by the controllers, the following item was not repeated and is close l
(CLOSED) (50-272/86-22-01 and 50-311/86-22-01) IFI The licensee did not estimate release duration based on plant dat The default release duration agreed to by both States was use.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self exercise critique on December 2, 1988 the NRC team met and evaluated the licensee's critique. Subsequently, the NRC team met with the licensee's representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspectio The NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was advised no violations were identified and the previously identified item was adequately addresse The NRC team determined, that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee demonstrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and. safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate action regarding the items identifie At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.