IR 05000272/1998004
| ML18106A442 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18106A441 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-98-04, 50-272-98-4, 50-311-98-04, 50-311-98-4, NUDOCS 9804090197 | |
| Download: ML18106A442 (15) | |
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Inspector:
Approved by:
9804090197 980401 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
PDR U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272, 50-311 DPR-70, DPR-75 50-272/98-04, 50-311 /98-04 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Hancocks Bridge, NJ March 16, 1998 - March 31, 1998 Aniello L. Della Greca, Sr. Reactor Engineer, DRS, EEB William H. Ruland, Chief Electrical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Salem Inspection Reports 50-272; 311 /98-04 March 16, 1998 - March 31, 1998 This inspection reviewed specific portions of engineering and plant support. The report covers a two-week review related to ongoing testing of equipment and systems in preparation for the restart of Unit 1.
Engineering Based on the his review of engineering and operations documents, the inspector concluded that:
PSE&G maintained acceptable controls over the conduct of the Unit 1 power ascension_,tests and the integrated test program remained acceptable. Tests were being conducted in an acceptable manner by a knowledgeable technical staff. [E1.1]
The licensee's review and resolution of test discrepancies regarding component cooling water flow balance were acceptable and the engineering documents resulting from this review were also acceptable. [E8.1]
The actions to address the control room ventilation test procedure inadequacies *
were acceptable. [E8.2]
The licensee's resolution of the NRC observations regarding the requirements traceability matrix was acceptable. [E8.3]
The licensee appropriately addressed the NRC concerns regarding signing off of test procedure prerequisites. [ES. 71
Although the control loop tuning acceptance criteria were incorrect, no violation of NRC requirements occurred. However, a better understanding by engineering of the process dynamics, might have resulted in a better definition of the acceptance criteria and avoided test delays. [E8.8.]
The licensee properly addressed the inadequate surveillance test procedure pertaining to the turbine trip logic testing. [E8.9]
ii
- Report Details Unit 1 began the period in Mode 4 and went to Mode 3 on March 17, 1998. It remained at this Mode for the rest of the inspection perio Unit 2 began the period operating at approximately 58% power and ascended to 100 on March 17, 1998. On March 24, 1998, operators commenced a power reduction due to a failure of the 22 essential controls inverter. Following repair, they began a power ascension again, reaching 100% on March 25, 1998. The reactor remained at full power through the remainder of the inspection perio Ill. Engineering E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 NRC Restart Issue 111.22 - Integrated Test Program (Closed) Inspection Scope (92903)
Background In October 1996, to evaluate the criteria used by PSE&G to restore equipment and systems to operability, the NRC initiated a review of the Integrated Test Program that PSE&G had proposed for the restart of the Salem Units. This review became Issue 111.22 of the NRC Restart Plan for Salem. To properly focus.the scope of the inspection, the NRC reviewed the Individual Plant Examination. Based on the results of that review and a review of the modifications performed during the outage, the inspectors selected eight systems for their follow-up and evaluation.*
The initial Unit 2 inspection evaluated the program as well as the quality of the tests
, themselves. The results of that inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Reports (IRs) 50-311/96-19;50-311/96-21;50-272 and 50-311/97-04;50-272 and 50-311/97-06;50-272and 50-311/97-10;and 50-272and 50-311/97-16. In IR 50-311 /96-19, based on a review of the existing program procedures, the NRC concluded that the governing documents provided adequate control for the conduct of the integrated test program. Subsequently (IR 97-10), the NRC concluded that:
While testing problems continued to exist, performance improvements had been and were being made; testing personnel were identifying deficiencies during the data review, rather than during completion sign off. Therefore, the NRC considered the integrated test program was acceptable for Unit 2 restar Scope Based on the previous NRC conclusions, the purpose of this inspection was to assure that the integrated test program remained acceptable for the restart of Unit 1. For this purpose, the inspector reevaluated the current program procedures, observed ongoing testing, and reviewed the results of tests already performe *
2 Observations and Findings The inspector's review of the Integrated Test Program controlling procedures determined that the procedures used for Unit 2 were stil.1 in effect and that the revisions were current. All procedures had been revised at least once since the original review in November 1996; one procedure, SC.TE-Tl.ZZ-00010, Startup and Power Ascension Program, had been superseded by a procedure carrying a different number, SC-SE-Tl.~Z-0001 (0), but with essentially the same content. A review of the changes performed to the original procedures and discussions with responsible engineering and test program personnel determined that the majority of the changes were made either to clarify test requirements and steps or to incorporate the lessons learned from the Unit 2 system readiness, post-modification and power ascension tests. Other changes were to account for physical differences between the two units. No concerns were identified by the inspector regarding the procedure changes, including those changes that added or deleted requirement Testing observations during the current inspection period involved tests scheduled to be completed during the reactor.Mode 3 operation. Most of the testing activities involved instrument calibrations and instrument loop tuning tests. No abnormalities were identified while observing these tests. Pre-test briefings were clear and detailed; the scope and expected results were described; potential abnormal occurrences were discussed with the operating staff; the response to these abnormal occurrences was also addressed. The conduct of tests. itself was acceptable. Testing staff appeared to have done the necessary test review in advance and to be knowledgeable of the test requirements. Steps were initialed as
- they were being completed and necessary verifications were done when appropriat Some confusion appeared to exist regarding the results of one test, but appropriate steps were taken to ensure the acceptability of the results. This test involved the verification of the correct response of the control software and setpoints loaded into the advanced digital feedwater control system (ADFCS). This was accomplished by perturbing a single process input and observing the dynamic open loop response of the output demand signal. The procedure used for this effort was Special Test Procedure No. 1 D, associated with Package 1 of Design Change Package 1 EC-320 The inspector's review of this procedure identified no concerns with the quality and clarity of the instructions. The technicians were knowledgeable of the system, the intent of the test, and the procedure itself. However, during their verification of the firstJqop, they found that the system response was different from that obtained during the factory acceptance test. By the end of the inspection the licensee was still evaluating the results, but an initial evaluation indicated that some Unit 2 specific algorithms being used for Unit 1 were not appropriate. While no concerns were raised by the inspector regarding the conduct of the test, the use of some Unit 2 algorithms by engineering in the ADFCS software was questionabl The inspector reviewed several previously completed Unit 1 tests and the tests that were associated with the closure of the Unit 2 previously-identified issues in Section E8 of this report. The inspector found that. the test procedures were acceptable, the procedural change requests were few, and the results reasonabl Conclusions Based on the above review, the inspector concluded'PSE&G maintained acceptable controls over the conduct of the Unit 1 power ascension test and that the integrated test program had remained acceptable. The inspector also concluded that tests were being conducted in an acceptable manner by a knowledgeable technical staff. This restart item is close ES Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (IP 92903)
E (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-311196-19-02: Component Cooling Water Flow Balance Test Discrepancie Inspection Scope During the component cooling water (CCW) flow balance test, the licensee identified four discrepancies between the test acceptance criteria and the actual results. These four discrepancies involved: (1 l differences between ultrasonic and permanently installed flow meters; (2) less than the required amount of cooling water flow to the 24 reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier heat exchanger (HX); (3) required coolant flow to the charging pump seal coolers could not be achieved; and (4) the 21 CCW pump was operating at the low end of the inservice test (IST) range. The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the licensee's
- resolution of the observed discrepancie Findings and Results Follow-up of this issue, during the current inspection, the NRC determined the *
following:
Flow Meter Error The licensee determined that readings obtained from permanently mounted meters were incorrect. This was partly due to incorrect spanning of the instrument loop components. To address this issue, the licensee initiated two minor modifications to reduce the indicators span from 10,000 to 7,000 gallons per minute (gpm). The new span was based on a normal flow requirement of 5000 gpm. The transmitter span were similarly changed. In addition, the computers were reprogrammed for new scaling, the alarm setpoints revised, and the accuracy of the flow loops verifie *
The inspector reviewed the packages for the two modifications prepared (597-015 and 597-017), including the safety evaluation applicability reviews; the loop calibration calculation SC-CC002-02; the completed procedures for performing the work and post-modification testing of the instrument loops accuracy. He identified no concerns during his review of these documents. Further, he confirmed that the instruments operated within the required accurac RCP Thermal Barrier HX Flow The licensee's review of this issue determined that the low flow achieved was due to the abnormal configuration of the system at which the test was being conducte Their evaluation also determined that the 40 gpm required by Westinghouse was based on a component cooling water supply temperature of 105° F. The actual water temperature during the test was 99° F. At this temperature the minimum required flow was only 36 gpm. Therefore, the 38 gpm achieved were acceptabl The acceptance criteria in the applicable procedure were revised. Following the test, as they began to return the system to the normal configuration, the flow *
increased, as expecte The inspector reviewed performance improvement request (PIR) No. 961113351 that had been issued for the purpose, discussed the results of the test and evaluation with responsible PSE&G engineering, and confirmed that the flow was acceptabl Charging Pump Seal Cooler Flow Based on test procedures S2.0P-ST.CC-0004and ISTM-52-CC the required flow to the charging pumps was 14 gpm. The flows obtained during the original testing
, with fully open throttle valves, based on the limiting accident alignment, were 9.3 and 10.4 gpm for charging pumps 21 an 22, respectivel The licensee review of this issue determined that the flow requirement in the procedures had been recently changed from 5 to 14 gpm and that the revised flow resulted from a misinterpretation of the manufacturer specified flow requirement Based on discussions with the seal cooler manufacturer and calculations that took into account applicable temperatures, the licensee determined that the required flow to the seal cooler was 7.3 gpm. This value also took into account instrument error and pump degradation. The procedures were revised accordingl The inspector reviewed the PIR that was issued to address this finding and th bases for the licensee's conclusions. He also verified that the procedure changes had been made, that the CC system flow balance had been performed, and that the FSAR table change had been initiated.
CCW Pump lnservice Test During the CCW flow balance test, the licensee determined that the CCW 21 was operating at the low end of the inservice test. Their evaluation of this issue determined that the data acquired was erroneous due to the inadequate spanning and calibration of the flow instruments described in the first issue, above. As also stated above, those instrument loops were modified to provide more accurate results. Therefore, the concerns with the operation of the CCW pump no longer existed. Following the modification of the instrument loop, the licensee rebaselined the pump operating curves. In addition, during the flow balance test, they set the flow to the safety loads higher to allow for a future 10% pump degradatio The inspector reviewed the results of inservice test for the three pumps and identified no concerns with *these test Conclusions The inspector concluded that the licensee's review and resolution of the above discrepancies were acceptable and that the engineering documents resulting from this review were also acceptable. This item is closed. The inspector also concluded that no violation of NRC requirements had occurred regarding the CCW pump inservice test discrepancy, because the data had been obtained using erroneous flow instruments. However, the inadequate design of the flow meters in the first issue and the incorrect procedure acceptance criteria in the other two issues, were in violation of the NRC Appendix B requirements. This licensee-identified and cor~ected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-311/98-04-01)
E !Closed) Violation 50-311196-21-01: Control Room Ventilation Test Procedure Inadequacies During a review of procedures STP-1, integrated test of the control area air conditioning (CAACS) and emergency air conditioning systems (EACS), and STP-3, Control Area Ventilation (CAV) Testing and Balancing, associated with design change package 1 EC-3505, the NRC inspectors identified several procedure deficiencies. In response to the Notice of Violation, in their letter No. LR-97194, dated April 11, 1997, PSE&G concurred with the violation and described the steps that already had been taken to address the violation. Inspection Report (IR) 96-21 acknowledged that the Salem staff had promptly initiated action to resolve the probl~ms identified by the inspector and to identify and resolve similar problem On May 30, 1997, the NRC issued Inspection Report 50-272; 311 /97-06 and a new Notice of Violation (97-06-01) for deficiencies identified in STP-2 and 4 of the same design change package. This report also stated that the inspector had reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to address the STP-1 con.cerns and found them acceptable. However, in view of the new deficiencies, the NRC requested that PSE&G review the April 11, 1996, letter and amend it as necess~r *
On June 30, 1997, PSE&G responded to Violation 97-06-01, but failed to address the NRC request for reviewing and amending the April 11, 1997, response. The NRC, subsequently reviewed the licensee's response to Violation 97-06-01, found it acceptable and closed the new violation 97-06-01 in report 97-1 On July 16, 1997, in response to clarifications requested by the* NRC regarding the April 11, 1997, letter, PSE&G issued Letter No LR-N970449. In this letter, the licensee stated that the actions specified in their response to violation 97-06-01 were aimed to address the root cause of the deficiencies in both notices of *
violation. The letter included the supplemental information requested by the NR On July 31, 1997, the NRC issued inspection report 97-10. In Section EB-2 of this report, the NRC ackn*owledged receipt of the July 16 letter and, based on the
. acceptability of the actions to address the deficiencies identified in notice of violation 97-06-01, closed the issue. In Section EB-3 of the same report, the NRC also acknowledged the acceptability of the actions to address the deficiencies identified in IR 50-311 /96-21 as well several other procedure deficiencies that had been identified by the licensee as a result of the Notice of Violation. Apparently, due to oversight, the NRC failed to close violation 96-21-01.
Based on his review of the above stated documentation and several other post-modification tests, the inspector concluded that the actions to address the subject violation were acceptable. This issue is close E (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item 50-311/96-21-05: Requirements Traceability Matrix Not Carried Through To Factory Acceptance Tests. *
The Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System (ADFCS) project used a Requirement Traceability Matrix (RTM) to track the system design requirements through the various design, development, and test stages *up to the site acceptance test (SAT). The use of the RTM for critical digital systems is required per site procedure ND.DE-TS.ZZ-5506(0). During the NRC follow-up of the Salem Unit 2 ADFCS installation and testing, the inspectors made several observations regarding the RTM and its content. Some of the observations included: the RTM had been prepared, but had not undergone the review and approval process; the exact factory acceptance test (FAT) or SAT step associated with the specific requirement had not always been identified in the RTM; there was a FAT step to ensure the controller responded to step changes, but there was no verification that reset wind-up was absent; and the FAT had been conducted more than two years earlier, but detailed post-test review had not been conducte During the current inspection, the inspector reviewed the RTM again, the status of its review and approval, and the licensee's resolution of the observation made by the NRC inspectors. He identified no areas of concern regarding the content of the RTM and determined that the licensee had dispositioned the RTM-related *
observations made by the NRC in inspection report 97-21. Based on the acceptable resolution of the original inspection observations, this item is close * E !Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item 50-311196-21-08: How and When Channel Calibration and Time Response Determined Acceptabl While reviewing two test procedures required for the Unit 2 reactor protection system time response testing, the inspector observed that neither procedure included acceptance criteria for the channel time response. From the information obtained during the inspection, he understood that the component response time determined through test would be used for input in the "Master Time Response" procedure. However, it was not clear what process was used to determine that the instrument channels met the "operability" criteria. He was concerned that the channels were being returned to the operable status prior to the channel response being determined acceptabl The review of the process used by the licensee to determine that the Unit 2 reactor trip system and the emergency safety feature actuation system met their response time requirements was controlled by procedure 52.IC-TR.ZZ-0002(0), "Unit 2 Master Time Response." This procedure, rather than specifying the response time for the individual components making up the channel, specifies the total response time of the channel. Therefore, no response time acceptance criteria are required or specified in the individual component calibration procedures, unless the component itself has its own acceptance criteria for some other purpose, e.g., valve stroke tim Although the method used by the licensee is in accordance with current industry guidance and, hence, acceptable, the failure to specify performance criteria, individually, for all components does not assure that potentially degraded components that operate outside their design limits, are promptly identified and adjusted, repaired, or replaced. The inspector identified no potentially degraded
,. component The inspector's review also determined tha~ the Master Time Response procedure did ensure that: individual components making up the channel are tested in accordance with their respective response time procedures; individual measurements are properly entered in the applicable channels; the entire channel meets its acceptance criteria; and the entire channel is verified operable before the reactor is placed in the mode for which the channel is require Based on the above review, this item is close E (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-311196-21-11: Review Questions and Answers from Salem Restart Inspections For Possible Enforcement Action During the NRG evaluation of PSE&G's integrated test program for Unit 2, some questions were presented to the licensee in written form to ensure that the licensee correctly understood the inspectors questions or requests. The licensee kept a database of the questions asked by the NRC and the responses provided. An unresolved item was open to further review the licensee responses and to ensure that the plant was designed and was being operated in accordance with NRC requirement *
E The inspector's review of PSE&G's database, during the current inspection, determined that many of the items were requests for information and that some requests for technical information apparently had been addressed verbally by the licensee, because no formal answer was included in the database. Some replies required clarification by the licensee. In this case, questions and answers were discussed with appropriate engineering personnel. As a result of this. review, no items.of concern or violations of NRC requirements were identified, except as follows:
Several observations made by the NRC inspectors during the review of Special Test Procedures, STP-1 and -3, for the control room modifications, DCP 1 EC:-3505, and the responses provided by the licensee indicated that the procedures were less than adequate. A violation, 96-21-01, resulted.* Closure of that violation is addresses in Section EB-2 of this report. This item is close (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item 50-311197-16-01: Accuracy of Infrequently*
Performed Procedur In June 1997, the inspectors observed overspeed trip tests of the No. 23 auxiliary feedwater pump turbine. These tests were conducted in accordance with a procedure that the licensee considered to be infrequently performed. Following the successful completion of these tests, the inspectors concluded (IR 97-16) that testing had been conducted in a controlled manner, appropriate a<;:tions had been taken to resolve deficiencies, and personnel had used conservative judgemen Because of the procedural deficiencies and the confusion displayed by testing personnel regarding the use of procedure attachments, the inspectors also expressed concern regarding the content of procedures not routinely use, To further evaluate the bases for these concerns, the inspector reviewed procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(0), "Station Operating Practices." He determined (Section 5. 7)
that, for infrequently performed tests and evolutions (PTE), the licensee recognizes the existence of increased risk and uncertainty regarding equipment and personnel response to unforeseen conditions. Therefore, the procedure requires that additional controls are put in place, particularly in the oversight area. The conclusions (above) reached by the inspectors, during test observations, indicate that those controls were in plac To address the quality of the procedure; the inspector reviewed three special test procedures (SPTs) considered to fall in the IPTE category: SPT-001 for design change package (DCP) 1 EC-3544, Package 1, Steam Generator Slowdown Sample Valve Isolation Bypass; STP-001 for DCP 1EC-3519, Package 1, Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Testing Associated with Valves 1 DR6 and 1DR107; and STP-003 for DCP 1 EC-3668, P*ackage 7, CFCU Building Air Balance. The inspector's review of these procedures identified no concerns regarding their acceptability and implementation. This follow-up item is closed.
- E (Closed) Violation 50-311/97-16-04: Failure to Follow Post-Modification Test Procedure On June 15, 1997, during the conduct of special test procedure No. 2, associated with DCP 2EC-3178, Package 1, the inspector identified two examples of incorrect procedure prerequisite signing off. In the first example, certain prerequisites had not been signed off prior start of work. In the.second example, the prerequisites had been signed off even though the portion of the procedure requiring prior.
completion had not been don In their response to the Notice of Violation, On October 14, 1997, letter No. LR-N970660, the licensee attributed the violation to personnel error and failure to follow plant procedures. In the letter, the licensee justified the incorrect signing off stating that the undone steps would not affect the performcmce of the signal sampling portion of the test and that the test manager was aware of it and had made a log entry to justify its.decision. The licensee, however, also recognized that a modification concern resolution should have been prepared to remove the requirement, if the steps were not going to be done. The licensee's corrective actions included the deletion of the requirements from the STP and sharif}g the lesson learned with the test personne Based on his review of the background information provided by t.he licensee and of the completed actions, the inspector concluded that the licensee tiad appropriately addressed the issue. This item is close E (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-311197-16-05: Control Loop Tuning Problems While observing the tuning of control loops for the Chemical and Volume Control
, System (CVCS), the inspectors noted that the test acceptance criteria stated in the procedures could not be achieved. The procedures TS2.SE-SU.RCP-004(0),.
005(0), and 007(0), for tuning of letdown flow temperature and pressure and pressurizer level controllers, respectively, required a less than 1 /4 transient decay ratio. Several unsuccessful attempts were made by the licensee to obtain the required transient decay rati Follow-up of this issue determined that tuning of the loops probably had never been done. In developing the procedures for the tuning, the licensee had used typical acceptance criteria for two and three-mode control systems, where the process dynamic is relatively fast and a sine wave is expected. The variables in question have very long time constants. Therefore, the loop had sufficient time to. adjust and track_the pr?cess changes.. As a result a waveform output was never obtaine The licensee's review of the test results recognized that the acceptance criteria for the particular loops were inappropriate and changed them to require a return to within 5% of the control loop setpoint within five time constants. Although the selection of five time constants appeared to be somewhat arbitrary, a review of the system response traces indicated acceptable tuning of the controllers and within the expected response of the process variable ('
E Although the original test acceptance criteria were incorrect, the inspector concluded that no violation of NRC requirement had occurred. Typically, much experimentation is necessary to properly tune process controllers. Further, a closer look at the test results shows that they met the literal interpretation of the acceptance criteria, since no overshoots occurred and, hence, t~e decay rate was essentially zero. However, a better understanding by engineering of the process dynamic might have resulted in a better definition of the acceptance criteria and might have avoided eventual test delays. This item is close (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-272/96-039: Inadequate Testing of Turbine Trip on Manual Safety Injectio The Salem Technical Specification requires that the licensee perform every 18 months a functional test of the manual safety injection, feedwater isolation and turbine trip. On November 19, 1996, during a review of the solid state protection system (SSPS) test, the licensee discovered two parallel paths for turbine trip, one from the SSPS and one from the reactor trip breakers. Testing of the circuit, prior to the discovery, had been inadequate because the parallel paths had not been isolated during testing. The purpose of the onsite review of this item was to evaluate the licensee's actions to address the testing deficiency they had identifie The inspector's review of the actions taken by the licensee to address the identified deficiency, determined that, using a temporary procedure, they had separated the parallel paths and verified that the SSPS trip operated correctly. The test confirmed that the circuit was functiona The licensee also initiated actions to revise test procedure S2.0P-ST.SSP-0001 (0).
A review of this procedure determined that section 3.0 had been added to require disconnecting signals from reactor trip breakers A and B and loss of electro-hydraulic control DC power to the turbine trip circuit. A technical specification surveillance improvement project had been previously initiated to identify and correct surveillance procedure deficiencie The LER identified several event reports that had been issued to address surveillance discrepancies. None of the event reports was issued to address circuit testing deficiencies. Based on the above review, the inspector concluded that the licensee had properly addressed the identified testing deficiency. This item is close This violation of the plant technical specification surveillance requirements was identified py the licensee and corrected when identified. Based on the above, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-272/98-04-03)
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E8.10 Additional Reviews In conjunction with his review of the previously identified Unit 2 issues, the inspector also verified, as appropriate, that the licensee had addressed applicability of those issues to Unit 1 and evaluated the actions they had taken to resolve the The. inspector found that, in each case, the licensee had reviewed the issues for applicability to both units and taken appropriate steps to resolve them. The results of this portion of the inspection were considered in the closure of NRC Restart Issue 111.22, Integrated Test Progra V. Management Meetings X 1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 31, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspector asked the licensee whether any material reviewed during the inspection should be considered as proprietary information. No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Public Service Electric and Gas Company *
L. J. Curran, J J. D. Deaton J. DeFebo R. McLaughlin H. L. Miller P. J. O'Donnell K. O'Hare C. Smyth A. Spivak D. Sproul E. H. Villar Superintendent Salem Operations Superintendent PMI Supervisor Quality Assessment Electrical Maintenance Superintendent Chemistry Salem Operations Manager Radiation Protection Manager Salem Licensing Manager System Engineering Superintendent Salem Planning Senior Licensing Engineer U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission H. Nieh Salem Resident Inspector
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ADFCS ANSI AR ASME CCHX CFCU CFR CJP COTSS CR DCP ECCS l&C ISi ISLT MCR MT N/A NOE NPS NOP NRC NSRB OTSC PMT PT PSE&G RCP RC RHR RPM RT SER SGFP SI SNSS SORC SRO SSFI SW TRB TRIS TS UFSAR UT LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Advanced Digital Feedwater.System American National Standards Institute Action Request American Society of Mechanical Engineers :
Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Containment Fan Coil Unit Code of Federal Regulations Code Job Package Commercial Off The Shelf Software Condition Report Design Change Package Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation and Controls lnservice Inspection lnservice Leak Testing Modifications Concerns and Resolution Magnetic particle Examination Not Applicable Non-destructive examination Nominal Pipe Size Normal Operating Pressure Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Safety Review Board On-The-Spot Change Post-Maintenance Testing Dye Penetrant Examination Public Service Electric and Gas Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Revolutions per minute Radiographic examination Safety Evaluation Report Steam Generator Feedpump Safety Injection-Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor Station Operations Review Committee Senior Reactor Operator Safety System Functional Inspection Service Water Test Review Board Tagging Request Inquiry System Technical Specification Updated Final Safety Analyses Report Ultrasonic Examination