IR 05000272/1989003
| ML18094A431 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1989 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18094A429 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-89-03, 50-272-89-3, 50-311-89-03, 50-311-89-3, NUDOCS 8905190434 | |
| Download: ML18094A431 (13) | |
Text
Report N License Licensee:
Facility:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/89-03 50-311/89-03 DRP-70 DRP-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 March 21, 1989 - April 30, 1989 Kathy Halvey Gibson, Senior Resident Inspector Stephen M. Pindale, Resident Inspector David K. Allsopp, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek P. D. Swetland, Chief, Projects Section 2B s:hh Date Inspection Summary:
Inspection 50-272/89-03; 50-311/89-03 on March 21, 1989 - April 30, 1989 Areas Inspected:
Reiident safety inspection of the following areas:
operations, radiological controls, surveillance testing, maintenance, emergency preparedness, security, engineering/technical support, safety assessment/assurance of quality, and review of licensee event report Results:
We are concerned about the apparently unexplained change in differential pressure associated with Unit 2 steam flow indication (paragraph 2.2.2 A).
A violation was identified involving the failure of the manning of the Nuclear Safety Review Department to meet Technical Specification (TS)
requirements (paragraph 9).
A non-cited licensee identified violation was reviewed dealing with the failure -to report impaired fire penetration seals within the TS required time (paragraph 10).
Increased management attention is needed to ensure an acceptable level of housekeeping in the Auxiliary Building and Unit 1 relay and switchgear rooms (paragraphs 3.2 and 8.2).
- DETAILS SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS Unit 1 was operating at 100% power at the beginning of the inspection perio The Ufiit was removed from service on March 23 due to a main power transformer problem and the eighth refueling outage commenced three weeks ahead of the April 15 scheduled start dat Unit 2 began the report period at 100% powe On March 29, the unit was in the process of being removed from service due to the inoperability of the auxiliary building exhaust air filtration syste During power reduction, a reactor trip occurred due to a high steam flow coincident with steam generator low water level reactor trip signa The unit was returned to service on April On April 1, a Unit 2 shutdown was commenced from approximately 50% power due to the inoperability of steam generator steam flow channel Following recalibration of the steam flow channels, the shutdown was terminated and power was raised to 100%.
On April 11, a reactor trip occurred due to low-low steam generator water level as a result of an inadvertent emergency closure of a main steam isolation valv FollQwing replacement of a faulty relay in the MSIV test circuit, the unit was returned to power on April 1 Full power operation continued until the end of the inspection perio.
OPERATIONS (25101, 71707, 92709, 93702) Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, the inspectors verified that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Limiting Conditions for Operation, and review of facility record These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedures listed abov The inspectors performed 189 hours0.00219 days <br />0.0525 hours <br />3.125e-4 weeks <br />7.19145e-5 months <br /> of normal and backshift inspection including deep backshift and weekend tours of the facility on April 11 (10:15 p.m. - 12:00 midnight), April 12 (12:00 midnight - 3:15 a.m.), and April 15 (7:30 p.m. - 9:00 ~.m.).
2.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2. Unit 1 On March 23, 1989, the unit was shutdown to investigate high combustible gas concentrations in the oil of the main power transforme The inspector discussed the transformer problem with the system engineer and determined the followin Licensee and vendor (Westinghouse) inspection of the
- transformer revealed insulation breakdown due to localized overheating at the low voltage lea In addition, melting of the long series connection low voltage copper windings was discovere These deficiencies have been attributed to*a susceptible design and aggravated by geomagnetic induced current The licensee concluded that the transformer needed to be replaced and elected to commence Unit 11 s eighth refueling outage at this tim The outage was originally scheduled to start on April 1 Major activities scheduled for the refueling outage and followed by the inspectors include:
Vital inverter replacement Control room modifications Reactor trip logic modifications Main steam safety valve replacement Service water piping replacement Electrical penetration protection modifications Steam generator eddy current and tube plugging Main steam flow nozzle inspection *
Refueling activities The unit is currently in Mode 6 with preparations for core reload, steam generator tube plugging and various design changes in progres C; Reactor coolant system level was operated* at midloop from April 9 to April 13, 198 The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures OP II-1.3.6, "Draining the Reactor Coolant System 11,
AOP-CONT-2 "Containment Closure on Loss of RHR and AOP-RHR-2,
"Loss of RHR Cooling - RCS Level Below *the Pressurizer";
verified control room compliance with the OP; and observed RCS level and temperature, and RHR operating parameters throughout the mi~luop operation The inspector also reviewed a letter from station management to the workers explaining what midloop operation is and do 1 s and don 1ts during midloo The outage manager cautioned station and contractor sup~rvisors at daily outage meetings that midloop controls were in effect and to be especially careful with work activities that could effect RCS leve The inspectors concluded that licensee actions to ensure RCS level stability and RHR operability were satisfactory during this midloop perio. Unit 2 On March 29, 1989, an Unusual Event was declared and a Salem Unit 2 reactor shutdown commenced in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to the inoperability of 'the auxiliary building exhaust air filtration syste With control
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rod insertion in progress in support of the reactor shutdown, a reactor trip occurre A No. 21 steam generator steam flow channel bistable was previously tripped due to a leaking equalizing valve and in conjunction with an actual low level in No. 21 steam generator experienced during the power reduction, the reactor trip logic was made u All plant systems responded as designed and the unit was stabilized in Mode On March 28, 1989, the control room, aux1liary building and fuel handling building ventilation systems were removed from service for charcoal filter replacement due to the installed charcoal failing a routine 18 month carbon laboratory analysis surveillanc The charcoal filter beds were replaced in the ventilation systems, however numerous problems were encountered during subsequent operability testin The control room (CR)
ventilation system exhibited a low flow rate which was sub-sequently attributed to test equipment problem The CR system was retested and returned to service within the TS LCD time requirement of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> However, due to problems with test-equipment (different equipment than that used for CR), repair of the pressure controller for the auxiliary building fans, resealing of several dampers, and reseating of the charcoal filters, the licensee was unable to meet acceptable system efficiency require-ments for the auxiliary building exhaust air filtration syste Consequently, it was not restored to service within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> TS LCO time limit and the unit was shutdown until the auxiliary building ventilation was repaired, tested s~atisfactorily, and made operabl During the return of the unit to power on April 1, 1989, an Unusual Event was declared and a unit shutdown commenced in accordance with TS 3.0.3 after determining that both steam flow
~hannels for No. 21 steam generator were indicating nonconser-vatively low (96% at 100% calorimetric power).
The steam flow circuitry and transmitters were checked for proper signal processin The transmitters were recalibrated and returned to servic The Unusual Event was terminated and the unit was returned to 100% powe Problems with steam flow transmitter drift have been experienced on Unit 1 and are discussed in NRC Inspection Report 272/88-17; 311/88-17., This is the first time the problem was exhibited on Unit Boroscope inspection of the steam flow nozzles did not identify any cause for the apparent differential pressure change Licensee investigation is continuing in this regar The inspectors and Region I management are closely following licensee activities to identify and resolve the problem of steam flow transmitter drif (UNR 272/88-17-01)
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2. *
On April 11, 1989, Salem Unit 2 reactor tripped due to low-low level in No. 24 steam generator (SG) as a result of the emergency closure of No. 24 main steam isolation valve (MSIV).
The closure of No. 24 MSIV was attributed to a faulty relay in the test circuit related to a main steam valve cycling and timing surveillance which was in progress at the time of the tri The inspector observed plant recovery from the trip, troubleshooting of the MSIV circuitry, relay replacement and MSIV testin Plant stabilization following the trip was complicated by the lifting of No. 24 low pressure main steam safety valve (24MS15).
No. 24 SG pressure peaked at the main steam safety setpoint (1070 psig) immediately following the tri Personnel observation indicated that the safety valve lifted immediately following the trip, reseated, then lifted a second time following return to no-load RCS temperature, however plant computer recorded data did not indicate any subsequent pressure spikes which would have caused the second lif Licensee investigation regarding the second lifting of 24MS15 revealed that severe seat damage occurred on the first lifting causing an effective reduction of the safety valve setpoin Reactor coolant system average temperature was reduced to 537 degrees F by plant operators at which time the main steam safety reseate The unit was cooled to 205 degrees F to replace main steam safety valve 24MS15.
In addition, a source range channel power supply was replaced due to the actuation of the power supply protective circuit which prevented the source range channel from energizing following the reactor tri The unit was returned to service on April 15, 198 Both Units The PSE&G/IBEW union contract was due to expire on April 30, 198 Primary station personnel impacted by the new contract negotiations included the operations staff (non-supervisory licensed and non-licensed operators) and maintenance, chemistry and radiation protection technician The Security organization is not covered under this contract and was not affecte The inspector reviewed the licensee 1 s strike contingency plans prior to the expiration of the contract and a possible strik The inspector found that the staff was well prepared to respond to both the first few days (pre-injunction) and the long term portion of a strik Listings, qualifications and schedules for shift complements were reviewed by the inspector to verify adequate staffin The inspector also confirmed that emergency prepared-ness planning, medical care, fire fighting and local law enforcement agency support, and sleeping and cafeteria provi-sions had also been addressed by the license Overall strike contingency plans were found to be acceptable to adequately react -to a strike.
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During the wee~ of April 24, a contract settlement was reached between PSE&G and the union managemen On April 28, the union members voted by about a two to one margin to accept the new three year contrac RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)
Inspection Activities PSE&G 1 s compliance with the radiological protection program was verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings The inspector reviewed activities associated with steam generator eddy current testing inside containmen The radiological controls were generally found to be effective in controlling and minimizing radiological doses to the personnel involve Tours of the radiologically controlled areas were conducted by the inspector The overall condition of the containment building was satisfactor Individual deficiencies were brought to the licensee 1 s attention for resolutio The overall condition and contamination controls in the Auxiliary Byilding were poor in that several areas were found to be littered with tools and debris (protective clothing, tape, food wrappers and cigarettes).
Numerous hoses, electrical cords and polyethalene drip collectors crossed contaminated area boundaries without being sleeved or taped at the boundar Personnel were observed to be sitting in contaminated area Similar concerns had been previously brought to management 1 s attention, however, house-keeping and contamination control in the Auxiliary Building continues to be deficient. See also NRC Inspection Report No. 272/89-09; 311/89-08 for further details on radiological control The inspector will continue to monitor plant condition during future routine inspection.
SURVEILLANCE TESTING (61726) Inspection Activity Dur~ng this inspection period, the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 *-
The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:
RP 1134 Ventilation System In Place Filter Testing (HEPA Filter Banks)
RP 1140 ESF and Other High Efficiency Air Cleaning System Test Requirements SP(0)4.0.5-V-MS-1 Inservice testing of main steam and boiler feed valves M3B lB SEC Sequencer Step Timing Surveillance Test M3U 18 SEC Output Relay Time Response Surveillance Procedure M3A lB 125 VDC Battery discharge test Inspection Findings During surveillance testing of 18 Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) in accordance with procedure M3U, lB vital bus was inadvertently disconnected from the syste Since the unit wa~ in a refueling outage and the majority of the loads normally on_the bus were tagged out, this incident had no detrimental effect on plant operatio Investigation by the licensee and**
the inspector concluded that the surveillance procedure was poorly written in that a technician must flip back and forth between pages and steps to correctly perform the surveillance, and the procedure is not clear in the sequence of steps to be performe The procedure was revised and subsequently implemented successfull The licensee has recently instituted two improvement programs to resolve procedure use and compliance deficiencie One is a work practices improvement program whi~h stresses pr6cedure use and adherence, and a procedure upgrade program to improve and verify the technical content of procedure In the case of this surveillance test, the technician was following the procedure verbatim which led to the proble The inspector is concerned that until all procedures are processed through the upgrade program, that more problems of this type may occur as workers attempt to comply with poorly written and sequenced procedure This concern was discussed with the Maintenance Manager who acknowledged the problem and stated that a policy of 11 thinking 11 compliance (versus 11 blind 11 compliance)
was being stressed to the worker The inspector is continuing to follow licensee implementation and results relative to the work practices and procedure upgrade programs.
8 MAINTENANCE (62703) Inspection Activity During this inspection period, the inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industrial codes and standard These inspections were co~ducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:
Work Order 890411137 890415229 890415237 890412046 890117166 5.2 Inspection Findings Procedure 2IC-14.l.001 M20A-1 M3A Description Troubleshoot and repair 24MS167 (main steam isolation valve) circuity In-Place testing of main steam safety valve 24MS15 Replace cell nos. 14 and 15 of 18 125 voe battery The maintenance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the maintenance progra.
EMERGrNCY PREPAREDNESS Inspection Activity PSE&G's use of and compliance with the Event Classification Guide (ECG)
was observed during the inspection period relative to Unusual Event declarations on March 29 and April 11, 198 In addition, the inspector verified proper implementation of Emergency Operation Procedures (EOP's)
in response to reactor trips which occurred on March 29 and April 11, 198.2 Inspection Findings The licensee's activities in the above areas inspected were determined to be satisfactor.3 Open Item Followup (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 272/86-22-02; Undue delay in locating an injured worke No deficiencies of this type were identified during the subsequent emergency exercise discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 272/88-23; 311/88-2 *
Some confusion was encountered due to the person playing the simulated injured worker being changed during the drill, however the worker was promptly located and emergency response was appropriat This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item 272/86-22-06; the Operations Support Center (DSC) did not feed back to the control room status and results of teams dispatched from the DS During a subsequent exercise dis-cussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 272/88-23; 311/88-26 the inspector observed that the DSC Coordinator frequently di scuss.ed the status and results of DSC teams with the operations shift superviso This item is close.
SECURITY (71707) Inspection Activity-PSE&G's compliance with the security program was verified on a periodic basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundarie These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2. Inspection Findings Implementation of the security plan was found to be adequate. Open Item Followup (Closed) Unresolved Item 272/86-30-01; Failure to adequately address security against sabotag Annual requalification training of licensed operators has been changed to include training on the
. interface of operations with security during normal and emergency situation This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Items 272/87-14-01 and 272/87-14-02; CCTV performance effectivenes The security plan has been* revised to require a one minute response time to supplement reduced CCTV effectivenes Thes_e items are close (Closed) Unresolved Item 272/88-06-01; Backup power supplies to CAS and SA Subsequent review of security power supplies documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 272/88-20; 311/88-22 determined them to be acceptabl This item is close.
ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT (62703) Inspection Activity The inspector reviewed the design change and modification program, design change packages and witnessed in-field work and testing associated with the following design change packages:
lEC-2150 lSC-2032 lSC-2028 lSC-2001 lSC-2018 8.2 Inspection Findings
Control room redesign modifications Vital inverter replacement Replacement of main steam safety valves Electrical penetration protection modifications No. 11 component cooling heat exchanger service water piping replacement The inspector noted that work stations are set up at the job site for each major Unit 1 outage design change activity where the con-trol 1 ed copy of the Document Control Package (DCP) and test package are kep The inspector observed that this practice appears to ensure proper control of paperwork and signoffs since the paper is kept in one designated place and controlled by the project manager and job supervisor Two issues were discussed with the license The first issue delt with ihe poor control of jumper cards in that the inspector observ~d two examples of numerous jumper cards for a DCP laying uncontrolled on a work tabl The inspector was told that the jumper cards are an administrative tracking mechanism for determination of jumpers and that the termination and determination of each jumper is specified in the DCP and is verified and signed off by Q The inspector found this to be acceptable to ensure proper restoration of electrical system The second issue delt with whether the review of test procedure changes are conducted in accordance with TS 6.5:3.2 requirement Modification test procedures were being changed by engineering with a peer review, rather than the TS specified metho The acceptability of the licensee's method of review of test procedure changes is an unresolved item pending further discussion with the licensee and review by the inspecto (UNR 272/89-03-01) Housekeeping in the auxiliary building and Unit 1 relay and switch-gear rooms is substandard in that papers, wire, pieces of wood, boxes scaffolding, tools and miscellaneous other materials were strewn on the floor and on top of some equipment including such safety related equipment as the battery charger Management attention needs to be focused to these areas to ensure a proper level of work control and cleanlines.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (61726, 90712, 92702) Inspection Activity The inspector reviewed licensee actions with regard to three Technical Specification discrepancies encountered during the inspection perio *
9.2 Inspection Findings Duri~g Unit 2 auxiliary building ventilation testing on March 28, 1989, some confusion was encountered as to the test gas removal efficiency acceptance criteria since the TS requirements appear to be contradictor TS 4.7.7 step b.2 refers to ANSI N510 which specifies a 99.95% system removal efficienc TS 4.7.7 step allows a 1% bypass flow, and steps e. and f. specify 99% efficiency for the HEPA and charcoal banks individuall (Unit 1 TS specifically require a 99% system removal efficiency and do not reference the ANSI standard).
A system removal efficiency of 99.3% resulted from licensee testin Following review of Generic Letter 83-13 and Westinghouse standard TS, and discussions with NRC Licensing, the licerisee concluded that a test acceptance criterion of 99.95% for system removal efficiency is applicable when a filter efficiency of 99% is assumed in the safety analysis and a 99% system removal efficiency when a filter efficienc of 90% is assume Since a filter efficiency of 90% is assumed in the Salem FSAR, the acceptance criterion of 99% for system removal efficiency was adopted for the test, and procedures were changed accordingl The inspector was concerned, however, that since a system efficiency of 99.95% was met in past test evolutions and could not be achieved in recent testing, a degradation in the system appears to have occurre Discussions with department managers and the responsible system engineer indicate that they also share this concern and are pursuing documentation reviews and troubleshooting of the system to ascertain the cause for the degradatio The inspector will follow licensee actions in this regar In addition, the NRC licensing project manager requested that the licensee submit a license change to clarify TS 4.7.7 surveillance criteria for Unit The licensee is planning to incorporate the clarification with their long term TS improvement projec.
On April 21, 1989, the ~icensee requested an emergency TS amendment relative to a reactor coolant pump breaker position trip surveillance that has not been completed as specified by TS table 4.3-1 and would require a unit shutdow A discrepancy between the licensee's con-trolled copy of Salem Unit 2 TS and the NRC record copy was identified in that the licensee's copy reflects that the surveillance be performed once per refueling outage while the NRC copy indicates that the surveillance be performed prior to any unit startu The License Change Request (LCR) requests that the TS surveillance requirement be changed to be consistent with Unit 1 and Westinghouse Standard TS surveillance requirement which specify testing once per refueling frequenc The NRC granted a waiver of compliance pending approval of the LCR.
The licensee is *in the process of verifying the correctness of the Unit 1 and 2 TS by compiling a living file, amendment by amendment, to ascertai,n approved changes and verify TS reflection of all approved change The adequacy of licensee administrative control of the license and control room documents is unresolved pending the results of the licensee's verification and NRC review. (UNR 50-272/89-03-02) (Closed) Unresolved Item 272/89-01-04; Determine the acceptability of manning of safety review grou The inspector reviewed TS requirements, LCR 88-07 dated July 15, 1988, and related licensee response to NRC Request for Additional Information dated April 25, 1989, and held discussions with the license The inspector concludes that the manning of the onsite safety review group (SRG) does not meet NSR composition requirements of a Manager-SRG and four dedicated, full-time engineer The SRG consists of an onsite safety review engineer who is assisted by three full-time engineer In addition, the inspector determined that the licensee has not submitted an LCR or provided justification for reduction in the manning for the SR Failure to meet the manning requirements of TS for the SRG is an apparent violation applicable to both unit (272/89-03-03)
1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) AND OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP (92700)
The inspector reviewed the following licensee reports for accuracy and timely submissio Unit 1 and 2 Monthly Operating Reports and Revisions - February and March, 1989 Unit 1 LER 89-007; Reactor trip on No. 14 steam generator steam flow/
feed flow mismatch coincident with low leve This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 272/89-01; 311/89-0 Unit 1 LER 89-008; Blackout loading on lC vital bu This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 272/89-01; 311/89-0 Unit 1 LER 89-011; Failure to report impaired fire barrier penetration seals in accordance with TS 3.7.1 Inspector review of this problem concludes that the root cause was the failure to follow procedures (AP-25) and a training deficiency in that the personnel involved in the degradation of the seals did not record the impairments in accordance with AP-25 requirements and apparently were not aware of the requirement Licensee corrective actions were determined to be adequate to resolve the proble However, failure to report impaired fire barrier p*enetrations and failure to properly implement procedures are licensee identified violations of -
TS 3.7.11.a and TS 6.8.1 respectively for which a violation will not be cited since the discretion criteria of 10CFR2, Appendix C have been me (NCV 272/89-03-04)
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Unit 1 LER 89-012; Reactor trip on turbine trip. This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report No, 272/89-01;_ 311/89-0 Unit 1 Special Reports 88-3-7, 88-3-8 and 89-2 address impaired fire barrier penetration seals which have not been restored to functional status within 7 days relative to the licensee's Penetration Seal Task Forc *
Unit 2 LER 89-003; Reactor trip on No. 23 steam generator steam flow/
feed flow mismatch coincident with low SG leve This event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 272/89-01; 311/89-0.2 Reference to Open Items 1 The following open items from previous inspections were followed up during this inspection and are tabulated below for cross reference purpose Closed I FI 272/86-22-02 Section Closed
!FI 272/86-22-06 Section Closed UNR 272/86-30-01 Section Closed IF! 272/87-H-Ol Section Closed UNR 272/88-06-01 Sect; ion Closed UNR 272/89-01-04 Section EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)
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The inspectors met with Mr. L. Miller and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2
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restrictions.