IR 05000272/1988014

Insp Repts 50-272/88-14 & 50-311/88-14 on 880607-0711. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Outstanding Insp Items,Operational Safety Verification & ESF Walkdown

ML18093B009
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/27/1988
From:	Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18093B005	List: IR 05000272/1988014 ML18093B007
References
50-272-88-14, 50-311-88-14, NUDOCS 8808110185
Download: ML18093B009 (14)

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272/88-14 Report No /88-14 DPR-70 License No DPR-75 Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jers~y Inspection Conducted:

June 7, 1988 - July 11, 1988 Inspectors:

Approved by:

R. W. Borchardt, Senior Resident Inspector K. Halvey Gibson, Resident Inspector 4' t j ~

r-o,r'{.

P. 0. swetlaf(7 Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:

7-J. 7- 'CCC date Inspections on June 7, 1988 - July 11, 1988 (Combined Repo~t Numbers 50-272/88-14 and 50-311/88-14)

Areas Inspected:

Routine inspections of plant operations including:

followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, engineered safety feature walkdown, assurance of quality, and review of licensee event report Results:

Two violations are cited in this repor Paragraph 3 documents an isolated failure to promptly enter a Technical Specification action statement when component failures caused a safeguard equipment cabinet (SEC) to become inoperabl The recurring problem of missed or overdue surveillance tests is discussed in the assurance of quality section (paragraph 7) and a specific example is cited as a violation in paragraph The licensee is aware of problems in this area and has initiated various corrective actions.. However, the scheduling and proper completion of surveillance.tests and action statements are of increasing concern to the NRC and will continue to be closely monitored during future inspections.

8808110185 880728

~DR ADOCK 05000272 PNU

DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit. *

Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (92701)

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 272/311/86-11-01; Licensee actions concerning steam flow spikes when main generator breakers are opene The licensee investigated the possibility of upgrading the steam flow sensors, but bave determined that the Rosemount differential pressure transmitters currently installed are the best available environmentally qualified transmitter This item is close (Closed)

Unresolved Item. 311/86-26-06; Reanalysis of load additions to busse This item is closed based on the followup during Special Inspection 50-272/311/87-35.

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 311/87-03-02; Engineering review of Technical Specifications (TS) associated with ECC The licensee submitted for NRR review and approval License Change Request 87-03 on July 23, 1987, which upgrades the subject T In the interim, Operations Directive OD-12 Technical Specification Interpretations Sections 14a 11 Emergency Core Cooling - Flow Path Operability 11 and 14b 11Safety Injection Pump Operability less than 312 degrees, Modes 4, 5 and 6 11 delineate the equipment required for an operable flowpath under various plant condition Also, see IFI 311/87-03-04 belo This item is close (Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 311/87-03-03; The licensee was to obtain approval for testing ECCS valve On January 29, 1987, a conference call was held between the licensee, Region I, and NRR in which the licensee was granted permission to enter TS 3.0.3 to accomplish testing of ECCS valve This item is close (Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 311/87-03-04; Engineering review and update FSA Revision 7 of the FSAR was issued on July 22, 1987, which explicitly identifies ECCS flow path requirement This item is close (Closed)

Inspector Follow Item 311/87-03-05; Evaluate Operating Experience Review Progra The licensee completed their evaluation and concluded that the review of the D. C. Cook

(Closed)

(Closed)

(Closed)

notepad notice was not given high priority due to the classification of the event (OE vs SOER or SER) in the notic The licensee took actions to improve communications with their NSSS vendor (Westinghouse) regarding timely notification of potentially generic issue This item is close Unresolved Item 311/87-03-06; Training of new operators on ECCS flow path The inspector verified that licensed operator requalification training was completed on June 30, 198 This item is close Inspector Follow Item 272/87-05-03; 311/87-07-03; Verify procedure revision project is on schedul The inspector has determined that revision of the radiation protection procedures is complet The new procedures will be reviewed for adequacy in a future specialist inspectio This item is close Unresolved Item 272/87-15-02; 311/87-18-02; Auxiliary Building and Switchgear equipment gauges have expired calibration sticker The licensee has upgraded and formalized their gauge calibration program as follows:

Technical Specification gauges - 3 year calibration cycle Operators log reading gauges - 5 year calibration cycle Information gauges - when required, labeled "For Information Only" Gauges are being calibrated with !CD cards and calibration stickers updated as appropriate to the above progra The licensee has committed to have the program implementation complete by October 1, 198 The inspector verified that the calibration program is being implemented and will continue to monitor licensee's progress in this area during routine resident inspection This item is close (Closed)

Violation 272/311/88-04-01; Radiation levels in truck cab greater than 2 millirem per hou The Radioactive Waste Shipment Procedure has been revised to delineate specific survey locations and allowable radiation level The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation and the revised procedure and found them to be acceptabl This item is close.1 Longstanding Unresolved Items Concerning Verbatim Technical Specification (TS) Compliance Regarding Main Steam (MS) Bypass Valve Operability On June 6, 1988, the licensee attempted to open main steam bypass valve 23MS18 to perform a closure response time test as required by TS 4.6.3.1 for containment isolation (CI) valve Due to a

broken diaphragm in the valve actuator, 23MS18 could not be opened or teste In this condition the licensee considers the valve operable as a *containment isolation valve since it is failed in its post CI required position (closed).

Although TS 3.7.1.5 allows continued operation with a main steam isolation valve (MS167) secured in the closed position, TS do not specifically address the MS18's in this conditio In 1981 (UNR 311/81-13-03) and on several occassions since then, discussions between the NRC and the licensee concerning verbatim compliance and clarific-ation of TS with regard to MS18 operability have occurre With regard to a related longstanding open item (UNR 272/84-47-01) concerning appropriate actions to be taken by the licensee when an MS18 exhibits seat leakage, TS 3.6.3.1 requires at least one redundant valve in the affected penetration to remain operable for containment isolatio This particular penetration has no redundant valve, so when an MS18 leaks (is inoperable) TS 3.6.3.1 cannot be met and a plant shutdown would be required in accordance with TS 3. Since TS do not require main steam valves including the MS18s to be Type C leak rate tested and the FSAR takes credit for steam generator tubes as an RCS pressure boundary, the licensee feels that requiring a plant shutdown for a leaking MS18 may be too restrictive in some cases (depending on the amount of leakage).

License Change Request (LCR) 84-22 was submitted to the NRC by the licensee to resolve these issues, however NRR reviewers did not agree with the particular wording in the submittal for this issu Subsequently NRR and PSE&G agreed to delete that section of the LCR in the interest of getting the rest of the LCR reviewed, approved and issue The licensee has committed to address these two issues again and submJt a license change request that will ensure appropriate and verbatim compliance with T This issue is unresolved pending licensee and NRC timely resolution of the concern (Unresolved Item 272/311/88-14-01).

Open items 311/81-13-03 and 272/84-47-01 are close.

Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709, 71881) Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, inspections were conducted to verify that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement The licensee's management

• control system was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and revi~w of facility record The licensee's compliance with the radiological protection and security programs was also verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedures 71707, 71709 and 71881 and included weekend and backshift inspectirin.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events (93702)

3.. Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection perio Unit 2 Unit 2 entered this report period at 100% powe On June 7, 1988, an unusual event was declared when the licensee initiated a plant shutdown as required by a Technical Specification (TS) action statemen A periodic chemistry sample of the spray additive system determined that the sodium hydroxide (NaOH) concentration was 29.7% by weight compared to the TS required range of 30-32%.

The licensee's TS interpretation states that the containment spray pumps should be declared inoperable whenever the spray additive concentration is below specificatio Declaring both containment spray pumps inoperable requires the plant to be in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in accordance with TS 3. The licensee took actions to return the NaOH concentration to the required range and subsequently the spray additive tank concentration was determined to be 30.7%.

The unusual event was terminated and the unit returned to 100% powe As a result of this event, the inspector questioned the basis for the TS interpretation which caused the containment spray systems to be declared inoperable due to a low NaOH concentration in the spray additive syste The inspector noted that TS 3.6.2.2 requires the spray additive system to be operable and if determined to be be inoperable, allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to return it to an operable status or be in hot standby within the next six hour A

I -

-**

separate TS (3.6.2.1) requires that 2 independent containment spray systems be operable or with one system inoperable restore the inoperable spray system to operable

• status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next six hour If both containment spray systems are inoperable, TS 3.0.3 (Motherhood) is applicable and hot standby is required within 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Because the spray additive system has its own TS which specifically allows continued operation for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with out of specification NaOH concentrations, the inspector questioned whether the subject TS interpretation was overly conservativ Conversely, if an immediate shutdown is appropriate for an out of specification NaOH concentration then the spray additive system action statement should explicitly require it and the licensee should not rely on a TS interpretatio A problem with the reliance on TS interpretations is evident as a result of a review of this even A review of chemistry and operation's logs indicates that the spray additive tank concentration was first determined to be less than 30% at 4:15 p.m. on June 6, 1988 (the day prior to starting the unit shutdown).

However, due to an oversight, the containment spray pumps were not declared inoperable until 6:25 a.m. the next mornin Two shifts of operators had failed to recognize or remember that a TS interpretation existed which required further actio The appropriate op~rators were counseled and the inspector was informed that the basis for the TS interpretation would be reviewe The inspector will followup on any interpretation changes during the continuing review of TS interpretation At 11:30 p.m. on June 15, 1988, the 11 SEC Trouble Alarm

overhead annunciator in the control room went into alar Investigation by the operators determined that the 2B safeguards equipment control (SEC) system had developed an auto test failure which would indicate that either an SEC component had failed or a problem existed with the auto test circui Extensive troubleshooting is required to identify the specific cause of the alar Attempts to reset the alarm were unsuccessfu A work request was written to investigate and repair the SEC, however the shift failed to declare the SEC inoperable, and the work request was not acted on until the day shift crews began wor The SEC was declared inoperable and the appropriate action statement was entered at 9:17 a.m. on June 16, in order to allow replacement of the SEC chassi The l

chassis replacement and operability checks were completed at 10:15 a.m. and the action statement was exite Subsequent troubleshooting by the licensee determined that

. the failed components could have affected the plant's

. automatic response to a mode 3 (loss of coolant accident with electrical blackout) or mode 4 (loss of coolant accident with a single bus undervoltage) acciden Only channel B equipment would have been affecte The amount*

of degradation could not be determined due to limited troubleshooting capabilitie *

The inspector informed the licensee that the operators'

response to this event was an apparent violation of Technical Specifications in that based upon the information available at 11:30 p.m. on June 15, the 28 SEC should have been declared inoperable and the appropriate action statement entere Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2 requires three SEC systems to be operable during power operatio This TS also requires that with 1 channel inoperable that the unit be placed in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> Because the shift failed to enter the action statement at 11:30 p.m., the unit operated at full power for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with an SEC inoperabl The shift's actions might have been allowable had there been conclusive evidence that the alarm was caused by an auto test circuit failure and not an SEC failure, but no such evidence existe Because all of the channel B emergency equipment was still operable from the control room, the severity of SEC degradation was indeterminate, and the degraded condition existed for less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, this event is not considered a significant violation of a TS limiting condition for operatio This event also appears to be an isolated even The inspector informed the licensee that the failure to promptly declare the 28 SEC inoperable and enter the applicable action statement constituted an apparent violatio (311/88-14-02)

At 10:24 a.m. on June 22, the C vital instrument inverter failed resulting in a reactor trip from 100% powe The loss of power to the C vital instrument bus resulted in a No. 23 reactor coolant pump breaker open signal which combined with reactor power greater than 36% (PB) caused the reactor trip signa The loss of power to the C instrument bus also caused low pressure signals in the N and No. 23 steam generator These low pressure signals combined with the P-4 high steam flow signals completed the safety injection logi Only the charging pumps actually injected since reactor pressure was maintained at greater than 1900 psig throughout the even **

The licensee declared an unusual event (UE) at 10:42 and terminated the UE at 11:15 a.m. after all Safety Injection pumps were secure The inspector witnessed the reactor trip recovery and execution of emergency operatfog procedures (EOPs) and found that there was good communications, supervisory control by the senior nuclear shift supervisor, and adherence to the EOP The post trip review determined that the inverter failure was caused by a circuit failure in the inverter 1s master firing car This failure resulted in the rapid cycling on and off of the C vital instrument bus and the reactor trip as discussed abov After the reactor trip, the control room operators de-energized the C vital instrument bus because of the constant cycling (approximately 5 on-off cycles per second).

Even though it was obvious that safety injection was not needed, both charging pumps were kept running until the EOP step directing their securing was reache This required the operators to open PR-2 (PORV) which limited system pressure to 2362 psi The post trip review determined that all equipment operated as expecte Three items of interest relate to this event:

A design change is planned for the next refueling outage which will require an indication of 2 (vs 1)

reactor coolant pump breakers opening to provide a reactor trip signa The_ TS change relating to this modification has received preliminary approval by NRC:NR The license change request submittal date was July 24, 198 This design change will be followed during the next refueling outag The NRC has questioned why the four steam generator pressure transmitters that provide the low pressure signals are powered from only the C and D instrument busse Current standard design would have each of the 4 instrument channels powered by a separate instrument bu The inspector understands that NRC headquarters will be following up on this issue including a check of other similar vintage plant A nearly identical transient (with different initiating cause) occurred in August of 1986 and is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/86-26~

The reactor was taken critical on June 24, following repairs to the C vital instrument bus inverte The unit operated at full power until June 29, when an unisolable electro-hydraulic oil leak required the generator to be taken off the gri The reactor was kept critical, repairs complete and the unit returned to the grid the same da **

The unit remained at 100% power for the rest of the report perio.

Maintenance Observations (62703)

The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, technical specifications, NRC regulations, and industry codes and standard Maintenance Work Order Number Procedure 880719010 M3Q-2 Description 2A Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker -

Semi Annual Inspection, Lubrication and Testing On June 21, 1988, the licensee informed the NRC that the Unit 2 11A

reactor trip bypass breaker undervoltage trip attachment (UVTA) failed it's post maintenance output force measurement test. This test measures the margin of force in addition to the weight of the trip bar that the UVTA is capable of overcomin As a result of the Salem ATWS event, the licensee is committed to report any deficiencies identified with the reactor trip breakers to the NR The maintenance and testing of the breaker and UVTA was performed as part of the above six-month preventive maintenance activit The "as found 11 (prior to maintenance) output force measurement on the UVTA was satisfactor Maintenance performed on the UVTA consisted of lubricating the mechanical trip leve The inspector witnessed licensee investigation of the failure which consisted of performing the output force measurement test at forces at and below the procedural acceptance criteri The inspector also witnessed re lubrication of the UVT As a result, the inspector and the licensee concluded that operability of the UVTA was marginal in that test results were not consisten The licensee replaced the UVTA and maintenance procedure M3Q-2 was completed successfull MP M23A IC.1.4.003 M3Z M3B 23MS132 (No. 23 Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Start/Stop Valve)

Inspection for 10 year ISI hydro, replacement, and repack with Chesterton live-loaded packin SW137 (No. 2 AFP room cooler inlet control valve) troubleshoot and repai Safeguards Equipment Control System (2B) troubleshooting and sequencer logic and step timing surveillance tes **

880622078 M4J Adjustment of Garrett 5KVA and lOKVA Inverters, troubleshooting and repair of 2C vital instrument inverte MP M4E Repair and repack of 1RH6 Diesel Generator lA K-1 Relay Inspectio M6K Installation of trip test device on 13 Auxiliary feed pump governo (Minor design change l-SM-00376)

Relative to discussions with licensee personnel during inspector observation of several surveillance and maintenance activities, the inspector noted that technicians and supervisors involved in these activities were experienced and exceptionally knowledgeable with the tasks they were performin Specifically the activities included reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance, reactor trip breaker and SSPS functional tests, and troubleshooting of the safeguards equipment control system and an instrument inverte It was apparent to the inspector that the personnel involved were focused on the detail of their assignment No violations were cite.

Surveillance Observations (61726)

5;1 Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the survei 11 anc.es were performed in accordance with technical specifications, licensee approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:

lIC-2.5.058 lIC-2. 5. 059 SP(0)4.8.l. SP(0)4.6.l.1Al-I No. 14 steam generator steam flow protection channels I (lFT-542) and II (lFT-543) Sensor Calibration Electric Power Systems - Emergency Diesels (28 and 2C DIG 15 minute runs)

Containment Systems - Primary Containment I -

Containment Isolation Valves

,---------

2IC-18.1.008 2IC.18.l.Oll SP(0)4.3. SSPS Train A Functional Test Reactor Trip Breaker UV Coil and Auto Shunt Trip Functional Test Unit 2 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Channel Checks The inspector concluded that these surveillances were performed in accordance with established station procedure No violations were cite.

Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown (71710) Inspection Activity The inspectors independently verified the operability of the Unit 1 service. water system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio The walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat This inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7171 The Unit 1 service water system, operating procedures, and surveillance tests were inspecte Service water at Salem has long been recognized as a system in need of material condition improvemen Because of the hostile water chemistry, silt entrainment, and numerous areas of cavitation, the service water system has historically accounted for approximately 40% of the station's deficiency report In April, 1987, the licensee formed a dedicated task force/project team to identify specific problem areas, establish priorities and manage a 5 year system upgrade progra The system upgrades will include extensive piping replacement with a corrosion and erosion resistant 6% Maly-stainless material, piping design improvements, and system control modification This program will continue to be reviewed as modification activities continu During the system walkdown, the inspector identified a number of drawing (P&ID) inaccuracie The majority of these inaccuracies related to the locked status of valve While the P&ID shows numerous valves to be locked open or closed the inspector found that additional valves were actually locked but the P&ID did not reflect this fac Additionally, two instrument root valves were found mislabeled, apparently the result of previous maintenance wor These discrepancies were brought to the attention of the I

system engineer who initiated corrective actio Material condition discrepancies found in the service water pump rooms included severe pump packing leaks, wood lying in cable trays and rags stuffed in a ceiling penetratio The latter two discrepancies were also brought to the system engineer's attentio The pump packing leak was previously identifie The review of system procedures and surveillance tests did not identify any discrepancie While the material condition of the service water system obviously needs improvement, the licensee has devoted significant resources toward permanent resolution of this issu The status of the service water system will continue to be reviewed by the inspectors on an ongoing basi No violations were identifie.

Assurance of Quality (71707, 90712, 61726)

The inspector reviewed NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports (LER) and incident reports from January, 1988 (beginning of the SALP period) to the present for the purpose of identifying any long standing or recurring problems which warrant increased licensee management attentio Two issues as discussed below are recurring problems for which continued station and QA management attention is warrante The inspector noted that these problems were also prevalent towards the end of the previous SALP cycl Since the start of the present SALP period (January 1988) at least 12 Technical Specification surveillances or action statement requirements have not been performed within the required tim The inspector has determined that each of the missed surveillances can be attributed to one or more of three root causes:

(1) poor administrative control in implementing procedures and/or programs (2) poor communication (3)

inadequate supervisory and/or management oversigh Licensee corrective actions have included additional personnel training; QA reviews, verifications and assessments; upgrading of procedures and program administration; and letters from station management to station personnel stressing attention to detail, adequate communications and increased supervisory oversigh The inspector notes that as these corrective actions are being developed and implemented, surveillances have continued to be misse Continued management attention is needed in this area to reduce the number of missed or late surveillances and action statement requirement The second issue of concern is recurring instances of inadequate administrative control of Operations files and procedures in the control roo Examples include eleven (11) cases of misfiled documents (two of which resulted in missed surveillances), four missing alarm response procedures in the Unit 2 control room, three BIT procedures that should have been deleted remained in the control room files, and one case of the wrong revision of a procedure in the master

• fil Although each of these examples individually does not present a safety concern, the number of occurrences indicates that increased oversight and controls are needed in this are The licensee is evaluating methods of upgrading the control of control room files and procedure These concerns and licensee corrective actions will continue to be reviewed during routine resident inspection (Also refer to Inspection Reports 272/311/88-01 and 88-11 and Section 8 of this report for additional discussion of these items). Review of Licensee Reports (90712, 92700)

Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed licensee event reports (LER) as well as other periodic and special reports submitted by the license The reports were reviewed for accuracy and timely submissio Additional followup performed at the discretion of the inspector to verify corrective action implementation and adequacy is detailed with the applicable report summar The following reports were received and reviewed during the inspection period:

Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - May 1988 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - May 1988 Unit 1 LER 88-11-00 discusses circumstances relative to a missed Technical Specification surveillance of valve 12SW39 (18 D/G cooling service water vent valve).

Due to the stroke time of valve 12SW39 exceeding the previous stroke time by 25%, testing of the valve was required to be increased from quarterly to monthl However, the surveillance checkoff sheets were misfiled in the control room and resulted in the surveillance not being performed within the required time as specified in TS 4. The surveillance was subsequently completed -satisfactoril Failure to properly implement and maintain procedures and failure to perform a surveillance within the required time is an apparent violation of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications (272/88-14-01).

Although the missed surveillance was licensee identified, a notice of violation is being issued since the corrective actions for a previous similar violation (311/87-14-01) in which misfiled checkoff sheets resulted in a missed surveillance did not prevent recurrenc~. The inspector is concerned with the frequency with which surveillance tests are missed at Salem and with the apparent inadequate control of paperwork in the control room See Section 7 of this report for further discussion of these issue *

• Unit 2 LER 88-10-00 deals with the lack of backup overcurrent protection for containment electrical penetrations as discussed in NRC combined inspection 272/311/88-1 Unit 2 LER 88-11-00 discusses the late performance of a Technical Specification (4.7.10.1.1.c) surveillance which requires valve position verification of the fire suppression water system inside containmen On 5 days during the 12 day period immediately prior to the surveillance due date, containment access was denied to fire protection (FP) personnel due to containment lighting being out of service due to an unrelated proble Subsequently containment lighting was restored and the surveillance was completed, but was late by 1 da The surveillance was performed late due to inadequate communication and supervisory oversigh The inspector discussed the circumstances of this event and the licensee's corrective actions with FP and station managemen FP supervisor's have been counseled concerning the importance of communication within the FP department and with other department In addition, station management has issued a letter to station supervision stressing the importance of adequate communications using this event as an exampl The inspector has determined that the late performance of TS Surveillance 4.7.10.1.1.c is a licensee identified violation for which acceptable corrective actions have beer. taken. (NV4 311/88-14-03)

However, the inspector is concerned wit~ the number of missed TS surveillances resulting from inadequate communication and supervisory oversight that have occurred at Sale (See Section 7 of this report.) Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with Mr. J. Zupko and other licensee personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on Region I review and discussions with the licensee, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restrictions.