IR 05000272/1996002
| ML18102A222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1996 |
| From: | Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18102A220 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-96-02, 50-272-96-2, 50-311-96-02, 50-311-96-2, 50-354-96-01, 50-354-96-1, NUDOCS 9607020094 | |
| Download: ML18102A222 (16) | |
Text
Report No License No Licensee:
Facility:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-354/96-01, 50-272/96-02, 50-311/96-02.
NPF-57, DPR-70, DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Artificial Island May 28-31, 1996 J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I N. McNamara, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I S. Morris, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek
. F. Kantor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR N. Stinson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR Richard R. Keimig, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9607020094 960627 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
. PDR
TABLE OF CONTENTS Exexutive Summary Report Details..
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance.
.......... Exercise Evaluation Scope.............. Emergency Response Facility Observations and Critique.... Simulator Control Room (SCR)........ Technical Support Center (TSC).... Operations Support Center (OSC).... Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)....*
___________ b.5- -Licensee Exerci-se-Crit-ique-.--.-
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-.-. - *** -.-.--.--. -.-;- Overall Exercise Conclusions..... *..
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PB Miscellaneous EP Issues..... -.........
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P (Closed) IFI 50-354/94-21-01, 50-272/94-23-01 & 50-311/94-23-01............ -................
P (Closed) IFI 50~354/94-21-02, 50-272/94-23-02 & 50-311/94-PAGE iii I
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23-02............................
P (Closed) IFI 5d-354/94-21-03, 50-272/94-23-03 & 50-311/94-23-03........................
PB.4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Review... *.
PB.5 In-Office Review of Licensee Procedure Changes
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Management Meetings............ -*.......
Partial List of Persons Contacted..
List of Inspection Procedures Used.
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed List of Acronyms Used...
Revised Licensee Documents (Attachment 1)
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- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Artificial Island Full-Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation May 28-31, 1996 Inspection Report 50-354/96-01, 50-272/96-02, 50-311/96-02 This inspection evaluated the licensee's performance during its annual emergency preparedness exercis The inspectors observed emergency facility staffing, procedure implementation, effectiveness of mitigation actions, communications, command and control, emergency classification, and off-site notificatio The inspectors also assessed licensee activity pertaining to several items that were tracked as a result of discrepancies identified in previous exercise The licensee's overall performance was goo The facilities were generally staffed and activated in a prompt manner, despite the fact that the plant page announcement for the alert (and site area emergency) classification was made approximately 20 minutes following the declaration. The classification of the simulated events was timely and accurate. Off-site notifications were completed within 15 minute The protective action recommendations were appropriate and timel Good briefings and good command and control were observed. There were many good discussions observed during the exercise within i ndi vi dual facilities and.among the facilitie The conduct of operations in the operations support center (OSC) was very goo Thirty-one teams were briefed, dispatched, and tracke The simulation of obtaining a sample from the post-accident sampling system was very goo The OSC coordinator demonstrated excellent command and control in directing the personnel and functions carried out in that facility. Overall, the OSC performance was excellen The emergency operations facility staff demonstrated exceptional teamwor Especially noteworthy was the tracking of plant conditions by the site support manager and th~ effective development of protective action recommendation The emergency response manager and his staff interacted well with the States of New Jersey and Delaware. Additionally, the radiological assessment staff performed well in tracking the plum The licensee's post-exercise critique was very thorough, identified all NRC findings, and was assessed by the NRC team as good.
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P4 Report Details Staff Knowledge and Performance Exercise Evaluation Scope During this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial full-participation exercise in the simulator control room (SCR), technical support center (TSC), operations support center (OSC), and the emergency operations facility (EOF).
The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of off-site agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, and the overall implementation of the emergency pla In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercis Emergency Response Facility Observations and Critigue b.1 Simulator Control Room (SCR)
An alert declaration was made by the senior nuclear shift supervisor (SNSS), based upon confirmation of a seismic event (earthquake)
exceeding the emergency action level criterion. The declaration was accurate and timely. All notifications to federal, state, and local officials were completed within th~ required time perio The SNSS command and control of SCR activities was good, crew briefings were frequent, and work priorities were continuously evaluated. Site-wide announcements were clear and accurate, although the announcement of the alert declaration in the plant over the plant page system was delayed by 20 minute The emergency operating procedures (EOPs) were effectively utilized for simulated degrading plant conditions, although the inspectors observed some delay in implementing contingency procedures necessary for manual rod insertion and additional attempts to scram withdrawn control rods. There were excellent discussions among the SCR crew members regarding accident mitigation strategies and recovery action Interactions with the TSC and the EOF were effectiv The SCR operating crew quickly identified, evaluated and took appropriate action for simulated degraded plant conditions, with one exception; it was slow tn recognize subtle indications of a stuck open safety relief valv Recognition of the open valve position was prompted by exercise referees using a predefined contingency messag This led to a minor delay in pursuing the mitigating actions of securing the reactor coolant system to primary containment release pat b.2 Technical Support Center CTSC)
The TSC was activated one hour and four minutes from the time that the alert declaration was made, slightly exceeding the one hour goa The activation time could have been reduced if the announcement of the alert declaration had been made over the plant page system immediately following the declaration by the SNSS, instead of 20 minutes late Notification of an alert declaration to the emergency response organization (ERO) is made via the ERO call out system (pagers).
Some individuals did not receive a pager message due
- to their location within the plant at the time of the pager signa Therefore, they were unaware of the declaration until it was made over the plant page system. A more timely announcement over the plant page would have shortened their arrival time at the TS However, this did not adversely affect the exercise.
. Shortly after his arrival in the TSC, the emergency duty officer (EDO)
contacted the SNSS to obtain information necessary for him to take control of response ~ctivities. The EDO checked with the TSC lead responders to ensure that all of the necessary personnel were present and that the TSC was functional before declaring it activated. The EDO's briefings were timely and informativ The TSC engineering staff was very proactive in addressing the prioritized mitigation actions such as, inserting the three stuck control rods into the core, reducing the hydrogen concentration in the
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-. dr'y-well,-establ-ishi-ng and--maintaining-core-cooling*,-and *stoppfng *the**
release.of radiation to the environmen The TSC engineers also cautioned the EDO of the potential for water in ~he torus exceeding its design load and causing damage if another seismic event occurre However, the inspectors noted that the priorities assigned to OSC repair team tasks did not always reflect the significance of the task relative to protecting public health and safety. Specifically, closing the stuck open safety relief valve was not the highest priority, despite the fact that the open valve represented a breach in one of the fission product barriers resulting in a release pathway of radiation to the environmen Instead, efforts to close the valve were conducted in parallel with other mitigation activitie *
b.3 Operations Support Center COSC)
The OSC was staffed and activated 27 minutes after the alert declaration was announced over the plant page syste The OSC personnel referenced and used procedures and checklists to set up and activate the facilit The facility was properly equipped to support the functions of the OS Radiological conditions were monitored every 30 minutes for habitability concern Good command and control was demonstrated by the OSC coordinator (OSCC)
and the maintenance supervisors. Frequent briefings were conducted on a timely basis to keep all OSC personnel informed of plant conditions and task priorities. The OSCC and the supervisors frequently reminded repair teams to be aware of possible dangers caused by the seismic event, the carbon dioxide leak from a ruptured pipe and the radiological release. The OSCC effectively utilized personne For example, he ensured that only one equipment operator (EO).was on each team so that EOs would be available for other team He also directed dispatched teams to perform plant status checks in the area of their assignment before returning to the OS The OSC supervisors arranged to procure a standby liquid control (SLC) pump from a nearby nuclear utility and monitored its location and status during the exercise. The OSC supervisors also effectively planned contingencies associated with the carbon dioxide arriving from off-site to replace what was lost as a result of the ruptured pip.. *
There was good oversight and control of the repair team There were a total of 31 teams dispatched during the exercise. All of the teams were effectively and methodically briefed with the aid of the OSC team briefing checklist. Immediately prior to being dispatched, the teams would report to the OSC clerk to be recorded on a status boar The clerk would ensure that the teams were properly briefed, had radios for communications, and reminded them to call in every 15 minutes and to provide a debrief upon their return. All teams were dispatched in timely manne If a change in plant status occurred after the teams were dispatched, the OSCC and the supervisors would promptly determine the location of the teams and inform them to take action commensurate with the change in plant status. During various events (e.g., carbon dioxide leak, fire and radiological release), concern for the safety of the repair teams was demonstrate The inspectors accompanied repair.teams into the plant to observe their actions pertaining to the carbon dioxide leak,*standby liquid control (SLC) pumps, and the post-accident sampling system (PASS).
The teams performed (simulated) their tasks effectively. Exercise controllers provided appropriate information to the teams to accomplish their task Minor discrepancies were noted when the simulated PASS sample was obtaine The radiation pr_otection technician was unfamiliar w.ith the operation of the PASS, rarely asked the controller for radiation dose rates and demonstrated poor health physics techniques (e.g., performed surveys with no gloves and was hesitant in providing HP direction). The chemistry technicians had difficulty diluting the gas sample due to laboratory equipment failures and lacked knowledge in the operation of the gamma spectroscopy system for analyzing a PASS sample on the gamma detecto The PASS sample analysis was provided to the TSC within minutes of the three-hour requirement in accordance with the licensee's emergency pla Good communications were noted within the OS In addition to the briefings, players frequently provided input to discussions regarding the various event Information was verified or clarified by OSC staff member An individual was added to the OSC (for this exercise) to monitor telephone communications between the SCR, TSC, and the EOF to provide current information to the OSC regarding plant status. This addition was effective in providing timely and accurate informatio The OSC maintained radio contact with the teams to verify location and status of task completion. Maintenance personnel in the Ready Room received periodic formal briefings in addition to listening to the radio communications between the OSC and the repair team Overall, OSC performance was excellen b.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Staffing of the EOF was initiated upon the declaration of the alert at 4:21 The emergency response manager (ERM) was among the first to arrive because his normal work location is in the building where the EOF is locate The EOF staff was in place and ready to activate at about 5:50 When the site area emergency (SAE) was declared at 5:56 by the EDO in the TSC, the ERM and lead EOF staff members were already
very involved in reacting to plant events and interacting with their TSC counterpart The ERM proceeded in a deliberate fashion to implement EPIP 401, "Emergency Response Manager Response," and, upon assurance that each EOF functional group was ready to support EOF activation, he declared the EOF activated at 6:35 p.m. and assumed the position of emergency coordinato The EOF activation time was well within the one-hour goal for activation of the EOF following the declaration of a SA The ERM demonstrated effective command and control of the EOF staff, which functioned well as a tea Especially noteworthy was the monitoring of plant conditions by the site support manager (SSM) and the emphasis on plant conditions, as well as radiological conditions, in developing protective action recommendations (PARs).
The ERM and EOF section leads utilized the implementing procedures and event classification guides in responding to, and projecting the consequences of, plant event Following the second seismic event at 8:25 p.m., the
_______________ ERM_ and_SSM __ qutckly_ and-accurately-determined that-the-emergency-acti-on levels for a general emergency had been met based on an evaluation of fission product barrier status. The PARs were appropriately developed in accordance with the flow charts shown in EPIP 404, "Protective Action Recommendations," and timely notifications of the off-site agencies were mad The ERM frequently consulted with the EOF lead staff and periodic briefings were held, in accordance with the EOF briefing checklist in EPIP 40 The emergency news center was included in these briefings via speaker phon Periodic briefings were also provided by the ERM to the entire EOF staff to keep them apprised of plant conditions and priority item Licensee dose assessment personnel demonstrated their ability to communicate with and control off-site field teams exceptionally wel Communications with the off-site field teams were frequent and effective in assessing radiological data. The radiological assessment staff coordinator (RASC) was cognizant of the surrounding road construction conditions in directing the off-site teams to locations for sample reading The RASC provided prompt and frequent briefings of off-site radiological conditions to the radiological support manage Dose assessment personnel effectively utilized the MIDAS computer to perform off-site dose projection calculations to support PAR decision The ERM and staff made a concerted effort to ensure that the state representatives from the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE)
and the Delaware Emergency Management Agency were kept informed of plant and radiological conditions. The licensee and state representatives coordinated closely in the development and issuance of protective action The protective actions agreed reasonably well and the reasons for any differences were discussed and understoo The state representatives were included in all EOF lead staff briefings where information on licensee PARs, and state protective action implementation was exchange *
- Licensee Exercise Critique Immediately following the exercise, the licensee began its critique proces Players, as well as referees, assembled in their assigned facility and commented on their performance and observations. These findings were collected and presented to the NRC on May 31, 1996-.
The inspectors noted that the licensee identified issues in addition to the ones identified by the inspectors. Positive and negative items were identified, and issues of concern will be tracked until resolution. The critique was thorough and appropriately self-critical. Overall, the critique process and content was assessed as goo c. Overall Exercise Conclusions The licensee's overall performance was goo The facilities were -
generally staffed and activated in a prompt manne Good command and contr-olwas_ observed at all-of the -faci-1 iti es-. --The -three-
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cl assi fi cations of the simulated events were timely and accurate and off-site notifications were completed within 15 minute The PARs were appropriate and timely. There were many good discussions observed during the exercise within individual facilities and among the facilitie PS Miscellaneous EP Issues P (Closed} IFI 50-354/94-21-01. 50-272/94-23-01 & 50-311/94-23-01:
status board updates and information content. This item was opened during the previous exercise when status boards in the TSC were not changed as equipment became inoperable or as major plant parameters changed nor did it indicate why equipment was out of service. During this exercise, the administrative and technical staff maintained the status boards current and accurate. Status boards in the other facilities were also well maintaine *
P (Closed} IFI 50-354/94-21-02. 50-272/94-23-02 & 50-311/94-23-02:
inadequate OSC coordinator command and control. This item was opened during the previous exercise, because the OSC coordinator did not effectively utilize various OSC resource During this exercise, the OSC coordinator ensured that repair teams were being closely tracked, conducted frequent and informative briefings, maintained order in the facility, and encouraged input from the OSC staff regarding mitigation action P (Closed} IFI 50-354/94-21-03. 50-272/94-23-03 & 50-311/94-23-03:
ensuring general emergency/protective action recommendation basis understood by New Jersey. This item was opened during the previous exercise when the State of New Jersey implemented a protective action that differed from the PAR issued by the licensee, because EOF management did not ensure that the State understood the basis of the licensee's decision. During this exercise, the ERM and his staff made a concerted effort to ensure that the State representatives from the New Jersey BNE and the Delaware Emergency Management Agency were kept
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informed of plant and radiologtcal conditions. The state representatives were included in all EOF lead staff briefings where information on licensee PARs and state protective actions implementation was exchange The protective actions agreed reasonably well and the reasons for any differences were discussed and understoo PS.4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report CUFSARl Review A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the UFSAR or the emergency plan. During this exercise, the inspectors observed the licensee's compliance with the Plan regarding ERO structure, facility activation and usage, classification of simulated events, and notification of off-site agencie *
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--- PS.5---In--=office-Review of Licensee Procedure Changes
An in-office review of revisions to the Plan and its implementing procedures submitted by the licensee was completed. A list of the specific revisions reviewed are included in Attachment 1 to this repor The inspector concluded that the revisions did not reduce the effectiveness of the emergency plan and were acceptabl Management Meetings Exit Meeting The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 31, 199 The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings *
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Licensee C. Banner T. Cellmer M. Meltzer J. Pollock J. Polyak L. Storz G. Warren
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Administrator - On-site Emergency Preparedness Radiation Protection Manager - Hope Creek Chemistry Manager - Hope Creek Hope Creek Quality Assurance Manager Manager - Radiological Safety Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations General Manager Hope Creek Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors 82302: Review of Exercise -Objectives ~nd-Scenarios for Power Reactors Opened None Closed ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED IFI 50-354/94-21-01, 50-272/94-23-01 & 50-311/94-23-01:
Status board updates and information content; IFI 50-354/94-21-02, 50-272/94-23-02 & 50-311/94-23-02:
Inadequate OSC coordinator command and contro IFI 50-354/94-21-03, 50-272/94-23-03 & 50-311/94-23-03:
Ensuring general emergency/protective action recommendation basis understood by New Jersey.
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BNE EAL EDO EO EOF EOP EP ERF ERO ERM IFI NRC osc oscc PAR-PASS RASC SAE SCR SLC SNSS SSM TSC UFSAR
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Emergency Action Level Emergency Duty Officer Equipment Operator Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Operating Procedure Emergency Preparedness Emergency Response Facility Emergency Response Organization Emergency Response Manager Inspector Followup Item Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Support Center Operations Support Center Coordinator Protective Action Recommendation _ _ _ _ __
--- -Post-=Acc iae-nf Samp lfo-g --System Radiological Assessment Staff Coordinator Site Area Emergency Simulator Control Room Standby Liquid Control Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor Site Support Manager Technical Support Center Update Final Safety Analysis Report
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ATTACHMENT 1
Revised Licensee Documents Administrative Procedures Document Document Title Revision(s)
EPIP 1001 Revision and Development of PLAN/EPIPs/ECG 1,2 EPIP 1002 Distribution of PLANS/EPIPs/ECG
EPIP 1003 Review and Approval of PLAN/EPIPs/ECG 9,10 EPIP 1004 Format of PLAN/EPIPs/ECG 3,4 EPIP 1005 Emergency Preparedness Deficiency/Revision
Tracking EPIP 1006 Emergency Equipment Inventory (Radiation 15, 16 Protection)
EPIP 1007 EOF/ENC Supply & Locker Inventory 13,14 EPIP 1008 Emergency Commun i cat i oris Drills
EPIP 1009 Emergency Response Callout Test Procedure
EPIP 1011 Maintenance of Emergency Response Organization 6,7 EPIP 1012 Administration of Emergency Drills and
. Exercises EPIP 1013 Emergency Response Personnel Telephone List 29,30,31,32,33 EPIP 1015 PC Dose Assessment Software Control
EPIP 1016 Test Procedures for EOF Backup Generator,
Vent System and HVAC Filter Replacement
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Attachment 1 Document EPIP 401 EPIP 402 EPIP 403 EPIP 501 EPIP 601 EPIP 602 EPIP 603 EPIP 604 EPIP 701 Document EPIP 201S EPIP-202S EPIP 204S EPIP 305S EPIP 308S EPIP 310S EPIP 311S EPIP 312S EPIP 313S EPIP 314S
Emergency Operation Facility Procedures Document Title RevisionCsl Emergency Response Manager Response 3, 4_
Site Support Manager/Staff Response
Public Information Liaison - EOF 3,4 EOF - Integrated Engineering Response 3,4,5 Radiological Support Manager and Radiological
Assessment Staff Response
___ ---~!d_i o l Q_gi_ c~ l _ Do_se _l\\s_sessmenL _
Field Monitoring Helicopter Plume Tracking Administrative Support Manager Response
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12,13 3,4
Salem Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Document Title TSC - Integrated Engineering Team Response OSC Activation and Operations Emergency Response Callout/Personnel Recall Stable Iodine Thyroid.Blocking Personnel/Vehicle Survey and Decontamination OPEN OPEN Radiation Protection Supervisor-Off-site and Field Monitoring Team Response Control Point - Chemistry Response Chemistry Supervisor - TSC Response RevisionCsl 7,8
27,28,29,30,31,32
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4
3
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Attachment 1 Document EPIP 201H EPIP 202H EPIP 204H EPIP 302H EPIP 303H EPIP 304H EPIP 305H EPIP 306H EPIP 307H EPIP 308H EPIP 310H EPIP 311H EPIP 312H EPIP 313H EPIP 314H
Hope Creek Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Document Ti t l e TSC - Integrated Engineering Team Response DSC Activation and Operations Emergency Response Callout/Personnel Recall Radiological Assessment Coordinator Response Control Point - Radiation Protection/
Chemistry Response DSC - Radiation Protection Response Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking Emergency Grab Air Sampling Plant Vent Sampling FRVSV Personnel/Vehicle Survey and Decontamination OPEN OPEN Radiation Protection Supervisor-Off-site and Field Monitoring Team Response Control Point - Chemistry Response Chemistry Supervisor - TSC Response RevisionCs)
14 27,28,29,30,31,32
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5
3
3
5,6
4
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Attachment 1 Document Attachment 1 Attachment 2 Attachment 3 Attachment 4 Attachment 6 *
Attachment.7
Salem Event Classification Guide Document Title Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency CMl Log (UE/A/SAE)
CMl Log (GE)
RevisionCsl 14,15,16
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20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26
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-- -- -- --Attacnmernt 8 - -- -- CM2 -Log 13,14,15 Attachment 9 Attachment 12 Attachment 13 Attachment 14 Attachment 16 Attachment 23 Section 7 Section 9 Section 10 Section 13 Section 14 Section 17 Section 18 Non-Emergency Notifications Reference One Hour Report - NRC/OPS Four Hour Report - Contamination Event Four Hour Report - NRC/OPS Spill/Discharge Reporting Written Reports/LERS/Others Radiological Releases/Occurrences Electrical Power Failure Loss of Instrumentation/
Annunciation/Communications Site Hazards (Aircraft Crash, Missiles, Explosions, etc.)
Fire Public Interest Items Tech Specs/Plant Status Changes 18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25
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6
5,6 2,3
8,9 10, 11
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Attachment 1 Document AttaChment 1 Attachment 2 Attachment 3 Attachment 4 Attachment 6 Attachment 7 Attachment 8 Attachment 9 Attachment 12 Attachment 13 Attachment 14 Section i Section ii Section iii Section 7 Section 9 Section 13 Section 14
Hope Creek Event Classification Guide
Document r; t l e Unusual Event Alert
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Site Area Emergency General Emergency CMl Log (UE/A/SAE)
CMl Log (GE)
CM2 Log Revision Cs)
13,14,15
9
_19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26 14, 15, 16 Non-Emergency Notifications 18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25, Reference
One Hour Report - NRC/OPS
Four Hour Report - Contamination
Event Four Hour 'Report - NRC/OPS
Introduction
Cross Reference - Event to 3,4 Requirement Cross Reference - Attachment to
Events Radiological Releases/Occurrences
Electrical Power Failure
Site Hazards (Aircraft Crash,
Missiles, Explosions, etc.)
Fire 4