IR 05000272/1988011

Insp Repts 50-272/88-11 & 50-311/88-11 on 880322-0502.No Violations Noted.Deficiencies Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Outstanding Insp Items,Operational Safety Verification & Assurance of Quality Maint

ML18093A850
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/23/1988
From:	Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18093A848	List: IR 05000272/1988011 ML18093A845
References
50-272-88-11, 50-311-88-11, NUDOCS 8806010170
Download: ML18093A850 (15)

Text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company

Report No Docket No License No Licensee:

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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50-311/88-11 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:

March 22, 1988 - May 2, 1988 Inspectors:

Approved by:

R. W. Borchardt, Senior_ Resident Inspector K. Halvey Gibson, Resident Inspector J. A. Golla, Reactor Engineer H. Zibul~mist

£2 P. D. Swetland, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:

s/;i.~/8'8 date Inspections on March 22, 1988 - May 2, 1988 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/88-11 and 50-311/88-11)

Areas Inspected:

Routine inspections of plant operations including:

followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, assurance of quality, maintenance, surveillance, engineered safety feature walkdown, review of licensee reports, containment integrated leak rate test results review, and allegation followu Results:

No violations were cited in this report, however various deficiencies were identified throughout the period that indicate that some programs are not being effectively supervise The inspectors identified instances of poor equipment maintenance practices, improper wearing of dosimetry, inappropriate storage of radioactive material, and inattention to procedural detail These observations are discussed in Sections 4.0, 5.0 and 6.0 of this report.

9806010170 88052:3 PDR ADOCK 05000272 Q

DCD

Public Service Electric and Gas Company Persons Contacted

DETAILS Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to s.upport inspection activitie.

Follo~up on Outstanding Inspection Items (92701)

(Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 272/84-04-05; Containment fan cooler unit (CFCU) operatio In* January, 1984 the inspector questioned the licensee's operation of CFCUs based upon a CFCU motor failur Engineering evaluation S-C-M945-NEE-017 was reviewed and concluded that the motor failures were due to reverse rotation in the standby mode, operation of CFCUs at different speeds simultaneously, and frequent fan start The inspector has no further questions at this tim (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 272/84-13-03; Addition of valves to the Technical Specification list of containment isolation valve Supplemental LER 84-007 identified the need to add certain valves to the Technical Specification (TS) listing of containment isolation valve The inspector has verified that a license change request has been submitted (dated November 27, 1985) requesting addition of the required valves to The inspector considers the licensee's action to be complete and this item is close (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 272/84-32-01; Charging/Safety Injection pump failur On July 13, 1984, the No. 12 Charging/Safety Injection (C/SI) pump seized shortly after being started for surveillance testin Shortly after this occurrence the inspector reviewed LER 84-17, however this item was opened pending review of a safety evaluation and a supplement to the LE The inspector reviewed safety evaluation S-2-N600-MSE-298, "Potential consequences of demineralizer resins and metal filings in the RWST and suction piping to the C/SI pumps".

The C/SI pump was damaged as a result of metal filings being drawn into the centrifugal pump casing from the RWS It was determined that the metal filings and some spent resin were in the RWST due to a procedural error in the resin transfer procedure Corrective actions completed by the licensee included cleaning of the RWST, flushing of piping and correction of applicable procedure The licensee is aware that a supplement to LER 84-17 is outstandin Based upon the review of the safety evaluation, the inspector has no further questions regarding this event.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

(Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 272/85-07-02; Thermal power indicatio The inspector verified that the licensee has the equipment and indication required by technical specifications to provide accurate reactor power indicatio A calorimetric calculation is performed daily to verify nuclear instrumentation accurac (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 272/86-04-01; Inservice Test Program deficiencie Licensee Event Report 86-02 and recent !ST submittals were reviewed and found to be adequat The inspector has no further questions at this tim (Closed)

NRC Bulletin 88-01; Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breaker This bulletin provided all licensee 1 s with information on Westinghouse series OS breakers and requested inspections of the pole shafts and the breaker closing mechanism alignmen The licensee responded to this bulletin in a letter dated March 31, 1988, which stated that Westinghouse DS/DSL circuit breakers are not used at Sale No further action is required by this bulleti (Closed)

Inspector Followup Item 272/87-33-01; 311/87-34-01; Measurement control evaluation - non radiological chemistr On completion of the analyses of water samples by the licensee and B'rookhaven National Laboratory, a comparison and evaluation was performe The results are tabulated in Attachment 1 to this repor The anion and metal disagreements and large biases are probably due to the poor calibration procedures that were identified during *the previous NRC inspectio The licensee has upgraded the analytical instrumentatio If they correct the weaknesses of their measurement control and calibration procedures as were identified and discussed during the inspection, the licensee will have a good measurement progra.

Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709, 71881, 93702) Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, inspections were conducted to verify that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement The licensee 1 s management control system was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and review of facility record The licensee 1 s compliance with the radiological protection and security programs was also verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedures 71707, 71709 and 71881 and included weekend and backshift inspection **

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

3.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 3. Unit 1 Unit 1 entered this report period at 100% power with the No. 13 steam generator primary to secondary leak stabilized at approximately 50 gallons per day (GPO).

The leak was originally detected on February 29, 1988 during power ascension testing following the unit's refueling outag On March 26, the calculated leak r~te increased to 75 GPO and on March 27 further increased and then stabilized at approximately 120 GP Slowdown samples were being analyzed on a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> frequenc On March 30~ the inservice electro-hydraulic (EH) pump tripped and the standby EH pump failed to star Operations personnel made repeated attempts to start the standby pump and reset the tripped pump but all efforts were unsuccessfu As EH pressure decreased, the main turbine stop valves began to close causing steam flow and generator electrical output to decrease and reactor coolant temperatures to increase. After it became apparent that the EH system could not be restored, the control room operator manually tripped the reacto All systems responded properly to the plant trip. A post trip investigation determined ihat the EH pump trip and inability to return the EH system to service resulted from an EH oil reservoir low level trip signa Although a reservoir high/low level annunciator was illuminated in the control room previous to this event, the operators believed that it was caused by a high level conditio This belief was based upon a level gage that was later determined to be defectiv The reservoir low level condition was caused by a number of relatively minor system leaks at connections throughout the EH syste The existence of these leaks was well known by plant personne Although EH fluid had not been added recently, the validity of a high level condition was not questione Corrective action taken prior to plant startup included removing the faulty gage and installing a dipstick to measure oil leve During the outage, an inspection of the No. 13 steam generator U-tubes identified the source of primary to secondary leakage to be the tube located at row I/column 7 This tube was plugged and no other primary to secondary leaks were identified by the helium sniff metho After the plant startup, measurements and calculations verified that no other U-tube leaks were present.

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company

3. The inspectors closely monitored the plant transitions between operating conditions including hot standby to cold shutdown, draining the reactor coolant system, mid loop

~operation) fil~~ng and-vehting ~be reactQr ~09l~nt system, and cold shutdown to power operatio These evolutions __ _

were well controlled and coordinate The reactor was taken critical at 8:45 a.m. on April 15, 1988 and synchronized to the grid at 2:21 Unit 1 was at 100%

at the conclusion of the report perio Unit 2 Unit 2 entered the report period at 100% power and remained at full power until a reactor trip occurred on April 21, 198 The unit tripped due to a No. 23 reactor coolant loop low flow signa One of three flow*

transmitters for the No. 23 reactor coolant. loop was being returned to service following maintenance, when a personnel valving error caused a spurious low flow condition to be sensed by one of the two inservice transmitter The two out of three logic was thereby completed resulting in a reactor tri The inspector discussed the cause of the trip with instrument and controls (I&C) supervision and reviewed procedure 2IC-2.5.011 - "Sensor Calibration, 2FT-435 Reactor Coolant Flow - Loop 3 - Channel II 11 *

Because the reactor coolant loop flow transmitters are the only transmitters in the plant that use a common sensing line, the return to service valving sequence is unique in that the high pressure side isolation valve must be opened prior to shutting the equalizing valv This sequence is reversed from that used for transmitters that have separate sensing line I&C technicians are trained and qualified to perform these procedures and are aware of the possible consequences (i.e. reactor trip) if the valving is done incorrectly for these particular transmitter Nevertheless, the I&C technician reversed the two valving steps which caused a slight flow disturbance in the common sensing line and resulted in the tri The inspector verified that the procedure is explicit in delineating the correct valving sequence and concluded that the technician did not pay attention to the detail of the p~ocedure. The senior I&C superviso~ subsequently held a meeting with the I&C technicians and reiterated the station's policy on procedure compliance and paying attention to detai The inspector has no further questions at this time.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

3. On April 22, 1988, during restart, Unit 2 tripped while synchronizing the main generator to the gri Stearn generator level oscillations resulted from picking up electric load too quickly, and the unit tripped on high No. 23 steam generator water leve The inspector -

discussed the details of the trip and licensee followup with the reactor operator (RO) involved, the senior shift supervisor (SRO), senior I&C supervision and the Operations Manage Stearn generator level and turbine load chart records were reviewe An apparent slow response of the turbine electro-hydraulic controls (EHC)

in picking up load following closure of the main generator breakers prompted the RO to manually raise turbine loa It is unclear whether this action alone or in combination with a sudden delayed response of the EHC resulted in a swell in the steam generators with the level in No. 23 steam generator reaching the trip setpoin The turbine load chart indicates that the turbine initially failed to pick up load (i.e. EHC did not respond), however post trip testing of the EHC did not identify any deficiencies in the syste The licensee elected to replace the EHC rate amplifier card based on past experiences in which a failed card resulted in similar faulty EHC respons Although no conclusive cause of the trip could be identified the EHC operated properly throughout the subsequent plant startu The inspector's review of this event is complet The unit was successfully returned to power on April 23 and continued to operate at full power for the remainder of the report perio Both Units On March 18, the licensee notified the NRC that an electrical cable designed to supply an alternate source of control and field flash power to the diesel generators was not routed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix The cable was originally installed to compensate for potential damage to the normal control cable due to a postulated fire in a 460V switchgear roo However, because the alternate cable was routed through the same 460V switchgear room, the possibility that a single fire could disable both the normal and alternate shutdown circuits was create The fire area in question is provided with full area detection and manual C02 suppressio A fire watch has also been posted since March 1987 for an unrelated reaso The licensee has been directed to respond to this issue in conjunction with the Appendix R violation and civil penalty issued on March 29, 1988.

No violations were identifie **

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 9 Assurance of Quality (71707, 71709)

This inspection report documents the first inspection conducted by the new senior resident inspector and also marks the return of the resident inspector after a 3 month absenc As such, this section presents initial findings and conclusions drawn from observed conditions and activitie Numerous conditions were identified throughout the period that indicate that some programs are not being effectively implemente The observations outlined below also lead to a conclusion that plant management and supervision are not holding the work force to the highest standards of performanc Although no serious safety issues were identified, the inspector was concerned that a relatively large number of issues were generated in various functional areas during this perio During an inspection of station batteries,. the inspector found that the Non lE 250 VDC battery had 4 cells with a water le~el right at, or slightly below the low level mark and one cell that was approximately 1/2 inch below the low level mar This battery supplies main turbine auxiliaries and is not safety relate The condition was brought to the licensee 1 s attention and correcte The inspector noticed that the location of personnel dosimetry was inconsistent between individual Although the commonly accepted correct location is between the neck and waist on the front of the torso the inspector noted many individuals with dosimetry clipped to back belt loops, shirt sleeves and trousers side pocket The licensee has subsequently issued a memorandum to site personnel describing the correct wearing of dosimetr This issue will continue to be reviewed during subsequent inspection The inspector also identified an improperly posted fire impairment permit in a Unit 1 auxiliary building stairwel The permit was posted at the wrong penetration and remained posted for nearly one month after work was complet Records indicate that the work was performed on the correct penetratio The inspector is concerned that workers and supervisors did not question the absence of a posted impairment permit at their work location and that roving firewatches and/or fire protection supervision did not identify the permit discrepancie This issue was brought to the attention of fire protection supervision who removed the permit and conducted a meeting with fire protection personnel stressing the importance of attention to detail and procedure adherenc The inspector will continue to monitor the fire protection program on a periodic basis.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

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The inspector noted that the Unit 2 trip on April 21, 1988, discussed in Section 3.2.2 was caused by inattention to detail and failure to follow procedures during the return to service of a reactor coolant loop flow transmitte Poor housekeeping practices were also identifie Radioactive material wrapped in yellow plastic being stored in the Unit 1 control room ventilation room was found in a puddle of wate The water was coming from a cooling water valve that had a packing lea It would have been relatively simple to erect a catch bag under the leaking valve and direct the water to a floor drain, however this was not don The licensee corrected this conditio Another poor housekeeping practice was observed in the Unit 1 Boron Injection Tank roo A plastic trash can was stored on top of a Limitorque valve motor housing inside of a contaminated are This discrepancy was correcte The maintenance section of this report documents two inspector concerns relating to the content of work packages and the use of 11 For Information Only 11 drawings for field wor The surveillance section identifies a concern with the adequacy of supervisory reviews of completed test procedure *

At the inspection report exit meeting the inspector and licensee discussed the fact that these deficiencies may be indicative of inadequate supervisory oversigh The issues discussed above and the licensee 1 s actions to address overall plant performance will be reviewed on a continuous basis by the inspecto.

Maintenance Observations (62703)

The inspector reviewed the following safety related maintenance activities to verify that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, technical specifications, NRC regulations, and industry codes and standard Work Order Number 880728001 880223136 880425107 Description Fisher Vee Ball Valve Inspectio Replacement of terminal board in Unit 1 cabinet TP 15-No. 24 Steam Generator Feedwater Control Valve (24BF19), demand pegged high, recalibrated I/P converter.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company Work Order Number 880324060 880319024

Description No. 22 Service Water Strainer~ replace carbon steel strainers with aluminum bronze strainers of a new design and add new drain, vent and pressure ta No. 22 Charging Pump inspection, replaced high speed bearings in speed increaser and performed laser alignmen During the observations of the above activities, two concerns were identified by the inspecto The work order written to conduct preventative maintenance on the Fisher Vee Ball Valve (23SW42 - Diesel Generator oil cooler flow control valve) stated that the inspection was to be performed in accordance with field directive S-C-M600-MFD-218, Revision However, a review of the work package and discussions with the mechanics on the job determined that this directive was not provided by-the planning departmen Although the mechanics were obviously familiar with the inspection requirements, the field directive should be provided in the work packag During a separate activity, the inspector observed that the technician replacing a terminal board in the Unit 1 relay room cabinet TP 15-1 was utilizing "For Information Only 11 drawings rather than 11Working Copy 11 drawings as is the normal practic When questioned about the use of 11 For Information Only 11 drawings, the technician stated that 11Working Copy 11 drawings are normally used but that he was using what his supervisor gave him and had not questioned their us The inspector verified that there were no relevant differences between the 11 For Information Only 11 and 11Working Copy 11 drawing Both of the above concerns were promptly brought to the licensee's attentio The inspector will continue to closely monitor the implementation of the maintenance program during future inspection No violations were cite.

Surveillance Observations (61726) Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, licensee approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 **

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

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The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:

SP(0)4. 6. llAl-I SP(0)4.l.2.1A&B Containment Systems - Primary Containment-I Reactivity Control Systems - Boration Flow Path SP(0)4.0.5-P-SW(l2) Inservice Testing - No. 12 Service Water Pump lIC-2. 6-009 Channel Functional Test 1 TE-431A-B, N Reactor Coolant Loop Delta T - Tavg Protection, Channel III Reactor Engineering Manual Part 9 - Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement (MTC)

During review of the licensee's MTC calculations, the inspector identified an error in the averaging of the boration and dilution MTC values in determinirig the final MTC resul The corrected value is within technical specification limits, however the inspector is concerned that supervisory review which was documented by signature on the test procedure was not adequate in identifying the calculation erro No violations were cite.

Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown (71710) Inspection Activity The inspectors independently verified the operability of selected ESF systems by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuratio This ESF system walkdown was also conducted to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat This inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7171 The Unit 1 Chemical Volume Control and the Unit 2 Containment Spray Systems were inspected and no deficiencies were identifie No violations were identified.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 13 Review of Licensee Reports (90712, 92700)

Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed licensee event reports (LER) as well as other periodic and special reports submitted by the license The reports were reviewed for accuracy and timely submissio Additional followup performed at the discretion of the inspector to verify corrective action implementation and adequacy is detailed with the applicable report summar The following reports were received and reviewed during the inspection period:

Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - March 1988 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - March 1988 Unit 1 Special Report 87-10 supplies information concerning the flooding of No. 1 service water ba The inspector verified that NRC concerns delineated in combined special team inspection 272/88-02/311/88-02 were adequately addresse Unit 2 Special Report 88-03, Unit 1 LER 88-008-00 and Unit 2 LER 88-005-00 discuss occurrences of late or missed firewatch surveillance The inspector reviewed the circumstances of each occurrence and licensee corrective actions and determined that these occurrences collectively constitute a licensee identified viulation which is not being cited based upon meeting the criteria of 10CFR2, Appendix Unit 1 LER 88-004-00 addresses a missed EQ surveillance resulting in No. 11 containment hydrogen analyzer being inoperable during a mode chang Unit 1 LER 88-005-00 addresses a missed sealed source leak check surveillanc The cause of these missed surveillances and others previously reported in LER 311/88-004-00 is poor administrative control when the licensee changed methods for surveillance trackin Licensee actions to address these issues include a departmental surveillance review by radiation protection (RP) and Chemistry to ensure accuracy and a QA evaluation of the administrative control of surveillances under the new tracking system in genera Licensee control of ensuring the completion of surveillances within the required time is unresolved pending licensee completion and NRC review of the corrective actions delineated abov (UNR 272/311/88-11-01)

Unit 1 LER 88-006-00 addresses an Appendix R cable design deficiency which is discussed in Section 3.3.3 of this repor Unit 1 LER 88-007-00 discusses licensee identification of non-rated fire dampers and duct sections penetrating barriers not having approved coating due to inadequate engineering review of procurement documentatio Public Service Electric and Gas Company

The inspector has determined that the corrective actions for previously identified Appendix R deficiencies committed to by the licensee in their response dated April 28, 1988 to the Notice of Violation and Civil Penalty (Inspection Report 311/87-29) should preclude recurrence of deficiencies of this* type and concludes that no further action is require Unit 1 LER 88-009-00 addresses a manual reactor trip due to the loss of both EH pump The details of this event are discussed in Section 3.2.1 of this repor.

December 1987 Containment In~egrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) Results Evaluation (70323)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's December 1987 CILRT results documented in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix J paragraph V. These results were summarized in a technical document entitled 11 Reactor Containment Building Third/Final Inservice Integrated Leak Rate Test First Ten Year Inspection Interval" attached to the licensee's letter dated March 25, 1988 to the NR The report contains a general test description, leakage data, and a summary of result Both Mass Point (ANSI/ANS-56.8) and Total Time (ANSI N 45.5) calculational methods were employed for the December 1987 CILR The total time method of ANSI N 45.4 is consistent with the requirements of the current version of 10CFR50 Appendix J and is the method of record for the tes The purpose of the test was to demonstrate that leakages through the primary containment building and systems penetrating containment do not exceed that allowed by plant technical specification The test was conducted with containment isolation barriers in an 11as-left

condition and was witnessed by an NRC regional inspector during a routine safety inspectio The CILRT was followed by a successful verification* test and demonstrated acceptable results for the containment with respect to both the 11 as-left 11 and 11 as-found

condition Inspection findings are documented in USNRC Region I Inspection Report 50-272/87-3 Pertinent test parameters and results are presented below: Type A Test Parameters Test Method Absolute Calculational Methods Total Time (ANSI N 45.4)

Mass Point (ANSI/ANS. 56.8)

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 15.

Test Duration:

Stabilization Period 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Data Gathering for Leakage 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Calculation Verification Leak Rate Test 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Test Pressure 63.2 psia (full pressure test)

Test Results Wt. %/Day Acceptance maximum 0.075 allowable leak rate Measured (Total Time Method)

0.043 leak rate, Lam at the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval Corrections due to water Insignificant level changes and Type C penalties Conclusion Acceptable The inspection concludes that, based on a review of the results, the containment has passed its acceptance criteria in both the "as-left" and "as-found" conditio No violations were identifie.

Allegation Followup RI-87-A-127 (71707)

On October 21, 1987, the NRC received an allegation stating that components associated with the charging/safety injection system may have been intentionally damaged to discredit the contractor performing work on associated pipe support It was also alleged that quality control (QC) inspectors were identifying an unusually high rate of discrepancies in order to justify an increased work load and overtim Combined inspection report 50-272/87-32; 50-311/87-33 documents the inspector's review of the licensee's investigation into the component discrepancie The discrepancies were determined to be caused by poor workmanship and after inspecting the discrepancies, reviewing the licensee report, and interviewing licensee and contractor personnel, the inspector concluded that the subject components were not intentionally

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

damage The inspector also reviewed the investigation of QC inspection findings and work hour The inspection findings were well documented by written surveillance reports and photograph Records indicate that the QC findings were well justified and that the amount of overtime was appropriate and controlled within nuclear department limit The inspector concluded that no safety concern exists and that the allegations are unsubstantiate.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with Mr. J. Zupko and other licensee personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on Region I review and discussions with the licensee, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restriction il.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

ATTACHMENT 1 Salem Units 1 and 2 Split Samples BNL Salem Ratio Comparison Chloride(ppb)-RWST+lmlSpike Chloride(ppb)-RWST+0.5m1Spike Sulfate(ppb)-RWST+lmlSpike Sulfate(ppb)-RWST+0.5m1Spike Fluoride(ppb)-RWST+lmlSpike Fluoride(ppb)-RWST+0.5m1Spike 62.6+1.7 80.0+8 1.28+0.13 Disagreement 35.8+1.7 46.0+5 1.28!0.15 Agreement 96.3+4.0 86.0+8 0~89!0.09 Agreement 79.3+3.6 73.0+7 0.92!0.10 Agreement 47.9+1.l 56.0+3 1.17!0.07 Disagreement 30.2+1.4 32.0+2 1.06!0.08 Agreement Iron(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+lmlSpike 499+2 Iron(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+0.5mlSpike 242+2 Copper(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+lmlSpike 516+1 Copper(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+0.5mlSpike 258+1 Nickel(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+lmlSpike 573+0 Nickel(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+0.5mlSpike 343+0 Chromium(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+mlSpike 523+5 Chromium(ppb)Aux.FeedTank+0.5ml Spike Hydrazine(ppb)

Ammonia(ppb)

272+0 547+/-7 515+40 517+59 1.04!0.12 Agreement 250+44 1.03!0.18 Agreement 523+51 2.01!0.10 Agreement 260+45 Agreement 530+32 0.92!0.06 Agreement 300+18 0.87!0.05 Disagreement 480+84 0.92!0.16 Agreement 250+44 0.92!0.16 Agreement 550+/-20 1.01+/-0.04 Agreement 510+31 0.99!0.10 Agreement