IR 05000272/1989021
| ML18094B252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1990 |
| From: | Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18094B251 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-89-21, 50-311-89-19, NUDOCS 9001250377 | |
| Download: ML18094B252 (10) | |
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Report N License Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/89-21 50-311/89-19 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Faci 1 ity:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Dates:
October 17, 1989 - November 20, 1989 Inspectors:
Kathy Halvey Gibson, Senior Resident Inspector Stephen M. Pindale, Resident Inspector Approv.ed:
Inspection Summary:
Reactor Projects I /r; lo/)
~
Inspection 50-272/89-21; 311/89-19 on October 17, 1989 - November 20, 1989 Areas Inspected:
Resident safety inspection of the following areas:
operations, radiological controls, surveillance testing, maintenance, emergency preparedness, security, engineering/technical support, and review of licensee report Results:
One non-cited violation was identified involving the failure to report to the NRC an RHR overpressurization event which placed the unit outside of its design basis as stated in the FSA PDR ADOCK 05000272 Q
DETAILS SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection period with the exception of several short duration power reductions for testing, maintenance or transformer solar magnetic disturbance precaution Unit 2 was in Mode 5 at the beginning of the report period for main transformer replacemen The unit was returned to service on November 5, 1989 and operated at essentially full power for the remainder of the report perio.
OPERATIONS (40500, 71707, 93702) Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, the inspectors verified that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct observation of a~~ivities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verifi-cation of safety system status and Limiting Conditions for Operation, and review of facility record These inspection activities included 203 inspection hours including weekend inspection on November 19, 1989 (4:30 -
8:30 p.m.). Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2. Unit l On November 9, 1989, the licensee performed a turbine volumetric test which reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) average temperature (Tavg) by boration to determine the quantity of steam needed to fully open the turbine governor valve The test was performed as part of a licensee rerating study for the Salem Unit Due to delays with removing an inoperable power range nuclear instrument (NI) from service, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3, which requires the initiation of a unit shutdown within one hour, was entered. After an hour, the licensee diluted the RCS boron concentration to raise Tavg and restore the NI to operable statu TS 3.0.3 was exite The unit operated outside the TS for over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The unit remained at 100% power throughout the even See NRC Special Inspection Report 50-272/89-27 for details on further NRC followup of the even. Unit 2 On October 27, 1989 with the unit in Mode 4, plant heatup in progress, and the residual heat removal system (RHR) out of service, the RHR high discharge pressure alarm annunciated in the control roo Reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure was in the process of being raised to 1000 psi When the RHR high discharge pressure alarm was received, control room indicated RCS and RHR pressure were 600 psi RHR and RCS pressures were reduced to 300 psig by plant operator The RHR local pressure gauge for 21 RHR suction piping indicated approximately 550 psig and 22 RHR loop suction indicated approximately 60 psi Investigation by the licensee identified a series of check valves which if not seated properly, would result in backleakage from the RCS to the 21 RHR loo During individual testing of the check valves, nos. 21 and 23SJ56 cold leg injection valves exhibited leakag By increasing the differential pressure across the valves combined with mechanir.al agitation, the licensee was able to reseat the 21 and 23SJ56 valve The cold leg injection line check valves were subsequently leak rate tested in accordance with surveillance procedure SP(0)4.4.7.2.1 with satisfactory result Immediate corrective actions ~aken by the licensee to prevent recurrence included an on-the-spot change to plant operating procedure IOP-2, 11Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby" to require the reactor operators to monitor RHR pressure while RCS pressure is being raised and terminate the RCS pressure increase if RHR pressure is found to be increasin The licensee has determined that the root cause of the improper seating of RHR cold leg injection check valves is the method with which the RHR system is removed from service in that the system is left solid at approximately 350 psig with no differential pressure across the check valves to assist in proper seatin The licensee is in the process of reviewing the RHR termination procedure for possible changes to resolve the ~roble The inspector reviewed the licensee's engineering analysis of the event and the RHR system design parameters as stated in the Salem Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The event was discussed with station management, engineering and operations personne Followup investigation by licensee engineers determined that inherent RHR suction piping design pressure is higher than that stated in the FSA Stress calculations verified that ANSI 831.1 code allowable limits were not exceeded as a result of the increased pressur Therefore, the safety
significance of the inadvertent high pressure condition is negligibl However, the design pressure of the RHR suction piping as stated in the FSAR and verified in the existing piping calculations is 450 psi Pressurization of the 21 RHR loop suction piping to approximately 600 psig, 150 psig above this stated design pressure, resulted in the unit being in a condition outside the* plant design basi Further, the inspector concluded that licensee failure to report the RHR system overpressurization to the NRC in a timely manner is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.72 (4 hour immediate notification) and 50.73 (Licensee Event Report) reporting requirement However, the violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section of the Enforcement Policy were satis-fie (NCV 50-272/89-21-01)
The inspector had no further questions at this time, however the revised RHR termination procedure and LER will be reviewed when availabl. Both Units On November 17, 1989, the licensee identified that the valve controls circuit for the residual heat removal (RHR) cold leg injection valves do no~ meet single failure criterion in that a short circuit in the valve control logic may cause an inadvertent closur The inspector verified that the valve motor breakers were tagged open and the station emergency operating procedures were revised to have the breakers closed when required for valve repositioning during an acciden For further information concerning NRC followup of this issue, refer to NRC Special Inspection Repdrt 50-272/89-25; 50-311/89-2.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707) Inspection Activities PSE&G's compliance with the radiological protection program was verified
_on a periodic basis. These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings The activities observed were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the radiological controls progra An improvement in house-keeping within the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) was noted by the inspector during the inspection perio.
SURVEILLANCE TESTING (61726) Inspection Activity*
During this inspection period the inspector performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillance tests were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, approved procedures, and NRC regulation These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6172 The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:
lPD-2.6.055 Reactor Engineering Manual Part 2 SP(0)4.0.5P-SW-26 SP(0)4.8. SP(0)4.8.2. SP(0)4.8.2..2 Inspection Findings No. 13 steam generator level protection channel I functional test Calorimetric Calculation Inservice Test - No. 26 service water pump Electric Power Systems - AC distribution Electric Power Systems - 28 voe*
distribution Electric Power System - 125 VDC distribution The surveillance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance progra.
MAINTENANCE (62703)
5.1 Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industrial codes and standard These inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:
Work Order 89111308 891025173 891025165 900813013 890818081 890405012 5.2 Inspection Findings Procedure M3Q-2 M3Z M3Z M3L-1 M3I MP5.14 Description Troubleshoot 2BKR52/RTB; Breaker failed to close during surveillance testin Perform inspection of limit switch compartment for 14SW2 Perform inspection of limit switch compartment for 14SW1 Discharge header to nuclear header MOV 12SW17 motor; clean, inspect, lubricate, megga Calibrate 2TD-7295 for 2C-diesel generator, Jacket water temperatur C-diesel generator Engine lube oil pre-circulating pump; disassemble pump, inspect, replace mechanical sea On November 9, during solid state protection system train B surveillance fun ct i ona l testing, the 11 B 11 reactor trip breaker ( RTB) successfully tripped, however, would not reclos Several attempts were made, however, the breaker repeatedly would not reclos The RTB was declared inoperable and the NRC was immediately notified in accordance with Technical Specifications (TSs).
The 11B 11 RTB was subsequently removed and replaced with the 11A
Bypass RTB, thereby exiting the TS action requirement The inspector observed the associated maintenance troubleshooting activities on November 1 Maintenance supervision, System Engineering personnel and Quality Assurance personnel were presen The troubleshooting activities were both systematic and deliberat Followup evaluation of the work activities, including consultation with the breaker manufacturer (Westinghouse) concluded that the undervoltage trip attachment (UVTA) was bumping the trip bar upon breaker closure resulting in the latch slipping off of the latch pi Westinghouse indicated to the licensee that a factory set adjustment may have been out of toleranc *
The UVTA was subsequently replaced and the breaker was returned to the 118 11 RTB cubicl The licensee plans to send the removed UVTA to Westinghouse for analysis and repai The licensee will evaluate corrective actions pending the results of the vendor analysi The inspector had no further question.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71707) Inspection Activity The inspector rev~ewed the licensee's compliance with 10CFR50.72 and 50.73 event reporting requirements relative to an RHR overpressurization even.2 Inspection Findings The inspector concluded that the licensee's failure to make the required 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification and submit an LER within 30 days is an apparent violation which is not being cited since the criteria specified in Section V.A. of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied. See Section 2. of this report for further details on this matte.
SECURITY (71707)
7.1. Inspection Activity PSE&G's compliance with the security program was verified-on a periodic basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundarie These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings The security activities inspected were effective with meeting the safety objective of the security progra.
ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT Operations and engineering response with regard to ECCS check valve leakage encountered during the Unit 2 startup w~s prompt and thorough in troubleshooting and correcting the leakage and RHR overpressurization conditio However, several subsequent evaluations of 'these problems were deficien The root cause of a body to bonnet leak on valve 23SJ56
was determined to be improper stud torque, however there did not appear to be any effort to determine why or how the studs were at the improper torque valu Further, the licensee did not promptly recognize that the RHR overpressurization placed the system in a condition outside of its FSAR design basis. These issues were discussed with the engineers and station managemen.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LER) (90712, 92700, 92702) The inspector reviewed the following licensee reports for accuracy and timely submissio Unft 1 Monthly Operating Report - September and October 1989 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - September and October 1989 Unit 1 LER 89-025; Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Inoperable; This event was identified during an investigation following a June 9 reactor trip (discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/89-15; 50-311/89-14), and was due to a steam trap isolation valve being misaligned following a recent design chang This self-identified violation was properly corrected by the licensee in a timely manne Therefore, the failure to comply with Technical Specification (TS)
operability requirements will not be cited since the discretion criteria of 10CFR2, Appendix C, Section V.G. have been me (NCV 50-272/89-21-02)
Unit 1 LER 89-026; Controlled Shutdown due to IA Safeguards Equipment Controller Inoperable; This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/89-15; 50-311/89-1 Unit 1 LER 89-028; Missed TS Surveillance relative to ECCS pump casing and pipe venting requirements; and Unit 2 LER 89-015; Missed TS Surveillance relative to channel calib-ration of containment wide range pressure post-accident instrumen-tatio For both of the events, the licensee immediately entered the appropriate TS action statement and satisfactorily performed the surveillance requirement The inspector determined that the root cause of these missed TS surveillance tests was inadequate licensee implementation of TS amendments (implemented June 1989 and July 1987 respectively).
As a result of a similar previous event (Unit 1 LER 89-22), the licensee instituted a new program for TS amendment implementation which includes a single individual responsible for ensuring required items needed for TS amendment implementation are identified and complet The completed items are then reviewed and
verified by Station Operations Review Committe NRC Unresolved item 50-272/89-15-10 was opened in Inspection Report 50-272/89-15; 50-311/
89-14 pending inspector assessment of the effectiveness of the new program. 'Additional corrective action taken by the licensee included a review of all TS amendments implemented to date and no additional deficiencies were foun In addition, a verification audit to ensure all requirements of Unit 1 and 2 TS surveillances are met will be completed by April 30, 199 Pending licensee completion of the audit and inspector review of the results, the adequacy of the licensee's program for implementation of Amendments is unresolve (UNR 50-272/89-21-03)
Unit 1 LER 89-029; TS Not Properly Implemented for Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Start Function; This event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/89-22; 50-311/89-2 Unit 1 LER 89-031; Oxygen Concentration in the Waste Gas Holdup System Exceeded TS Limits; Several similar events have previously occurre The NRC is currently tracking the licensee's actions via UNR 50-272/89-15-0 Further, the licensee plans to submit a supplemental report by December 31, 1989 following completion of the continuing root cause investigatio Unit 1 LER 89-018-01; Supplemental to LER 89-01 Unit 2 LER 89-016; Three of Four Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
Inoperable; During a controlled shutdown on October 14, 1989, three of the four MSIVs failed to close within the TS required 5 seconds during a surveillance tes In the past the associated hydraulic valves have been responsible for MSIV closure time concern As a means of identifying why the closure times were not met the bypass valves were disassembled and inspected and the hydraulic oil for the bypass valves was change No problems were identifie The, licensee has not yet identified the root cause of this event, however, investi-gations are continuin The MSIV's have been tested previously during unit restart operations. Testing during removal of the unit from service was done as an initiative by the licensee for early identifi-cation of problems so they could be corrected during the scheduled outage and ensure satisfactory testing during restart (rather than having to deal with problems during the start-up). A supplemental LER is expected to be submitted by the licensee by January 31, 1990 to document the completion and results of the investigations, including results of a probabilistic risk assessment associated with the increas~d measured valve stroke time During the subsequent plant startup, all four MSIVs were successfully tested on November 4, 198 I
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Unit 2 LER 89-017; Environmental Qualification of Motor-Operated Valves due to Installed Limit Switch Compartment Heaters; This concern is documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/89-22; 50-311/89-2 Unit 2 LER 89-013-01; Supplement to LER 89-01 The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and the guidance provided in NUREG 102 In general, the overall quality of the LERs reviewed during this inspection was adequat.
EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)
The inspectors met with Mr. Lynn Miller and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on ~egion I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restrictions.