IR 05000272/1998080
| ML18106A401 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1998 |
| From: | Modes M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18106A399 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-98-80, 50-311-98-80, 50-354-98-04, 50-354-98-4, NUDOCS 9803310146 | |
| Download: ML18106A401 (11) | |
Text
Report Nos:
License Nos:
Licensee:
Facility:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/98-80, 50-311/98-80,50-354/98-04 DPR-70, DPR-75, NPF-57 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Artificial Island March 2-4, 1998 D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist N. McNamara, Emergency Preparedness Specialist F. Bower, Resident Inspector, Calvert Cliff R. Struckmeyer, Senior Radiation Specialist P. Frechette, Security Specialist Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9803310146 980320 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE Executive Summary................................................ iii Report Details...................... *............................... 1 P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance.................................. 1 PB Miscellaneous EP Issues......................................... 5 PB. 1 Scenario Preparation and Control.............................. 5 P Emergency Notification System (ENS) Telephone Line Staffing......... 6 P Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Review............... 6 V. Management Meetings............................................ 6 X 1 Exit Meeting................................................. 6 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED....................................... 7 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED................................ 7 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED............................................ 7 ii
t
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Artificial Island Full-Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation March 2-4, 1998 Inspection Report 50-354/98-04, 50-272/98-80, 50-311 /98-80 The licensee's overall performance was good. The facilities were staffed and activated in a prompt manner following the alert declaration due to a simulated tornado touching down on site. However, accountability was not initiated until about two hours after the alert declaration and therefore resulted in the delay of locating and responding to a simulated injured person. The classifications of the simulated events were timely and accurate and offsite notifications were completed within 1 5 minutes. The protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. Good briefings and generally good command and control were observed in all facilities. However, efforts by the technical support staff could have been more aggressive in pursing alternate methods to terminate the release. There were good communications observed during the exercise among the facilitie The licensee's post-exercise critique was very good. The licensee identified numerous issues, in addition to those identified by the NRC, and categorized those issues according to significance. The critique was balanced with positive and negative findings but overall was appropriately self-critica The NRC sent a team to the site to participate along with the licensee. Overall, the licensee worked well with and effectively supported the NRC tea iii
- Report Details P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance Exercise Evaluation Scope During this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial full-participation exercise in the simulator control room (SCR), the technical support center (TSC), the operations support center (OSC), the emergency operations facility (EOF) and the emergency news center (ENC). The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations (PARs), command and control, communications, and the overall
- implementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercis Emergency Response Facility Observations and Critique b. 1 Simulator Control Room (SCR)
The SCR crew quickly recognized and addressed off-normal conditions throughout the exercise. Good briefings and communications techniques were demonstrated throughout the exercise. Plant procedures were readily referenced and implemented, such as, Technical Specifications, abnormal procedures, emergency plan implementing procedures, and emergency operating procedures. The crew quickly and accurately classified a simulated tornado touching down on site as an alert. Activation of the emergency response organization (ERO) and notification of offsite agencies was timel Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was activated in a timely manner. Command and control was good and the emergency director of operations (EDO) continually referred to the licensee's emergency action level (EAL) tables to determine if classification upgrades were required. As information became available, status boards were immediately updated and there was excellent communication between the emergency facilities and with the NRC players. The technical team displayed excellent teamwork and continually kept the NRC players apprised of changing plant conditions. Although the facility briefings could have been more timely, they were sufficiently detailed and the technical support supervisor (TSS) utilized visual aids to describe plant condition The technical team was proactive in mitigating simulated malfunctions. However, alternative solutions were not simultaneously considered nor were back-up plans developed if the original plan failed. This improved near the end of the exercis Accountability was not implemented by the licensee in a timely manner (one hour fifty minutes following the alert declaration). Timeliness was a concern because a tornado struck the site and could have caused damage to site structures and injury to personnel. Because accountability was not performed until about 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br />, a simulated injured person wa*s not located for two hours. Also, the accountability procedure was not properly implemented in the TSC because the security guard did
'
not forward the collected accountability cards to the security guardhouse for verifying missing persons. Even though the initial accountability list was available within the allotted 30 minutes, it took the licensee an additional 12 minutes to verify tl:le location of TSC personnel on the list. This issue was identified by the licensee and their review determined it was a training issue because accountability had* been correctly performed at the other facilitie During the radiological release, the inspectors observed that the EDO became narrowly focused on closing the back draft dampers in the auxiliary building to stop the release rather than pursuing the direct closing of the VC-5 valve (containment pressure relief isolation). This decision was based on a high dose rate (30 rem/hour) in the vicinity of the VC-5 valve. However, before the licensee could proceed to close the dampers, they needed to know the design pressure limit of the duct work around the dampers. For over an hour, the technical team pursued acquiring this information while the EDO did not initiate other solutions as suggested by the TSS. When a pressure limit was obtained, a team was dispatched to close the dampers. However, approximately 15 minutes later, a vent specialist entered the TSC, contradicted the initial pressure value, and pointed out that under the existing plant conditions the pressure would rupture the duct work causing the release to go into the auxiliary building. The dispatched team was then immediately pulled back. This prompted the technical team to re-examine efforts to close the VC-5 valve. It was at this point that the radiological assessment coordinator began to establish the precautions for the team and how long they could remain in the area without exceeding their dose limits. The inspectors concluded that there had been confusion regarding dose rates versus accumulated doses for backout values for working on the VC-5 valve. Therefore, licensee efforts to stop the release were delayed for approximately an hour because parallel solutions for terminating the release were not pursue * Operations Support Center (QSC)
The OSC was staffed and activated 27 minutes after an alert declaration was announced over the plant page system. The OSC personnel referenced procedures to set up and activate the facility. Generally, the facility was appropriately equipped to support the functions of the OS Good command and control was demonstrated by the OSC coordinator (OSSC) and his supervisory staff. The initial brief established the command and control protocols, and was excellent in scope and detail. However, the inspectors noted that the brief appeared pre-planned for the exercise, but was not proceduralize The turnover from the initially responding OSCC to the assigned OSCC was well conducted. Status and priority job boards were appropriately maintained. The OSC staff was periodically briefed on plant status and OSC priorities. The communication of commands was satisfactorily controlled; however, three-point communication and phonetic alphabet techniques were inconsistently used by the OSC staff and support teams.. Support teams dispatched by the OSC were briefed, tracked, and debriefed. Pre-implementation planning for the support teams included reviews of the job and radiological conditions. Work orders, tagouts, and
procedures were satisfactorily developed to support the dispatched team However, the high demand for health physics technicians and supervisory personnel became a bottleneck to the timely dispatching of support team The OSC staff demonstrated good oversight and control. of repair teams. Generally good briefs were conducted using large visual aids such as plant maps, building plans, and a briefing checklist. However, the backout instructions for a team to the auxiliary building were incorrectly communicated, in that, the team backed out based on a* dose rate versus an accumulated exposure limit intended by the OSC HP/ALARA staff. Teams were logged onto the OSC status board, assigned team numbers, and reminded to contact the OSC every 15 minute The inspectors observed two dispatched teams. The following discrepancies were observed. One team opened two electrical panel doors versus simulating these actions as directed during the initial OSC briefing. Frisking practices were inconsistently implemented between the two teams. Specific protective clothing instructions were not provided during briefings and the auxiliary building team members were not consistently dressed. One worker was not able to successfully don his respirator and did not bring the required prescription lens to the radiological control poin Emergency Operations Facility (EOFl The EOF was activated in a timely manner with the appropriate level of staff. There were no pre-positioned participants. Emergency management responsibilities were effectively transferred from the TSC. The emergency response manager (ERM) was in charge of the facility and demonstrated good command and control of all aspects of EOF operations. The EOF was of sufficient size and contained all materials and equipment necessary to support proper facility operations. Habitability of the EOF was assessed during the event. Appropriate protective actions, when required, were properly implemented in the EOF to maintain habitability. Accurate and timely briefings were provided on a periodic bases to all facility personnel. In addition, periodic "leads briefings" were provided by appropriate individual The EOF staff used the EAL process in conjunction with continuous assessment of plant conditions to properly make the general emergency (GE) classificatio Appropriate PARs were determined and provided to state authorities in a timely manne The EOF staff demonstrated continuous communications capabilities with each other and with other participating organizations. The communications systems functioned properly and all required notifications were accomplished. The ERM insured that offsite representatives were briefed on an ongoing basis. This was accomplished both through facility briefings, and inclusion of offsite representatives in the "leads briefings." It was observed by the inspectors that although the "leads briefings" were informative, they were somewhat repetitive and therefore required more time than was necessary to convey pertinent informatio '
The licensee performance in the dose assessment area was very good. Dose assessment personnel arrived within 45 minutes of the alert declaration. The dose assessment staff displayed good initiative by promptly obtaining meteorological data and performing calculations of plume direction and offsite dose projections. Offsite dose projections were performed in a timely manner as release data and additional meteorological data became available. Frequent "what if" calculations were performed in addition to those based on actual conditions. When radiation levels increased in the electrical penetration room, a "what if" projection was performed in the TSC for an unmonitored and unfiltered release from that room. (It was later determined that the increased radiation levels were due to shine.) However, considering the confusion about the design pressure of the duct work and filter banks in the release path, the inspectors did not observe the licensee perform a
"what if" projection for an unfiltered release going out through the plant ven Overall, the dose assessment staff worked well with one another and with the radiological support manager. The dose assessment staff also displayed good initiative by performing simultaneous assessments using different methodologies to compare result Offsite field monitoring teams were deployed in a timely manner following a good briefing from the offsite team coordinator (OTC). The OTC effectively directed the teams according to procedure. Plume traversals were performed as specified in the procedur Status boards for the radiological monitoring system (RMS) and meteorological data were maintained and kept current throughout the drill. Trends were noted on the RMS status board. Plume direction, sectors recommended for evacuation or sheltering, and field team monitor readings were displayed on a map boar Emergency News Center (ENC)
The ENC was well staffed and equipped. Information being relayed to the ENC was accurate and status boards were updated regularly with minimal delay. News bulletins and press conferences were accurate and were communicated in an understandable manner. The ENC staff satisfactorily addressed simulated rumors during the press conferences. There was good awareness and discussion about relocating the ENC because the area where the ENC was located was to be evacuated because of the direction of the simulated plume. It was observed that no plant drawings were used during the press conferences to help explain plant conditions. The simulated press could have been more aggressive in their questioning. It was also observed by the inspectors that no procedural directive exists for the review of news bulletins by the ERM prior to their release. Although early bulletins were reviewed, that practice was abandoned as it resulted in the delay of the releases. Procedural directive to have the ERM, or his/her designee, review the releases would help ensure the accuracy of the news bulletin *
5 Licensee Exercise Critique Immediately following the exercise, the licensee began its critique process. Players, as well as controllers, assembled at their assigned facility arid provided debrief The inspectors observed the debriefs at the OSC and TSC and assessed those activities as very good. At the formal licensee critique on March 4, 1998, the inspectors observed that the licensee identified issues in addition to the ones identified by the inspectors. Positive and negative items were identified, and issues were ranked according to significance. Overall, the critique was thorough and appropriately self-critical and was assessed as very goo Overall Exercise Conclusions The licensee's overall performance was good. The facilities were generally staffed and activated in a prompt manner. Good command and control was observed at all of the facilities. The two classifications of the simulated events were timely and accurate, and offsite notifications were completed within 1 5 minutes. The PARs were appropriate and timely. There were many good discussions observed during the exercise within individual facilities and among the facilities. Site accountability could have been initiated immediately after the alert declaration. Aggressive pursuit of simultaneous solutions to terminate the release was not evident in the TS PS Miscellaneous EP Issues P Scenario Preparation and Control Due to the combination of simulated events (tornado, reactor coolant system leakage, rising containment radiation levels, and failure of one containment pressure relief isolation valve to close), a decision was made to escalate to a GE classification from an alert. According to the scenario time rine, the ERM was anticipated to have declared a site area emergency instead of a GE. Licensee exercise controllers did not intervene to stop the declaration of the GE. Although the decision to declare a GE was appropriate considering the circumstances, failure of the controllers to maintain the exercise time line could have resulted in offsite agencies being unable to meet exercise objectives due to the sudden escalation of classification level After the exercise was completed, the licensee informed the inspectors that the scenario had been reviewed by operating crews and not by anyone at an ERM leve Since the ERM made the GE declaration during the exercise, future scenario preparation may necessitate an ERM review. The controllers stated that they did n*ot intervene because it would interfere with the realism of the exercise. For future exercises, consideration should be given to maintaining the agreed-upon scenario time line to support offsite agency exercise objectives.
..
P Emergency Notification System (ENS) Telephone Line Staffing During this exercise, the NRC participated by dispatching a site team, as well as by staffing response centers in the Regional office and headquarters. After the exercise was completed, the inspectors received comments from NRC players regarding the licensee's use of the ENS telephone line. Specifically, NRC headquarter's players initially received intermittent and incomplete information from licensee staff via the ENS line. The NRC then requested that the licensee designate an ENS communicator to staff the line and provide a continuous source of plant *
status information. Eventually, the line was continuously staffed and the flow of information to the NRC improved. 10 CFR 50. 72(c)(3) requires "that each licensee, shall during the course of an event maintain an open continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC." This issue deserves licensee attention to prevent future occurrenc P Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Review A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the UFSAR or the emergency plan. During this exercise, the inspectors observed the licensee's compliance with the emergency plan regarding ERO structure, facility activation and usage, classification of simulated events, and notification of offsite agencie V. Management Meetings X 1 Exit Meeting The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 4, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' finding ".
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors Opened None Closed None Discussed None ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
c.
EAL EDO ENC EOF EP ERO ERM GE NRC osc oscc PAR RMS SCR TSC TSS UFSAR
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Emergency Action Level Emergency Duty Officer Emergency News Center Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Preparedness Emergency Response Organization Emergency Response Manager General Emergency Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Support Center Operations Support Center Coordinator Protective Action Recommendation Radiation Monitoring System Simulator Control Room Technical Support Centei Technical Support Supervisor Update Final Safety Analysis Report