IR 05000272/1998011
| ML18106B007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18106B005 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-98-11, 50-311-98-11, NUDOCS 9901050140 | |
| Download: ML18106B007 (23) | |
Text
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Report N Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50-272, 50-311 DPR-70, DPR-75
REGION I
50-272/98-11,50-311/98-11 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 October 25, 1998 - December 5, 1998 M. G. Evans, Senior Resident Inspector F. J. Laughlin, Resident Inspector H. K. Nieh, Resident Inspector L. M. Harrison, Reactor Engineer J. T. Furia, Senior Radiation Specialist J. T. Yerokun, Senior Reactor Engineer T. F. Burns, Reactor Engineer James C. Linville, Chief, Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects 9901050140 981221
- DR ADOCK 05000272 PDR
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Salem Nuelear Generating Station NRC Inspection Report 50-272/98-11, 50-311 /98-11 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of an announced inspection by a region-based inspector focusing on the radiation protection progra Operations Observed operator performance was generally good. Operators responded promptly and appropriately to the unplanned trip of a Unit 2 steam generator feed pump. Additionally, Unit 2 shutdown activities to make repairs to the No. 21 reactor coolant pump seal were well controlled. (Section 01.1 l Operational Experience department personnel reviewed the selecte.d NRC and industry communications in a timely manner, and thoroughly communicated the information to the appropriate station departments. PSE&G's actions for selected risk-significant NRC communications were effective. (Section 08.1)
Maintenance PSE&G personnel failed to evaluate the potential impact of connecting non-safety-related test equipment on all four operable channels of the reactor protection system, thereby potentially compromising the system's design bases. Corrective actions for previous issues identified by the NRC involving the similar connections of temporary equipment to operable safety-related systems were ineffective in preventing the occurrence of the event described in the subject licensee event report. PSE&G's root cause evaluation thoroughly examined the issues. As a result, PSE&G personnel developed extensive corrective actions. (Section M8. 1)
Engineering Following self-identification, PSE&G appropriately documented and corrected a deficiency involving the use of a non-safety-related spring charging motor in a safety-related circuit breaker, which resulted in a non-cited violation. (Section E4.1)
Plant Support An effective radiation protection program has been established for controlling high, locked high and very high radiation areas, and planning and maintaining occupational exposures ALARA. Appropriate controls were implemented in radiation protection to support forced outage work in the Unit 2 containment. (Section R 1. 1)
ii
An effective training program for radiation protection technicians and contractor technicians has been established. Lesson plans and material presentations reviewed were appropriate. (Section R5.1)
A field review of PSE&G's firewatch program showed that the program procedure was adequately implemented, with no discrepancies noted. (Section F4.1)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................ iv I. Operations...................................................... 1
Conduct of Operations..................................... 1 ci 1. 1 General Comments................................... 1
Miscellaneous Operations Issue............................... 2 08. 1 Operating Experience Feedback Program........ *........... 2 08.2 (Closed) LER 50-311 /97-004-01......................... 2 II. Maintenance................................................. *... 3 M 1 Conduct of Maintenance.................................... 3 M 1. 1 General Comments................................... 3 M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment........ 4 M2.1 Leak Repair of Feedwater Containment Isolation Valve 12BF22.... 4 M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues............................. 5 M (Closed) LER 50-272/98-015-00......................... 5 M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-311/98-08-01andLER 50-311/98-013-00... 6 M8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-272/98-08-02....................... 8 Ill. Engineering..................................................... 8 E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance.................... 8 E Non-safety-related Spring Charging Motors Installed in Safety-related Circuit Breakers..................................... 8 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues.............................. 9 E (Closed) LER 50-272/97-010-00......................... 9 E (Closed) LER 50-311/96-006-01........................ 10 E (Closed) LER 50-311 /98-007-00........................ 10 E (Closed) Violation 50-272 & 50-311 /98-81-01.............. 11 IV. Plant Support.................................................. 1 2 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&CJ Controls............. 12 R 1. 1 * Radiation Protection Program Review..................... 1 2 R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C........................ 13 R Radiation Protection Training Program Review............... 13 R8 Miscellaneous RP&C Issues................................. 14 R (Closed) IFI 50-272 & 311/98-06-04..................... 14 R (Closed) IFI 50-272 & 311 /98-06-05..................... 14 R (Closed) Violation 50-272/98-08-11 and LER 50-272/98-014,.00.. 14 F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance................. 1 5 F4. 1 Firewatch Program Review............................ 1 5 V. Management Meetings............................................. 15 X 1 Exit Meeting Summary.................................... 1 5 iv
- Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the period at 100% power and remained at that power level until the end of the report perio Unit 2 began the period at 100% power. On October 26, 1998, PSE&G personnel manually reduced power to approximately 60% due to the unplanned trip of a steam generator feed pump. Full power operation resumed on October 28. On December 1, PSE&G management elected to remove Unit 2 from service to make repairs to the No. 21 reactor coolant pump seal. The unit was placed in a cold shutdown condition on December 2, and remained in that condition until the end of the report perio.1 I. Operations Conduct of Operations General Comments Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent observation of ongoing plant operations, including control room walkdowns, log reviews, and shift turnovers. The inspectors also conducted numerous plant tours to observe equipment operation and nuclear operators working in the fiel Observations and Findings In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Unit 2 control room operators promptly identified and responded to an unplanned trip of the No. 22 steam generator feed pump resulting from an electrical distribution ground. Operators maintained clear three-way communications and followed station procedures during the subsequent power reductio On December 1, 1998, PSE&G personnel commenced a shutdown of Unit 2 to make repairs to the No. 21 reactor coolant pump seal. Operators had been monitoring elevated seal leakoff rate since November 1998. The inspectors observed portions of the shutdown, and noted that control room activities were well controlle Conclusions Observed operator performance was generally good. Operators responded promptly and appropriately to the unplanned loss of a Unit 2 steam generator feed pum Additionally, Unit 2 shutdown activities to make repairs to the No. 21 reactor coolant pump seal were well controlle Miscellaneous Operations Issue *
0 Operating Experience Feedback Program a.*
Inspection Scope (40500)
The inspectors reviewed PSE&G's actions for selected generic communications and operational experience (OE) reports, such as NRC information notices and significant industry operating event reports. The inspectors also held discussions with station personnel and reviewed OE department self assessment reports to evaluate the OE program effectivenes Observations and Findings OE department personnel reviewed NRC generic communications and industry experience reports in a timely manner. The inspectors selected several risk-significant NRC communications and found that PSE&G personnel appropriately determined the applicability to the Salem and Hope Creek stations, and developed adequate actions for the issues of concern. The inspectors verified that the actions are being appropriately tracked in the PSE&G corrective action program. Based on a review of a recent OE department self assessment report, the inspectors concluded that information received by the OE department is well communicated to the appropriate station department. Conclusions Operational Experience department personnel reviewed the selected NRC and industry communications in a timely manner, and thoroughly communicated the information to the appropriate station departments. PSE&G's actions for selected risk-significant NRC communications were effectiv.2 (Closed) LER 50-311197-004-01: Failure To Comply With Technical Specification Action Statement, Diesel Generator Start, And Inadequate Surveillance Testing Inspection Scope (927001 The inspectors performed an in-office review of the subject licensee event report
. (LER), which was a supplement to an LER previously reviewed and close Observations and Findings The issue concerning the failure to comply with a technical specification action statement was documented initially in NRC inspection report 50-272,311 /97-07as a violation, and was subsequently closed in report 98-03. The NRC also documented in inspection report 50-272,311 /98-06,Section 08.2 that PSE&G planned to revise LER 311/97-004-00to remove the reference to an LER
supplement which would document the results of the manufacturer's analysis of a degraded safeguards equipment cabinet (SEC). PSE&G subsequently decided to
- write the LER supplement to document the fact that the manufacturer's evaluation did not identify any degraded components and that the cabinet would perform as designed. *There were no new issues arising from this supplemen Conclusions There were no new issues arising from a licensee event report (LER) supplement for an LER which was previously close II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance (50001, 62707, 61726, 92902, & 40500)
M 1. 1 General Comments Inspection Scope The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activitie Unit 1
WO 981119222 Repair 13 SG blowdown radiation monitor (1R19C)
TVS1.MD-GP.ZZ-0001 Leak repair on 12BF22
WO 981010073 12BF22 has packing leak
S1.OP-ST.RHR-0001 11 RHR pump surveillance test
S1.OP-ST.CC-0003 13 component cooling water pump surveillance test Unit 2
- WO 020813001 Calibrate 21 chiller condenser controls
WO 970509115 Inspect and repair 21SW102
WO 971122160 Inspect and repair 21 SW92
WO 981102245 Replace cell 21 on 28 125 VDC battery
WO 980225007 Repair 21 reactor coolant pump seal
S2.0P-ST.CS-0001 21 containment spray pump surveillance test The inspectors observed that the plant staff performed the maintenance effectively within the requirements of the station maintenance program, and that the plant staff did surveillances safely, effectively proving operability of the associated syste Minor deficiencies noted by the inspectors were promptly corrected by the license The inspectors also reviewed the historical performance of emergency diesel generator and auxiliary feedwater system preventive maintenance (PM) activities for potential system "preconditioning" prior to surveillance testing, and found that
PSE&G personnel did not routinely schedule surveillance testing immediately following PM activitie M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Leak Repair of Feedwater Containment Isolation Valve 12BF22 Inspection Scope (62707, 92902)
At the end of the previous inspection period (as discussed in inspection report 50-272 & 50-311 /98-09, section M2.1 ), PSE&G was evaluating additional actions to repair an unisolable pressure seal leak on Unit 1 feedwater containment isolation valve 12BF22. During this period, additional inspector review of the activities associated with the previous leak seal repairs of the valve were performed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed PSE&G's evaluation for performing subsequent leak seal repairs of 12BF22 and observed the performance of additional leak repair activitie Observations and Findings Following the unsuccessful leak seal repair for valve 12BF22 performed on October 23, 1998, PSE&G concluded that the repair had not been successful because the injection pressure for the leak repair sealant was riot sufficient to overcome system pressure to allow effective sealant compression and leak stoppage. Therefore, PSE&G had calculations performed to evaluate the relative effect of injecting sealant at 3000 psig on the pressure seal gasket for the valve. On November 12, the station operations review committee (SORC) reviewed and approved a safety evaluation, allowing a fifth repair of the valve. A conference call between the management and staff of PSE&G and NRC Region I and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was condu_cted on November 13, to discuss the valve repai The inspectors observed the leak repair activity performed on November 13. The repair appeared to be successful after injection of sealant into one injection por However, there was a slight leak remaining following completion of the leak seal injection and PSE&G opted to monitor the valve leakage rather than injecting into a second port at that time. On November 18, the valve began to leak again. A sixth valve repair was performed on November 19. This repair was successful and the valve was not leaking as of the end of the report period. The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluations associated with the leak repairs and found them to be adequat For both the November 13 and 19, leak repair activities, the inspectors found the activities to be well planned and controlled, with appropriate supervisory oversight and thorough pre-job briefing Conclusions PSE&G personnel performed additional steam leak repairs to a Unit 1 feedwater isolation valve in a well controlled manner. The associated safety evaluations for the activities were adequat.e. The inspectors observed a significant improvement in the coordination and oversight of the leak repair activities since the NRC's previous assessment in October 199 MS Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues M (Closed) LER 50-272/98-015-00: Improper Installation of Test Equipment in the Reactor Protection System Inspection Scope (92700, 92902, 92903)
The inspectors performed an onsite review of the nature, the corrective actions, and the root cause of the event described in the subject licensee event report (LER). Observations and Findings On September 16, 1998 during a tour of the Unit 2 reactor protection system (RPS)
cabinets, the inspectors noted that temporary test equipment was connected to all four operable channels simultaneously for state point data collection. The inspectors questioned the control room operators regarding the adequacy of the RPS channel separation. As a result, PSE&G maintenance department personnel evaluated the configuration in question and identified that there were two separate instances of inadequate channel separation, and that inadequate isolation existed between the safety-related RPS channels and the non-safety-related test equipmen The "as-found" configuration of the RPS was contrary to the design bases information described in the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, which states that the RPS is designed to ensure that adequate electrical isolation and channel separation is maintained. Therefore, PSE&G personnel disconnected the test equipment from the RPS and placed the state point data collection procedure on administrative hold to preclude further us The inspectors reviewed PSE&G's root cause evaluation, and determined that it was thoroughly prepared. PSE&G personnel attributed the causes to an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 review of the noted state point data collection procedure, and to ineffective corrective actions for previous similar issues. Although the potential existed to affect all four RPS channels adversely, no actual safety consequences occurred. The condition report (CR 980924250), which addressed this issue, included extensive corrective actions. For example, PSE&G personnel revised the 10 CFR 50.59 program procedure to include evaluations of measuring and test equipment (M& TE) as part of the review process. Performance of additional procedures that involved the connection of M&TE to operable plant equipment have been placed on hold pending evaluation. PSE&G personnel also performed testing on the state point data collection equipment to identify potential failure mode Planned corrective actions include the establishment of a technical standard that
"lessons learned" from this issue in departmental training programs. The inspectors verified the completion of selected corrective actions, and verified that all planned actions are appropriately being tracked in the corrective action progra The NRC previously identified similar instances where PSE&G personnel have connected M& TE to operable systems without an adequate evaluation of the potential impacts. Specifically, in July 1997, the inspectors observed M&TE
- connected to the control cabinet of an operable emergency diesel generator, and in May 1998, inspectors observed a portable battery charger connected to an operable vital battery. In each case, the affected components should have been declared inoperable. These issues were described in inspection reports 50-272 & 311 /98-03 and 98-05, respectively. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for the aforementioned events, and concluded that they have been ineffective in preventing the occurrence of the event described in the subject LER. Previous actions included the development of procedural guidance for the connection of M& TE to operable systems, and the review of maintenance procedures to identify and evaluate cases where temporary equipment is connected to operable systems. This failure to implement corrective actions to preclude the recurrence of operable plant equipment being in an inadequately evaluated configuration during the temporary connection of M&TE is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action."
(VIO 50-272 & 311/98-11-01) Conclusions PSE&G personnel failed to evaluate the potential impact of connecting non-safety-related test equipment in all four operable channels of the reactor protection system, thereby potentially compromising the system's design bases. Corrective actions for previous issues identified by the NRC involving the similar connections of temporary equipment to operable safety-related systems were ineffective in preventing the occurrence of the event described in the subject licensee event report. PSE&G's root cause evaluation thoroughly examined the issues. As a result, PSE&G personnel developed extensive corrective action M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-311/98-08-01andLER 50-311/98-013-00: Missed Technical Specification Surveillance For Molded Case Circuit Breakers Inspection Scope (92700, 92901)
The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the subject licensee event report (LER) and verified selected corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed PSE&G's response to the noted violation for the same issue, which contained similar corrective action Observations and Findings This LER documented a self-identified missed technical specification surveillance test of containment penetration circuit breakers. Initial NRC findings were
documented in NRC inspection report 98-08, Section M2.1, which cited the issue as a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section XVI, "Corrective Action." PSE&G initiated a significance level one condition report (CR 980820134) to investigate this issue and performed a full root cause evaluation. The inspectors reviewed this evaluation and found that it was completed by a multi-disciplined team and was thoroug PSE&G determined that the root cause for this event was the failure to establish recurring tasks (RTs) for both the five-year surveillance and the 1 8-month trip test for a 10% sample of each breaker type. This resulted in a single human barrier for scheduling the 18-month trip test, which finally faile PSE&G's corrective actions included a comparison of the maintenance management information system database with the design engineering calculation for overcurrent protection to ensure that all breakers were contained in the database. This revealed that all breakers. were included. Also, the surveillance RTs are being revised to ensure the completion of the 18-month surveillance. One third of each breaker type will receive the five-year surveillance, including overcurrent test, every 18 months, which will meet the requirements for both the five-year and 18-month surveillance tests. Additional barriers were put in place by the creation of two new RTs. One RT directs the electrical work coordinator to review each breaker type every 12 months to ensure the 10% sample has been done, and the other directs scheduling personnel to review the list of breakers every month for the same reason. The inspectors verified that these RTs had been created and placed in the work schedule. PSE&G also intended to start a training and qualification program for all individuals involved in TS surveillance administration to ensure that those personnel had adequate knowledge to perform their jobs. The inspectors noted that there were additional corrective actions with future completion dates which were documented in PSE&G's corrective action syste The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions were reasonable to prevent recurrence of this issue and agreed with PSE&G's assessment that since a 10%
sample of breakers was subsequently tested satisfactorily, this event had minimal safety consequence Conclusions PSE&G's root cause evaluation for a missed technical specification surveillance on containment penetration circuit breakers was thorough and corrective actions were reasonable.
M8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-272/98-08-02 Inspection Scope (92901, 92902, 92903)
The inspectors reviewed PSE&G's response to the Notice of Violation and verified the completion of selected corrective actions pertaining to an inadvertent discharge of a service water accumulator during surveillance testin Observations and Findings This issue was previously discussed in NRC inspection report 50-272 & 311 /98-0 The inspectors reviewed PSE&G's root cause evaluation, and found it to be thoroughly prepared. Additionally, the inspectors verified that PSE&G appropriately revised the associated test procedure to clarify the proper test device connection point Conclusions E4 PSE&G's root cause evaluation for the violation was thorough. All planned corrective actions were adequate and properly complete Ill. Engineering Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4. 1 Non-safety-related Spring Charging Motors Installed in Safety-related Circuit Breakers Inspection Scope (92903)
The inspectors followed up on a PSE&G quality assurance finding that non-safety-related spring charging motors had been installed in safety-related circuit breakers because of the potential for a generic issu Observations and Findings On November 4, 1998, a PSE&G engineering self-assessment revealed that non-safety-related (NSR} spring charging motors had been installed in safety-related (SR)
circuit breakers. PSE&G's initial investigation revealed that the motors in question were downgraded from a purchase class two (PC2) safety classification (commercial grade part dedicated for safety-related usage} to an NSR purchase class
- four (PC4) classification. PSE&G determined that the motors should be PC2 since they perform a safety function by providing the motive force to close the breakers during accident conditions. The downgrade was performed by an individual who is no longer employed by PSE&G, and without the required documentatio * PSE&G initiated performance improvement request (PIR 981104207) to evaluate this issue. An extent of condition investigation revealed that there were 1 5 NSR motors in SR applications (six on Unit 1, nine on Unit 2). Subsequent to discovery, a commercial grade dedication was performed to allow the NSR motor to be used in SR equipment. This process involves a functional test of the component, which had already been met through the post-maintenance testing when the breakers were installed. The inspectors reviewed the dedication documentation and found it to be thorough and in accordance with PSE&G procedures. PSE&G also performed a check on all components that had been classified PC4 by the individual who changed the charging motor classification. This revealed two additional components which could possibly have SR applications, but had never been installed. These components were removed from the affected bill of material Based on the initial investigation, PSE&G determined that this issue was an isolated case resulting from an error in judgement by one individual, not a generic procurement problem. The inspectors agreed with this assessment and concluded that PSE&G's immediate corrective actions were thorough and reasonabl CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria VII, requires that measures be established to assure that purchased material conform to procurement documents, and.have objective evidence of quality. PSE&G procedure NC.DE-AP.ZZ-0016(0),
Procurement Classification Guidelines, requires that a repl~cement item classification justification be completed to change the purchase class of a spare part. The change of safety classification of the spring charging motors from PC2 to PC4 was a violation of the requirement and not in accordance with PSE&G procedures. However, the issue had no safety consequence and was promptly corrected. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC
. Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-272&311/98-11-02)
Conclusions Following self-identification, PSE&G appropriately documented and corrected a deficiency involving the use of a non-safety-related spring charging motor in a safety-related circuit breaker, which resulted in a non-cited violatio ES Miscellaneous Engineering Issues E (Closed) LER 50-272/97-010-00: Past Operation of the Emergency Diesel Generators in a Degraded but Operable Condition Inspection Scope (90712)
The inspectors performed an in-office review of the nature, the corrective actions, and the root cause of the event described in the subject LE *
10 Observations and Findings This NRC previously reviewed this issue in inspection report 50-27 2 & 311 /98-07 (section E8.7). The subject LER did not contain any new information. Therefore, the inspectors closed the issue based on an in-office revie Conclusions LER 50-272/97-010-00did not present any information in addition to that previously documented in inspection report 50-272 & 311 /98-0 E (Closed) LER 50-311196-006-01: lnoperability of Non-Radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor During Low Head Conditions Inspection Scope (90712) The inspectors performed an in-office review of the nature, the corrective actions, and the root cause of the event described in the subject LE Observations and Findings This LER supplement documents the cause of the event previously described in LER 50-311196-006-00. The aforementioned LER and its cause were reviewed by the NRC in inspection report 50-272 & 311 /98-08 (section E8.6). The inspectors performed an in-office review since the LER supplement did not contain any new informatio Conclusions LER supplement 50-311/96-006-01 did not present any information in addition to that previously documented in inspection report 50-272 & 311 /98-0 E !Closed) LER 50-311198-007-00: Reactor Coolant Instrument Line Through-Wall Leak Inspection Scope (90712)
The inspectors performed an in-office review of the nature, the corrective actions, and the root cause of the event described in the subject LE Observations and Findings The NRC previously reviewed this issue in inspection report 50-272 & 311 /98-08 (section E2.2). The.inspectors performed an in-office review of the subject LER since no new information was presented. PSE&G personnel are expecting to document the root causes and the results of a metallurgical analysis performed by the vendor in a forthcoming LER supplement in December 199 *
11 Conclusions LER 50-311198-007-00did not present any information in addition to that previously documented in inspection report 50-272 & 311 /98-0 E (Closed) Violation 50-272 & 50-311198-81-01: Failure to Implement Action Request Procedure Inspection Scope (92903) The inspector reviewed and evaluated PSE&G's response to the referenced Notice of Violation (NOV) pertaining to testing of the Emergency Control Air Compressors (ECACs).
Observations and Findings This violation was written because PSE&G personnel did not perform a condition resolution to evaluate the impact of unsatisfactory results on January 19, 1998 for an ECAC test. Specifically, unsatisfactory starting pressure and load time test data indicated degradation of the No. 1 ECAC, but no root cause or corrective actions*
were developed to preclude recurrence. The inspector reviewed PSE&G's Response to the NOV dated June 22, 1998 and AR/CRs 980216085and 980819182which documented PSE&G's evaluation and corrective actions for this issue, and discussed performance of the ECAC with the system manager. PSE&G attributed the reason for the violation to inadequate communication between the corrective action coordinator and operations department personnel. Corrective actions included evaluation of the acceptance criteria. PSE&G personnel determined that the ECAC performance test section of procedure 81.OP-PT.CA-0001 and its acceptance criteria were created to provide trending indication of compressor performance.. The results were not intended to be used to prove compressor capacity since the test was not conducted at the required minimum pressure. As a result, the acceptance criteria was revised to clearly indicate a range of values which was appropriate and that the data was for trending purposes only. The inspector found the corrective actions to be appropriat Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the actions taken by PSE&G to address the referenced NOV were adequate. Therefore, this violation *is close *
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R 1. 1 Radiation Protection Program Review Inspection Scope (83750) A health physics inspection during routine operations was conducted. During a portion of the specialist inspection period, Unit 2 was in a forced outage to repair the pump seal on the No. 21 reactor coolant pump (RCP). Areas of inspection focus were based on the following regulatory requirements from 10 CFR Part 20:
20.1101 20.1601 20.1602 20.1902 20.1904 20.2103 Radiation protection program Control of access to high radiation areas
- Control of access to very high radiation areas Posting requirements Labeling containers Records of surveys The inspection was conducted via direct observation of in-process work in the radiologically controlled areas (RCA), review of pertinent documen:ts including surveys, radiation work permits (RWPs) and as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) reviews, and discussions with cognizant personne Observations and Findings The program for the control of access to high, locked high and very high radiation areas is described in plant procedures. All areas of this type that were observed were determined to be appropriately barricaded, secured (as applicable) and poste Keys for these areas were under the direct control of the shift radiation protection technician, and key logs were reviewed to verify that all keys were properly accounted fo Tours of the units' auxiliary buildings and spent fuel pools, and the Unit 2 containment demonstrated appropriate levels of radiological housekeeping, the minimization of contaminated areas and the appropriate posting and labeling of potentially contaminated materials and components. Records of radiological surveys were readily available for review by plant personnel prior to entry into the RC The program for maintaining occupational exposures ALARA was effectively implemented. The Salem Station annual exposure goal was reasonable based on the scope of work to be performed and was effectively communicated to the plant staff. Numerous informational postings, including the identification of low dose waiting areas and high dose work areas were found throughout the facility. Dose tracking by individual departments was implemented, and daily exposure results were discussed at management meeting *
- During the specialist inspection, Unit 2 entered a forced outage to repair/replace the seal package on the No. 21 RCP located in the containment. Appropriate radiation protection response was demonstrated during the first four days of this outage, including the establishment of radiation work permits, surveying and posting of containment areas, and contrql over the potential spread of contaminatio Conclusions An effective radiation protection program has been established for controlling high, locked high and very high radiation areas, and planning and maintaining
occupational exposures ALARA. Appropriate controls were implemented in radiation protection to support forced outage work in the Unit 2 containmen RS Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C R Radiation Protection Training Program Review Inspection Scope (83750) A review of the technical training program for radiation protection technicians, including continuing training, establishment of curriculum, and training of contractor technicians was conducted. The portion of the inspection was accomplished via interviews with cognizant personnel, review of lesson plans and other related documents, and observations of training in progres Observations and Findings Management of the technical training program for radiation protection technicians
. has recently been transferred to the radiation protection manager (RPM). Two=
instructors now report directly to the radiological support group and provide the development and presentation of lesson plan Two sessions of formal continuing training were scheduled for 1998, with the second session ongoing at the time of this inspection. Lesson topics are reviewed and approved by the training review group, which includes both technicians and supervisors, and is chaired by the RPM. Direct observation of one training session, covering use of the new database system, was made. The presentation was professional, accurate and informative. Contract radiation protection technicians hired to support refueling outages are given the Northeast Training Association examination, then provided site-specific and task-specific trainin Conclusions An effective training program for radiation protection technicians and contractor technicians has been established. Lesson plans and material presentations reviewed were appropriat *
RS Miscellaneous RP&C Issues R (Closed) IFI 50-272 & 311 /98-06-04: Establish a method for sampling the Tubular Ultra-Filtration System (TUFS) filtrate discharg The licensee has procured a multiport sampling device to ensure appropriate waste sampling in the high integrity containers, and has successfully demonstrated its us This item is close R (Closed) IFI 50-272 & 311 /98-06-05: Revise the Process Control Plan and licensee procedures, to account for dewatering of the TUFS filtrate discharg The licensee reviewed the existing procedures and determined that they were adequate to process the TUFS materials in existing high integrity containers, and successfully demonstrated this process with wastes shipped to a vendor. This item is close R (Closed) Violation 50-272/98-08-11 and LER 50-272/98-014-00: Failure to Follow Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) Calibration Procedures Inspection Scope (92700)
The inspectors conducted an on-site review of the subject licensee event report (LER) and the response to the noted violation, both pertaining to the same issue, and verified selected corrective action Observations and Findings These items involved a technical specification non-compliance caused by the failure to correctly calibrate the Unit 1 liquid radwaste effluent line radiation monitor (1R18). This issue was documented in inspection report 50-272 & 311 /98-08, Section R2.1. Upon determining that the 1R18 monitor was inoperable, PSE&G immediately performed a satisfactory channel calibration. Also, an assessment of the latest channel calibration data for other effluent monitors was performed to ensure that no other monitors were inoperable, with no discrepancies noted. The inspectors verified by documentation review that this assessment was performe PSE&G also reviewed this event with qualified maintenance technicians and stressed procedural adherence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions were adequate. Also, because an effluent sample is analyzed prior to an effluent discharge, and public exposures are calculated from sample results, the inspectors agreed that no amendment to the annual effluent release report was necessar Conclusions PSE&G's corrective actions were adequate for the incorrect calibration of a Unit 1 liquid radwaste monito l
F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance F4. 1 Firewatch Program Review Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors reviewed PSE&G procedure ND.FP-DD.ZZ-0020(Z), "Compensatory Measure Firewatch Program," interviewed a duty fire protection supervisor, and accompanied firewatch personnel on plant tours to assess the effectiveness of the firewatch progra Observations and Findings Roving and continuous firewatch personnel are utilized as compensatory measures when elements of the fire protection program are impaired. PSE&G posts continuous firewatches in areas with defective fire wrap and no fire detection capability, and roving watches in areas of defective wrap, or other impairment, where fire detection equipment is installe The inspectors noted that firewatch personnel were alert and carried out their duties in a professional manner. They performed their tours in a timely manner, maintained accurate logs, and were knowledgeable of duty-related issues when questioned by the inspector. The inspectors concluded that firewatch personnel were adequately following the directives of the noted firewatch procedure. No discrepancies were note Conclusions A field review of PSE&G's firewatch program showed that the program procedure was adequately implemented, with no discrepancies note V. Management Meetings X 1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 10, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
IP 37551:
IP 40500:
IP 50001:
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 83750:
IP 90712:
IP 92700:
IP 92901:
IP 92902:
IP 92903:
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems Steam Generator Replacement Inspectio Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Occupational Radiation Exposure lnoffice Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Plant Operations Followup Maintenance Followup Engineering Followup
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened/Closed 50-272 & 311 /98-11-01 50-272 & 311/98-11-02 Closed 50-311198-08-01 50-27 2/98-08-02 50-272/98-08-11 50-272 & 311/98-81-01 50-272 & 311 /98-06-04 50-272 & 311 /98-06-05 50-311/96-006-01 50-311197-004-01 50-272/97-010-00 50-311198-007-00 VIO Improper installation of test equipment to the reactor protection system. (Section M8.1)
NCV Non-safety-related spring charging motors installed in safety-related circuit breaker (Section E4. 1 )
VIO Missed technical specification surveillance for molded case circuit breakers. (Section M8.2)
VIO Inadvertent discharge of a service water accumulator during surveillance testing. (Section M8.3)
VIO Failure to follow radiation monitoring system calibration procedures. (Section R8.3)
VIO Failure to Implement Action Request Procedur (Section E8.4)
IFI Tubular ultra-filtration system solid waste stream sampling. (Section R8.1)
IFI Tubular ultra-filtration system dewatering process control program.. (Section R8.2)
LER lnoperability of non-radioactive liquid basin radwaste monitor during low head condition (Section E8.2)
LER Failure to comply with technical specification action statement, diesel generator start, and inadequate surveillance testing. (Section 08.2)
LER Past operation of the emergency diesel generators in a degraded, but operable conditio (Section E8.1)
LER Reactor coolant instrument line through-wall leak. (Section E8.3)
50-311198-013-00 50-272/98-014-00 50-272/98-015-00
LER Missed surveillance of containment penetration overcurrent protection devices. {Section M8.2)
LER Technical specification non-compliance caused by improper calibration of the liquid radwaste effluent line radiation monitor. {Section R8.3)
LER Improper installation of test equipment to the reactor protection system. (Section M8.1)
- A LARA CFR CR ECAC LER M&TE NOV NRG NSR OE PC PDR PIR PM PSE&G RCA RCP RMS RP&C RPM RPS RTs RWP SEC SR TUFS
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable Code of Federal Regulations Condition Report Emergency Control Air Compressors Licensee Event Report Measuring and Test Equipment Notice of Violation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Non-Safety Related Operational Experience Purchase Class Public Document Room Performance Improvement Request Preventive Maintenance Public Service Electric and Gas Radiologically Controlled Area Reactor Coolant Pump Radiation Monitoring System Radiological Protection and Chemistry Radiation Protection Manager Reactor Protection System Recurring Tasks Radiation Work Permit Safeguards Equipment Cabinet Safety-Related Tubular Ultra-Filtration System