ML20204J688

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Insp Repts 50-348/86-13 & 50-364/86-13 on 860611-0710. Violation Noted:Failure to Update Procedures & Drawings
ML20204J688
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 07/25/1986
From: Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Dance H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204J631 List:
References
50-348-86-13, 50-364-86-13, NUDOCS 8608110164
Download: ML20204J688 (6)


See also: IR 05000348/1986013

Text

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UNITED STATES

[C. Glog'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ , REGION 11

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j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.: 50-348/86-13 and 50-364/86-13

Licensee: Alabama Power Company J

600 North ~18th Street l

Birmingham, AL 35291 )

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 l

Inspection Con ted: Ju e.11 - July 10, 1986

Insp tor: - ' 7 15 II

W. H. Bradford Date Signed

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L R.aBodser /t L ,l>dec

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  1. - Date Si'gned

Approved by: C- M 7 N

H. C. Dance) Section Chief Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, onsite inspection in the areas of monthly surveillance

observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification,

engineered safety feature walkdown, and onsite followup of events.

Results: One violation was identified: Failure to update procedures and

drawings.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted:

J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager

D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager

W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager

R. D. Hill, Operations Superintendent

C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent

R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent

L. A. Ward, Maintenance Superintendent

L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent

J. E. Odom,. OpefGtions Sector Supervisor

B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Sector Supervisor

T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor

J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor

L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor

R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor

L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Supervisor

J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations

personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office

personnel.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

interviews throughout the report period and on July 11, 1986, with the

general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection

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findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the violations

discussed in paragraph 7. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any

material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

This area was not inspected.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

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The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification required

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surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance

with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that

limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and

were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test;

that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed

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and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel

conducting the tests were qualified. The inspector witnessed / reviewed

portions of the following test activities:

STP-1.0 - Operations Daily & Shift Surveillance Requirements

STP-24.4 - Service Water Pumos 10, 1E and 1C Annual Inservice Test

STP-9.0 - RCS Leakage Test

STP-20.0 - Penetration Room Filteration System Test

STP-20.1 - Penetration Room Filter Alignment

STP-80.1 -

1-B Diesel Generator Functional Test

STP-80.2 - 2-C Diesel Generator Functional Test

STP-71.0 - Technical Specification Valve Surveillance

STP-615.0 - Service Water Battery Charger Load Test

STP-42.0 - Turbine Trip Functional Test

STP-41.3 - N-41 Power Range Functional Test

STP-22.18 - AFW Automatic Valve Position Verification

STP-22.19 - AFW Normal Flow Path Verification

STP-33.2A -

Reactor Trip Breaker Train A Operability Test

', STP-33.2B -

Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test

STP-38.0 -

Manual Reactor Trip Greaker Trip Verification

STP-34.1 -

Containment Inspection

STP-33.0 -

Solid State Protection System Operability

STP-10.3 -

Emergency Core Cooline Valves Inservice Test and PORV

Block Valve Stroke Test

STP-27.3 - Auxiliary and Service Water Building 125V DC Distribution

FNP-UOP 1.3 - Reactor Startup following an At Power Reactor Trip

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were

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observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with

! approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and

were in conformance with technical specifications.

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The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions

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for operations were met while components or systems were removed from

service; approvals t;ere obtained prior to initiating the work; activities

were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as

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applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

l returning components or systems to service; quality control records were

maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and

materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented;

I and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed

to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was

assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system

performance. The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Service Water Building Batteries (PCN-80-0-796)

2C Charging Pump Room Cooler

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2C Charging Pump Alignment

FCV- 122 (Unit 2)

4160V ACB Preventative Maintenance Program

Unit 2 Post Accident Hydrogen Analyzer MWR 135596

Unit 2 MDAFW pump to 2C Steam Generator check valve

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operations during the report

period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency

systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of

affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building,

turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant

equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations. The

inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for

Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance test. The verifi-

cations were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumen-

tation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers,

and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry results. The

licensee's compliance with LC0 action statements were reviewed as events

occurred.

The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management

and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisors, shift

foremen and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a

daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in

progress, as well as discussions of significant problems.

The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force

members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the

facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the

organization of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of

gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were

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proper; and procedures were followed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)

The inspector verified the operability of the 125V DC auxiliary building

distribution system by performing a complete inspection of the accessible

portions of the system. The inspector verified the positions of breakers,

operability of local and remote instrumentation where possible, the

condition of equipment, and compared the licensees' system checklist with

the systems drawings and actual position of breakers. During the inspection

the following inadequacies were identified: ,

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The following drawings, which are controlled referenced material used by

plant operators in the control room, had not been revised to reflect changes

in plant design:

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a. Unit 1 DC Distribution System drawing D-177082 shows SPACE at breaker

  1. 26 on 125V DC Distribution Panel ID. Breaker #26 actually supplies a

terminator cabinet.

b. Unit 2 DC Distribution System drawing 0-207082 shows breaker #22 on

125V DC Distribution Panel 28 supplying the Auxiliary Feed Water

Turbine Control Panel. Breaker #22 is a spare breaker,

c. Unit 2 DC Distribution System drawing 0-207083 shows breaker #21 on

125V DC Distribution Panel 2D as a spare breaker. Breaker #21 actually

supplies a termination cabinet.

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A Temporary Change Notice on Unit 2 was not issued to cover a pen change

made to FNP-2-SOP 37.1 125 Volt DC Auxiliary Building Distribution System

checklist, to show breaker #22 on 125V DC Distribution Panel 2E is a spare

breaker and not a SPACE as indicated in the 50P checklist.

Unit 1 DC breaker LB-15, a supaly to a security inverter, is not included in

the system checklist in FNP-1-SOP 37.1, 125 Volt DC Auxiliary Building

Distribution System.

The above examples are identified as a violation (348,364/86-13-01) of

Technical Specification 6.8.1 as implemented by Administrative Procedures

(AP) 1 and 8. AP-1, Review and Approval of Plant Procedures, requires

reviews of procedures for current conditions and adequacy and the issuance

of a temporary change notice for pen changes. AP-8, Design Modification

Control, requires procedures and drawings to be updated after modifications.

Several minor discrepancies were identified by the inspector which are not

considered to be part of the violation. The license has implemented prompt

corrective action.

a. Unit 2 DC breaker LA-06 is described in the FNP-2-SOP 37.1 battery bus

2A checklist and on the nameplate of the local control panel as Diesel

Generator 2C Control Panel . The breaker nameplate and DC Distribution

System drawing D-207082 list Diesel Generator 1C Control Panel.

b. Unit 2 DC breaker LA-1? is described in the FNP-2-SOP 37.1 battery bus

2A checklist as SKVA Inverter 28. The DC Distribution System drawing

D-207082 and the nameplate on the local control panel list a 7.5KVA

inverter.

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c. In the FNP-2-SOP 37.1 system checklist breaker #16 on distribution

panel 2B is described as reactor trip switchgear control power to Unit 1

"A" bypass breaker and "A" reactor trip breaker. Unit 2 does not supply

Unit 1 DC power.

d. In the FNP-2-SOP 37.1 system checklist breaker #13 on distribution

panel 20 was listed twice with different loads specified. There is

only one breaker #13. Both entries were signed off in the checklist

completed prior to Unit 2 startup.

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8. Follow up of Plant Events (93702)

On July 2,1986 at 3:15 p.m., Unit 1 tripped from 99% reactor power on a

negative rate trip. The trip was caused by a short in control rod . F14

stationary gripper coil circuit in the containment penetration resulting in

blown fuses and control rod F14 dropping into the core. All systems

functioned as designed. The cabling for control rod F14 stationary gripper

coil circuit was rerouted through spare conductors in the same penetration.

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