IR 05000298/1988024: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20206A643
| number = ML20245F539
| issue date = 11/07/1988
| issue date = 04/24/1989
| title = Insp Rept 50-298/88-24 on 880912-23.Violation & Unresolved Item Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Previous Insp Findings,Onsite Review Committee,Offsite Review Committee & Equipment Qualification/Seismic Design of Agastat Relays,
| title = Ack Receipt of 881208 & s Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-298/88-24. Understands That Util Now Agrees That Violation Did Occur & Will Provide Addl Details to Prevent Recurrence
| author name = Gagliardo J
| author name = Callan L
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Trevors G
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
| docket = 05000298
| docket = 05000298
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| case reference number = REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR
| document report number = NUDOCS 8905020416
| document report number = 50-298-88-24, GL-83-08, GL-83-8, GL-87-02, GL-87-2, GL-88-02, GL-88-12, GL-88-14, GL-88-2, NUDOCS 8811150202
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| package number = ML20206A621
| page count = 2
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 26
}}
}}


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(    APPEN0!X B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
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APR 2 41989  )
In Reply Refer To:
Docket: 50-298/88-24      l Nebraska Public Power Distrilet ATTN: George A. Trevors-      j Division Manager - Nuclear Support P.O. Box 499 Columbus, NE- 68602-0499 Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letters of Dece:nber 8,1988, and February 10, 1989. in  !
response to our letter and the attached Notice of Violation dated November 8, 1988. As a result of our review and telephone conversations on April 12 and 14, 1989, we understand that you now agree that the violation did occur and that you will provide additional details regarding your actions to prevent recurrence of the violatio We have no further questions regarding-your response to the open items (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03) and will review the implementation of your corrective action
  'during a future inspectio Please provide the supplemental information within 30 days of the date of this lette


==REGION IV==
Sincerely,
NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/88-24    Operating License: OPR-46 Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
l  P.O. Box 499 l  Columbus, NE 6B601 i Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
Inspection At: CNS, Nemsha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: September 12-23, 1988 l
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Accompanying Personnel: D. R. Hunter, Senior Reactor Inspector, Operational
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Original Signed By  l L.). Callan L. J. Callan, Director  ;
Program Section Division of Reactor Safety R. C. Stewart, Reactor laspector Materials and Quality Programs Section. Division of Reactor Safety i  J. R. Boardman, Reactor Inspector, Plant Systems l    Sectien, Division of Reactor Safety l   G. A. Pick, Reactor Inspector, Operational Program
Division of Reactor Projects cc:-
!    Section Division of keactor safety R. V. Arva, Reactor Inspector, Test Program Section, 1    Division of Reactor Safety R. Evans, Reactor Inspector, Operational Programs Section. Otvision of Reactor Safety f s f ~
   ' Cooper Nuclear Station ATTN: Guy Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska' 68321 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director bcc w/ enclosures:  (see next page)
   / A )/ k        1 Approved: bJ\ E. Ga i iarco,
RIV:0PS *  D:DRS * .
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PQ h JEGagliardo/lb  JLMilhoan JCallan   ;
Cnief, Operational Program
  ./ /89  / /89 L ([/89  l
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   * previously concurred
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5ectio , Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Sumary l
8905020416 890424    /
l Inspection Conducted September 12-23,_1933 (Report 50-295/8S-24j l
PDR ADOCK 05000298    Il Q  PDC    f
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Areas Inspecled: Routine, announced inspection of folicwup of previous l inspection findings, onsite review cemittee, offsite review comittee, l E0/ seismic design of AMSTAT relays, licensee's action in response to NRC ger.eric letters, and codification to the wetwelVerywell vacun breaker Su"Uss Q
SSNP


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  ,4  o Neliraska Public Power District  -2-
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bec to DMB (IE01).   .
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bec distrib. by RIV:
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RRI    ~ R. D.' Martin, RA~
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Section Chief (DRP/C) '
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Lisa Shea, RM/ALF
  ~RPB-DRSS    MIS' System RIV File    Project Engineer (DRP/C) '
RSTS Operato DRP .
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P.-0'Connor,NRRProjectManager(MS: 13-D-18)      -l DRS-    D. R. Hunter    H l
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J. E. Gagliardo I
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Results: In general, t :e licensee's approach to the resolution of the
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;    technical issues reviewed was sound and thorough. The resolutions were '
I    generally acceptable, however, several of the issues had .t been resolved in l    4 timely manner. The licensee's control and resolution of issues identified !
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through NRC generic letters appeared to be very ef fective. Their responses to i the generic letters were generally timely and the licensee's actions were !
appropriate,    ,
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Within the six areas inspected, one violation was identifie The violation L l    involved the failure of the offsite review committee to adequately review r l    safety evaluations for procedure changes (paragraph 4.4.3), f l    One new unresolved item was identified (paragraph $). The unresolved item :
1    involved the licensee's failure to locate records of the seismic and EQ !
l    Qualifications of AGASTAT relays. This is a matter about which more information (
15 required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation, or a !
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l The open item related to the training of offsite technical support personnel l (paragraph 2.4.4) is still coen after six years. The licensee has been -
i requested to address this in their response letter, l
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GENERAL OFFICE
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h'M { Nebraska Public Power District  * * "?Ets'3*s#L"ASa^ ''' '"
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      . .u.Ls t NLS8900075    :'    i ,
February 10, 1989    L g 7lggg  j l
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d U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: NPPD Response to NRC Open Item (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03): Failure to Develop and Implement Training Plan for Offsite Personnel Cooper Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46 Reference (1) Letter from Callan to G. A. Trevors dated November 8, 1988, transmitting Inspection Report 88-24 Centlement This letter is written in response to Reference (1) in which you requested that the District describe the actions taken, or being planned, to resolve the issue of training for corporate technical support personnel as discussed in paragraph 2.4.4 of the subject repor Following is a discussion of the open item s,d our respons (open) Open Item (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03): Failure to Develop and Implement  i Training Plan for Offsite Personnel -
This open item identified the lack of a comprehensive training plan for corporate technical support personne ]
This program deficiency was identified on April 28, 1982, and it was identified  ,
as Open Item isd/u''2-0 The licensee formed a task force to resolve this   '
and other training issue This task force developed a training program for general office (Corporate) personnel, which was approved on April 5,    !
1983, In 1984, this area was again reviewed by the NRC and it was found that "a formal written technical and nontechnical training program and j
requalification program which includes defined goals, objectives, schedules,    j lesson plans, methods of evaluating the effectiveness of the training, and    j methods for record retention had not been developed at the time of the
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inspection." This was again identified as an open itte (298/8412-03). During its meeting on January 14, 1988, the SRAB reviewed this issue and recommended that action be taken to resolve this issue. During this inspection the NRC inspector found that this issue was still open. The NRC is concerned that    *
this item has been open for at least 6 years and has asked the licensee to respond to this report with a description of the actions to be taken to resolve this issu $~'h ~0 0 gg2-){
xxzmrE1pLm:Frmrmm:rmram1m:rmm%ni:mmmzteM i i


DETAILS 'u :.a.:ted
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NLS8900075 February 10, 1989
G. R. Horn, Plant Manager
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  +*G. A. Trevors, SRAB Chairman
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  + C. M. Kuta, SRAB Administrator
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  *J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager, Technical Support
   *E. M. Mace, Engineering, Manager V. L. Wolstenholm, Division Manager, Quality Assurance L. J. Cooper, D. vision Manager, Environmental P. V. Thomas. SRAR Vice Chairman D. R. Robinson, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor
  *R. L. Gibson, Acting Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
  * R. Moeller, Technical Staff Supervisor
  *L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist R. Brungardt, Operations Manager R. Windham, Technical Staff Training Supervisor M. Unruh, Plant Maintenance Supervisor G. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager-CNS D. Bremer, Operation Support Group Supervisor T. Gurths, Design Change Coordinatnr (Training Department)
N,LC
  * R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector
  *0enotes those individuals att.nding the exit interview conducted on September 23, 198 + Denotes those individuals who were contacted by telephon . Fol'owup on Previously identified Inspection Findings (92701 & 92702)
2.1 Violations 2. (Closed) Violation (298/U 15-07)- Co.f'ict Between Technical Specification and procedure for Control ogre Doors - The violation was the result of a conf f Nt between the requirenents set by the licensee's Technical Specifications (TS) and the fire watch requirements sat forth in the licensee's Procedure 0.16, "Control of Fire Doors."
 
The licensee had submitted a TS change to NRR and was awaitino approva This item is considered to be close .. .
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Response In March and April 1988 initial meetings were held between training and corporate engineering personnel to identify the steps required to establish a formal training program for appropriate Nuclear Engineering Department (NED)- personnel to be developed  using systematic -
approach-to-training method As a result, matrices of available training courses were prepared to assist line management in defining their training need Pending the development of this formal program, which was to be described in a Training Program Description, in May 1988 a revision to the NED Training Task Book 1 was issue This NED Training Task Book had been used in the past to outline and describe an indoctrination and training program for newly hired engineers in NE This revised book was used as an interim training course until the formal training program could be finalize This training program methodology continues to be utilized in NED and is effectiv Training records are maintained by the respective NED supervisors. Portions of this manual will be incorporated into the formal training progra On September 23, 1988 and again on October 6, 1988 representatives of the Corporate Training Department, the Nuclear Training Department, and the Nuclear Engineering Department met to start draf ting a Training Program Description (TPD), for the subject training program, in accordance with Nuclear Training Department procedure It is anticipated that this TPD will complete final review and be approved by March 1, 198 Upon TPD approval this training program will be formally administered under Nuclear Training Department procedures and will have defined goals, objectives, lesson plans, effectiveness evaluations and record retention requirement Please call me if you have any questions regarding this respons


2. (Closed) Violation (298/8810-02): Failure to Perform Proper Surveillance of Welding Activities - Quality assurance surveillance had not been performed to verify the availability of weld procedures to welder The licensee quality assurance surveillance checklist, 5C-700-06, was formally revised to provide verification of the availability of weld procedures to welders. In addition, a dedicated checklist, SC-2600-04,
Sincerely,
  "In process Welder Performance," was issued May 19, 1988, which is to be implemented during outage During this inspection, the NRC inspector verified the above corrective actio This ni.tter is considered close . (Closed) Violation (298/8813-01): Failure to Evaluate Nonessential Items Prior to Declaring Systems or Components Operable - During this l  inspection two NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to I  this violation dated June 8, 1988, and verified the corrective actions initiated, which included:
. . Trevors Division Manager Nuclear Support
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    /jw ccU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office, Region IV Arlington, TX
   * CNS Operations Procedure 0.27, "Component Operability," dated July 23, 1988, and Plant Services Procedu; 1.8, "Warehouse Issue and Return," dated August 8, 1988, wa e revised to clearly indicate that the performance of a documented operability review
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Resident Inspector Office    ;
is required prior to the issuance of a nonessential part for an essential application.
Cooper Nuclear Station    '
 
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A documented operability revision, in accordance with CNS Procedure 0.27 was completed prior to the division manager of nuclear operations approval to release a nonessential part for an essential applicatio This item is close . (Closed) Violation (298/8806-02): Determine Adequacy of Present Fire Extinguisher Surveillance Program - The violation was the result of a missed surveillance inspection of the site fire extinguishers (Procedure 6.4.5.17). The surveillance was missed due to an inadequate *. racking process. The person in charge of tracking this item only used his desk calendar, and when he did not report to work, due to illness, his replacement was unaware of what was on the calenda The NRC reviewed the licensee's response to the violation. The corrective action taken by the licensca to improve the tracking of this surveillance procedure was to add this item to the preventive i maintenance (PM) tracking system (Item No. 05054). The computer j tracking system will, on a monthly basis, provide a list of PMs that i need to be performed each mont The PM specialist then will notify the responsible department, and will not close the PM until he l l
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receives notification that the PM has been completed. Near the end of each month the PM specialist reviews his list to see what items have not been completed, at which time he will notify the department who has an outstanding PM. This response was found to be satisfactor This item is close .1.5 (Closed) Violation (298/8806-03): Determine Adequacy of Licensee Procedure Review Process and Operator Attention to Detail - The violation was a result of an inadequate review process for completed procedures, which allowed several omitted signatures and out-of-specification data to go undetecte The hRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this violatio The corrective actions taken include:
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  (a) The procedures in question were rereviewed to verify that the unsigned sections of the procedures had actually been performed, and were then subsequently signed of (b) The out-of-specification data was evaluated to determine that it was a nonsafety parameter and would not affect the reliability of the system performanc (c) Test personnel, plus the individuals involved in the review of
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GENERAL OFFICE  I i
completed procedures were counseled on the need to conduct a thorough review of the testing performed and to ensure that required signatures and test data were complete and accurat (d) The methodology for performance of procedural reviews was enhanced, to ensure that surveillance tests and procedures were accurately reviewe (e) Those procedures that were found, upon review, to lack data or contain out-of-specification data, which affected plant performance and safety, were reperforme Upon review of the procedures in question, the NRC inspector found all errors had been corrected. In addition, the NRC inspector reviewed a random selection of procedures, which had been performed following the implementation of the corrective actions listed abov No errors or omissions were detected. The enhanced methodology for procedure review was found to be adequat This violation is considered closed.
P O. box 499. COLUMBUS. NEBRASKA 65601 0499
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Nebraska Public Power Distn*ct  reLeesoNei402>se4-ssei 1 =
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NLS8800554 December 8, 1988      '


, 2.1.6 (Closed) Violation (298/8814-02): Failure to Have an Adequate As-Built Orawing - Previously, a Burns and Roe drawing (2_0iST was noted to be itiadequate in that sections of the control room copy of the drawing were blacked out and were unreadabl _ -.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: NPPD Response to NRC Inspection Report No. 50-298/88-24; Cooper Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46 Reference: 1) Letter from L. J. Callan to C. A. Trevors dated November 8, 1988, transmitting Inspection Report 88-24  l Gentlemen:
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This letter is written in response to your letter dated November 8, 1988, Reference Therein you indicated that one of our activities was in violation of NRC requirement Following is the statement of the violation and our response in accordance with 10CFR2.201:     i Statement of Violation Failure to Adequate 1v Review Procedure Changes The Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.1.B.4.a, requires in part, that the safety evaluations for changes to procedures shall be reported to and reviewed by the safety review and audit board to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety _
questio ,
Contrary to the above, the safety evaluation for changes to normal, abnormal, maintenance, and emergency operating procedures, which were reviewed by the station operations review committee in accordance with !
TS 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, and 6.3.4, were not being routinely provided to the safety review and audit board for their required review in meetings No. 115 through 130, dated January 1987 through September 198 This is a Severity Level IV violatio (Supplement I) (298/8824-02)
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During this inspection, the drawing in question was inspected to assure a readable copy was available to operators in the control roo The visibility of the current copy of Burns and Roe Drawing 2045 was determined to be acceptabl Other drawings in the control room were scanned to assure readabilit One drawing, Burns and Roe Drawing 2014, Sheet 1, Revision 7, was observed to have two additional valves sketched on the drawing in pencil. The valves were not part of the open drawing change notice (DCN) on the drawing, and were located on a line leading to another drawing. The sketch on the orawing was pointed out to the operators for correction. No other problems were observe This item is considered close .2 Deviations 2. (Closed) Deviation (298/8607-02): Inadequate Trainino Procedure (CNS Procedure 0.17) and Incomplete Documentation of Training - This deviation was written when one new site engineer and some senior general office engineers performing safety-related work were noted by the NRC not to be documented as having been trained by applicable procedures as cummitted to in letter CNSS 857490. Additionally, the procedure for training new site engineers did not address an applicable engineering procedure (EP 3.3), and not all applicable site and general office engineers were documented as having been trained in the applicable procedures as committed to in NLS Letter 840002 The licensee responded to the deviation with letter CNSS 865821. The NRC reviewed the reply and found it to be responsive to the concerns raised. Corrective actions, which have been taken by the licensee, were reviewed during this inspectio The corrective actions taken included:
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NLS8800554      =
  ' December 8, 1988
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Revising CNS Procedure 0.17, "Selection and Training of Station '
Personnel," to include EP 3.3, "Station Safety Evaluations,"
EP 3.4, "Design Changes," and Plant Services Procedure 1.4,
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  "Requisitioning."
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Developing a formal training program for CNS engineers (Training Program Description TPD 0502, Technical Staff).
The training records of selected plant staff members were reviewed to' ensure the incorporation of the training progra This item is considered closed, i 2. (Closed) Deviation (298/8803-01): Determine Adequacy of Training Program on Radioactive Waste Handling and Shipping - The deviation was a resuit of training records which indicated that some
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maintenance personnel involved in the transfer and packaging of radioactive material, had not received periodic retraining as required by the NRC, Department of Transportation and plant-specific procedure The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the deviatio The corrective actions taken include:
  (a) A "Radwaste Packaging and Handling" lesson plan was developed to provide training guidanc (b) Appropriate personnel were trained under the lesson plan described abov (c) The c=rse for personnel involved in handling and packaging low-level radioactive waste for transport will be conducted in accordance with their established requalification training progra In addition to reviewing the lesson plan, the NRC inspector reviewed the course outline and also inspected the training records to check the adequacy of the training program and to verify that the appropriate personnel had completed the training requirements. The method for tracking personnel requalification was also inspecte This item is considered close .3 Unresolved Items 2. (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8703-03): :nadequate Training of Ogrators in the Area of Procedural Changes and/or Operational
  ,ffacts of the Changes - Appendix A to 10 CFR 53 previously required requalification training to include training in facility design changes, precedures changes, and license changes. Procedural changes following an outage were apparently covered by providing the operators with a large reading file for self-stud The effectiveness of this technique was questionabl The licensee committed to taking steps to eliminate this concer According to Memorandum CNSS 885033, the corrective action steps which have been taken include:
Operations department will review all outage design changes and identify the changes that affect plant operation * Procedures upgrade group will review outage design changes and identify all procedures affected by the change * Training department will provide training on the selected design changes and their affected procedures prior to plant startu __
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Reason for Violation if Admitted The District is of the opinion that a violation of CNS Technical Specification 6.2.1.B.4.a did not occur and requests a reconsideration of the violatio The District contends that safety evaluations for certain changes to procedures were submitted to and reviewed by the Safety Review and Audit Board (SRAB) in accorJance with Technical Specification requirement CNS Procedure 0.4, " Preparations, Review, and Approval of Procedures,"
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currently requires that every procedure change receive a Safety Evaluation Applicability revie The intent of this review is to screen all procedure changes to ensure that the ones which 1) could result in an unrevieved safety question or, 2) require a change to Technical Specifications, are identified and then subjected to a detailed safety evaluatio A key feature of the applicability review is that should any uncertainty exist regarding the potential for either an unreviewed safety question, or Technical Specification change, a detailed safety evaluation is also performe Sections V.B.6 and V.C.5 of CNS Procedure 0.4 provide that "Should the Safety Evaluation applicability review indicate that a Safety Evaluation is required, ;
 
than the package shall be forwarded to the Engineering Manage The Engineering Manager ensures that a detailed Safety Evaluation is performed in accordance with CNS Engineering Procedure 3.3, " Station Safety ;
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Evaluations." Precedure 3.3, Section V.A.6, then requires that the submittal be sent to the SRAB for their revie The District's position is that the Safety Evaluation applicability review required by CNS Procedure 0.4 is a review to determine if a safety evaluation is require It is recognized that the guidance provided in NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9800, dated January 1, 1984, allows a simpler screening process to be imposed for proposed changes (i.e., Is the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) affected?). However, as described above, the intent )
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of CNS Procedure 0.4 is to provide a more comprehensive review of proposed procedure change In reality, the applicability review, however, is clearly not a detailed safety evaluation as specified by the CNS Tech Specs and need not be reviewed by the SRA The District is concerned that the violation, as written, implies that the i NPPD Safety Review and Audit Board must review all procedure changes to comply with Technical Specification 6.2.1.B. To require the review of all procedures is both in3onsistent with the written requirements of the Technical Specification and Edd-intent. The Standard Review Plan, Section 13.4 and the Second Proposed Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, as well as the CNS Technical Specifications, are clear that the Independent Review and Audit Group (NPPD SRAB) is not responsible for reviewing all procedures, oniv those requiring detailed Safety Evaluations for the change To require SRAB to conduct these reviews is not required nor meaningfu This time-consuming effort and the resulting review would unnecessarily divert and dilute the safety responsibilities of those involve On the j other hand, we realize that the existing procedural requirements need to be clarified to address the purpose of, and difference between, a preliminary and detailed safety evaluatio This clarification will be implemented by March 198 l
A post outage evaluation of the method will be performed to '
determine its effectiveness and recommend imprcvement I The NRC inspector verified that all steps, except the post outage !
.. evaluation, were performed by the licensee during the Spring 1988 !
outage. The implementation of the corrective actions during the next t refueling outage is subject to inspection by the NR "
  ~This item is considered close l 2. (Closed) Unresolved Items (298/8630-02): Omission of Support l Structure Weight from Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System  [
Seismic Evaluation - It was previously determined from a review of t the reevaluation criteria that the weight of the support structure i (hanger) itssif was not considered in a Cygna seismic evaluation ;
analysi !
During this inspection, the CNS response to the unresolved item and a
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safety evaluation report (SER) were reviewed. According to CNS
;  Letter NLS ~8700012, the weight of the hangers was addressed in the l
. design verification of the hanger supports. The Cygna as-built
,   recirculation calculations included the effect of self-weight. Also, j  sample calculations were submitted to NRC/NRR for review.


j  The SER, dated March 6,1987, that addressed the seismic adequacy of
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;  the SBGTs and control room ventilation system (CRVs), also was reviewed. }


The NRR staff determined the licensee's analysis methodology was 1  acceptable following review of sample calculation ;
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i  This item is considered close . (Closed) Unresolved Items (298/8630-04): Determination if Errors in
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Isometric Drawings Had Been Included in the Seismic Analysis - Using isometric drawings, an NRC inspector previously performed a walkdown
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of the suction side of SBGT system. Three as-built dimensional discrepancies were identified. At that time, it could not be determined whether or not the discrepancies had been included in the seismic analysis calculations or were drafting errors.
:  During this inspection, the licensee stated that the drawings previously I  used by the NRC inspector were draft copies of the isometrics. A
[  formal review had not been performed on the drawings. On completion i  of the support modifications, the system was as-built and a full
!  as-built reconciliation calculation was performed. All drawine,,
t errors and interferences were corrected during the final as-built, which occurred after the initial NRC walkdown.
 
!  This item is considered closed.
 
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2.3.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8630-06): Verify Completion of Cocument Search For Additional Calculations of CRVS - An NRC inspector previously r  reviewed generic support calculations, and had questions about the calculations. NPPD had not concluded their document search for additional calculation A document search to support calculations was in progress at the time of the previous inspectio NPPD and Burns and Roe had identified (reference: Letter NLS8700012) additional calculations that provided answers to the original questions. In addition, Cygna performed an independent seismic verification of CRV Sample calculations were submitted to NRC/NRR for review. The analysis methodology was found to be acceptable to the staff (reference: SER dated Narch 6, 1987).
 
An ongoing analysis by Cygna of the CRVS found some support problem Some prcblerns were corrected by Design Change 86-60 Amendment All modifications were completed by Design Change 87-063 during the Spring 1988, outage. NPPD calculation NED C87-207 documented the NED review of Cygna calculation files for CRV This item is considered close .3.5 (0 pen) Unresolved Items (298/8630-07): Determine the As-Built Condition of the CRVS Supports - The as-built condition of the CRVS could not previously be verified by the NRC inspector, since no individual support detail drawings had been locate The licensee stated that CNS previously did not have es-built drawings of CRVS support Cygna was contracted to walkdown the CRVS and develop as-built drawings. Later, modifications (Design Change 87-063) were required to seismically qualify the duct support The modifications were complete during the Spring 1988 outage. The as-built drawings were currently under revisio DCNs, as a result of the modifications, were outstanding on the as-built document This item is considered open until the NRC performs a sample walkdown of the CRVS as-built conditio .3.6 (Closed) Unresolved Items (298/8630-08): Determination of the Adequacy of the Seismic Design of Class II Items Which May Affect the Integrity of Class I Items - Section X11 of the facility
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updated safety analysis report (U$4M states that a Class II designated item shall not degrade the integrity of any item designated Class In a previous inspection, the NRC inspector questioned the ability of certain seismic Class II items designed to low seismic loading of being able to satisfy the intent of the USAR statemen This subject area is also discussed in Generic Letter 87-0 This unresolved item is considered closed, since the subject area will be tracked by the Generic Letter 87-02 coen ite *
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2. (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8229-03): Incomplete Site Vault Design -
Design and construction of the onsite QA records storage vault had not been completed. This item is c'osed based upon a reinspection of similar Unresolved Item 298/8603-?l, which is discussed belo This item is close . (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8606-01): Failure to Meet QA Record Retention Requirement In Regards to Vault Facility - Design and construction of the onsite QA records storage .ault had not been complete During this inspection, the NRC inspector conducted a design review of the licensee's design construction drawings and specifications relative to the onsite QA records storage vault now in use. In addition, the NRC inspector conducted a "walkdown" examination of the facility to assess conformance with licensee commitments to ANSI N45.2.9, Section 5.6. It was observed by the NRC inspector that the design is based on protection equivalent to a 4-hour fire rating for Class A record The facility protection includes a early warning fire protection and automatic fire suppression system, with electronic supervisio It was also observed by the inspector that, although the vault was contained within 4-hour fire rated walls, the entrance door and fusable-link fire damper, were only three-hour rated. However, located immediately adjacent to the door and damper were exterior overhead sprinkler heads which provided a 4-hour "equivalent" conditio This item is close . (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8808-01): Failure tn Obtain Station Operation Review Committee (50RC) Review - CNS SORC did not review inservice inspection (ISI) programmatic change During this inspection, the NRC inspector verified that the licensee's independent review process, relative to the ISI program changes, met ANSI N18.7, This item is close .3.10 (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8821-01): Lack of Timeliness in Updating Procedures *.ST test procedure revisions did not prove to be timel During this inspection the NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's schedule for "IST Procedure Update and Implementation," dated August 12, 1988. The NRL 1.1:pactor had no further questions regarding this ite This item is close . . - _ _ _ . _- _ . .-
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2.3.11 (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8601-02): Determine if the Training Progrem for Electrical and Mechanical Maintenance Personnel (Plus I&C Personnel) Meets the Requirements of ANSI N18.1-1971 as Required by Technical Specifications - ANSI N18.1-1971, Section 5.3, states that a suitable training program shall be established for technicians and repairman to properly prepare them for their assignments. Section 5. states that technicians and repairmen shall be trained by on-the-job training, or by related technical training. Previously, the licensee's training program appeared not to meet these standards required by TS 6. During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the training program for technicians and repairme CNS Procedure 0.17, Revision 8, "Selection and Training of Station Personnel," provided required reading lists for general employees, I&C maintenance, operations and engineering personnel. Additionally, the training program descriptions (TPDs) for selected job titles were reviewe The TPDs listed the courses required to be completed for a certain position or task and the requalification training period requirement The NRC inspector reviewed several training files to determine if training had been received as required by the TPDs and Procedure 0.1 No problems were observed with the reading files, but it was noted that not all maintenance personnel had received all TPD required trainin In these cases, a "grandfathering" of personnel was performed to assure personnel were qualified when the original TPD went into effec The training program currently in place at CNS appeared to meet of ANSI N18.1-1971. Additionally, it was noted that the electrical and mechanical maintenance training programs have been accredited by INP This item is considered close .3.12 (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8614-08): Control of Contingency Plan -
During NRC Inspection Report 50-298/86-14, the NRC inspectors found that the contingency plan for spent fuel shipments was not designated or handled as a controlled documen During this inspection, the NRC inspector found that CNS Administrative Procedure 3.10 had been issued (Revision 0, dated June 1,1988) to include the contingency plan in Attachment This issue is considered close .3.13 (Cicsed) Unresolved Item (298/8229-02): Licensee Irability to Retrieve-Base-Line Data on Seismic Qualification of safety-Related E3ectricaf Components Necessary to Assure Qualificati_on of New, or Replacement, Parts - During this inspection the NRC inspector reviewed data retrieved by the licensee on initial seismic qualifica-tion of CN Documentation provided to the NRC inspector was not in
 
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yg *;' NLS8800554
i ~ sufficient detail to assure that the requirements for con.ponent parts were defined. The licensee, however, was currently maintaining a list which included new and replacement components. This list identified all safety-related items as being Seismic Category 1 and    /
included the technical requirements for these items. Programmatically    $
this should assure that safety-related parts are reviewed by engineering for seismic requirement Licensee memorandum E. M. Hace to G. S. McClure, dated September 13, 1988, subject: Unresolved Inspection Report Item 8229-02, addressed the past lack of clarity in the licensee's program for seismic qualification. The memorandum further stated that applicable portions l  of this item were included in the licensee's program for implementing i
NRC Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) -46. This action should include l-  all previously installed new, or replacement part This item is considered close .3.14 (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8411-04): Direct Current (DC) System-Overvoltage - The potential for operation of the licensee's safety-related 125 volt DC system at voltages above the maximum system component design voltage. The original concern was based on problems experienced by another nuclear plant, the Fort Calhoun Station, with ASCO valve solenoid During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the following factors which close this iter:
j
  ' The battery for the 125 volt DC system had been replaced. The replacement battery uses fewer cells resulting in a lower system voltag '
Most components are normally deenergized. This design feature prevented degradation of components from continuous over-voltage, if this condition were to occu * Certain components, such as motor starters, had been replace * Station procedures had been revised to prevent overvoliage of system components. For example, licensee personnel indicated that station batteries were now isolated from the system during the battery equalizing charg This item is considered close .4 Open Items 2. (Closed) Open Item (298/8808-03): Inadequate Documentation of General Electric Eye Examinations - This open item dealt with a General Electric (GE) memorandum related to eye exa'nination .
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Dacamber 8, 1988
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During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed GE Letter QC88171, dated August 17, 1988, which identified certified vision acuity testing examiners in accordance with GE NPSD Quality Procedure EQP-0 This item is close .4.2 (Closed) Open Item (298/8813-02): Dedicatien Process for Qualifying Nonessential Parts - A single dedication procedure for qualifying nonessent.al parts was bei,g developed 'c' implementatio During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed CNS Procedure EP-3.22,
  "Cemmercial Grade Item Dedi.:a* ion Evaluation," dated June 9,198 This proceduce contained the essential elements necessary for the *
i dedication process. The NPC inspector had no further questions regarding this matte l This item is close .4.3 (Closed) Open Items (298/8412-02): Review of Licensee's Nonlicensed Training Program to Determine Compliance With the USAR and CNS Technical Specification Commitments - This open item dealt with the absence of a written training program for the training department instructors and an approved CNS training program for nonlicensed personnel, shift technical advisors (STAS), fire protection training and radiological emergency trainin In addition, the USAR had not been updated to provide a detailed description of the CNS training progra The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the above open item. The corrective actions taken include:
  (a) INPO accredited general employee training (GET) program had been institute (b) Courses hid been instituted to train and certify the training instructors (NTP-03 and NTP-08).
 
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  (c) All training instructors had completed the training courses and had been certified via the progra (d) The USAR had been updated to provide a general but adequate description of the GET training program and its requalification progra The NRC inspector reviewed the programs and associated course  ,
outlines. In addition, the documentation of training and  -
certification for each instructor was inspected along with the GET records of three randomly selected employees. No problems were encountere The USAR was reviewed and its content on the GET program was found to be satisfactor This item is considered closed.
 
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Based on the above, the District respectively requests your reconsideration of the violatio It should be noted during your reconsideration that we have proceeded to ensure that SRAB receives copies of all procedure change safety evaluations, both preliminary and detailed, to alleviate all NRC concerns in this are The District's response to Open Item (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03), Failure to Develop and Implement Training Plan for Offsite Personnel will be the /
s'ubject of separate correspondenc If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact m


2.4.4 (0 pen) Open Item (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03): Failure to Develop and Implement Training Plan for Offsite Personnel - This open item identified the lack of a comprehensive training plan for corporate technical support personne This program deficiency was identified on April 28, 1982, and it was identified as Open Item 298/8212-01. The licensee formed a task force to resolve this and other training issue This task force developed a training program for general office (Corporate) personnel, which was approved or, April 5, 1983. In 1984, this area was again reviewed by the NRC and it was found that "a formal written technicci and nontechnical training prcgram and requalification program which includes defined goals, objectives, schedules, lesson plans, methods of evaluatine the effectiveness of the training, and methods for record retent,on had not been developed at the time of the inspection."
Sincerely, IfA O&
 
G. A. Trevors
This was again identified as an open item (298/8412-03). During its meeting on January 14, 1988, the SRAB reviewed this issue and recom-mended that action be taken to resolve this issue. Durfng this inspection the NRC inspector found that this issue was still ope The HRC is concerned that this item has been open for at least 6 years and has asked the licensee to respond to this report with a description of the actions to be taken to resolve this issu .4.5 (Closed) Open Item (298/8412-07): Determine Adequacy of STA Requali-fication Training Program and Engineering Department Training Program -
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This item was considered open pending development and implementation of an approved STA requalification training program and engineering department training program, which was to include: detailed lesson plans, goals and objectives; qualification or certification criteria, training and retraining schedult,; methods of evaluating training efforts, and records of training performe The licensee had developed detailed IPDs, documents which establish formal training requirements for a job or functio TPDs existed for STAS and technical support staff (plant engineers included). In addition to TPDs, the licensee had developed nuclear training instruc-tions and nuclear training procedures which described the processes and responsibilities of the training department and other plant departmentr.. The training records for two members of the plant staff training records were reviewed to ensure TPD incorporation. In addition, it was noted that INPO has accredited the STA and technical staff training program This item is considered close _ _ __ _
Division Manager Nuclear Support
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  /rg cc: U Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office - Region IV Resident Inspector Cooper Nuclear Station
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2.4.6. (Closed) Open Items (298/8412-08): Determino Adequacy of Formal Certification Training Program for QA Auditors - The open item identified the absence of an approved QA training program for QA auditors. The NRC in3pector reviewed the licensee's response to the open item. The corrective actions taken included:
An approved QA division training program which included: Training requirements for audit team members, Training requirements for lead auditor The NRC inspector reviewed the program described above, inspected selected detailed lesson plans, ard reviewed training records of auditing team members and lead auditors. The objectives and certification criteria for 1 fad auditors met the requirements set fortn in ANSI n45.2.2 This item is considered close '
2. (Closed) Open Item (298/8706-01): Determine Existence and Adequacy of Procedures Which Cover Quality Control Inspector Qualifications, Training and Organization - A previous inspection determined that the licensee's qualification, training and independence of QC inspectors i  had not been develope The NRC inspector found that the licensee had an approved formal training program and procedures, and implementation of the training was in progress. The NRC inspector reviewed the approved CNS QC training course guidelines ( ADM007-01-01). The training files of selected QC inspectors were reviewed to determine if the training
;  program was being implemented. No additional concerns were raised
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during the review of the training files. Additionally, the CNS organizational charts were reviewed to ensure independence of the QA/QC organizatio This item is considered close . (Closed) Open Item (298/8728-02): Determine Clarity of Temporary Change Procedure - When are they Applicable - The open item identified an inadequate Tiemporary Procedure Change" procedur The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the open ite The licensee reviewed the temporary procedure change steps from CNS Procedure 0.4 and created a new procedure, with enhanced methodology, solely for temporary procedure changes (0.4.2). This new procedure corrected the condition that led to the open ite The new procedure will prevent a temporary procedure change from being omitted from a procedure that is performed on a routine basi This item is considered close . _ _ _
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2. (Closed) Open Item (298/8810-01): Inadequate Description for Documenting the Qualification of the Power Plant Maintenance (PPM) Welders - The method of documenting the qualification of the power plant maintenance (PPM) welders was not adequately specified in the NPPD station procedures for welder performance qualification, Procedure 7.7. During this inspection, the NRC inspector verified that Revision 1, to CNS Procedures 7.7.2.1, "Welder Performance Qualification," dated April 12, 1988, contained specific administrative controls associated with the qualification of contract welder This item is close .4.10 (Closed) Open Item (298/8821-02): Minimal Clarification as to the Scope of Outies and Responsibilities of Assigned IST Personnel -
During this inspect 1uti, the NRC inspector reviewed CNS Engineering Procedure 3.9, "ASME Code Testing of Pumps and Valves," dated August 31, 1988, Revision 0. It was observed by the NRC inspector that specific duties and assignments of IST engineering personnel have been clarifie This item is close .4.11 (Closed) Open Item 289/8808-02: Inadequate Procedure Review - ISI procedures had not been reviewed by the authorized nuclear inservice inspector ( ANII).
 
During this inspection, the NRC inspector, discussed this issue with the cognizant ISI enginee Although the ASME Code, Section XI, (IWA-2120), does not require specific approval of the ANII for ISI procedures, space has been provided, on applicable ISI procedures, for the ANII's signature. In addition, the plant engineering supervisor had drafted an engineering instruction to clarify the identity of specific ISI procedures required to be revised by the ANI This item is considered close . Onsite Review Comnittee (40700)
This area was inspected to determine the CNS SORC effectiveness and to determine the extent and adequacy of the licensee's overview of licensed activities by the onsite committe The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures which controlled I  activities of the onsite review committe The procedures reviewed were Station Procedures 0.3, Revision 5 "Station Operations Review Committee,"
dated April 14, 1988, and 3.3, Revision 7, "Station Safety Evaluations,"
dated April 14, 1988. The NRC inspector evaluated the above procedures against TS 6.2.1.A; USAR Section 9.3; and ANSI N18.7-1972, "Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants." The procedures addressed the regulatory requirements described in the above document __
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Station Procedure 0.3, Revision 5, had requirements to review station procedures which were determined by a 50RC committee member to affect nuclear safety or were described in the TS. From review of SORC meeting  ;
minutes, the NRC inspector determined procedures reviewed by the 50RC included procedures relating to: the security plan, emergency plan, fire protection, maintenance and operation Serial review of items of safety significance were performed; however, the  j serial reviews did not replace the in-committee review and approval  j requirement. Review of meeting minutes from 1987 and 1988 indicated that  '
an in-committee review of documents occurred, as require The procedure prescribing onsite committee activities included guidance in  I the following areas: quorum requirements, policy on the appointment and  I use of alternates, guidance on calling committee meetings, items to be  l included on the agend&, policy un the use of subet sittees, provisions for  l introducing material for committee review, and requirements for meeting  '
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minutes including documentation and distributio The NRC inspector determined that the method of calling the meeting to order was adequately specified; however, there was no method described for dissemination of the agenda (i.e., so many days in advance). From discussions with the licensee, the NRC inspector learned that the agenda was sent to the committee members by memorandu The memorandum was sent two or three days prior to the meeting with the time of the meeting specifie Alternate committee members were appointed in writing.
 
l The minutes stated that procedures were reviewed and approved by the
! committe The minutes, however, failed to include a statement implying l what review criteria were used, such as, "procedures were reviewed and no unreviewed safety questions were identified." Documentation of each committee member's review and approval of the minutes occuired by their I initialing of the final versio This was a serial review and approval, l
The responsibilities for preparation and dissemination of the meeting minutes was not specified; although they were required to be prepared and disseminate According to the proceeure describing onsite committee activities, the following items were required to be sent to the offsite committee: a l written summary of any disagreements between the recommendations of SORC and the 50RC chairman; copies of the 50RC committee minutes (within a month of the meeting); report of the results of reviews and investigations of violations of TS; reportable events specified in 10 CFR 50.73, emergency exercise and drills; and any requested item The onsite committee tickler system was manual in nature and carried the open items from meeting to meetin .
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The guidance on conducting 10 CFR 50.59 reviaws was contained in Procedure 3.3, Revision 7. The guidance for doing a safety evaluation and making an unreviewed safety question determination was contained in the procedure. The procedure included a definition of an unreviewed safety question. Responsibilities were assigned and requirmnents specified for preparation of the safety evaluation and for reporting the results, respectivel The NRC inspector determined that the onsite committee members were all in key positions in plant management. From discussions with the licensee representatives, the NRC inspector determined that the SORC reviews facility activities to detect potential nuclear safety hazards through conduct of their line function responsibilities. Additionally, some members attend the morning plan-of-the-day / plant status meetings. Selected members saw the summaries of various plant activities which were documented in the daily report, form. The control room logs were reviewed by the operations department managers. The shift supervisors log was routed daily to the SORC chairman and vice-chairma The SORC was not required to review procedures that required a biennial review and had undergone such a review if the review resulted in no change to the procedure Station Procedure 0.4, Revision 12, "Preparation, Review, and Approval of Procedures," dated August 18, 1988, required the responsible section manager's approval for a biennial procedure review without any changes to the procedure. This appeared to satisfy the requirements of the facility T3, the USAR, and ANSI N18.7-197 The NRC inspector reviewed ;he type of training being presented to the SORC committee members to improve their ability to effectively function as a member of the onsite review committee. From discussions with the licensee, the NRC inspector determined that no formalized training had existed for onsite committee members up until the time of this inspectio The knowledge and abilities obtained previous to this inspecticn had been through informal on-the-job training. (For some individuals, a few training courses had been attended.) Review of routed industry event information in accordance with Station Procedure 0.17, Revision 8
"Selection and Training of Station Personnel," dated April 7, 1988, was
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required of selected managers. Approximately, one month before the inspection, training was presented to SORC committee members on the Nuclear Safety Operational Analysis (NSOA) relative to Cooper Nuclear Station. The course provided a history of the NSOA, including why it was developed and how it has been used. The NSDA provided in-depth determination of the safety classification of structures, systems, and component Additionally, selected onsite committee members had received training in January 1988 on 10 CFR 50.59 and on conducting safety evaluation From the above description of training received by various 50RC members, it is apparent that training had been a weaknes However, the licensee was in the process of formalizing a training program for 50RC committee members and their alternates. The training was to include the below listed "position required" courses:
 
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General Empicyee Training 10 CFR 50.59 Industry Events Technical Specifications 0.3 Procedure Training USAR Chapter 14/ Appendix G Industrial Codes and Standards The selected courses had been assigned a requalification cycle. The tracking of implementation of the SORC training program and attendance by the committee members will be tracked as an open item (298/8828-01).
 
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of 'nis program are . NPPD Safety Review and Audit Board (SRAB) (40701)
The NRC inspectors reviewed the program requirements, implementing procedure, selected practices, and minutes for SRAB meetings to determine that the functions of the offsite committee were being performed in accordance with the requirements of TS 6.2.1.8, USAR, Section XIII 9.5; and ANSI N 18.7-1976, "Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants."
 
4.1 Occuments Reviewed Procedures:
* SRAB Instructions and Guidelines, Revision 3, July 20, 1987
' CNS Procedure 0.3, Revision 5, Station Operations Review Committee
* CNS Procedure 3.3, Revision 7, Safety Evaluations Audits:
* QAP-2200, SRAB and 50RC Activities Audit 87-08 (memorandum to SRAB June 1, 1987)
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QAP-2200 SRAB and SORC Activities Audit 88-19 (memorandum to SRAB, September 9, 1988)
General:
* 1988 Internal Audit Schedule, Revision 0, dated December 28, 1987
' 1988 SRAB Audit Participation Schsdule, dated January 25, 1988
* 1988 Internal Audit Schedule, Revision 1, dated August 17, 1988
* SRAB Meeting Minutes Nos. 115 through 130 (January 1987-September 1988)
4.2 SRAB Instructions and Guideline (Charter)
The NRC inspector reviewed the written SRAB charter to ensure that administrative controls were established regarding selected requirements of the licensee and were adequately addresse _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The charter included a SRAB policy statement dated February 24, 1986, signed by the NPPD president emphasizing the commitment of NPPD to operating CNS safely and the importance of the SRAB functio Additionally, the SRAB instructions and guidelines were signed by the ,
present nuclear power group manage J Document review and personnel interviews revealed that SRAB members routinely attended the meetings and performed the reviews of the matters (material) provided, as appropriat *
The charter addressed the SRAB membership requirements and provided for eight SRAB members. The use of alternates was addressed; however, alternates had not been used on a routine basi The SRAB membership qualifications and expertise was addressed in Attachment 5 to the charter, which included resumes for the members (qualifications and experience) and a matrix indicating areas of expertise for each membe . The SRAB chairman indicated that a replacement for a recently retired member was being selecte l
  * The SRAB meeting frequency and conduct was addressed. The licensee's l      l practice was to conduct SRAB meetings monthly. Specific meeting ,
guidelines were provided in Attachment 1 to the charter and specified
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meeting scheduling, meeting locations, agenda, meeting conduct, meeting minutes and issuance, telephone usage, and handling of SRAB concerns / question The SRAB charter described in detail the handling of review items, l  including the "Category 1," in-committee review items; "Category 2,"
route-for-review items; "Category 3," route-for-review items determined on a case-by-case basis; and "Category 4," unimportant items (e.g. , promotional materials, nonsafety-related). The SRAB administrator was delegated the authority for screening, categorizing, and logging the materials for SRAB action Document reviews and personnel interviews revealed that only a limited number of meetings had been conducted at the CNS site (one meeting a year specified); however, more meetings were planned to be conducted at the CNS site to provide the opportunity for easier access to the plant and plant personne Plant personnel did not routinely attend the SRAB meetings, nor did the SRAB personnel routinely attend the 50RC meetings. It was noted that quality assurance attended both SRAB (member) and SORC (nonvoting member)
meeting .3 SRAB Audits The SRAB audit requirements were discussed in some detail in Section of the SRAB instructions and guidelines. Quality assurance was charged with performing the aud N , under the cognizance of the SRAB. The safety-related and reliability activities were described in about 24 quality assurance plans (QAP), which provided the basis for the audits
 
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  (e.g., QAP 2200, SRAB and 50RC activities, and QAP 2700, training). An initial audit schedule was provided each January specifying the QAP to be used, the SRAB member / consultant assigned to the audit, and the QA contact for the audit. The QAP audit schedule provision had been revised on August 17, 1988, (Revision 1). The review of the completed audits and followup audits were required to be part of the routine SRAB meeting agend Document review and personnel interviews revealed that the QAP 2200, SRAB, and SORC activities did not specifically include all c.ommitments (ANS 3.2/ ANSI N18.7, USAR, etc..) in addition to the TF.. This concern was ,
addressed to the licensee representatives for consideratio l 4.4 SRAB Meeting Minutes    i l
The NRC inspector reviewed selected portions of the SRAB meeting minutes l l  for the period of January 1987 to the date of this inspection (Meeting l
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Nos. 115 through 130) to ensure the required matters were being reviewed.
 
l 4. The matters reviewed individually in the meetings included all
  "Category 1" (Standing Agenda Items-SAIs) items:
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review items, (proposed license changes, unreviewed safety questions (none noted), NRC violations and responses at the Severity Level I, II, or III, failure data summaries, monthly
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LER/NCR status reports, cognizant audit reports with responses,
!  and LERs)
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The NRC violations and responses at the Severity Level IV and V were l  routinely reviewed as "Category 2" items (routed items) due to the l
l licensee's opinion that they were of lesser safety significance, This classification and safety significance of the Severity Level IV NRC violation and response as a "Category 2" item was discussed with the licensee to ensure this matter is given the appropriate j
level of SRAB review (e.g. , as a "Category 1" item). The licensee noted that this comment would be given consideratio . The matters, which had been previously reviewed as routed documents and were discussed in the meeting (comments and questions reviewed specifically in the meeting) included all "Category 2" items (items routed for approval with no request for discussions). Interviews revealed that these items were generally reviewed in a quick fashion during the meeting and, as noted, any and all comments and questions were specifically addressed during the meetings. "Category 2" items included:
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* Closed NCRs
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Design changes, equipment specification changes, temporary modifications, and temporary design changes
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Setpoint changes
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Miscellaneous items 4.4.3 The review of the requirements and implementing procedures associated with the review item specified in TS 6 2.1.B.a. which requires that the "following subjects shall be reported to and reviewed by the NPPD Safety Review and Audit Board," including the (safety evaluations for 1) changes to procedures, . . . to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety question."
The review of SRAB meeting minutes 115 through 130 and discussions with personnel revealed only a few procedure changes were provided to the SRAB by the 50RC; and then, only in those cases when the change was deemed questionable (uncertain) as to whether 50.59 applied. The onsite procedure, CNS 0.4, which established the controls for procedure changes, effectively screened the majority of changes as,
  "no safety evaluation" required cnd "no change to the TS", therefore, none of the safety evaluations for the changes were provided for the SRAB revie The SORC minutes, included routitiely as a SRAB agenda item, contained only a simple listing of the procedure changes; however, no determinations were included in the 50RC minutes for SRAB review The licensee's failure to provide SRAB with the safety evaluations for changes to TS required procedures is an apparent violation (298/8824-02) of the TS 6.2.1. No other violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . .
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23 Documentation Of Qualification Of Installed AGASTAT Safety-Related Series 7012 And E7022 Time Delay Relays - The NRC inspector, as part of closure of Unresolved Item 298/8411-04, reviewed documentation of component qualification related to the licensee's replacement of safety-related 125 and 250 volt DC motor starters. During this review, the NRC inspector identified concerns with AGASTAT Series 7012 and E-7022 time-delay relays
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installed in the starter assemblies. While documentation to resolve these concerns was not in the data provided to the NRC inspector, the licensee subsequently informed Region IV that acceptable documentation was available. Verification of this documentation will remain an unresolved item (298/8824-03) pending review by the NRC inspector during a  i subsequent inspection. The following concerns will be addressed by the NRC  !
inspector to assure that documentation is available te support  l qualification:      f l
The time-delay ralays contain an internal part designated a "timing insert." This part determines each relay's time delay range of adjustmen It is made on Nylon 10 The timing insert has a mechanical activation energy of 0.83 eV using the Wyle Lab data bas This part was not identified in documentation of the licensee's environmental qualification of commercial grade AGASTAT 7012 relays as provided to the NRC inspector. This activation energy is lower than the activation energies for other relay components as analyzed by the licensee's contracto The timing inserts appeared to be the limiting factor in the qualified radiation-life of these relay Based on this fact and available documentation, the licensee had not based the qualified radiation-life of these relays on the relay part having the shortest radiation-lif The licensee subsequently stated that the silicon diaphragm and the Buna N seals installed in these relays had higher activation energies,  ,
but that these parts could not tolerate any degradation of their  l mechanical properties and still function properl Therefore these f parts were limiting for radiation agin This determination obviated '
the need to consider the radiation life of the nylon timing inser I The licensee also stated that documentation of these facts was not i  provided to the NRC inspector, but are available for review during a  t follow-up inspection.
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Documentation provided did not include relay operating temperatures 1  in the starter enclosures after operational events which included
-  temperature transients, such as CNS Equipment Qualification Profile "G."
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  * Documentat.on provided did not include demonstration of qualification of relays during CNS plant design pressure transients and temperature i  conditier to which they may be subjected.
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Section 6.3.1.5 of IEEE Standard 323-1974, which was specified by the licensee for these relays, specifies voltage margins for tests as plus and minus 10 percent of rated system voltage. For battery systems, rated voltage includes battery float voltage (132 volts) and battery discharge voltage (50 volts) as the range. The relays were tested at 125 volt Meeting the requirements of the subject specification would apparently require testing at 81 volts and 145 volt No documentation was provided of testing at these voltages. As tested, especially with the relay chatter experienced with the tests performed, there is no documentation to show (deenergized, energized, and transitional) during design basis seismic events with minimum design battery voltag * Documentation did not identify the orientation of the AGASTAT relays mounted in the starter enclosures. Relay design appears to necessitate qualification in each installed orientatio '
Occumentation provided for commercial grade series 7012 relays included material descriptions for nonmetallic relay parts considered
.ecessary for environmental qualificatio The documentation did not tie the relays tested and installed to the material descriptions of relay part Commercial grade AGASTAT relays were not under design or configuration control, including shelf-life control of age sensitive materials such as those discussed in the dScumentation provide Documentation did not inicuded certification of tne age (shelf-life)
of these age-sensitive parts at the time of assembly of the relay As a result, documentation provided did not define and substantiate the qualified life of installed commercial grade series 7012 relay *
Documentation provided did not include the plant specific design bases and operational cycles and limits which must be considered for the qualification of the subject relay For example, the relays were tested for a number of operating cycles, but this number was not correlated to plant or component design lif * The documentation provided identified that the ACASTAT relays were seismically tested in the energized (operate mode) and deenergized (annoperate mode). No documentation was provided of seismic testing in the transitional mode, nor was a basis documented for not testing in this mod IEEE Standard 344-1975 was specified by the lic.ensee for these relay IE2E 344-1975, Section 4, specifies that seismic qualification should demonstrate an equipment's ability to operate during the time that it is subjected to a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
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* Documentation provided identified that the AGASTAT 7012 and E7022 l;  relays, which were tested, had experienced "contact chatter" during the seismic tests. The E7022 relay was retested and was found to be satisfactor No retest, or other documentation of acceptability, was provided for the 7012 rela * Documentation provided identified that the 7012 relay, which was tested, "dropped out" in 20 seconds, in lieu of the identified required ticae of 15 second No documentation was provided showing the acceptability of this possibly significant (+33 percent) variance experienced during a tes . Modification of Wetwell/Drywell Vacuum Breaker Valves (T12515/96)
In December 1979 General Electric issued SIL No. 321 informing licensee's
! with Mark I containments that unanticipated cycling of drywell vacuum l breakers could result in damage to the vacuum breakers. In November 1981, the licensee completed the modifications to the vacuum breakers under Major Design Change (MDC) 80-10 The NRC inspector reviewed MOC 80-100,
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which documented the licensee's safety evaluadon, the completion of the l installation data sheets, and the acceptance test checklists. In 1983, l the NRC issued Generic Letter 83-08 requesting licensees to perform
! calculations of their installation to determine the structural adequacy of l the vacuum breakers. The licensee completed the evaluation of the f modified vacuum breakers. This evaluation was endorsed by the NRC in an SER dated September 25, 1986.


l This issue is considered close l l
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7. Generic letters (G,Ls) (92703)
This inspection effort reviewed the licensee's actions in response to the GLs issued by the NRC in 1987 and 198 The licensee used a special transmittal sheet to transmit GLs to site managers for their evaluation, recommendations, and action. After the appropriate action had been completed a closecut summary sheet was prepared and routed to management for review. The licensee's practice appeared to be very effectiv Responses required by the GLs had been generally timely and the licen>ee's actions were appropriat The licensee had not yet responded to GLs 88-12 and 88-14. Neither of the responses were due at the time of the inspection. The licensee had been granted an extension to respond to GLs 88-02. This GL involves Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 and the licensee's response is being prepared by a special owners grou GLs 88-02, 88-12, and 88-14 will remain open until the licensee's responses have been submitted and reviewed in a subsequent inspectio The remaining GLs for 1987 and 1988 are considered close _- _
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26 Exit Interview (30703)
An exit interview was held on September 15, 1988. At this exit interview, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspectio The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspectors.
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Latest revision as of 13:33, 16 December 2021

Ack Receipt of 881208 & s Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-298/88-24. Understands That Util Now Agrees That Violation Did Occur & Will Provide Addl Details to Prevent Recurrence
ML20245F539
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/24/1989
From: Callan L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Trevors G
NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
References
NUDOCS 8905020416
Download: ML20245F539 (2)


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APR 2 41989 )

In Reply Refer To:

Docket: 50-298/88-24 l Nebraska Public Power Distrilet ATTN: George A. Trevors- j Division Manager - Nuclear Support P.O. Box 499 Columbus, NE- 68602-0499 Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letters of Dece:nber 8,1988, and February 10, 1989. in  !

response to our letter and the attached Notice of Violation dated November 8, 1988. As a result of our review and telephone conversations on April 12 and 14, 1989, we understand that you now agree that the violation did occur and that you will provide additional details regarding your actions to prevent recurrence of the violatio We have no further questions regarding-your response to the open items (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03) and will review the implementation of your corrective action

'during a future inspectio Please provide the supplemental information within 30 days of the date of this lette

Sincerely,

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Original Signed By l L.). Callan L. J. Callan, Director  ;

Division of Reactor Projects cc:-

' Cooper Nuclear Station ATTN: Guy Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska' 68321 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director bcc w/ enclosures: (see next page)

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d U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: NPPD Response to NRC Open Item (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03): Failure to Develop and Implement Training Plan for Offsite Personnel Cooper Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46 Reference (1) Letter from Callan to G. A. Trevors dated November 8, 1988, transmitting Inspection Report 88-24 Centlement This letter is written in response to Reference (1) in which you requested that the District describe the actions taken, or being planned, to resolve the issue of training for corporate technical support personnel as discussed in paragraph 2.4.4 of the subject repor Following is a discussion of the open item s,d our respons (open) Open Item (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03): Failure to Develop and Implement i Training Plan for Offsite Personnel -

This open item identified the lack of a comprehensive training plan for corporate technical support personne ]

This program deficiency was identified on April 28, 1982, and it was identified ,

as Open Item isd/u2-0 The licensee formed a task force to resolve this '

and other training issue This task force developed a training program for general office (Corporate) personnel, which was approved on April 5,  !

1983, In 1984, this area was again reviewed by the NRC and it was found that "a formal written technical and nontechnical training program and j

requalification program which includes defined goals, objectives, schedules, j lesson plans, methods of evaluating the effectiveness of the training, and j methods for record retention had not been developed at the time of the

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inspection." This was again identified as an open itte (298/8412-03). During its meeting on January 14, 1988, the SRAB reviewed this issue and recommended that action be taken to resolve this issue. During this inspection the NRC inspector found that this issue was still open. The NRC is concerned that *

this item has been open for at least 6 years and has asked the licensee to respond to this report with a description of the actions to be taken to resolve this issu $~'h ~0 0 gg2-){

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Response In March and April 1988 initial meetings were held between training and corporate engineering personnel to identify the steps required to establish a formal training program for appropriate Nuclear Engineering Department (NED)- personnel to be developed using systematic -

approach-to-training method As a result, matrices of available training courses were prepared to assist line management in defining their training need Pending the development of this formal program, which was to be described in a Training Program Description, in May 1988 a revision to the NED Training Task Book 1 was issue This NED Training Task Book had been used in the past to outline and describe an indoctrination and training program for newly hired engineers in NE This revised book was used as an interim training course until the formal training program could be finalize This training program methodology continues to be utilized in NED and is effectiv Training records are maintained by the respective NED supervisors. Portions of this manual will be incorporated into the formal training progra On September 23, 1988 and again on October 6, 1988 representatives of the Corporate Training Department, the Nuclear Training Department, and the Nuclear Engineering Department met to start draf ting a Training Program Description (TPD), for the subject training program, in accordance with Nuclear Training Department procedure It is anticipated that this TPD will complete final review and be approved by March 1, 198 Upon TPD approval this training program will be formally administered under Nuclear Training Department procedures and will have defined goals, objectives, lesson plans, effectiveness evaluations and record retention requirement Please call me if you have any questions regarding this respons

Sincerely,

. . Trevors Division Manager Nuclear Support

/jw cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office, Region IV Arlington, TX

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Resident Inspector Office  ;

Cooper Nuclear Station '

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NLS8800554 December 8, 1988 '

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: NPPD Response to NRC Inspection Report No. 50-298/88-24; Cooper Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46 Reference: 1) Letter from L. J. Callan to C. A. Trevors dated November 8, 1988, transmitting Inspection Report 88-24 l Gentlemen:

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This letter is written in response to your letter dated November 8, 1988, Reference Therein you indicated that one of our activities was in violation of NRC requirement Following is the statement of the violation and our response in accordance with 10CFR2.201: i Statement of Violation Failure to Adequate 1v Review Procedure Changes The Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.1.B.4.a, requires in part, that the safety evaluations for changes to procedures shall be reported to and reviewed by the safety review and audit board to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety _

questio ,

Contrary to the above, the safety evaluation for changes to normal, abnormal, maintenance, and emergency operating procedures, which were reviewed by the station operations review committee in accordance with  !

TS 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, and 6.3.4, were not being routinely provided to the safety review and audit board for their required review in meetings No. 115 through 130, dated January 1987 through September 198 This is a Severity Level IV violatio (Supplement I) (298/8824-02)

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Reason for Violation if Admitted The District is of the opinion that a violation of CNS Technical Specification 6.2.1.B.4.a did not occur and requests a reconsideration of the violatio The District contends that safety evaluations for certain changes to procedures were submitted to and reviewed by the Safety Review and Audit Board (SRAB) in accorJance with Technical Specification requirement CNS Procedure 0.4, " Preparations, Review, and Approval of Procedures,"

currently requires that every procedure change receive a Safety Evaluation Applicability revie The intent of this review is to screen all procedure changes to ensure that the ones which 1) could result in an unrevieved safety question or, 2) require a change to Technical Specifications, are identified and then subjected to a detailed safety evaluatio A key feature of the applicability review is that should any uncertainty exist regarding the potential for either an unreviewed safety question, or Technical Specification change, a detailed safety evaluation is also performe Sections V.B.6 and V.C.5 of CNS Procedure 0.4 provide that "Should the Safety Evaluation applicability review indicate that a Safety Evaluation is required, ;

than the package shall be forwarded to the Engineering Manage The Engineering Manager ensures that a detailed Safety Evaluation is performed in accordance with CNS Engineering Procedure 3.3, " Station Safety ;

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Evaluations." Precedure 3.3,Section V.A.6, then requires that the submittal be sent to the SRAB for their revie The District's position is that the Safety Evaluation applicability review required by CNS Procedure 0.4 is a review to determine if a safety evaluation is require It is recognized that the guidance provided in NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9800, dated January 1, 1984, allows a simpler screening process to be imposed for proposed changes (i.e., Is the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) affected?). However, as described above, the intent )

of CNS Procedure 0.4 is to provide a more comprehensive review of proposed procedure change In reality, the applicability review, however, is clearly not a detailed safety evaluation as specified by the CNS Tech Specs and need not be reviewed by the SRA The District is concerned that the violation, as written, implies that the i NPPD Safety Review and Audit Board must review all procedure changes to comply with Technical Specification 6.2.1.B. To require the review of all procedures is both in3onsistent with the written requirements of the Technical Specification and Edd-intent. The Standard Review Plan, Section 13.4 and the Second Proposed Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, as well as the CNS Technical Specifications, are clear that the Independent Review and Audit Group (NPPD SRAB) is not responsible for reviewing all procedures, oniv those requiring detailed Safety Evaluations for the change To require SRAB to conduct these reviews is not required nor meaningfu This time-consuming effort and the resulting review would unnecessarily divert and dilute the safety responsibilities of those involve On the j other hand, we realize that the existing procedural requirements need to be clarified to address the purpose of, and difference between, a preliminary and detailed safety evaluatio This clarification will be implemented by March 198 l

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Based on the above, the District respectively requests your reconsideration of the violatio It should be noted during your reconsideration that we have proceeded to ensure that SRAB receives copies of all procedure change safety evaluations, both preliminary and detailed, to alleviate all NRC concerns in this are The District's response to Open Item (298/8212-01; 298/8412-03), Failure to Develop and Implement Training Plan for Offsite Personnel will be the /

s'ubject of separate correspondenc If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact m

Sincerely, IfA O&

G. A. Trevors

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Division Manager Nuclear Support

/rg cc: U Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office - Region IV Resident Inspector Cooper Nuclear Station

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