IR 05000298/1988028
| ML20205L113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1988 |
| From: | Bennett W, Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205L082 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-88-28, NUDOCS 8811010479 | |
| Download: ML20205L113 (8) | |
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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMfilSS10tl
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-290/88-28 Operating Licensee DPR-46 Docket: 50-298 i.icensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
P.O. Box 499 Columbus, NE 68601
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Facill'.y Name:
Cooper Nuclear Stat 1on (CNS)
Inspection At: CNS, Nemaha County, Nebraska
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Inspection Conducted:
September 1-30, 1988 Inspector:
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W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector, Date Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects
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/ /9 67 Approved:
.G. L. Const'able, Chief Project Section C, Da te
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Olvision of Reactor Projects 8911010479 GG1021 PDR ADOCK O'JOOO298 O
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted September 1-30, 1988 (Report 50-298/88-28)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unancounced inspection of LER followup, transportation, facility modifications, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified. The licensee continues to operate the plant in a safe, controlled, manner. The violation, a failure to signoff procedure steps, was possibly due to confusion concerning responsibility for procedure signoff.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations
- J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager of Technical Support
- D. M. Norvell, Maintainence Manager
- G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
- H. T. Hitch, Plants Services Manager
- J. V. Sayer, Radiological Manager
- R. A. Jansky, Outage and Modifications Manager
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- R. Brungardt, Operations Manager
- L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- G. R. Smith, Licensing Supervisor NRC Personnel
- G. A. Pick, Resident Inspector The NRC inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection period.
- Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on October 3, 1988.
2.
Plant Status l
The plant operated at essentially full power throughout the inspection i
period.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
l (Closed) Violation 298/8820-002:
Failure to Perfom Adequate Valve Lineup
- This item concerned a valve out of position during the perfonnance of Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.3.4.3 resulting in injection of water into the reactor vessel by the core spray and residual heat removal systems.
Corrective actions comitted to by the licensee included; attempting to reduce control room distractions, reviewing complex surveillance procedures to improve signoffs and to provide sufficient subdivisions such that any portion of the surveillar.ce can be completed in one shift.
In addition, the licensee revised SP 6.3.4.3 to provide separate signoffs to check valve position and to secure power.
The SRI reviewed Conduct of Operations Procedure 2.0.3, "Control Room Conduct and Manning," Revision 6 dated September 6,1988, and verified that guidance concerning nonoperations personnel in the control room had
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been incorporated into the procedure. The licensee reviewed 54 i
surveillance procedures for the possibility of separation into subprocedures and improvement of signoffs. Seven arocedure changes were
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generated from this review.
Five procedures have seen revised and the s1 other two are in the revision process. The SRI reviewed two of the I.
revised procedures SP 6.2.2.3.14. "HPCI Turbine Trip and Initiation Logic Functional Test," Revision 15. dated September 12, 1988, and
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SP 6.2.2.5.12. "RHR Loops A and B Pump and Yalve Control Logic Functional
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F Test," Revision 14, dated September 12, 1988 This review verified that
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no multiaction, single signoff, steps were 1n the procedures, and that the procedures did not require separatinn into subprocedures.
The SRI verified that SP 6.3,.4.3
"Seg'Jential Loading of Emergency Diesel Generators," had been revised to provide separate signoffs for checking valve position and securing pcwer.
The SRI also verified that the operations supervisor had briefed all operations personnel on this event.
l-This item is closed, s
4.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup (92700)
(Closed)LER88-015:
This LER documents an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system and engineered safety feature group isolations.
The cause of this event was a procedural deficiency in that no specific guidance was provided in the design change package for backfilling and venting of instrument lines. The licensee has requested that the offsite
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engineering group provide detailed installation / acceptance testing instructions in future design change documents.
The licensee consnitted to disseminate information concerning this event to Engineering and I and C
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personnel.
The SRI verified that instructions had been given to the Offsite engineering group to provide specific filling and venting instructions in future design changes. The SRI also verified that information concerning this event had been promulagated to Engineering and I and C personnel.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)LER88-017: This LER documents an unplanned autonatic actuation of engineered safety features during surveillance testing.
The cause of this event was determined to be personnel error.
The individual responsible was counselled by his manager on the need to be deliberate and cautious in the perforr u ce of his duties.
The licensee comitted to perfonn a b man factors evaluation of the surveillance being performed when the event occurred.
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i The SPI verified that the human factors evaluation was perfonned and that
labels were adequate for surveillance performance.
l This LER is closed.
(Closed)LER88-018: This LER documents inadvertent injection of water i
into the reactor vessel from the core spray and residual heat removal
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systems during a survaillance test.
i This LER provides the documentation of the event discussed in paragraph 3
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of this report. Licensee corrective actions taken regarding both this LER t
and the subsequent violation are documented in paragraph 3 of this report.
i This LER is closed.
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The LERs reviewed were accurate and submitted within the 30 days
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requirement. Corrective actions taken appear to have been appropriate and timely. No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The SRI observed operational activities throughout the inspection period.
L Control room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled.
Proper control room staffing was maintained. Discussions with operators
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demonstrated that they were cognizant of plant status and understood the
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importance of, and reason for, each lit annunciator. The SRI observed
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selected shift turnover meetings and verified that information concerning
plant status was comunicated to the oncoming operators.
Control board t
i walkdowns and tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to L
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vitrify operability of plant equipment. Overall plant cleanliness was
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observed to be good throughcut the inspection period.
i On September 16, 1988, a group 3 (Reactor Water Cleanup) isolation
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occurred. On September 28, 1938, a group 6 (Reactor Building Ventilation)
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and a partial group 2 (Residual Heat Removal System) isolation occurred.
The SRI monitored the licensee's response to tnese group isolations.
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Troubleshooting detennined that the cause of the isolation was separate failures (coil burn out) of General Electric type CR 120A relays.
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relay failures occurred this year. Other failures have occurred in the t
past few years. NPPD review of the recent relay fuilures at CNS have
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identified aging as the cause of failures of GE CR120A relays. GE no
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longer manufactures these relays which had an expected service life of
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15 years. These relays are used in several safety-related applications.
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At CNS, the failure mode initiates the safety-related function in all
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cases. NPPD plans to replace all nomally energized CR12CA relays after 10 years of service.
This will result in the replacement cf about i
40 relays during the next outage which amounts to all such relays at CNS.
NPPD personnel have reported that GE plans to issue a service infonnation i
letter on these relays in the near future.
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The SRI verified that diesel generator fuel oil is included in the licensee's quality assurance program.
The SRI reviewed Quality Assurance
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Plan 600 "Surveillance Testing," Revision 8, dated August 19, 1987, and associated checklists to verify that diesel fuel oil quality was included.
In addition, the SRt reviewed Quality Assurance Audit 87-15 dated February 26, 1988, and verified that diesel fuel quality had been checked.
Multi-Plant Action Item A-15 and Temporary Instruction 2515/93 are closed.
The SRI verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with facility policies i
and procedures, and regulatory requirements.
Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled.
Radiation work pemits contairied appropriate information to ensure that work could be perfomed in a sr.fe and controlled manner. Radiation monitors were properly utilized to check for contamination.
The SRI observed security personnel perform their duties of vehicle, controlled or escorted in the protected area (properl" authorized andTbeSRIconduc personnel, and package search. Vehicles were PA).
tours to ensure that compensatory measures were properly implemented as required because of equipment failure or equipment deenergization due to the security upgrade in progress. The PA barrie* had adequate illumination and the isolation zones were free of transient material.
The licensee continues to operate the plant in a safe, controlled manner.
Licensee response to plant problems is quick and conservative. The licensee is very responsive to observations and concerns of the SRI. No violations or deviations wert: identified in this area.
6.
Transportation (8672Q The SRI monitored the preparation of the spent fuel shipment that departed the site on September 20, 1983. The SRI verified that radiation and
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containation surveys were properly performed.
The SRI observed that cask handling and shipping was performed in accordance with Nuclear Performance
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Proceduce (NPP) 10.27, "Cask IF-300 Handling and Shipping," Revision ll,
dated August 11, 1988. During a review of NPP 10.27, on September 20, 1988, the SRI observed that no signatures were present for steps G.6, J.2, and J.5, which had been perfonted on September 19, 1988. Discussion with personnel who had perfonned the procedure verified that the procedure steps had been performed. Tt.e failure to document perfomance of steps G.6, J.2, and J.5 in NPP 10.27 is an apparent violation (298/8823-01).
the licensee prepared the spent fuel for trarisportation in accordance with appropriate procedures.
Contamination and radiation surveys were proper and thorough. A confusion concerning respcnsit,ility for procedure signoff is potentially the root cause for the apparent violation. Ne other violations or deviations were identified in this are _ _ _ - - - _
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Facility Moaifications (37701)
TheSRIreviewedNonconformanceReport(NCR)88-111issuedonApril28, 1988, and closed on September 15, 1988. The NCR concerned work performed
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on Design Change (DC)87-113 without using the latest revision tu the DC.
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While reviewing the NCR package, the SRI noted examples of different
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copies of the same pages of the DC being signed by more than one person on different dates.
Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that the
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root cause of the problem was that the design engineer had made a complete copy of the original design change, and that copies of this uncontrolled copy, without revisions, had been utilized to perfom work. The licensee comitted to developing a program for controlling copies of design change documents prior to the next refueling outage.
The licensee had previously identified the cause of the problem noted above in a LER and appropriate corrective actions are being taken to prevent n occurrence. The licensee is attempting to improvo its outage preparat.on and performance as evidenced by its comitment to control copies of design change documents.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.-
8.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The SRI observed the performance of Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.2.2.6.3,
"RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low Calibration and Functional / Functional Test," Revision 13, dated February 8,1988. This surveillance was performed on Septemte 8,1988, to verify operability and calibration of the Retetor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam supply pressure monitors per Technical Specifications (TS).
The test was performed by qualified technicians in accordance with the procedure. All precautions and prerequisites were followed. Test equipment utilized was verified to be in calibration. Test results were within TS and procedure limits.
The surveillance program is being performed in accordance with applicable procedures, The licensee is in the p.ocess of entering the surveillance tracking program into a computer.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
M_onthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
On September 23, 1988, a group 6 (reactor building ventilation) isolation occurred. The SRI monitored troubleshooting of the problem which was detennined to be a failed zener diode in the power supply to the reactor building radiation monitor. The power supply was repaired and the SRI monitored post maintenance testing of the radiation monitor. The SRI determined that Technical Specifications (TS) were unclear about required actions and did not appear to be in agreement with the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Discussions with the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Region IV, and the licensee confimed that the reactor
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building radiation monitor wa3 only required to be operable during f
refueling operations. The licensee consnitted to issuing a TS change l
ciarifying the number of channels required to be operable and under what l
plant conditions they are required to be operable.
The licensee performed prompt corrective action whenever equipment failed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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10., Exit Interview Q0703)
An exit interview was conducted on October 3,1983, with licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview,' the SRI reviewed the scope.and findings of the inspection. Other meetings between the SRI and licensee management were held periodically during the inspection period to discuss identified concerns.