IR 05000298/1988025

Insp Rept 50-298/88-25 on 880801-31.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Info Notices Followup,Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance & Maint, Observations,Esf Walkdown & Security

ML20154E865
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	09/12/1988
From:	Bennett W, Constable G, Madsen G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154E839	List: IR 05000298/1988025 ML20154E836
References
50-298-88-25, IEIN-87-047, IEIN-87-048, IEIN-87-067, IEIN-87-47, IEIN-87-48, IEIN-87-67, IEIN-88-001, IEIN-88-044, IEIN-88-1, IEIN-88-44, NUDOCS 8809190162
Download: ML20154E865 (8)

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APPENDIX

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/88-25 Operating License: DPR-46

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.i Docket: 50-298 i Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) -

P.O. Box 499

- Columbus, NeSraska 68601  ;

Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)

] f i Itspection At: CNS, Nenaha County, Nebraska  !

j Inspection Conducted: August 1-31, 1988 [

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Inspectors: I 7[A/M

. W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Date i Section C Division of Reactor Projects j i

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'G.'L Madsen, Project Engineer, Project Date !

Section C, Division of Reactor Projects

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C"U- nnstaMeT~Ihief. Project Section C, Dafe / [

vision of Reactor Projects j l

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Inspection Sumary Impection Conducted August 1-31, 1983 (Report 50-298/88-25)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of Infonnation Notice followup, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations, ESF walkdown, radiological protection, and securit Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees

• G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations

• J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager of Technical Support

• E. M. Hace, Engineering Manager

• G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager

• R. L. Gardner, Acting Operations Manager

• L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• R. Smith, licensing Supervisor The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection period,

• Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on September 2 ,

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198 . Plant Status The reactor operated at essentially full power throughout the inspection period except for the period August 25-27, 1988. A reactur scram from l 100 percent power occurred at 12:40 a.m. (CDT) on August 25. The cause of i

the scram was detemined to be noise which caused a spurious main steam

) line high radiation signal; however, no other indications of high radiation I were present. The plant was started up and declared critical at 2:12 a.m.

l on August 27, and was synchronized to the grid at 2:59 p.m. on August 2 , Licensee Action on previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Unresolved 298/8630-003: Tension / Shear Interaction This item concerned the use of an elliptical tension shear interaction curve in detemining adequacy of Phillips Red Head anchor bolt The licensee, in Letter NLS8700012 dated January 8, 1987, stated that the use of the elliptical tension shear interaction curve had been addressed and accepted in its response to IE Bulletin 79-02. The SRI verified that the bulletin response letter addressed the issue, and concluded that the curve can be applied to Phillips Red Head anchor bolt This item is close . Allegation Followup (99014)

Allegation 4-88-A-0020 concerned a contractor utilized by CNS. The allegation concerned: unsecured background investigation files; unmonitored W PI psychological tests compromised by collaboration;

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unmonitored urinalysis procedures, and heavy drug users cleared for work at the site; one named employee who had his urinalysis sample switched; one named employee with an undocumented felony; and falsified experience levels of supervisor This allegation was fonnally referred to the licensee by the NRC on May 20, 1988. The SRI was provided documentation associated with the licensee's investigation on June 1, 1988. The SRI reviewed the licensee's investigation of the allegation to determine whether the f licensee's actions were adequat A licensee quality assurance specialist conducted an audit of the contractors security screening program on January 22, 1988, and verified that the contractor's screening program complied with the CNS Physical Security Pla The contractor's procedures require that all psychological tests be monitore In addition, no talking or discussion of the test among applicants is allowed. A sample of background checks revealed that l

, followup conversations between an employee and a psychologist had occurred ;

in two of four instances. This would tend to demonstrate that the tests !

had not been compromise l The contractor's procedures require that all drug screening be monitore l Approximately 90 percent of the contractor's badged employees were originally screened under the licensee's program. In addition, the contract employees are subject to random drug screening. The named employee was tested by the licensee subsequent to the allegation. The screening results were negative, showing no use of illegal drugs.

! The resumes of four contractors were reviewed and verified for accurac The background evaluation of the named employee was reviewed, as well as the history of his badging at a previous site. No problems were identifie This allegation was not substantiate . Information Notice Followup (92701)

The NRC inspector reviewed Information Notices (ins) 87-48 through 87-6 The ins appear to have been appropriately routed and reviewed. The inspector noted that Attachment C closeout sheets had not been utili.ted for final signoffs in all cases. The inspector was infonned that the Attachment C form was a relatively new addition. ins 87-47 through 87-67 and 88-01 through 88-44 are considered closed based on the program in place for distributing and reviewing in . Operational Safety Yerification (71707)

l The SRI observed operational activities throughout the inspection perio Proper control room staffing was maintained, and control room activities

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l 5 i and conduct were observed to be well controlled and well coordinate Activities were conducted in a professional manner. Discussions with  ;

o>erators revealed that they were cognizant of plant status and understood l tie importance of, and reason for, each lit annunciator. The SRI observed selected shift turnover meetings and verified that information concerning plant status was communicated to the oncoming operators. Tours of accessible areas at the facility were corducted to confirm operability of "

plant equipment. The SRI performed a walkdown of DC electrical system !

Results of this walkdown are documented in paragraph 9 of this report, i Overall plant cleanliness was observed to be good throughout the inspection perio :

t On August 25, 1988, at 12:40 a.m., a reactor trip from 100 percent power  ;

occurred. All systems operated as per design during the transient. The SRI responded to the reactor trip and monitored licensee actions  !

subsequent to the scram. In addition to the maintenance action documented i in paragraph 8, the licensee tested hand-hcid radios to verify  !

that they could not generate the signal that caused the plant tri The !

trip was detemined to have been caused by doise from an unknown sourc This noise generated a high main steam line radiation signal which caused i the reactor trip. The SRI reviewed the completed Conduct of Operations  !

Procedure 2.0.6, "Reactor Post-Trip Review and Restart Authorization t Procedure," Revision 4. dated April 14, 1988, for the reactor trip, i On August 27, 1988, the SRI witnessed the reactor startup following the j reactor trip on August 25. The startup was perfomed in a controlled, l'

cautious manner in accordance with General Operating Procedure 2.1.1 "Cold Startup Procedure," Revision 52, dated June 2, 1988. The reactor was 7 rieclared critical at 2:12 a.m. on August 27, and synchronized to the grid i at 2:59 p.m. on August 2 !

l No violations or deviations were identified in this are ; Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)

The SRI observed and/or reviewed the performance of the following Surveillance Procedures (SPs):

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SP 6.3.4.1, "CS Test Mode Surveillence Operation " Revision 23, dated June 16,1988; and SP 6.3.4.2, "CS Motor Operated Valve Operability Test," Revision 16. dated March 3, 1988: These surveillances were performed to verify Core Spray (CS) system operability to meet Technical Specification (TS) requirements after the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable after failing a surveillance test. The SRI observed the perfomance of these surveillances on August 10, 1988. The tests were performed by qualified operators who were cognizant of all precautions and limitations in the procedure Prerequisites were properly verified and the surveillances were performed in accordance with written instructions. Test results met acceptance criteria of the procedures and TS,

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. SP 6.3.3.1, "HPCI Test Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 29, dated July 14, 1988: The SRI observed the performance of this surveillance twice during the inspection period. On August 11, 1988, the surveillance was performed to verify operability after maintenance on Valve HPCI-2 On August 27, 1988, the surveillance was performed as part of the reactor startua and to verify proper operation of the HPCI controller which had aeen noted to be controlling sluggishly. The surveillance, in each instance, was performed by qualified operators in accordance with the procedur . The SRI reviewed SP 6.2.8.1, "RR/ATWS Reactor Vessel High Pressure Calibration and Functional / Pump Trip Logic Test," Revision 16. dated September 11,1987; SP 6.2.8.2, "RR/ATWS Reactor Low Water Level Calibration and Function / Logic Trip Test," Revision 16 dated January 14,1988; and SP 6.2.8.3, "ART and ATWS/RPT Reactor Vessel High Pressure Calibration and Functional Test," Revision 13 dated June 7, 1988. Tnis review demonstrated that the surveillances were adequate to verify recirculation pump trip per TS and the ATWS rul Multi-Plant Action Item C-02 and Temporary Instruction 2515/95 are close No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703[

On August 10, 1988, a ground was discovered in Valve HPCI-21. The ground l was caused by a broken agastat relay retaining clip falling across a

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teminal. Maintenance personnel discovered the problem and replaced the agastat. Engineering personnel informed the SRI that they had contacted the manufacturer and that they were unaware of any similar occurrences with this type valve. The problem was attributed to isolated equipment failur On August 25, 1988, a reactor scram occurred due to a high main steam line radiation signal. Maintenance and vendor personnel inspected the main steam line radiation instruments, but could not find a cause for the scram signal. Electrical noise was present in the instrument but not enough to cause a scram signal. Internal ground straps were installed in each instrurent cabinet to reduce the amount of electrical noise present in the instrument On August 28, 1988, after perfonnance of a surveillance test, the HPCI turbine failed to trip when a trip signal was applied from the control room. The turbine was tripped locally and subsequently declared inoperable. Troubleshooting determined the problem to be a failed trip solenoid. A new trip solenoid was installed per Maintenance Work i Request (MWR) 88-3878 on August 31. The solenoid was properly tested and the HPCI system declared operable on August 3 No violations or deviations were identified in this are .. _

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7 Engineered Safety Feature Walkdown (71710)

The SRI performed an independent walkdown of the DC electrical system The inspection was performed to verify operability, to confirm that licensee system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, and to identify equipment conditions or items that might degrade system perfomanc I

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The SRI utilized System Operating Procedure (S0P) 2.2.24,

"250 V DC Electrical System," Revision 15, datet May 17, 1988; S0P 2.2.25, {

"125 V DC Electrical System," Revision 17. dated January 14, 1988; and 50P 2.2.26 "24 V DC Electrical System " Revision 8, dated January 14, 1988, in performing the system walkdown. During the procedure review and system walkdown, the SRI noted some minor inconsistencies. The licensee is reviewing these inconsistencies for possible procedure revisio The SRI compared the breaker and fuse indices to As-built Drawing, Burns & Roe 2058, "0C One Line Diagram." No discrepancies were note No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

l 10. Radiological Protection Observations (71709) l The SRI verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological l protection program were implemented in conformance with facility policies,  !

procedures, and regulatory requirements. Radiation work pennits contained I appropriate information to ensure that work could be performed in a safe i and controlled manner. Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled. Radiation monitors were properly utilized to check for contaminatio No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Security (71881)

The SRI observed security personnel perform their duties of vehicle, personnel, and package searc Vehicles were controlled or escorted in the protected area PA). (properly authorized The licensee and continued j

implementation of the security equipment upgrade during this inspection period. The SRI conducted site tours to ensure that compensatory measures were properly implemented as required because of equipment failure or the security upgrade. Interviews with security personnel demonstrated that they were cognizant of their responsibilities. The PA barrier had adequate illumination and the isolation zones were free of consient mate rial .

No violations or deviations were identified in this are _- .

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12. Exit Interview (30703)-

! An exit interview was conducted on September 2,1988, with licensee

representatives (identifiedinparagraph1). During this interview, the i

SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. Other meetings between the SRI and licensee management were held periodically during the inspection period to discuss identified concerns.

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