IR 05000298/1988009
| ML20151W353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1988 |
| From: | Gagliardo J, Greg Pick, Vickrey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151W336 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-88-09, 50-298-88-9, NUDOCS 8805030375 | |
| Download: ML20151W353 (9) | |
Text
L
..
l
,
.
v;
APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/88-09 Operating License: DPR-46 Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
P.O. Box 499 Columbus, NE 68601 Facility Name: CooperNuclearStation(CNS)
Inspection At:
CNS, Brownville, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: March 21-25, 1988 Inspectors:
kW&%
~
b k131988
..
G.A.P)yk,fyactorInspector, Operational Dhte
'
Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety
?//J/W
/
R. B. Vickrey, Reactor IjWpector Operational Da'te Progra Section, Division of Reactor Safety
'
Approved:
'
0. E. @ gliardo, Chief Operational Programs Dtite f Section, Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Sumary Inspection Conducted March 21-25, 1988 (Report 50-298/88-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of site tours, nonlicensed staff training, and licensed operator training.
'
Results: Within the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8805030375'8S0426
~
PDR ADOCK 05000298 O
-
-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,
-
-
.
.
.
2'
DETAILS
,
1.
Persons Contacted NPPD
- G. Horn, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
- J. Dutton, Nuclear Training Manager
- J. Mecham, Senior Manager, Technical Support
- G. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
- 0. Norvell, Maintenance Manager
-
- R. Drier, Program Development Supervisor
- J. Flaherty, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- G. Reece, Operations Training Supervisor
- D. Shallemberger, Senior Reactor Operator / Reactor Operator Instructor L. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist M. Holmes, Senior Reactor Operator / Reactor Operator Instructor R. Windham, Technical Support Training Supervisor M. Gillan, Maintenance Training Supervisor G. Mace, Engineering Manager NRC
- J. Jaudon, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety
- E. Holler, Chief, Project Section C
- W. R. Bennett Senior Resident Inspector i
Other persons contacted included electrical technicians, instrument and
control (I&C) technicians, engineers, reactor operators, station
'
operators, and training instructors from various disciplines.
- Denotes those who attended the exit interview.
2.
Site Tours (71707)
'
a.
Fire Doors The NRC inspector found two nonsafety fire doors open and apparently unattended for several hours. A fire door exiting to the roof was found to be propped open at approximately 11 p.m.
This door
!
apparently had provided access for workers on the roof earlier in the (
day and was left open until discovered by the NRC inspector. The NRC l
inspector also brought to the licensee's attention that the latch on
-
the fire door had been damaged and would not close properly.
A fire
'
door for the turbine lube oil reservoir room had a respirator hose running through it at 6:30 a.m.
The NRC inspector noted that there was no work activity in the room at the time.
Special Work Permit 88-3-51 (to clean the inside of the lube oil reservoir tank)
indicated that the last use of the respirator hose had been between
.
+,-,
-:,w--
- - - _ _
.
.-
.-,--~,_m
-,, - - -
- <, -.
, --. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
_
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1:35 and 2:44 a.m.
The licensee took prompt action in the above two cases to secure the fire doors and fix the latch. The NRC inspector expressed a concern to the licensee about the relaxed condition on nonsafety, fire doors and the possibility that while in a maintenance condition some areas may be more subject to fire hazards than normal due to the additional maintenance materials in the area. The licensee responded to the NRC inspector that they would conduct additional instructions to workers and watch standers to be sensitive in these areas.
The NRC inspector observed that, while the safety door to the diesel generator rooms had a hydro supply hose through it, a fire watch was properly stationed.
b.
Diesel Generator Lube Oil Temperature The NRC inspector observed that the standby diesel lube oil temperature was between 148'F and 153'F as indicated on DGD0-PI-3140 (lube oil temperature) over a period of several hours.
Diesel Generator Operating Procedure OP 2.2.20 states that lube oil temperature be maintained at 140*F in standby. The shutdown log sheets only indicate that the lube oil temperature should be greater than 100 F and normal operating temperature is in the 150*F to 170*F range.
The NRC inspector informed the licensee that attention to detail was important in procedures and that in cases like this the procedures should be changed as necessary to ensure that they can be reasonably followed.
The licensee stated that their procedures were currently being rewritten to correct such problems, c.
Relays The NRC inspector observed relay testing in accordance with Maintenance Procedure 7.3.1.2 (timed and instantaneous overcurrent relays testing and calibration).
It was noted that several relays had as-found readings out of specification. A discussion with the electricians involved with the testing indicated that this problem seemed to be related to the relays individual environmental location.
Some of the relays that had as-found readings out of specification were found to be within specification after cleaning, while others required adjustment or parts replacement.
The NRC inspector noted that the data sheet for the procedure had a signature space for engineering review. These relays were on a 3-year testing cycle.
The NRC inspector discussed with the licensee's engineering manager his concern that these relays need to be evaluated on an individual basis to determine if more frequent testing or replacement should be implemented.
The licensee informed the NRC inspector that they were changing the review cycle to include a double review of the test data. This item will be an open item (298/8809-01) pending satisfactory engineering review, evaluation, and corrective action relating to the relay test dat *
,
t
3.
Nonlicensed Staff Training (41400)
This inspection was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the training programs for nonlicensed staff in the areas of principal staff members, maintenance technicians, nonlicensed operators, technical staff members, and quality control inspectors. -The inspection included interviews with staff, operators, and maintenance technicians to determine if training was being provided for specific tasks assigned.
The NRC inspector audited two instrument and control technician training classes. Based on the course curriculum, training materials, instructor presentations, and classroom conduct observed, it appeared that the personnel were receiving appropriate training.
The NRC inspector reviewed the training records of approximately 20 personnel who were observed performing duties related to electrical and mechanical maintenance, testing, inspection, operations, and instruction.
Based on the training records and personal interviews with these personnel, it appeared that they were receiving appropriate training to provide adequate qualifications for their work.
During the review of records, course curriculum files, procedures, and discussions with licensee personnel, the NRC inspector made the following observations:
All training records were not yet being stored in 1-hour fire-rated
file cabinets. When identified to the licensee by the NRC inspector, these records were properly filed in approved containers during this inspection period.
The licensee had a 3-6 months backlog in filing attendance sheets in
personnel training records. This was identified by the licensee on Training Work Request No. 8800246 on March 11, 1988.
The NRC inspector brought to the attention of the licensee's Training
Program Development Supervisor that all employee certification records were not being maintained in the personnel training records files. The licensee informed the NRC inspector that the certification records would be included in the files as they were updated.
During the NRC inspector's review of licensee Nuclear Training
Procedure - 08 (instructor qualification) and course curriculum files, it was noted that the files did not contain Attachment "A" as specified in the procedure. The NRC inspector questioned the licensee about the absence of Attachment "A" in the files. He was informed that there was a proposed change to the procedure to delete Attachment "A", but that the licensee had elected to delete the attachment at the time of the proposed change rather than wait until the change was approved.
Draft Administration Directive 3.3 (nuclear training and indoctrination), will require the nuclear training
.
.
>.
,
,
.
.
department manager to be responsible for controlling training procedures. Procedures must be complied with, and the training department should emphasize this during training. Training should set'the proper example for personnel dealing with safety-related procedures. These observations are noted for the licensee consideration for program improvement.
INP0 is scheduled to visit the site to review the nonlicensed operator training for accreditation in May 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensed Operator Training (41701)
The NRC inspector conducted this inspection to evaluate licensed operator training program effectiveness.
The documents listed below were utilized during the conduct of the inspection:
CNS Procedure 0.10.1, Revision 2. "Operating Experience Review,"
dated January 7, 1988. This prescribes a method to assure that operating information originating both within and outside the utility organization is evaluated as to its applicability and potential effect upon plant operations.
NTP-07, Revision 0, "Training Work Request," dated December 30, 1986.
- This describes process required to initiate requests for training material revisions, scheduling courses, new course development, needs analysis or other Nuclear Training Department (NTD) actions and describes the process used to evaluate, authorize, document, and approve requests for NTD action.
NTP-06 Revision 0, "Remedial Training," dated December 30, 1986.
- This describes the process to be used for developing and implementing remedial training for courses required by Training Program Description (NTP-02).
NTI-08 Revision 2. "Training Management," dated December 1, 1987.
- This discusses the Training System Development process which is used to design, produce, and implement the systematic, job-performance based training program utilized by NPPD/CNS.
NTG-309, Revision 0, "Procedure Changes," dated October 13, 1987.
- This provides the methodology to evaluate whether a procedure change affects any information presented in a Training Manual.
NTG-308, Revision 0, "Design Change Training," dated October 12,
1987. This describes the process which is followed to identify, document, and conduct training in the area of Plant Design Changes within the Operations Training Sectio _.. - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
_____
_ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _
y
.
!
' *
..
,.
..
.
6'
.
!
P NTG-302, Revision 0, "Operations Technical Training Proficiency,"
dated March 11, 1987. This identifies the technical training proficiency requirements for Operations Training Section Instructors.
'
'
Course INT 023 "Industry Events " dated June 26, 1987.
This, through the use of seminar fonnat and discussion techniques, is used to enhance the plant operators' awareness of possible operational
,
problems by reviewing industry event applicability to CNS.
i Lesson Plan INT 023-99-01, "Industry Events - Initial Presentation and
Survey " - guidance provided to conduct training on industry events as they relate to CNS.
The NRC inspector reviewed the CNS licensee event reports (LER) for 1986 i
and 1987. The below listed LERs were utilized to conduct the inspection and evainate the CNS licensed operator training program.
!
LER Number Subject
<
!87-002 Reactor Scram Due to Rapid Injection of Feedwater l
Due to a Valving Error
-
l Primary Containment Pneumatic Header Pressure 87-006 Low Reactor Vessel Level Due to Loss of Water
'
Inventory Upon Reopening MSIV.
l 87-011 Unplanned Actuation of RPS and Containment Isolation During Turbine Valve Testing
l For each of the above events the personnel involved were qualified Senior Reactor Operators (SR0s) and/or Reactor Operators (R0s). The training that the involved personnel received was sufficient; however, the effectiveness of the training would have been enhanced if the CNS plant-specific simulator had been operational.
The simulator, which will more closely reflect CNS
.
operating characteristics, is not scheduled for initial operation until the
third quarter of 1990 with certification scheduled to be completed in the second quarter of 1991.
i
.
The NRC inspector reviewed the mechanism, Training Work Request (TWR)
t process, that implemented the training required as a result of the above
'
.
events. The TWR process used the following data:
operational events that occur at CNS, reported via the LER process,
!
industry event reports applicable to CNS such as INPO Significant
[
'
Operating Experience Reports and INP0 Significant Event Reports,
,
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
..
.
.
vendor and architect engineer reports, and
regulatory documents.
- All industry events reviewed have an initial training presentation.
Subsequently, an Industry Events Survey Form is routed for coment and evaluation.
The survey requests that the subject matter experts (SR0s and R0s) consider the following:
the severity of the consequences'
how often these conditions exist at CNS, and
whether as an individual, this event is easy or difficult to avoid.
- Each category is rated by the subject matter experts.
These scores are then averaged, with the average value being used to determine which one of the following actions is taken:
no further training required.
- place in the requalification training cycle,
schedule for initial licensee training, or
present in both requalification and initial license training.
- Presentations of the licensed operator training were on temporary hold because of the CNS refueling outage.
During this requalification training cycle (89-01), the licensed operating staff was undergoing simulator training.
From discussions with instructors and licensed individuals, the NRC inspector determined that the industry events training was useful in l
relaying pertinent information to the operating staff and factors lessons learned from an event / activity into training sessions.
The NRC inspector detennined from discussions with an SR0 that licensed operators receive training on specific tasks, such as complicated l
surveillance tests, equipment operations, refueling and special procedures through on-the-job training. The operators during initial license training are required to complete specific tasks as delineated by I
on-the-job-training check sheets.
I The NRC inspector selected eight licensed individuals, both SR0 and R0,
-
who were on shift during one of the events described in the above LERs, to l
verify that records existed for the 1988 CNS requalification cycle of training in areas associated with the LERs. The annual requalification j
examination, including answers for the 1988 cycle, were verified to be on
'
file.
Lectures that were scheduled as part of the requalification cycle and those required for individuals who had scored lower than 80 percent in I
any test section of the 1987 cycle requalification test were verified as
.
being recorded.
Performance evaluations of operating crews, and required l
r
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
.
. '. !
l
.
.
control manipulations, were credited for the activities conducted at the simulator.
The performance evaluations were conducted on crew compliments of four individuals for various operating manipulations.
For two individuals who had scored less than 70 percent on the 1987 requalification exams, a remedial course schedule was implemented. When retested, they brought their score above 80 percent and were allowed to conduct onshift duties.
One licensed SR0 scored less than 70 percent on one section of the 1988 requalification examination. His remedial training consisted of self-study of procedures. When retested, he scored above 90 percent and was allowed to resume licensed duties.
The NRC inspector determined that a letter had been issued to relieve the SR0 from licensed duties.
The mechanism to reinstate the SRO was by the operations supervisor's signature on the remedial training form. The R0s mentioned previously had no letter relieving them of licensed duties. The NRC inspector received a comitment for CNS to upgrade necessary procedures to utilize a process similar to that conducted with the SRO.
The pass rate for initial licensed operator and senior reactor operator qualification examinations were as follows for the last 3 years:
Sumary 1986 Seven R0s and four SR0s took their respective examinations with 53 percent of the R0s passing and 100 percent of the SR0s passing. Upon reexamination, the R0s had 100 percent pass rate.
1987 Five R0s and eight SR0s took their respective examinations with a 100 percent pass rate in both categories.
1988 Six R0s and seven SR0s took their respective examinations with 83 percent of the R0s passing and 86 percent of the SR0s passing.
Reexamination will be required for one R0 and one SRO, respectively.
The pass rate for the last 3 years requalification examinations were as follows:
Year Summary 1986 Thirteen SR0s and 12 R0s took the examination with one SR0 requiring retest in one area.
1987 Seventeen SR0s and 15 R0s took the examination with two R0s retested in one area.
1988 Twenty-four SR0s and 12 R0s took the examination with one SR0 requiring retest in one area.
i i
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ - - _
'
'
,
... -
.
The requalification program schedule for the upcoming cycle was developed based upon the lessons required to be taught, which were similar to those presented in calendar year 1986.
There will be concentration on weak
>
areas as determined from:
the results of simulator evaluations.
- the annual written, requalification examinations, and
walkthroughs including oral examinations.
- The CNS SRO, RO, and station operator training programs received INPO accreditation board certification in August 1987.
The NRC inspector determined from discussions with training personnel that the design change coordinator will present a sumary of the various design changes and their impact on plant operations before the reactor is started up after completion of the current refueling outage.
This is being done as
<
part of the licensees corrective action for LER 87-005 and Unresolved
'
Item 298/8705-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Interview The NRC inspectors summarized the inspection scope and findings on
'
March 25, 1988, with those persons identified in paragraph 1.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors.
,