ML20214U129

Forwards FEMA Findings for Offsite Emergency Preparedness Aspects of Plant Exercise Conducted on 860408.No Deficiencies Requiring Corrective Action Identified.Four Weaknesses Observed Requiring Actions by State of Il

ML20214U129
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	11/25/1986
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8612090148
Download: ML20214U129 (2)

Text

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NOV 25 G86 Docket No. 50-373 Docket No. 50-374 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEHA) letter dated October 15, 1986, containing the findings for the offsite emergency preparedness aspects of the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station exercise conducted on April 8, 1986. Based on the performance of the offsite agencies during the exercise, FEMA identified no deficiencies requiring corrective action. However, four weaknesses were observed that will require corrective actions by the State of Illinois and LaSalle County.

We fully recognize that any remedial actions to be implemented may involve other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control. Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station to be addressed by you as well as others.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

(..,-,- .D. CMTC="

W. D. Shafer, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure:

As stated

See Attached Distribution 8612090148 DR 861125 ADOCK 05000373 PDR RIII RIII RIII RII 4\d I Plos 1/mnj Yne1 hpfe /

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Commonwealth Edison Company 2 NOV 251986 Distribution.

cc w/ enclosure:

D. L. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing G. J. Diederich, Plant Manager DCS/RSB(RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division David Rosenblatt, Governor's Office of Consumer Services

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D. Matthews, EPB, OIE d

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Washington, D.C. 20472 OCT I 519%  % QIE MEM3RANIXM FOR: D3 Ward L. Jordan , 7 Director, 7Y Division of Dnergency Preparedness (M 4Z and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcenent y 4 FILE V-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission

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Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Prograns SUBJECr: Exercise Report of the April 8, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Raiiological Dnergency Preparedness Plans for the LaSalle tOclear Power Station. ,

h is is to transmit a copy of the Exercise Report of the April 8, 1986, joint exercise of the offsite radiological energency preparedness plans for the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station, near the Village of Seneca, in LaSalle County, Illinois. Wis was a joint exercise for the State of Illinois (full participation), LaSalle County (full), Grundy County (limited participation), Seneca (limited), Marseilles (limited), Grand Ridge (limited), Ranson (limited) and Ccmnonwealth Edison Company (full).

The 10-mile Dnergency Planning Zone (EPZ) primarily impacts LaSalle County and to a lesser extent, Grundy County. We report, dated July 17, 1986, was prepared by the Federal Energency Managanent Agency (FD4A) Region V.

In the April 8,1986, exercise there were no Deficiencies identified, but there were 4 areas observed requiring corrective actions. We State of Illinois has received a copy of the exercise report and has responded to FEMA Region V with the attached schedule for corrective actions for the State of Illinois and LaSalle County. We proposed schedule of corrective actions, transmitted to this of fice by FEMA Region V on Septenber 29, 1986, is satisfactory to correct the weaknesses identified in the exercise.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Ibchnological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

Attachments As Stated flDV2o ggg fpRM oro4s861ois y ADOCK 05000373 f PDR (p y '

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Federal Emergency Management Agency p Region V 300 South Wacker,24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500 September 29, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistanct Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards ATTENTION: Ken Green, SL-NT-TH FROM: Wallace J. Weaver, Chief Technological Hazards Branch hi h a

SUBJECT:

LaSalle Nuclear Power Station REP Joint Exercise - Schedule of Corrective Actions A copy of the State of Illinois schedule of corrective actions for the weak-nesses identified during the April 8, 1986 LaSalle Nuclear Power Station REP joint exercise is enclosed. We have reviewed the proposed actions and find them acceptable to correct the exercise weaknesses identified. A copy of our letter to the State of Illinois is included.

To date no comments have been received which have resulted in any changes to the draft exercise report previously provided to you. Therefore we recommend that you attach the schedule of corrective actions to the draft report, remove the draft designation from the exercise report cover and transmit the document to the NRC as the final exercise report.

As noted in our letter to the State of Illinois, we will notify the State of your action with respect to the 44 CFR 350 approval, the final exercise report and the schedule of corrective actions.

Enclosures I

T.4 Federal Emergency Management Agency k . .

b Region V 300 South Wacker,24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500 September 29, 1986 Mr. Charles D. Jones Director, Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency 110 East Adams Street Springfield, Illinois 62706 i

Dear Mr. Jones:

We have reviewed the schedule of corrective actions for the weaknesses identified during the April 8,1986 LaSalle Nuclear Power Station REP joint exercise. The proposed corrective actions are satisfactory.to correct the weaknesses identified for both the State of Illinois and LaSalle County during the exercise.

A copy of your schedule of corrective actions is being sent to FEMA HQ for trans-mittal to the NRC along with the final exercise report. To date no changes have been made to the draft exercise report which was previously provided to you.

We will inform you of the action FEMA HQ takes with respect to the LaSalle 350 approval, the final exercise report and the schedule of correctivo actions at such time as it becomes available to us.

Sincerely m -

O W*w

$lf! c ' N Wallace J. Weaver, Chief Technologic'al Hazards Branch cc: 1DNS Mazon

Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency 110 East Adams Street, Springfield,litinois 62706 August 14, 1986 Mr. Wallace Weaver Chief, Technological Hazards Branch Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency 300 S. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606

Dear Mr. Weaver:

This letter is in response to your letter of July 18, 1986 and the accompanying Report of the LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station exercise conducted April 8, 1986.

Attached is our Proposed Corrective Action Response which indicates the schedule for correcting the areas requiring corrective action, as you requested in your letter.

Sincerely, Jana S. Fairow Radiological Emergency

, Preparedness Supervisor JSF/jk cc: Steve Dunas

r LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATION ..

Sumary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action .

April 8, 1986 Illinois State Scheduled Actual Narrative Statement Corrective Action Date Date NUREG Proposed Item of Weakness The NARS form is presently undergoing 01/01/87 F. The NARS form needs revision with chances revision. Problems with Item 9M will cade to line 9M and those changes defined be addressed during the revision during previous exercises. process.

Future scenarios will use a source Future J.11 Field smaple results were of levels that exercises l

did not require the implementation of term sufficient to allow demonstra-tion of ingestion pathway protective ingestion pathway protective actions. actions.

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a LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATION Summary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Recuiring Corrective Action ,

April 8, 1986 Illinois LaSalle County Corrective Action Scheduled Actual MUREG Narrative Statement Proposed Date Date Item of Weakness The prepositioning of equipment in the EOC Because E0C equipment is stored in the 01/01/87 H.4 LaSalle County ESDA office, which is in anticipation of the exercise precluded. some distance away from th EOC, the the demonstration of E0C activation. LaSalle County ESDA Coordinator found it necessary to transfer the equipment to the E0C prior to the start of the exercise. To correct this problem, LaSalle County ESDA plans to purchase storage cabinets in which to store EOC equipmeni. These cabinets will be located in the E0C area.

During the next training sessions for During the G.4.b EBS messages should be supplied to the next LaSalle JPIC so they can be incorporated into LaSalle County, the need to supply EBS messages to the JPIC will be County training the new releases.

emphasized. During the next offrite sessions and exercise at LaSalle Station, LaSalle during the County will-supply.EBS messages to next offsite the JPIC. exercise'at LaSalle Station i

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EXERCISE REPORT LASALLE NUCLEAR POWEh STATION C0rtONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY JOINT EXERCISE Location of the Plant: Located in the State of Illinois, LaSalle County, near the Village of Seneca, Illinois.

Exercise Date: April 8, 1986 Date of Report: July 17, 1986 Participants Included: 'Ihe State of Illinois (full), LaSalle County (full),

Grundy County (limited), Seneca (limited),

Marseilles (limited), Grand Ridge (limited), Ransom (limited) and Conconwealth Edison Conpany (full) .

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FEDERAL D4ERGENCY MANAGDdINT AGENCY, REGION V NATURAL AND TDCHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS BRANCH 300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE, 25th FIDOR CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606 eu26cTR ADOCK 050 861015 3 PDR F

E ~5 TABLE OF CONTENTS -

TABLE OF COffrEh7S Page 1 EXECUTIVE SIM4ARY State of Illinois Page 2 LaSalle County Page 3 Grundy County Page 4 EXERCISE REPORT Introduction .Page 5

1. Exercise Background Page 5

2. Participating and Non-participating State and Local Governnents Page 5

3. List of Evaluators Page 5

4. Evaluation Criteria Page 6

5. Sunnary of Exercise Objectives Page 6

6. Exercise Scenario Sunnary Page 8

7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise Page 9

8. Findings Noted in Past Exercises Page 10

9. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved Page 10 Narrative .

Page 11

1. State of Illinois Page 11

2. LaSalle County Page 18 SIM%RY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS State of Illinois

1. Deficiencies Page 22

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Page 23

3. Areas Reconnended for Inprovenent Page 24, LaSalle County

1. Deficiencies Page 25

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Page 26

3. Areas Reconnended for Inprovenent Page 27

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EXTUTIVE Stkf4ARY State of Illinois he State of Illinois activated and nobilized staff for the Ehergency Operations Center (EOC), t}.9 State Forward Connand Post (SFCP) and the Illinois Departnent of Nuclear Saftey (IDNS) Radiological Energency Assessnent Center (REAC) during the " Alert" classification. Facilities were i fully staffed and operational within an acceptable tine limit. Around the clock staffing was denonstrated by the presentation of a roster of personnel.

We ability to nake decisions and coordinate activities was denonstrated at all locations.

Connunicatilons, hard copy, radio and telephone, were effective. Personnel l at all levels were kept inforned with infernation vital to their operations i as well as general infornation on overall operations. Entrie.s nede on l several NARS forns were difficult to read and not conplete. Wese errors l were subsequently corrected but training should be given to the person recording NARS nessages. We NARS form needs revision with changes nede to line 9n and those changes defined during previous exercises.

We facility used for the EOC is spacious and well suited for this type of operation. Access to the facility was controlled. Appropriate naps and status boards were available and energency classification levels were posted. Federal assistance was requested by the State EOC via a teletype

" exercise nessage". The teletype system was used throughout the exercise.

taSalle County has the responsibility for alerting the public within the EPZ. However, the State EOC provided support and backup to the County in these efforts. The State has a room to give briefings to the nedia.

After infornation from the IDNS was confirned, the Governor announced his reconnendation for unrestricted reentry. The infornation was pronptly relayed to all agencies, County organizations and the public, i

%e SKP facility and personnel, through their activities, denonstrated that tinely activation, staffing and nanagenent could be achieved. Key elenents of maintaining an effective connunication channel were denonstrated. The personnel were trained, knowledgeable and aware of their role in the overall exercise. It would enhance operations and administrative housekeeping if a standardized status board with columns and pertinent colunn headings was used rather than a blank board. This would facilitate posting infornation.

We REAC denonstrated that it is an effective operation. State-of-the-art conputer and graphics support continues to be upgraded. A confuter link with Connonwealth Edison to access real-tine reactor paraneters was successfully tested.

We exercise objective concerning inglenentation of protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards could not be fully denonstrated. Radioiodine .

deposition simulated by scenario data was significantly below levels which would initiate the inplenentation of protective action reconnendations.

We State reconnendation was correct based on radioiodine deposition supplied from the scenario.

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Se Joint Public Infornation Center (JPIC) is co-located with the utility's EOF approxinately five miles north of the city of Mazon, Illinois. The IESDA and IDNS PIOS were prepositioned but sinalated real tine activation.

Sey arrived at the JPIC/ EOF, set up their offices, nede ecnnonication checks and started operations.

We JPIC has adequate prinary and secondary connonications capabilities. A datafax is used for hard copy exchange of infornation. IDNS at the REAC sent no hard copy infornation to their PIO. Grundy County aent copies of IBS releases to the JPIC, LaSalle County did not. This lack of infornation from LaSalle County resulted in no infornation about milk producing livestock being placed on stored feed from 2 to 10 miles in sectors M, N and P. It also resulted in no announcenents being nede about the evacuation of the Grand Ridge schools.

The State' PIOS arrived at the JPIC after the utility's PIOS. As a result the utility PIOS were ready a issue a press release which necessitated coordination with the State PIOS. The State PIOS were unable to participate at the beginning of the briefing but joined later. Befere th'ey couldbecone involved in the briefing the State PIOS had to confirm the infornation and obtain the State's reconnended protective actions. '

Further, the State PIOS were denied access to the utility's EOF after the sinclated trip was nede from Springfield to the Mazon EOF even though the utility PIOS were already working at that location. This is not the first tine denial of access has been nede at an EOF. The reason given by the utility has been that the EOF was not activated. It is not considered a valid reason for the fact the Etate PIOS have a need to gain access to their connonication links and the utility PIOS and they can be an asset to the public infornation flow. Denial of access is believed to be the reason for the delay of early infornetion releases by the utility's corporate office; the releases were delivered to the State PIO's desk in the JPIC and renained there until the PIOS could staff the position.

Utility press releases were not always coordinated with the State prior to release. In nost cases, the utility spokesperson proceeded with press briefings without coordinating with the State PIOS. The PIOS provided current infornation at briefings and answered nost questions from the nedia. Those questions not answered were written down and answered at later briefings. Lewis University had five journalism students at the JPIC who acted as nedia representatives. In addition the utility had three enployees who acted as nedia representatives.

In a separate decontamination drill conducted June 12, 1986 at the Pontiac Township High School, the IDNS denonstrated the adequacy of the facil.ity as an energency worker decontamination station. The IDNS, with appropriate local support, denonstrated effective procedures and adequate equipnent for the decontamination of energency workers and their equipnent and for the control of the spread of the contamination at the facility.

LaSalle County

- We LaSalle County EOC activation coincided with the " Site Area Energency" classification. The ability to staff the facility and naintain 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operations was dencastrated by the use of alternates and presentation of a roster. The prepositioning of equipnent in the EOC in anticipation of the exercise precluded the denonstration of EOC activation.

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Se decision neking process was effectively denonstrated with the ESDA Coordinator in charge of the operation. Briefings were held throughout the exercise with good participation from the staff. m e facilities are adegaate and contain all the anenities to sustain extended operations. We capability to connonicate with State, utility and County agencies was denonstrated through the use of dedicated telephone, connercial telephone, telefax and radio.

W e alerting and notification of the public was denonstrated through sinclated sounding of the sirens, route alerting and activation of the EBS.

We EBS nessages should be transmitted to the JPIC by the County so they can be included in the news releases.

Se traffic control points were activated by the Sheriff's Department with assistance from the Illinois State Police, during the sinulated evacuation.

A sinclated evacuation of Grand Ridge schools and connunity was conpleted with buses from the Kline Bus Conpany.

Radiological exposure control equipnent and training were sufficient.

Inprovenent can be acheived by giving dosinetry instructions when handing out dosinetry kits.

Although nedia relations / recovery and reentry were not objectives of this exercise the ESDA Coordinator and EOC staf f used the opportunity for extra training in these areas. The ESDA Coordinator conducted two nedia briefings and there was discussion on what should be done in recovery and reentry.

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We local jurisdictions within LaSalle County of Grand Ridge, Marseilles, l

Ransom and Seneca denonstrated their capability to support LaSalle County's l

mergency response. They were effectively nanaged by nonicipal officials.

l te connonities staffed the various energency response positions. The

' facilities in which the energency operations were directed were had connonication capability and other resources to support the energency response activities.

Grundy County l

l Grundy County was given an exenption from full participation for the LaSalle exercise in that they recently (Novenber 6,1985) fully exercised with the Braidwood NPS. However, the County did participate in a limited node. They did activate the County EOC for training purposes; neinly to familiarize new staff. Executive decision-caking took place. The connonications networks were tested and utilized. The pronpt alert and notification system was sinciated activated including both the sirens and the EBS station. The EOC staff discussed their response activities should the plune inpact ort Grurdy County.

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f EXERCISE REPORT Introduction

1. Exercise Background h is was the fifth joint exercise for the State of Illinois, LaSalle County and Grundy County based on a sinulated accident at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. Earlier exercises were conducted on Decarber 4,1980, April 14, 1982, July 12, 1983 and October 12, 1984.

j i 2. Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governnents

%e 10-mile plune exposure EPZ of the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station inpacts prinarily on Lasalle County. It inpacts to a lesser extent on Grundy County. The State of Illinois and the two Counties participated in the

) exercise. We nonicipalities of Seneca, Marseilles, Ransom and Grand Ridge 7

also participated in the exercise.

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3. List of Evaluators L

For this exercise there was a total of eight Federal evaluators observing f offsite exercise activities. Onsite activities were evaluated by a separate i

team from the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission (NRC). Of the offsite evaluators, four, including the offsite Exercise Director, were Federal Diergency Managenent Agency (FEMA) Region V staff. W e balance of the team was conposed of a representative from the Departnent of Energy and three contract evaluators from the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). The evaluator assignnents were as follows:

Offsite Exercise Director Gordon Wenger, FEMA State of Illinois Evaluation Team Gordon Wenger, FEMA, Team Ieader, State EOC Bill Gasper, ANL, State EOC Steve Kouba, DOE, State REAC Wiley Howell, FDiA, JPIC (Mazon EOF)

Jerry Staroba, ANL, State Foward Connand Post LaSalle County Evaluation Team s

Ed Robinson, FEMA, Team Leader, County EOC Bill Knoerzer, ANL, County EOC Grundy County and LaSalle County Municipalities

• Wallace Weaver, FEMA, (observer) 5

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4. Evaluation Criteria me plans that were evaluated by this exercise were developed using the

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological hergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG 9654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1) . Therefore, these criteria and the nodules based on these criteria entitled, " Modular Fornet for Uniformity of Radological hergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation," dated June 1983, were used for exercise evaluation.

5. Sunnary of Exercise Objectives Objectives for this exercise were selected from anong the FDiA thirty-five (35) standard objectives listed in TAB "M" of the " Modular Fornet for Uniformity of Radiological Energency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations", dated June 1983. We objective nunbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".

The State of Illinois selected the following sixteen objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be denonstrated during the exercise:

1. Dsonstrate ability to nobilize staff and activate facilities pronptly.

2. Dmonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and neintain staffing around the clock.

3. Denonstrate ability to nake decisions and to coordinate energency activities.

4. Denonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support energency operations.

5. Denonstrate ability to connonicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

19. Denonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plune exposure based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective neasures based on PAGs, available shelters, evacuation tine estinates and all other appropriate factors. i

11. Denonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective neasures, based on PAGs and other relevant factors. *e

12. Denonstrate ability to inplenent protective actions for ingestion l pathway hazards.

13. Denonstrate ability to alert the public within the 19--mile EPZ and ,

disseminate an initial instructional nessage, within 15 minutes. l

14. Denonstrate ability to fornulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a tinely fashion.

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21. Denonstrate the ability to nake the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to energency workers and/or the general population.

22. Denonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been nade to do so.

24. Denonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and tinely nenner.

25. Denonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of infornation released.

32. Denonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

34. Denonstrate ability to estinate total population exposure.

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The following objective was denonstrated by the State during the June 12, 1986 medical-decontandnation drill.

29. Denonstrate adequate equipnent and procedures for decontandnation of energency workers, equipnent and vehicles.

LaSalle County selected the following ten objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise:

1. Denonstrate ability to nobilize staff and activate facilities pronptly.

2. Denonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and naintain staffing around the clock.

3. Denonstrate ability to nake decisions and to coordinate energency I

activities, s

4. Denonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support energency operations.

5. Dcconstrate ability to connonicate with all appropriate locations, organizatjans and field personnel.

13. Lenonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructiona.1 message, within 15 minutes. ,,

14. Denonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a tinely fashion.

15. Denonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the pime EPZ.

16. Denonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with inpedinents to evacuation, as inclenent weather or traffic obatructions.

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22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been nede to do so.

We following three objectives were denonstrated by LaSalle County during the scheduled June 12,.1986 nedical-decontamination drill:

29. Denonstrate adequate egaipnent, and procedures for decontamination of energency workers, equipnent and vehicles.

30. Denonstrate adequacy of anbulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

31. Denonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

6. Exercise Scenario Sunnery f

LaSalle Unit 1 is operating at 75% power and shutting down at 100 MWeUnit per 2 l' hour due to a 2.% gpm unidentified leak in the prinary contaiment.

is in Hot Shutdown and stable. The Unit 1 HPCS system is Out of Service and its tine clock expires at T = 0. The Unit tie breakers (one of twoThere offsite is power sources) are out of service for OAD to nodify the breakers.

a large ground on the Division I 125VDC Bus and OAD is looking for the ground starting at bus 111Y. Deinerting of the prinary containnent is in progress. Were is freezing rain outside.

UNUSUAL EVENT T = 0 (0730) TO T = 45 he Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is still Out of Service and therefore Technical Specification 3.5.1 requires Unit 1 to be inThis Hot is Shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Cold Shutdown in the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

an Unusual Event per EAL 414. A short tine later, a Switchyard Breaker OCB 9-10 trips due to the ice storm.

ALERT T = 45 TO 105 N

A Line Truck loses control on the ice and crashes into the System Aux The ladder shorts B and C phases together causing an Transforner (SAT) .

electrical trip. Electrical Bus transfers occur insideThis thecauses plant, astartling loss of a worker, who shorts out Division I 125VDC Bus ll1Y.

control power to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Mis Fystem (RCIC) is an and EAL Alert per Division I Energency Core Cooling System (EXIS).

414. The loss of DC power also causes an Outboard Prinary Containnent Isolation of Groups II through VII.

a he reactor scrams on Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closureOnly caused50%byof loss of Instrunent Nitrogen (IN) to the Primary Containnent.

the Control Rods go Full In, the rensinder stay Full Out, an Alert per EAL 413(2). The Main Turbine trips and thus all offsite power to Unit 1 is

' lost.

The Division'I, II and III Diesel Generators start but only the Division II and III Essential Service electrical switchgear 142Y and 143 are reenergized. Reactor water level is decreasing, Reactor pressure is increasing and Dryw K pressure is slowly increasing.

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An Inboard Primary Containnent Purge Danper fails to fully close and the Outboard Danper's seat is failed causing a snell breach in the Primary Containnent with minor effect on Drywell pressure.

SITE EMERGENCY T = 105 TO 195 Reactor water level is still decreasing and is less than -129", Drywell pressure is increasing and is greater than 1.69 psig, thus the second fission product barrier has been lost. Wis is a Site Area Snergency per '

EAL #15) B.2) and 3) e) . The Division II Diesel Generator has to be shut down and renoved from service due to a governor failure, thus no nornal ECCS punps are available. Reactor water level decreases to 2/3 core height and Prinary Containnent Radiation levels begin to increase.

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GENERAL EMERGENCY T = 195 'IO 435 This is a Prinary Containnent Radiation level is greater than 2000 R/hr.

General Ehergency per EAL $15)A. Reactor water level is at the bottczn of the active fuel.

At T = 285 the Prinary Containnent Purge Valve becones stuck further open.

Drywell Pressure starts dropping and a radiation release via the Standby Gas Treatnent System (SBGT) begins.

f Division I 125VDC Bus 111Y is restored, and eventually Division I ECCS begin i injecting. Prinary Containnent is restored and at T = 360 the release is terminated. Se radiation rate is diminishing. Reactor water level is increasing and Prinary Containnent Radiation level is decreasing RECOVERY T = 435 TO 465 A Tine Jung occurs. Plant conditions stabilizing. Reactor water level is Containnent high, reactor pressure is low, Radiation Release is negligible.

level is decaying off.

S e actual exercise events followed the scenario with the exception of the Se Alert occurred at Notification of Unusal Event which did not occur.

0840, the Site Area Ehergency at 0935 and the General Ehergency at 1938.

The protective We Governor declared a State Disaster Energency at 1955.

action to evacuate occurred at 1103. Recovery and reentry was initiated following the tine jung which occurred at 1450.

7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used In he Exercise. ,,

The State of. Illinois planned to fully staff and demonstrate response m

activity at the State EOC in Springfield; the State Forward Centrand Post at the Mazon EOF; the JPIC at the Mazon EOF; and the IDNS REAC in Springfield.

LaSalle County planned to denonstrate its EOC with full energency staff We County also chose to demonstrate its capability

' participating.(sinulated) to activate the pronpt alert and notification system, the EB Evacuation of the plume EPZ was to be simulated.

and access control.

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Grurx3y County had been granted an exaption for the exercise. Weir participation was limited to connunications operations. Within LaSalle County four nonicipalities participated through their support of the LaSalle County energency response.

8. Findings Noted in Past Exercises his was the fifth exercise for the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station EPZ.

During the October 10 and 11, 1984 exercise there was one deficiency which required corrective action. On June 11, 1985 FDth advised NRC that Grundy County's denonstration of the ability to alert and notify the public in a tinely nanner during the Dresden joint exercise, combined with the training provided earlier by Illinois ESDA, corrected the deficiency identified during the 1984 LaSalle joint exercise. Other weaknesses noted during the October 1984 exercise were either corrected prior to or d. iring the April 1986 exercise. Under the previous system of tracking weaknesses they were not significant to adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

9. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved The State of Illinois did not cortpletely demonstrate the following exercise objective:

fl2 Denonstrate ability to inpleent protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.

Field sanple results were at levels that did not require the inhlenentation of ingestion pathway protective actions. Therefore, the objective could not be denonstrated.

LaSalle County did not conpletely denonstrate the following exercise objectives:

il Deonstrate ability to nobilize staff and activate facilities prenptly.

. We LaSalle County EOC was pre-arranged which did not allow for the I denonstration of activation procedures, i

1. 14. Denonstrate ability to fornulate and distribute appropriate i instructions to the public, in a tinely fashion.

LaSalle County did not provide copies of their EBS nessages to the JPIC for release to the nedia. .

10

N

, Narrative State of Illinois

1. Activation and Staffing h State EOC in Springfield began activation at 9736 when the initiating call was received from the utility. There is a direct comunication link (NARS line) between the utility, the State EOC and the County EOCs in the LaSalle EPZ. When the initiating call was received it was verified, then mobilizing procedures were inplenented. Notification of EOCOnce staffthe is acconplished through the ESDA connonications watch officer.

initial call is received the connnnications watch officer begins notifying key personnel. A written call list was used and all nunbers were current.

W e EOC was fully staffed with the exception of two positions, Civil Air Patrol and Departnent of Education. They were not present because the scenario and objectives did not provide for their involvenent. Both organizations have satisfactorily participated in exercises in the past.

Organizations present and represented in the State EOC were: Illinois State Police; Illinois Departnent of Transportation; Military and Naval; Red Cross; Departnent of Conservation; Illinois Energency Services and Disaster Agency (Director, Operations Chief and Hazardous Materials Officer); ESDA NARS Controller; Illinois Departnent of Nucler Safety; Illinois Public Health Services; Illinois Mental Health; Connonwealth Edison Conpany and the Central Managenent Services / Insurance. 24-hour staffing capability was denonstrated by presention a roster of personnel.

The REAC staff was nobilized by the IDNS radio dispatcher upon notification of an " Alert" status. IDNS procedures Voltme I, IPRA, 2 SOP 2 was used to activate the REAC. The REAC was fully staffed in 40 minutes. However, key decision-cakers were in place in less than 19 minutes. 24-hour staffing capability was denonstrated by using the roster found in 2 SOP 2.

Most of the personnel at the SK P at Mazon were pre-positioned for the exercise. Only the State Police and Departnent of Transportation personnel a later tine. All arrive 3 atRound-the-clock personnel were knowledgeable and well staffing was denonstrated by double staffing and trainad.

with the presentation of and up-to-date roster. Activation and staffing of l

I the SKP was acconplished in a reasonable tine.

l 2. Diergency Operations Managenent

'Ihe IESDA Director was present in the EOC during the exercise. The State Director and the Operations Chief took turns at holding periodic briefings Good to update the EOC staff and hear reports from the agencies inWthe EOC.

e EOC was two-way connonications and decision making were exhibited.

notified of " Alert" at 9836, " Site Area Energency" at 9943 and " General Emergency" at 1951. h order to evacuate was at 1951 and inglenented at 1193.

h State and local plans were available for use by EOC staff. Agency representatives had written procedures and checklists for reference and use in inglenenting the energency response. Message logs were kept, reproduced and distributed in an efficient manner.

11 4- -

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Access to the EOC was handled by uniforned Illinois State Police personnel along with a State ESDA staff nenber. All entrants were screened and I required to have ID. W ey were escorted into the EOC.

He All REAC players clearly recognized the authority of the REAC Carmender.

involved his staff in decision neking and conducted periodic briefings to l keep them inforned. The REAC Concender requested off-site radiological monitoring support from both the DOE and EPA.

We State Forward Conrand Post was managed by the Chief, Division of Field Services, ESDA, and his assistant, who played the lead role. Wey worked in tandem with the Site Chief from IDNS, who was located in an adjacent room. I All nessages were logged, hard copies nede and distributed in duplicate to I all agencies. Were were periodic briefings to the staff for updates on Plans and SOPS were readily available and events an'd forIt infornetion.

was denonstrated that the SECP would be effectively nanaged I

referred to. l during emergency operations.

3. Facilities l

%e State ESDA EOC is located in Springfield innediately across the street l from the State Capitol. We facility is appropriately Noise is held tofurnished.

an acceptable Space, lighting and telephones are adequate.

level. Facilities are available for extended operations.

Backup power is available. It was put to the test when an unannounced power The back up generator cane on line outage was ordered by the ESDA Director.

in less than five seconds to continue the operation of the EOC conmunications egaipment and mininal lighting. The test was successful.

The appropriate energency classifications were posted in a tinely nenner.

We naps, status boards and other -posted naterials were clearly visible and kept up to date. We plume was plotted and labeled.

We REAC facilities are considered excellent. Capabilities and amenities are above that required by NUREG-0654. Conputer and graphic The real-tine supporttoto conputer assist decision nakers is state-of-the-art.

access the utility's reactor paraneters was successfuly tested during the exercise.

The State FCP is located in a double-wide nobile type structure within 100 Access to this conpound was controlled at the perimeter feet of the EOF.

fence.

Applicable neps and charts were posted, clearly visible and utilizhd by staff.

The mobile structure is divided into four large roons with phones a One room is used solely for copying and and radios telefaxing.in two rooms.A status board was kept updated and energency classifications were displayed.

It would enhance operations and AREA RECOPMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

Twhinistrative housekeeping if a standardized status board with colunns and This would pertinent colunn headings was used rather than a blank board.

facilitate posting infornetion. (NUREG 0654 Standard H).

12

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4. Cmannications

%e Connonications Center is located in an area adjacent to the EOCIt is m operations room. %erefore, there is 24-hour a day coverage.

officer during off hours.

It11tiple connunication systens are available for use by the EDC staff, these the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), ESDA radio network, include:

canercial and NAWAS.

telephones, fax aschines, teletype, various State radio sy Prior to activation of the EOC, the Counties and the State is the NARS.

NARS nessages are received and transmitted from the connunication center.

Upon operations room.

activation of the EOC, the NARS connunications are hamile 0945.

With the exception of sone minor problens with fax transmissions between the State EDC (IESDA) and the JPIC, all emnunications systens worked well.

Once the fax problem was renedied, no further difficulties were encountered and the fax system provided a rapid hard copy capability.

Canunication operation.

systens operators are familiar with the equipnent and procedures. Inprovement on recording the NARS nessages on the NARS form would be helpful. Specifically, on several nessages certain written entries were difficult to read and on others the operator neglected to record whoThese wer received the nessage and who verified it.

and distributed to all holders of a copy.

Entries nede on several NARS forns were AREA RECOPf4 ENDED FOR IMPROVDOTT:Wese errors were subsegaently dif ficult to read and not conplete.

corrected but training should be given to the person recording NARS nessages. (NUREG-0654 Standard F.)

Problens which have been observed withDuring the the NARS form during previous exercise, exercises recurred.

already defined deals with line 9m of the LineNARS form.reconnended prote 9m specifies all sectors and later out to 10 miles all sectors.There is no provision for nodifying the infornat downwind sectors only.

The NARS form needs revision with changes AREA REQUIRING CORRIETIVE ACTION:

nede to line 9m and those changes defined during previous exercises. ,,

(NUREG-0654 Standard F.)

he REAC and the IDNS radio dispatchers denonstrated groups) and the State's radiological nonitoring teans.

%e State Forward Cmnand Post enployed various connonicationThe nethods to different agencies. Ten phones and two radios were available and used. its connunications personnel denonstrated the SECP is capable of performing assigned tasks during energency operations.

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5. Dose Assessnent and Protective Action Reconnendations Based on plant conditions and scenario weather data, REAC personnel consulted with the utility and NRC representatives to determine appropriate protective action recormendations for potential pitme exposures.

Based on the potential for a significant release of radioiodine, the REAC Connander instructed IDNS radiological field monitoring teans and other energency workers located in or near the downvind sectors to take KI. There were no nobility inpaired individuals located in this area.

After the plune had passed and the potential for further releases had decreased significantly, REAC personnel estinated the nexinum population exposure in the area.

Based on data obtained from analyzing field sanples, REAC personnel made appropriate protective action recotmendations for ingestion pathway exposures. Unfortunately, the scenario data did not yield exposures that would require a positive action such as washing food, naintain grazing aninals on stored feed, etc.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Field sanple results were of levels that did not require the inplenentation of ingestion pathway protective actions.

(NUREG 0654 Standard J, Elenent 11)

6. Public Alerting and Instruction

%e State EOC plays a role in public alerting. One of its functions is the receipt of utility reconnendations; assess and review them and, in conjunction with IDNS reconnendations, transmit the State's reconnendations to the County EOCs.

During the exercise, the Pronpt Alert and Notification System was activated. Preceeding each of the activations the State EOC denonstrated a rapid and conprehensive response, issuing reconnendations within the required tine constraints.

@e SFCP nonitored all public alerting and instructional messages.

Infornation was posted and the staff was kept inforned. Decisions were not required to be nede here or were actions initiated.

7. Protective Action On June 12, 1986, the State of Illinois condacted a separate drill to denonstrate energency worker decontamination procedures. An energeNcy worker decontamination station was established at the Pontiac Township High School by the IDNS. Precautionary neasures were taken to minimize the potential for contamination of the facility itself. For exanple, walkways were covered, segregated " hot" and " cold" traffic patterns for both vehicles and persons were established, potential " hot" areas were kept to a mininum and a secured area was established for contaminated vehicles. Access to the facility was controlled by a local law enforcement agency.

14

This facility would serve as a decontamination station for State and local emergency workers such as law enforcenent, fire .and rescue, radiological During the drill, fire department personnel, monitoring teans, etc.

equipnent and vehicles were utilized to denonstrate decontamina procedures. individuals were directed into the personnel decontamination station.

Sone of the fire equipnent such as AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVENENT: Although the inside of turnout coats and hel:rets were left in the vehicle.

the vehicle would be monitored, fire personnel should be directed to take their equipnent into the facility with them in accordance with procedure.

(NUREG 0654 Standard K, Elenent 5.b.)

Following .the instrunent survey, the vehicle was %e 1ehicle determindd to be was washed contaminated and was relocated to the washdown area.The rensining " hot spots" were cleane down by fire hose and renonitored. An additional by hand and the vehicle again washed down by fire hose.

survey determined the vehicle to have been successfully decontaminated.

Following conpletion of the vehicleSecurity decontamination, of this area, Ubichthe washdown was ropedarea would be nonitored and cleaned as needed. As fire off and narked, would be naintained by law enforcenent personnel.

departnent personnel arrived at the nonitoring station, personal infornation All of the was obtained and they were nonitored for possible contamination.

Contaminated individuals were infornation and results were recorded. Non-contaminated directed along the " hot" pathway to the shower station.

individuals were directed along the " cold" pathway to the thyroid nonitoring station.

At the shower station, clothing and egaipnent would be renoved, bagged and labelled. We individual would be nonitored, shower and mcnitored shower.

again.

Appropriate supplies were availableA'1y forirdividual the decontaminatioriDe who could

" cold" pathway to the thyroid nonitoring station.

not be properly decontaminated would be transported to a nedical facility

' for additional treatnent.

We appropriate equipment and procedures were denonstrated for theFollowing the th nonitoring of potential thyroid contamination.

check, the decontamination procedure was conplete.

We IDNS personnel staffing the decontamination They center were each wore properly attired TLD's.

to limit their exposure to possible contamination.

Personal dosineters were available in the kits but not issue drill.

f the action level for decontamination (twice background) although not all o

• the personnel at each station recorded their background reading.

It would be appropriate for personnel to AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMEN'T: establish a backg each station at the decontamination center.

- 5.a.)

The IDNS personnel denonstrated some of the procedures which would beIDN utilized to deactivate the decontamination center.

through the nonitoring station and demonstrated appropriate " hot line" procedures for removal of their protective clothing and the renoval of the protective floor coverings, i 15 _ _ .

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P . .

8. Radiological Exposure Control Not to be evaluated during this exercise.

9. Media Relations he State PIOS were prepositioned but sinulated travel from Springfield following receipt and confirnation of the " Alert" notification arriving at the JPiC at 1020. W e State PIOS were denied access to the EOF where the The State JPIC is located although the utility PIOS were already at work.

PIO has been denied access during previous exercises at the EOFs at other CTo Nuclear Power Stations. We reason given by the utility has been that the EOF was not activated. It is not considered a valid reason for the fact the State PIOS have a need to gain access and they can be an asset to the public infornation flow. Denial of access is believed to be the reason for the delay of early infornetion releases by the utility's corporate office.

We releases were delivered to the State PIOS' desk in the JPIC and renained there until the PIOS staffed the position after they were granted access.

We facility is used by the utility on a day to day basis therefore supplies and naterials are readily available. On notice of activation, utility We personnel secured personal effects and granted entry to the State PIOS.

PIOS set up offices, nede emnonications checks and started operations.

24-hour staffing capability was denonstrated with by a shift change by IDNS and a roster for IESDA.

We prinary neans of connonication with all locations # om the JPIC was connercial telephone. A radio backup system is availaoie in the EOF as well as a State contunications van that can " drop" radio lines into the JPIC. A datafax was used for sending and receiving hard copy infomation. Hard copy of both the utility and State news releases were datafaxed to the State EOC and the REAC. The JPIC received copies of two EBS messages from Grundy County; nothing from LaSalle County. Copies of infornation released to the public should be sent in hard copy to the JPIC so the sane infornation can be released to the rest of the nedia. In addition, there was no hard copy of infornation from IDNS.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVD4ENT: The staff at the JPIC should naintain a connonications log for reference on what nessages have been sent and l

received. (NUREG 0654 Standard F.)

Media kits were available for nedia representatives. No actual media was ,

present during this exercise. Five journalism students from Lewis Wree utility l University acted as reporters and ask pointed questions. l enployees also acted as reporters and asked questions that pronpted the l

" college reporters".

he utility PIO announced the " Site Area Ehergency" before the State PIOS could confirm the infornation and protective actions with IESDA and IDNS.

Wis release (utility 94) announced " Radioactivity is being released from j S e State PIOS were able to join the briefing at about 1115 and the plant".

announced the State's position and protective action resdations.

We )

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utility should insure that on all critical announcements there is agreenent '

We utility did not always confer prior to briefing the public and nedia.

I with the State PIOS prior to briefings and did not fully coordinate the news releases.

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s On several occasions (utility releases # 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8) were not provided to the State. me State secretary obtained copies of these nessages from the releases provided the nedia. Despite the lack of coordination, there were no incidences of conflict between the State and utility, but the opportunity for conflict existed.

Se failure of LaSalle County to provide EBS messages resulted in no announcennets being nede by the JPIC concerning Grand Ridge Schools being evacuated. Wese announcenents could have been of an assistance to the efforts of LaSalle County to reduce confusion about the safety and location I of Grand Ridge students. In addition, no announcenents were made about milk producing aninals being placed on stored feed 2-10 miles in sectors M, N, and P. (State release #1 at 1945 announced " Milk producing livestock that are within a two-mile radius of the plant be placed on stored feed".)

Generally, the PIOS provided current infornation at the briefings. Most questions were answered at the briefings. If the question was not answered at the briefing it was written down and answered at later briefings.

10. Recovery and Reentry Although it was not an exercise objective to denonstrate and inplenent appropriate neasures for controlled recovery and reentry at the State EOC, various activities and discussions were inplenented by the staff. We Departnent of Health was involved in nunerous reconnendations on procedures, precautions, and possible health effects from low-level exposure during the recovery / reentry operations. An enthusiastic and stinalating discussion between the Departnent of Health and IDNS occurred during this phase. Other agencies represented at the EOC showed an interest in the discussion.

At 1450, a two week tine advance was inplemented along with a downgrade in the FAL to a " recovery only" node. Based on analysis of field sanples, the concentration of radioiodine was not at a level to require ingestion pathway protective actions. We REAC did analyze field sanple data and properly advised the State EOC that an unrestricted reentry was in order. At 1526,

) unrestricted reentry was initiated by the State.

We State KP nonitored and coordinated infornation between the State EOC and the County EOCs concerning recovery and reentry.

11. Scenario We scenario provided sufficient activity to test the State ESDA EDC operation. The staff was tested on itens which required rapid and thorough treatnent, thereby denonstrating the required exercise objectives. >

> AREA RECOPHENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: 'IVo agencies (Education and Civil Air Patrol) were not represented at the EOC due to their lindted roles and participation in previous exercises. It is reconnended that future exercises involve these agencies and provide activities to test / train the response personnel. (NUREG 0654, Standard N, Element 1.b.)

l he problem with insufficient radiciodine deposition has been discussed above. Inplenentation of protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards j could not be denonstrated.

17 l

IaSalle County

1. Activation and Staffing Se activation of the EOC followed receipt of the " Site Area Ehergency" notification. However, the EOC was prepared for operations prior to receipt of the activation notification. Up-to-date call lists were used and staffing was acconplished in one hour. Eight LaSalle County and eight non-County organizations responded to the EOC. 24-hour staffing was accorplished during this exercise by the use of alternates and presentation of a roster. The EOC staff displayed adequate training and knowledge.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Se prepositioning of equipnent in the EOC in anticipation of the exercise precluded the denonstration of EOC activation. (NUREG 0654 Standard H, Elenent 4.)

2. Ehergency Operations Managenent We LaSalle County ESDA Coordinator, as designated in the plan, was in charge of the County EOC. He conducted periodic briefings which involved connents from each response organization. Se EOC staff frequently referred to individual copies of plans and checklists. Message handling m s efficient, a copy of each NARS nessage was distibuted to responst.:

organization and logged on a status board. Sufficient naps, status board and energency classification level were visible to all in the EOC.

3. Facilities The EOC is located in the basenent of the County conplex and has anple room to acconodate the necessary personnel. It has all the necessary amenities to support extended operations. Se status board and naps were positioned

-so all the participants could see them without any difficulty. The access to the EDC was controlled throughout the exercise.

4. Conconications me participants can connonicate with the various organizations by telephone and radio. Bere is also hard copy capability available to the JPIC. The NARS is the prinary system used to connonicate with the State and utility.

In the event the NARS system was inoperable, the State and utility could be contacted by radio. We EOC staff can concunicate with the hospitals by telephone and radio. m ey also have the capability to contact the l anbulances by police and fire radio frequency.

5. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Reconnendation l

his is a State responsibility.

l 6. Public Alerting and Instruction he call requiring action by the County to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System was received from the Str.te EOC at 1197 over the NARS.

I Se nessage was received by the Sheriff Dispatcher, verified and sent to the BOC staff. S e ESDA Coordinator, Deputy Coordinator and County Board

Chairman had a conference and nede the decision to activate the alert and 18

notification system. At 1114, the sirans were activated and the vehicles were dispatched for route alerting. ne sirens were sounded a second tine at 1452. The Drergency Eroadcast System was activated at 1951 to inform the public of a possible incident at the power station and to inform the farners within a 0-2 mile radius of the station to shelter and place milk producing animals on stored feed. Prescripted nessages were read (sinclated) over EBS .

at 1117, 1142, 1303, and 1452. Familiar boundaries were used in each message to describe the areas to be evacuated.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: EBS nessages should be supplied to the (NUREG 0654

_JPIC so they can be incorporated into the news releases.

Standard G, Elenent 4.b.)

7. Protective Action l Activation of traffic control points was sinclated. The area under evacuation was controlled by County Sheriff Departnent personnel and equipnent. Illinois State Police (ISP) was available to support any request I

for personnel or equipnent. LaSalle County Highway Departnent has sufficient eqaipnent to keep roads cleared.

A conputerized list of special needs people was available to the EOC staff.

We County School Superintendent and the Red Cross coordinated a sinclated school evacuation. The bus conpany representative was not at the EOC for a discussion of equipnent and the personnel capabilities. Sinclated evacuation of Grand Ridge schools and connonity was conpleted in a l professional nenner. Buses from the Kline Bus Conpany were used to transport the school children and individuals without transportation.

On June 12, 1986 the FEMA Region V Regional Assistance Consnittee nenber from the Departnent of Health and Hunan Services, Public Health Services We drill evaluated the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station Medical Drill.

fulfills the exercise objectives 30 and 31.

For the nedical drill a sinulated contaminated-injured individual was transported from the LaSalle Station site to St. Mary's Hospital, Streator, Illinois.

The initial call was received by the hospital mergency room at 0910. When verification was attenpted there was no answer so no further verifying calls were placed. We notification is received in one location he in the hospital and then the energency room supervisor is paged, mergency room nursing staff conpleted energency room set up within 20 minutes after the notification.

The action of verifying the notification AREA needs RECOtNENDED to be conpleted. FOR IMPROVEMENT:Further training and familiarity with the procedures should enhance the process. (NUREG 0654 Standard 0, Elment 4.a.)

When the anbulance arrived at the nuclear power station the paranedics were given a kit for use in protecting themselves and the vehicles from contamination. % ey did not use it.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVIM2Tr:_ 'Ite paranedics should utilize the floor cover and personnel protective clothing provided to them by the utility.

(NUREG 9654 Standard L, Elenent 1 and Standard 0, Elment 5.)

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19 I _ - __.

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t Once the hospital area was set up the nurses proceeded to dress in the appropriate cover clothing. 'Ihe deonstration proceeded in an orderly manner. The victim was decontaminated and received nedical treatnent to the sinulated injury.

During the set up of the energency room the special decontamination stretcher was set up too far forward on the exandnation table. When water was used to deevontandnate the victim, most of the water splashed on the floor outside of the water containnent vessel.

AREA RECOPf4 ENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is reconnended that an appropriate hose and contaiment barrel be used to contain the waste water. (NUREG 0654 Standard L, Elenent 1. and Standard 0, Elenent 5.)

8. Radiological Exposure Control Although radiological exposure control was not an objective of this exercise, kits which included a dosineter, sinulated TLD, and record keeping card, were handed out to Sheriff's Departnent and EOC personnel.

9. Media Relations Although not an objective of the exercise, two nedia briefings were held by the ESDA Coordinator. 'Ihe first briefing used references to NARS nessages which required additional clarification as to the infornation given.

10. Recovery and Reentry Although not an objective of t.he exercise, both the IDNS and CECO EOC representatives discussed their activities for recovery operations. Each of the EOC staff gave a sunmary report of their organization's operations during recovery and reentry.

11. Scenario See connents in State section.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS l

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LASAILE NUCLFAR POWER STATION ,

Stamery Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies April 8, 1986 Illinois .

State Corrective Action Scheduled Actual NUREG Narrative Statement Proposed Date Date Item of Weakness None 22

e. _ _ _ _ _ -

a LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER STATION .

Stmanary Listing of Exercise Findings I'

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Illinois i

State I

Corrective Action Scheduled Actual

! NUREG Narrative Statement Date Date Itan of Weakness Proposed F. 'the NARS form needs revision with changes

made,to line 9m and those changes defined during previous exercises. ,

J.ll Field sanple results were of levels that did not require the inplenentation of ingestion pathway protective actions.

23

7 LASALLE NUCLFAR POWER STATION ,

Suanary Listing of Exercise Findings .

3. Areas Reconcerxled For Inprovenent April 8, 1986 Illinois State I

1. It would enhance operations and administrative housekeeping'this if a would standardized status facilitate board posting with columns and information.

pertinent coltan headings was used rather than a blank board.

These errors were subsequently f 2. Entries made on several NARS forns were difficult to read and not conplete.

corrected but training should be given to the person recording NARS nessages.

3. Sone of the fire equipment such as turnout coats and helmets were left in the vehicle. Although the inside of the vehicle would be monitored, fire personnel should be directed to take their equipnent into the facility with them in accordance with procedure.

4. It would be appropriate for personnel to establish a background reading and action level and post it conspicuously at each station at the decontamination center.

5. The staff at the JPIC should maintain a consnunications log for reference on what messages have been sent and received.

6. Two agencies (Education and Civil Air Patrol) were not represented at the EOC due to their limited roles and l It is reconnended that future exercises involve these agencies and provide participation in previous exercises.

activities to test /tt' aid the response personnel. .

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e 4

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9 LASAILr: NUCLEAR POWER STATION .

St:rmary Listing of Exercise Findings

1. Deficiencies Illinois April 8, 1986

L:.Salle County NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual

! Iteen of Weakness Proposed Date Date i None e e

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LASAILE NUCLTAR POWER STATION .

Stenary Listing of Exercise Findings

2. Areas Regairing Corrective Action April 8, 1986 Illinois IaSalle County Corrective Action Scheduled Actual NUREG Narrative Statenent Date Date j I su of Weakness Proposed H.4 'Ihe prepositioning of equipnent in the EOC in anticipation of the exercise precluded the denonstration of EOC activation.

G.4 b EBS messages should be supplied to the JPIC so they can be incorporated into the

news releases.

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LASALLE NICLEAf4 POlf/H STATION Stamery Listing of Exercise Findings .

3. Areas Recormended For Ittprovement April 8, 1986 Illinois LaSalle County

1. 'the action of verifying t'ge hospital notification needs to be conpleted. Further training and familiarity with l the procedures should enhance the process.

2. 'the paramedics should utilize the floor cover and personnel protective clothing provided to them by the l

utility.

3. It is rh.._cM that an appropriate hose and containment barrel be used to contain the waste water.

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