ML20203C263
| ML20203C263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1986 |
| From: | Brian Bonser, Bradford W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203C177 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-86-11, 50-364-86-11, NUDOCS 8607180383 | |
| Download: ML20203C263 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1986011
Text
.
O CE2o,
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
f
o
J\\-
REGION ll
I
C
101 MARIETTA ST5tEET. N W,
ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323
.
%, w...../
Report Nos.: 50-348/86-11 and 50-364/86-11
Licensee: Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street
Birmingham, AL '35291
Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364
Facility Name:
Farley 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: May 14 - June 10, 1986
-[
c%m
~ J
Inspec rs:
.
w
W. H. Bradford
Date 51 ned
<l
L p ;L.t'. w
,/ 3 Pc
ps
B. R.
onser
Date Si
ed
7!3 [h
Appr ved by:
d
@stou
H. C. Dance, Shetion Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine onsite inspection was conducted in the areas of monthly
surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, op
- tional safety
verification, licensee event reports, onsite followup of event , followup survey
of licensee response to selected safety issues and plant ste up from refueling
outage.
Results: Two violations were identified:
Violation of Technical Specification 3.7.12 - Inoperable fire damper; Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 -
'
Failure to follow procedures.
0607100303 860/00
PDH
ADOCK 00000348
O
,
. _ .
_-
. _ . -
- . .
_
._,
-
- - - . .
-.-
-
- - - -
_ - - .
-
--. -
.
.
.
.
..
!
l
i
j
REPORT DETAILS
i
i
i
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
J
1
J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager
D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager
i
W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager
l
R. D. Hill, Operations Superintendent
C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent
q
]
R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent
L. A. Ward, Maintenance Superintendent
,
1
L. W. Engineer, Administrative S'uperintendent
}
J. E. Odom, Operations Sector Supervisor
{
B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Sector Supervisor
!
T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor
,
- J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor
[
L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor
'
R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor
,
i
L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Supervisor
l
i
J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review
l
l
l
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations
l
'
personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office
i
personnel.
i
-
!
2.
Exit Interview
-
i
i
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management
interviews throughout the report period and on June 10, 1986, with the
,
1
general plant mantger and selected members of his staff. The inspection
.
j
findings were discussed in detail.
Two violations . are discussed in
{
]
Paragraph 6.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
l
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
!
j
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
i
l
I
This area was not inspected.
i
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
!
The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification required
!
surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance
!
with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that
]
j
limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and
j
were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing :he test;
i
that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed
1
J
j
,
-
-
- -
- -
-
--
-
- -
-
.
_
.- .-
__
. _
...
_
-
.- __ . . _ -
_ -
_ _ - .
.
,
i
2
j
and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel
!
conducting the tests were qualified.
The inspector witnessed / reviewed
portions of the following test activities:
!
STP 34.1 - Containment Inspection (Post Maintenance).
UDP 1.3
- Startup of Unit Following an at Power Reactor Trip.
i
STP 121
- Incore Flux Map.
1
1
ETP 4209 - 2C CCW Heat Exchanger Leak Detection.
STP 45.1 - Cold Shutdown Valves Inservice Test - MSIV's.
!-
STP 71.0 - Main Control Room Remote Valve Verification.
STP 33.2_ - RX Trip Breaker' Train Operability Test.
l
STP 1.0 * - Daily and Shift Surveillance Requirements.
!
STP 33.1B - Safeguards Test Cabinet Train Functional Test.
)
l
No violations were identified.
i
!
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
J
J
Station _ maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were
j
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
i
approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and
were in conformance with Technical Specifications,
j
The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions
for operations were met while components or systems were removed from
j
service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities
j
were accomplished using approved procedures and were performed prior to
returning components or systems to service; quality control records were
i
!
maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and
j
materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented;
i
and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed
l
to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was
assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system
j
performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
1
Diesel generator 28 air start air filter
-
Unit I control rod M-4
-
1
Unit 1 turbine interface valve
-
j
Unit 2A MG set
-
!
Various I&C instrument maintenance functions
-
,
'
During the restart of Unit 2, after completion of the refueling outage, the
licensee experienced certair problems on the lower motor bearing of 2C RCP.
.
i
The 2C RCP motor had undergone a required 5 year inspection during the
!
' fueling outage. The inspection was conducted under MWR - 109316 which used
'
Maintenance Procedure FNP-0-MP-61.2.
" Reactor Coolant Pump Motor 5 Year
Inspection."
i
!
I
!
!
!
lI
. .
.
_.
.
. _ _ _ _
._.
.
__
.
3
!
The unit was brought to cold shutdown to inspect the lower bearing of 2C
y
1
RCP. When the lower bearing was inspected, the licensee found the desig-
l
nated clearances between the jack screws and guide shoe to be in excess of
the required clearance.
The locking device for the jack screws had not
j
been manipulated to lock the jack screws in place to hold the set clearance.
4
The clearance between the jack screw and guide shoe was found to be
i
0.020 inches to 0.024 inches, contrary to step 5.13.3 of MP 61.2 which
l
states to " Install the guide shoes. and keeper plates, set the clearance
between the jack screw and guide shoe at 0.004 inches to 0.006 inches, lock
the jack screws." Step 5.13.3 of MP 61.2 requires a signature and date and
i
is noted in the procedure as an "S" or supervisor check point. During the
inspection, the procedure was lost due to contamination.
The electrical
foreman supervising the day shift transposed the data from the contaminated
3
procedure to a clean copy.
He noted that step 5.13 had not been verified
complete. Section 6.0 of Administrative Procedure (AP) 15
" Maintenance
'
Conduct of Operation" states that the "S" denotes Supervisor check point and
,
is signed and dated by the Maintenance Foreman responsible for the work,
'
j
Based on his understanding of the job status, the work logs and conversations
-
with the supervisor from the previous shift he assumed step 5.13.3 was
'
completed and signed it off as complete.
This violation was identified by
the licensee Safety Audit Engineering Group during a " spot audit." The
NRC will not issue a notice of violation to the licensee in accordance with
1
the enforcement guidance in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.
,
J
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
4
!
j
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
<
J
and conducted discussions with control room operations during the report
period.
ihe inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency
]
systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of
-
affected components.
Tours of. the auxiliary building, diesel building,
i
turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant
i
equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibrations. The
inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Opera-
tions (LCO) and results cf selected surveillance tests. The verifications
'
'
were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve
positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and review of
completed logs, records, and chemistry results.
The licensee's compliance
with LC0 action statements were reviewed as events occurred.
4
I
The inspectors routinely attended meetings with licensee management and
observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foreman and
licensed operators.
These meetings and discussions provided a daily status
'
)
of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activities in progress, as
-
well as discussions of significant problems.
l
F
I
'
5
-
-
-
-
_ - _ _ _ _
o.=
4
The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force
members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-
tion of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of gates,
doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were proper; and
procedures were followed.
Two violations were identified:
a.
On May 21, 1986, at 8:55 a.m. , the inspector found a sound powered
telephone cord blocking fire damper 05-139-06, on Unit 2.
This is the
opening between the electrical penetration room, elevation 139', and
the piping penetration room, elevation 121'.
The sound powered
telephone was connected to the outlet in the electrical penetration
room #2322 and run through the fire damper opening into tne piping
penetration room below. This fire damper serves as the fire boundary
between elevation 139' and elevation 121' . There was no fire watch
posted nor was a hourly fire patrol established as required by Sec'.f on
3.7.12 of the Technical Specifications.
Fire damper 05-139-06 could
not fulfill its intended function. This is a violation (364/86-11-02).
The licensee has initiated corrective action on all fire doors and
dampers by marking the doors and dampers with a distinctive red
diagonal stripe.
Each fire barrier is also labeled.
b.
During a plant inspection on May 16, 1986, at approximately 10:00 a.m.,
the inspector found stored and unattended flammable material in the Hot
Machine Shop in the Auxiliary Building.
This flammable material
consisted of one spray can of Zinc-it.
The can was labeled extremely
flammable. There was no one in attendqnce in the Hot Shop. Admini-
strative Procedure (AP) 35, " General Plant Housekeeping and Cleanliness
Control", Section 5.1 requires that no combustible or flammable
materials are to be stored in or adjacent to the Auxiliary Building,
Containment Building, Diesel Building or Service Water structure.
This is a violation (348,364/86-11-01).
7.
Licensee Event Reports
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic problems to determine
trends, to determine whether information included in the report meets the
NRC reporting requirements and to consider whether the corrective action
discussed in the report appears appropriate. Licensee action, with respect
to selected reports, were reviewed to verify that the event had been
reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the Technical Specifi-
cation; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety
limits, limiting safety setting and LCOs were not exceeded. The inspector
examined selec'.ed incidents reports, logs and records and interviewed
selected personnel.
The following reports are considered closed:
Unit 1 LER 86-006
- Residual Heat Removal System Inoperable Due to
Personnel Error
..
5
8.
Onsite Followup of Events (92702)
On May 18, 1986, at 11
p.m. , Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a
deteriorated diaphragm on the turbine interface valve which allowed the
turbine auto stop oil pressure to decrease below the setpoint. All systems
functioned as designed; there was no safety injection.
During restart, control rod M-4 on control bank "C" dropped from 36 steps to
18 steps. All rods were inserted and the startup terminated. The licensee
found a loose connector on rod M-4.
The connector was repaired and tested.
i
The reactor was critical at 1:36 p.m. on May 19, 1986.
1
'
On June 8,1986, Unit 2 tripped from 81% power due to loss of both motor
generator (MG) sets. The "A" MG set failed and the output breaker did not
open. The "B" MG set backfed the "A"
MG set resulting in the "B" MG set
output breaker tripping and the rods dropping into the core. Following the
trip, it was observed that a differential overcurrent relay had tripped the
"B" MG set output breaker. The cause of the
"A" MG set malfunction is under
,
i
investigation by the licensee.
The inspectors had no further questions.
9.
Followup Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues (92701)
A survey of the licensee's response to specific issues concerning biofouling
of service water heat exchangers was conducted. The purpose of the survey
was to determine whether safety related equipment cooled by open-cycle
service water systems have instrumentation available and have readings
recorded and reviewed against design parameters to determine the extent (if
any) of biofouling. The survey also determined if procedures and training
,
i
address operator actions if significant heat exchanger performance degrada-
tion as a result of biofouling is detected and if periodic inspections are
performed to detect biofouling.
l
The survey revealed biofouling of service water heat exchangers is not a
'
problem at Farley and currently installed instrumentation and monitoring of
that instrumentation is adequate to determine if biofouling becomes a
problem. Procedures and training for operators do not specifically address
biofouling because it is not a problem. Periodic inspections are performed
to detect biofouling in service water heat exchangers.
l
10.
Plant Startup From Refueling (71711)
Following the Unit 2 refueling outage a walkdown of appropriate portions of
selected systems was performed to determine that they had been returned to
service in accordance with approved procedures.
Selected portions of the
Unit 2 startup were also witnessed.
Sati sf actory completion of all
surveillance tests required to be performed prior to startup was verified.
Startup activities were also verified to be conducted in accordance with
Technical Specification requirements and technically adequate and approved
procedures which, if applicable, had been revised to reflect facility
"
l
modifications.
!
,