ML20195G811

Forwards Amend 137 to License NPF-1 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Revises Tech Specs Table 3.3-1, Reactor Trip Sys (RTS) Instrumentation & Table 4.3-1, RTS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, Per Generic Ltr 85-09

ML20195G811
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	12/01/1987
From:	Chan T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Cockfield D PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
Shared Package
ML20195G820	List: ML20195G811 ML20236X517 ML20236X531
References
GL-85-09, GL-85-9, TAC-55383, NUDOCS 8712090256
Download: ML20195G811 (54)

Text

December 1, 1987 s

• Docket No. 50-344 ,,DISTRLBUTLON 3 L seeset F0e- a WJones NRC & Local PDRs EButcher GMPolahan ACRS(10)

Mr. David W. Cockfield JLee GPA/PA-Vice President, Nuclear TChan ARM /LFMB Portland General Electric C wpany OGC-Bethesda PD5 Plant File 121 S.W. Saltnen Street DHagan Portland, Oregon 97204 EJordan

+

JPartlow

Dear Mr. Cockfield:

TBarnhart(4)

SUBJECT:

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.hPF-1,TROJANNUCLEARPLANT(TACNO.55383)

The Comission has issued the enclosed Arrenament No. to facility Operating License No, hPF-1 for the Trojan Nuclear Planc. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application (LCA 132)datedJune 22, 1987.

The amendment revises Technical Specification Table 3.3-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrurrentation" and Table 4.3-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, as reconnended in Generic Letter 85-09.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Ccomission's next regular ti-weekly Federal Register riotice .

Sincerely, original signed by Terence L. Chan, Project Manager Project Directorate Y Division of Reactor Projects - !!!,

IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosures * '

1. /sendment No, to NPF-1 l E. Safety Evaluation cc w/ enclosures:

See next page ,j l

D4SP DRSP/P p S CB/Bq# OGCh PD5 J 'eb(PDS TChan:cd si i

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'v: h. E. Fowl. : [b TEB 35-87M FROM: T. E. Bushnell DATE: June 3 1987 c '.' U.1 EC T : TROJ A!; !;L'ri.EAD F f. A!;T Main Feedwiter Rectraint Failure Action Plan Following is the presently available information which was requested pursuant to the subject action plan.

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u :. . . >c' 3 ': ' 2 J. tem A.1,a.1 An evaluation of the restraint installation ic provided following the description of the as-found condi* ion of the main feedwater EBB 3-1 Seismic Restraint SR-8 (SR-8).

Jtem A.1.c Upon inspection of SR-E after disacsembly, tne following conditior.s were identified (see attached sketch of design configuration. Attach..ent 1):

The concrete under the base plates of the W4 x 13 (W4) diagonal and the W6 x 20 (W6) vertical members was broken out in an area

n plan dimensions of approximately 33-in, east-west by 24-in, nortn-routh The average depth of the failure surface was i n : x i a t a l .- 1/4 to 1/2 in. along the outcide dges of tne

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- . . W6 ca s. ..p i a

• e and ' 4 in, ceep ancer t .e 'e;

.* co ~ . i '. e .

A .arav c e e ['. o n of irregular-cnaped concrete was found pulled

ut under t h .

front n a '. : ot tne base plate of the W4 diagonal

.~ cection eacured I? 'n. in width (north.coutn). 20 in in

".- * " . . ar- was a na L um cf 3 ' ii :n. deep. Thu s n e ' . :: :' t h  :-

;r at .wc a t.c n c r

01ta s

,i d - i n diameter Ph:ii.i, mr ca : ;' .

ancnot bolts) under the W4 diagonal base plate were still engaged in the front third of t%10 concrete cection Vnien snowc c ne'usive'.y. that the concrete fai'.ed as opposed to snell pul'out. Due to the conical shape of the failed concrete section and the relatively clean fracture surface of the area under the section (le, no apparent crushing or grinding) it appears the concrete section failed due to tencion and shear

'. o . : impar *ed from *no W .; J: 3 gonal r. o its base plate.

~. t r :. en vrerat

. -: : :no ba:e p l a t .. ot 'n, Wt .er .ca

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. . a e o n a '. me .t e r bace p;a: e. There appears tc .a v" re 2:me cruaning of :e concr-;.. ; .c-r t *. e We base plato .n;;: 2 . - '

.4 ..ne fiilure wac m,: 1 . s. e '. ,- : a u :. e d by n~2 : snd

. pre ;;an .,adc. T ." c e c i r.w e s t arenor bo.* r..n. '*

r- cc -

1 of W6 base plate in plan) remained anchored below tne tallure surface of the concrete. The anchor bolt had loosened laterally but could not be removed by hand-applied teat.'e force. This is evidence that this anchor bolt did not axperience tencile loade nutficient to cauce failuro in a tanc;1e concrete cone t a llut. ode or in a chell innc;.~

puliout mode I

The writer ic led to bel: cvo that, baced on the evidence curnari:ed above. tno conce of load causing the failure i t. CH 0 was, eithor initial. 7: as a result of cycl:e progrescion. I

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tension in the strut accombly which produced combined ccmpression and shear on the W6 vertical member base plate and combined tension and chear on the W4 diagonal member base plate. Restraint SR.8 may, however. also experience significant load; i r, a sense of compression on the ctrut assembly. Load rever:als should not, in this section of main feedwater line, be unexpected if initiated by a transient condition.

The structural steel accemb'.y of SR-8 wac visually inspected.

Tnere was no evidence ot danage to welds or indication of permanent deflection in W6 or W4 members or their base plates.

There was possible indication (paint scraping) that the pin had come in contact with the pin bracket plate, but with no clearly detinable sense of load magnitude or direction.

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.anufSClure:'C inStallat10n OtandardS. Tne anenor bella otvlously developed tne concrete snear cone type f a ; '. u r e

~ e C n J n ; 0 ". without prenature pullout as evidenced by the

O$efvud Cuncrete ta' lure Surt2000 and Configur3tions. ". ' ". ! L type of Concrete shear Cone failure

*.e C h a n i s m iS a C o !'.m o n ** C d e of ultimate load development foc anchor bolts of thic type and ic provided fat in estati;ctment of design allowed loads

'.'. ..r c_ e : at ta a. .a- 1-veling nuts ont.- anenct ; . *;

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. a '. 1  !". . -..t Proper engagement of expancion-type inchors, wnich are set ty expanding a cleeve at the end of the bolt by use of bolt torque, would be affected by the use of bace plate level.nq nuts, but at explained above. that 15 not the case in the CE-8 1

anchorage

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wa: c'oncluded t. hi. ;r.i~9

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'.'."  : -67M J u r. e 3 1987

.n .i g e :

Item A.1.d Upon inspection of Pipe Whip Restraint 54.4 for EBB-3-1. the following conditions were observed:

At first observation it appeared that there was an approximate 1/16-in. gap between the base plate and the grout at the bottom of the upper whip restraint base plate. A similar gap appeared between plate.

the grout and the concrete at the top of this same base There was no evidence of damage to the anchor bolts, velds. base plate. or structural steel members. There was no evidence of damage to the whip restraint bottom base plate.

grout, welds, or anchor bolts.

The grout chamfer was removed around the perimeter of the upper wnip restraint base plate.  ! was evident that the charter had

er i.ted : e c e n t '. y and, t  :? fore, would not be i retilb'.?

I

. ';;;: :: ;; r: ;:3. : *: ;::anea at *7u rec!: . 4 A T o r t ; ; n o,t the criginal grout under the outside edge of tne

pi e r race plate was removed tot closer inspection. Two flat ta

s t e e '. shims were located behind the top and boticm of the t i: ' p'a*^ and were  ; g r. : up against the concrete and base i

n.2t3 A ( 2 . '. : 4 3 a g .. w 3 :; .nserted 3rcund the por;ae:~: -t tre tace plate and the deepest penetration parallel to :ne tas0 plate found was 2-3/4 in. Two layers of thin. brittle, and corroded metal cheets were found between the upper base plate  ;

I and the cr:ginal grout, j

From these observations it was concluded that the gaps first observed were from the installation and shrinkage of the grout placenents, and possibly from deterioration of ne metal sheet layers.

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n ; .. p;aro :' :w:

, , , w... w ! c t .ed of the area arouna .

3*.itional grau' - o va i ins

• nc / il ot da n a G. d concrete 3:Qund Ch 9. *i a l : 1 ; *. e s;re: O r d t'

• 2 u'o d;secvered on the concret- ledge 01:ect'.y benind ~e ;;1 :

base p ' 3 '. e of Rectra;nt u.t.

Soundtnq of the cane:+:e :n t r. e general area incicated a icosene a s of tne concret> d;tect.i behind the upper base plate measuring approximately 30 in.

along the length of the ledge by 15 in. perpendicularly into the ledge by 8 in, deep. The depth of this :one extended to the approximate centerline of the 2-in.-diameter rock anchors of the upper base plate

To e "*

n.e . 1n. l paco '

i lien A.2.a2

of tne cix (6) concrete anchor bolts (1-in.-diameter I l wedge type) in the base plate of Support EB8 3-1-SR-4, one (1)

was (cund to have evidence cf lifting approxinately 1/16 in.  !

L'c other evidence of support damage or failure was found. and the bolt was able to be retorqued to design values. This [

support was reinstalled to its present co.1 figuration in 1979. ,

using the plant installation standards current at that time. l This required inspections of anchor bolt installation to ensure proper installation. Due to the fact that the gap wa: i

, approximately 1/16 in, and the gap wac found on only one of tha six anchor bolts, it is possible that the dynamic load from a f feedwater line water hammer or transient jolted the support,

, causing clippage of this anchor. At this point, the ancnot F : : b a r '. y t o o k. hold and performed it; function.

t

, i r. n

: o c .' - :ou.. ;e ret):qued, and t. 2 .m c

pc..<u... .---e ,* . . ". .2 . .. . " * -

1 ..;.2 ;.:n; .: a :sncrete 2 n- . .

i oc.: r e - s t a 'a . ; c h e d tne design capactty of the support.

t' ; s recommended that the support be reincpected H

ve" .

du : . f u *. u r e refueling outage; ta verify its : n t e g r i t '. J 1

3. .;

I t2edvater Support EBD-6-2.SR-17, 71-ft Elevation in Main Steam i

Support Structure (MSC2).

t

Inspect;onc c: this cupport revealed the folleving: The top

! two ancnor bolts were out from the bace plate approximately 1/8 in. While the bottom left anchor bolt was no longer snug.

The p;pe clamp was rotated such that the centetline of the c'.a r it ino strut was 1-;/t in, below the centerline Of *%o l Pipe Tne ttrut wac bound up tight at the clamp anc p a i n t . n';  !

l an .

:-n i r. d cla.p :n m c tnat tne :: l a m p had .* e -

i i .e r i' n: -o wa: o , p . a t ..s The na;n between *: - :: a . .,*.  !

j end tne wo.. :i a d craesee, ;n~..n; :nat the t a c .. pia *- * .2. .

d away,f cs t n.. wa1;.

l The pre'..minary indicot;2n ;- i n c. t the probab.e :aus- ;; -*3 au-found condition (more investigation is being pe r f o r r.ed as ct June 4 1987) is ac follows:

I 1 The vertical movement of the pipe at this location is i apprcximately 3/4 in. With the clamp rotated and the strut l e e s. c s t1cnt (in the cold condition), a vertical laad a ,1

.? O r o - '

w ', ' i !g npar*ed into the utgut at the clamp ( a ;. w. '

1 at the :: o: ial t o!.C i l e load)

Th10 Vertical load and mur

• n! In Ine S1lUt vi11 cauce 4 Notent in the base plate due tc the eccenitic;ty o! the pin ftem the base plate. Thic wei,ld .n 1

i TS- fi 0;"

Jun< 3, 19 '

n a: n turn induce extra tensile forces in the top two bolts causing them to slip. The lower bolt was probably pried loose at this point. With the thermal load off the pipe, the base plate would be pushed back to the wall.

Since the paint on the clamp indicates that it has been rotated for some time. The clamp was probably either installed that way or was rotated by someone climbing on it when the pipe was cold and set in its position when the pipe heated up.

After our further investigation has been completed, the clamp position will be corrected and the support repaired to meet design loads.

-: tem B ^ -

V: "'. i 30Tnary Ot *9e inal/ sis p e r f 0 C '*. e d r e .' ~ : . s e *s 4.:21 .00 in ;1.t.a. e *N . J a r ; ; n O L ::iu ' 2 : . 4 -* - . . o ': a ina! Culd'bdVe c30 sed tne observed failure 1 :' E e s *. r a '. n '. 3h-3.

First, it . 's important to state tnat the ana'.ysis was based on sta* C load calculations, not dynamic loads and eff0C!s.

A t!'.Jugh Ih- loading Condition Causing failure of $H-3 iS noW ur..:ved t; have been dynamic in nature, rational translat;cnt cetwe"n static and dynam;c load regimes are availacl2. neue translations arm described further in this response l

Unt;l noted otnervise, the following discussions are baced on j

stat;c principles. I

1. Significance of sense (strut assembly tension or compression) of failure load.

l 1

As desor:b.d in the response to item A . '. . c . tne evi:-nce 1

. ac ; :a r. s tnat tne SR-8 anchor D o ' *. s wer" a d eq u.i r . .

. e v .: ared *o .

tuse, n r i r.a r i l y , a tension fa;1ure c ". : ,

ne :encrete Jue to v e r *. t c 3 . reaet;cas 5: *ne La .

.a.?s.

.et.;ca. equiiibrium, static or :/nami:. must be Ta; .s:a

-( ;e. equal and opposite ver*;cai reacr.ons at the 6 and .;q T.e m b e r base plates), and the fail.ure load should De essenttally tne same for either t e n s '. o n or compresa.. .

the strut assembly. Thus, within the context of otner )

analytical considerations used and described herein. the  !

l sense of load (tension or compression in the strut assembly) which resulted in the anchorage failure of SR-8 Thould not significantly affect the overall conclusions.

. .v. : , .;..

June 3 1967 Page 7

2. Distribution of horizontal load imparted by the strut assembly to members of SR-8.

Restraint SR-8 was designed to resist loads transmitted by the feedwater line through the strut assembly in a horizontal direction. When the strut load is imparted to the SR- 8 framing, two bounding case load paths are possible: (a) considering effectively complete rotational resistance at the welded interface of the W6 vertical and W4 diagonal members (likely). and at the member base plates. and (b) considering effectively no rotational resistance at these locations. Iri case (a). calculations demonstrate that 92 percent of the horizontal load is resisted by the W4 diagonal. and in case (b). 100 percent of the horizontal load is resisted by the W4 diagonal For purposes of this evaluation, the difference is by so T.e a n s

. rant

C;r::~t? Strength T .e 3ctual /ersus design concrete strength, which is a parareter in anchor bolt development, was o :. necess:'.y cue

.ac. of any other specific data, treated by :urc ent e

7 ". e jeu.gn 2Oncr ?te 3trength 1meaGu!?d in "Orms 'i '" -day ultimate compressive strengtn) was 5.000 psi concrete strength generally, but not always, increases w:th age.

For these calculations, a concrete strength of 5,000 ps:

was considered reasonable.

The possible variations in concrete strength should not also result in intolerable differences in conclusions since botn concrete and anchor bolt strength parameters are a square-root function of the concrete compre;s ./- c t r e ;c t h.

)! anchoc bolt pertarmance w;tn r :per' -

s 1 n .nteraction and Nce p.'at >

f.*x' i.

Shear-tension interaction considerations The t > . *. c 01 combined shear and tension on the ultimate i a '. G : >

acad capacity of an anchor bolt of the type s t ad . 20 are, at best, unclear to the writer. Tests (Hanford and others) have shown that shear in combination with tension could contribute to prematur9 anchor bolt tensile failure. The interpretive dtfficulty is that the test data failure mode (anchor bolt shear pull-out or bolt shear versun concrete failure cone development)

. =

.EE e'y une ,. 19e7 dage E does not seem to lead to any clear conclusion regarding capacities at concrete failure, which is the case of present interest.

b. Base plate flexibility considerations:

Because the SR-8 framing members are welded to their base plates and are of such dimension (particular'y the W4 diagonal) as to effectively stiffen the base plate, potential base plate flexibility is not considered to be a significant contribution to lower bound failure vt the anchor bolts due to base plate prying action.

5. Static Failure Load Evaluation A2

tatec previously, the static failure load evaluat;on

'ase~ on a linear elastic anal./ sis. ~ '. e starical '

.. u _trat .oad pred ict e : 3 :.. - inenc: r ..._: w.s a: :m:ned based on the anenorage : o n : ; g u r i t ; o r.; , sa t

p. ate .ind anchor bolt geometrics), bolt type and emcecment, e ; . . m a Os c concrete strength, and the type of failure asa rv d (concrete cone-type failure) Considering ne aLa 2 anchor bolt failure loads were (1) t a r. e n frca i:

i:.. ;.dustry test data ( P i t t s b u r g n Ta s t i r.<;

ancratary) and (b) theoretically derived from f a : ; u r .' icau models (which are also based on test data) taken from Appendix B.Concrete Institute (ACI) Standard 349 American By both methods used and some variaticns .a a s s u.n p t i o n s considered reasonable, the statix strut ta;1ure load was calculated to be on the order of 40,000 lbs.

6. Dynamic Effects An a w- .

known, the oftect et a dynamic ; cad 3n te

>:s a*

to an ao u i va ; e r. : : 3*.c laal : ) , '

- 2 a.- 2 ' ~

..u: - 2na./c;s if the charact:r ::

• 7e a ' m: i:.

t> est. mated or bounded.

L's e of 3 d , *:a mi c . cad m a;::*

(,1A .# ) .c a convenient means to perform th;G typ- ' .

.t r a n : l a t '. a n . The DLF is simply the factar by wn;en .

pea . .'alue ot a dynamic load is moitipl.ed to d.*-:  :: a static load which produces the same effect For an l impulsive load. the DLF can vary between 1.0 and 2.0, ie, for a DLF of 2.0, the peak value of an impulsive load causing failure of SR-8 could have been as low as 20,000 lb. 1 An another example. although simpl:st c. If the dynamic i l ua.

w"re to have resulted in a system r e s o r..s n t condi*. ion 0:

.inuso; dol character, for low system damping (for e x a r. p l e , une 5 percent), as few as five resonant cycles  ;

l cou;d have resulted 'na DLP on the order of 8.

- = ,.

. e n.

r s .

J u n. 3, l'.47 Page 0 In summary, the static equivalent strut assembly load resulting in SR-8 anchorage failure could have been on the crder of 40.000 lb. If the load causing failure were dynamic in character, which is believed to be the case, the value could have been much less than 40,000 lb.

7 Pre-existant Anchotage Degradation As is obvious, a pre-existing weakened condition in the SR-e anchorage could have a dramatic effect of the fallCTe load. At present, there is no clear evidence known to tne writer wnich would indicate that the SR-8 anchorage was or was not degraded prior to failure load application.

_I t e m C.l.a i'--  :: 9 3r? pr3 senti- beia: "erformed.

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': L :n capaci*y for SR-8 repaired, witn norma' factors : .

. 1-i "ci'2ded.

. is greater than 40,000 lb.  :: desired, a

. ~. a . capa;;y calculation can be perfarmed wnen SR-8 a_-bul ;

': '93t;;n ic received.

'.vace a d '. . s e vf any questions you may nave concerning tnic T. e . o .

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FEETMATER FESTRAINT DAMAGE CMHoh0U4Y OnpCE by Mayon 19, 1987, damage to a seismic restraint (EBB-3-1-SR8) was 'iccovered the f eedwater line to .the "B" cteam generator.

The anc hor bolts for the knee brace restraint had been pulled out of the concrete floor, On May 22 an engineer from Nuclear plant Engineering examined the i damage and co.mmenced an investigation to determine the cause of the failure restraint' {

j On May 23, walkdowns were completed of all Containment piping penetrations .

to the second cupport from the Containment wall both incide and outcide of Containment. i examined on thic date.

Additionally, the failed restraint was dicacccmbled and further ,

During the week of May 24, 1 feedwater lines was performed.a systematic evaluation of the'"A" and "B" "B" The evaluation included modeling of the feedwater line by Bechtel in order to perform dynamic analysco for root i cause identification. I Additionally, nondestructive exaninationc are being performed To dase, on all feedwater linec to identify potential damage to these line. )

the following dicerepanciec have been observed: .

. "B" feedwater line Restraint SR-8 anchor boltc pulled out of fltor.

"B" i f eudwater line pipe whip restraint i support. hac minor grout damage at top '

. "B" feedwater line snubber (SS-7) vicual inspection dicerepancy.

. Surf waterace line examination inside Containment. hac revealed ceveral lineal indicationc "B" in feed-

. Abnormal buildup observed inside of pipe on radiographs of f eedwater i

line in vicinity of pipe whip restraint (54.4). "B" "A" )

feedwater line Restraint SR-4 under compressive load indicat ing perma-nont cet in piping.

Loose anchor nut Obccrved on SR-4

. Crack observed in 45-degree elbow in "A" feedwater line.

Restraint SR 17 on "D" feedwater line outside Containment appears to have gaps between base plate and anchor bolt heads, and strut is bound tightly

,in the clamp.

Repairs have been completed to SR-8, SR-17, SS-3 and SS-7.

the event has been completed and an engineering report has been An evaluation incued of Bechtel has performed analyses to size .

cause the ob.etved impact on SR-8. the steam bubbic collapse required to Additionally, the auxiliary feedwat er  !

control valven will be throttled to prevent excecnive flew to the cteam generatorc when the pumps auto ctart. The mined by the perf ormance of TpT- 213. throttle position is being deter-Following changen to the Emergency Operating proceduren to limitthe completion of 1pT- 213, water flow to the steam generator to prevent the auxiliat y f eed.

completed. steam bubble formation will be SAb/kal/1344P.587

o I. Page 1 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTIO_N PLAN Updated as of- September ll, 1987

__ Action Action part_y Statu,s A. Comments /Results Inspection.

1. "B" Feedwater Line.

a. Inspect as-is condition Cil Koerger Complete.

of failed seismic Restraint installation was restraint SR-8 on determined to be satisfactory.

"B" feed line.

1) Evaluate restraint Ted Bushnell Complete.

Installation,

b. Inspect pipe whip Gil Koerger Complete.

restraint (54.4) in Kevin Marshall as-found condition.

c. Inspect failed seismic Kevin Marshall Complete.

restraint (SR-8) fol-lowing disassembly.

d. perform destructive Kevin Marshall Complete.

examination of pipe No clearance between base whip restraint upper plate and shims. Apparent anchorage (ie, remove damage to pipe whip restraint grout and inspect upper anchorage is. minor.

clearance between base plate and shims).

c. Inspect pipe hangers Cil Koerger Complete.

r.nd supports. Steve Chalk All snubbers' bench tested.

m

4 ,

- ,+,

1 I. page 2 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN .

4 4

Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action party Status Comments /Results a

1) Evaluate Snubber Gil Koerger Complete.

SS-7 visual inspec- Snubber functionally tested tion discrepancy. satisfactorily. NCAR written i

~

5/29 because inservice inspec-tion of this snubber did not

identify discrepancy (resolu-

{ tion not necessary for I feedwater restraint issue).

f. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete.

i nation of line from Quality Control Several lineal' indications

! Containment penetration obse rved.

to fourth elbow.

1 -

1) Perform volu- Don Wheeler Complete.

I metric examination Quality Control Radiographs were clear. b

[ of selected

indications.

i

, g. Perform volumetric Don Wheeler Complete.

examination of welds Radiographs are clear.

Quality Control at flued head penetra- i tion and first and I

second cibows inside i Containment.

4

h. Perform surface and Don Wheeler Conplete. Radiographs are clear.

volumetric examination Quality Centrol Abnne-3: '

j of feed line where buildup on inside pipe surface '

j brackets for pipe whip. determined to be normal sludge.

restraint bumper con-

] tact pipe.

i h

j -

4 4

1 4

-- . . . . . - . ._ .~.- _. _ . - - - .

I I. Page 3 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE .\"

., ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

1) Perform ultrasonic Bill Dickinson 'Chmplete.

measurement of wall NPE thickness of first three elbows inside Containment.

i. Perform volumetric Bill Dickinson Complete.

examination of feed- .NPE Possible indication identified water to steam genera- on weld. Refer to Action tor nozzle. Plan VI.

1) Evaluate indication Arlen Wogen Closed.

l on "B" nozzle weld. Refer to Action Plan VI.

t .

j. Perform inspection of Al Cohlmeyer Complete- ults acceptabic.

main feed check valve. Don Schumacher

k. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete.

nations of selected No problems noted.

welds outside Containment.

1. Perform visual examina- Jeff Duncan Complete.

i ation of feed ring and Alex Krawchuk No abnormalities noted.

J-tubes.

2. "A" Feedwater Line.

a. Inspect pipe hangers Gil Koerger Complete.

and supports. SR-4 found loaded with a loose -

nut on one anchor bolt.

I I

l l

l

I. Page 4 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

1) Evaluato load on Gil Koerger LComplete.

SR-4. Restraint was in compression.

When restraint removed, pipe moved 33 mils-toward restraint.

Approximate compression load on strut of 1200 lbs prior to release.

2) Evaluate loose nut Kevin Marshall Complete.

on anchor bolt on NPE SR-4

b. Perform surface examl- Don Wheeler Complete.

nation of line from Quality Control Sevcral indicat ions observed.

Containment penetration On* indication observed in 45* clbow weld.

to fourth elbow.

1) Perform volumet- Don Wheeler Complete.

ric examination Quality control Minor surface indication only.

of indication in 45* elbow and indications.

2) Perform ultrasonic Bill Dickinson Complete.

wall thickness NPE measurements of first three elbows inside containment. -

.i

c. Perform volumetric Bill Dickinson Complete.

examination of feed- NPE Examination results were satis-water to steam genera-factory. Refer to Action Plan.

tor nozzle.

4

_ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ ______.._.__--- _ . .-____- _ - _ _ _ - - - __ _____ __--- __ _- -- -m- - - - - i *_a w-_- --______m . _m_ -f __s _m.__ - -- + --__m -__ __

I. Page 5 of 13

-- MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE .

ACTION PLAN I Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action .

Action partL_ Status Comments /Results

d. Perform surface examl- Don Wheeler Co:rp le te .

nations of selected No problems found.

welds outside Containment.

c. Inspect main feed Al Cohlmeyer Complete. Results acceptable.

check valve. Don Schumacher ,

3. "C" and "D" Feedwater Lines.

a. Inspect pipe hangers Alex Krawchuk Complete.

and supports. Craig Dirkson On SR-17 there wore gaps between the heads of three anchor bolts ~

and the base plate. SR-17  ;

strut tightly bound in clanp.

1) Evaluate gaps Ted Bushnell Complete.

between anchor boll NPE Not related to SR-8 failure.

heads and base plate for SR-17.

I 2)- Evaluate SR-17 Gil Koerger Complete.

strut condition. Resolution to be included in

.NCR disposition for Item 3.a.l.

b. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete.

nation of welds. Quality Control

c. Perform volumetric Bill Dickinson Closed.

exa.31 nation of feed- NPE Indication identified on -

"D" steam generator nozzle-to-ws6er to steam genera-tor nozzles. reducer weld. -Refer to.

Action Plan VI.

l 1) Evaluate Indication Arlen Wegen Closed.

on **D" nozzle we Id . Refer to Action Plan VI.

i l

l

. -i

I. Page 6 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE

. ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

d. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler 'C mplete.

nations on selected No problems noted.

welds outside containment.

c. Inspect main feed check Al Cohlreyer Complete valves.

Don Schumacher Results satisfactory.

4 Other Inspections.

a. Inspect first two sup- Brian Fritz Complete.

ports inside and out- NPE No discrepancies noted.

side of Containment for all piping systems.

b. Repeat above inspection Drian Fritz Complete.

following heatup. NPE l

c. Develop inspection plan Den Sci.umachar/ Co plete and inspect auxiliary Maintenance Results satisfactory.

feedwater check valves.

B. Evaluation / Analysis.

1. Develop list of significant Don Schumacher Complete.

operating transients Dan Seely experienced by the feed- Frank Rogan water lines over the last year and prior to the November 1979 outage.

n- _. r . -

. _ _ = , .r.. - .

I. Page 7 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN -

Updated as of: September 11 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

• 2. Calculate load required to Ted Bushnell Ochplete.

impart observed failure NPE Static load required to damar.e to SR-8. SR-8 determined to be 40 kips.

• Calculation (TC-450) reviewed by Bechtcl. Provided to NRC 6/5.

+3. Prepare model for "B" line ,

Bechtel Complete.

and perform dynamic loading Initial analysis of a 100 psir, analysis. transient with a ramp of I millisecond complete. Load at SR-8 determined to be 6.5 kips.

a. Determine stresses on Bechtel Complete.

line from transients To identify adequacy of systen (ranging from normal supports and potential causes.

to abnormal) on system ~

with SR-8 intact.

b. Determine stresses on Bechtel Complete.

line from transients To identify potential system with SR-8 failed. damage while SR-8 was non-functional.

• 4 Use hydraulic model for Bechtel Complete.

"B" line to perform bounding analysis.

• S. Calculate the effect on Brian Fritz Complete.

SR-8 from performance of NPE Load determined to be 1.6 kips an integrated leak rate at SR-8.

test.

• Analyses provided to NRR.

I. Page 8 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAIUT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as Gf: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

6. Determine adequacy of sup- Don Schumacher C mplete.

port scheme for feedwater NPE - Civil and Support scheme is satisfactory.

lines.

Mechanical Bechtel

'7 Review the "A" feedwater Bechtel Complete.

line stress analysis with respect to present as-built conditions.

8. Calculate deflection of Brian Fritz Complete.

line going from full to NPE Deflection upwards of approxi-empty. mately 2 Inches.

9. Westinghouse to provide Westinthnuse Complate. List providad tn nochtel f /'

list of events a.id bounding case to result in forces needed to damage SR-8.

10. Determine if modifications Frank Rogan Complete.

to the "B" line were con- Modifications were considered sidered when the "A" line but were determined to be unnecessary.

restraint failed in 1979.

11. Compare Trojan design and Mike Malmros Complete.

event to San Onofre water hammer event.

12. Evaluate WNp-2 thermal Mike Malmros Complete.

stratification issue for applicability to Trojan.

fn.)Iyscs provided to NRR.

O I. page 9 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION _PI,AN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Par _t_y Status Comments /Results C. Repairs / Modifications. *

• 1 Modify / repair supports. NPE Complete. Restoring SR-8 to original configuration with additional margin.

a. SR-8. Ted Bushnell Completa.

2. Remove indication in 45* 7.1 Cohlmeyer Complete. No indication on radiograph.

cibow in "A" feedwater line.

a. Verify wall thickness Al Cohlmeyer Co plete.

following conditioning. Wall thickness satisfactory

3. Order pipe clamps and a Brian Fritz Complete.

variety of struts. NPE Purchase Requisit}on Q24-1912 (5/30/87).

4 Identify locations for Frank Rogan Complete.

additional restraints and No new hangers / supports Dechtel required.

providt preliminary design, if necessary.

% Replace SR-17 ("D" line). Don Schumacher/ Complete.

Maintenance

6. Repair anchors on SS-3 Don Schumacher/ Complete.

("A" line) and SS-7 Maintenance

("a" line).

O l

o I. Page 10 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN

_ -_ Updated as of: September 11, 1987 A c_t i on Action Party Status Commente/Results D. Post-Startup Test / Inspection. ""

1. Prepare post-startup Jack Seibel Complete. TPT-208.

ronitoring/ test program, Ins t rumen ta t ion installed.

2. Determine monitoring Jack Seibel Cnnplete.

requirements during Will be part of procedure for operation. D.1 above. Procedure will include actions to be taken for indications on monitorin$

equipment.

3. Evaluate monitoring / testing Bob Fowler Clesed.

requirements in futurc Post-startup issue. Will be years. based on results of observations this cycle. To be tracked by CTL Item 20674 4 Prepare test procedure to Bill Sherwood Complete. TPT 213.

establish throttle setting I Jay Fischer for CV 3004 valves.

E. Long-Term Evaluation.

1. Determine if evaluation of Rodger Wehage support schere for other NPE Complete. Main feed support schere is adequate. See Item B.6.

systems is necessary if main feed system support scheme is determined to be inadequate.

m l

I.

Page 11 of 13 Malt! FEEDWATER RESTRAIFIT FAILURE ACTION Pl.AN Updated as of: September 11 1987 Action Action Party _ _ Sta_tus Comments /Results F. Independent Evaluation. *

1. Perfonn third party review Impell Corporation Complete.

of engineering activities.

2. Form oversight committee Paul Yundt Complete. Evaluation complete.

to evaluate event.

G. Feedwater Line Reducer to Steat Generator Nozzle Closed. See Action Plan VI.

Indication.

H. Report.

1. Prepare letter to NRC Scott Bauer Complete.

providing requested a n.11 y s e s .

2. Prepare letter to PTRC Region V.

a. Attachment A - Frank Rogan Complete.

PCE Report.

1) Introduction. Frank Rogan Conplete.

2) Description of Frank Rogan Complete.

feedwater syntem.

3) Description of Frank Rogan Complete.

failure.

I. Page 12 of 13 MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILtlRE

. ACTION I]I.Ap_ Updated as of: September ll, 1987 Action Action Party S t a_tu s Corre.en t s / Re s_u l t s A) Action plan. Frank Rogan *dhmplete.

Inspection plans l and results.

5) Industry Mike Malmros Complete.

e vpe ri en c e .

San Onofre and Frank Rogan Complete.

WNP-2 events.

6) Analyses Bechtel Complete.

Westinghouse

7) Conclusions. Frank Rogan Complete.

8) Corrective action. Frank Rogan Complete.

9) Monitoring program. Jack Seibel Complete.

b. Attachment B - Paul Yundt Complete.

Oversight Committee See Item F.2.

Report.

3. Submit Bechtel analyses Scott Dauer Complete.

and third party review PGE letter of 7/27/87.

to h7C.

I. Procedures.

-1. Revise Emergency Dave Modecn Closed.

Operating Procedures See CTI. Item 20%3. I Mike }ioy to modify noxiliary feedwater operation.

I. Page 13 nf 13

!'AIN FEEDWATER I ESTRAINT FAILt1RE A CT I_O N_ P ;>,N Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

2. Determine need for test .'.

Pete Morton Closed. See CTL Item 20943.

to periodically verify l position of CV 3004s.

3. Revice OI P.-2 and COI 2 Don Pearson Closed Sac CT: Item 20944.

to set CV 3004 valves at Rich Russell I throttle position when setting up for auto-start.

SAB/kal 1343P.7R7 1

I 1

,e

• ENGil;LI.h'I!!G r. iHDINATORS: Rod,e:

t Wehage (E039)

Ted Pushnell (8061)

Pete P.orton ( 191 <. - 2 35 )

Mark liaficann (3253) l t

Lead Percon Support Person I. Mark Hoffmann Brian Fritz, Don Schumacher II. Gary Van Bladeren Marl Bohlander III. Rodger Wehage Juff Wheeler IV. Ted Buchnell Mike Candert V. Pete Norton Bob Rupe VI. Mark Hof f runn 1 Rodger 4'chage 1

Action Plan Maintenance: Scott Bauer (8108)

Lead Person 1

• Prinary responsibility for all activities.

i l

• Approve any work on the equipment and/or syctem.

) Eu1To r t .Pe r c op l

Assembles report. Collects input from all action parties. perfoms ther tasks ar. ascigned by lead person.

Dates in the action plans are target dates, l

i 1

l l

SAB/rc H?A8C 1

l l

,co. '

1. <

MAILEEEDWAIfRllflRG_RESJRA1RI 1

I I l

CALCULATION Of LOAD REQUIRED FOR OBSERVED FAILURE TO SR-8 l l

l DYNAMIC LOADING ANALYSIS FOR THE "B" FEEDWATER LINE l A. T R A f? 51 E N T LINE STRESSES WITH SR-8 INTACT .

B. TRAr?SIENT LINE STRESSES W11H SR-8 FAILED j C AL CUL A110'.; or EFFECT ON SR-8 DUE 10 INTEGRATED LEAK RATF 'EST (LATER) l STRESS ANALYSIS Of "A" FEEDWATER LINE l

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$ AC1 349 APP. B N 1

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ENCLOSURE 1

%' c ,

., MEMORANDUM TO: R. E. Fowler TEB-55 -87M FROM: T.-E. Bushnell_ - -

DATE: June 3, 1987

SUBJECT:

TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT ..

Main.Feedwater Restraint Failure Action Plan Following is the presently available information which was .

cequested pursuant to tne subject action plan.

i TEB/SGH/KJM/mc '

8368" Attachment '

i.

c: T. D. Walt A. N. Rollet C. P. Yundt  ;

C. A. Olmstead  !

i D. W. Cockfield '

F. R. Rogan - Pacific R. W. Fosse - Bechtel ,

l 9

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,,,I

TEB- 55 -87M June 3, 1987 Page 2 Item A.1.a.1 An evaluation of the restraint installation is provided following the. description of the as-found condition of the main feedwater EBB-3-1 Seismic Restraint SR-8 (SR-8).

J. tem A.l.c Upon' inspection of SR-8 after disassembly, the following conditions were identified (see attached cketch of design configuration, Attachment 1):

The concrete under the base plates of the W4 x 13 (W4) diagonal and the W6 x 20 (W6) vertical members was broken out in an area in plan dimensions of approximately 33-in, east-west by 24-in.

north-south. The average depth of the failure surface was approximately 1/4 to 1/2 in along the outside edges of the case places increasing to approximately 2-5/3 in, deep under the W6 base plate and 3-7/8 in. deep under the W4 base plate.

A large section of irregular-shaped concrete was found pulled out under the front half of the base plate of the W4 diagonal.

The section measured 12 in. in width (north-south), 20 in. in length, and was a maximum of 3-7/8 in. deep. The shells of the front two anchor bolts (5/8-in.-diameter Phillips Redhead-typa anchor bolts) under the W4 diagonal base plate were still engaged in the front third of this concrete section which shows conclusively that the concrete failed as opposed to shell pullout. Due to the conical shape of the failed concrete section and the relatively clean fracture surface of the area under the section (ie, no apparent crushing or grinding) it appears the concrete section failed due to tension and shear loads imparted from the W4 diagonal to its base plate.

The broken concrete under the base plate of the W6 vertical membet was in smaller pieces than what was found under the W4 diagonal member base plate. There appears to have been some crushing of the concrete under the W6 base plate indicating that the failure was most likely caused by shear and -

compression loads. The southwest anchor bolt (right front bolt of W6 base plate in plan) remained anchored below the failure surface of the concrete. The anchor bolt had loosened.

laterally but could not be removed by hand-applied tensile force. This is evidence that this anchor bolt did not experience tensile loads sufficient to cause failure in a tensile concrete cone failure mode or in a shell tensile pullout mode. .

The writer is led to believe that, based on the evidence summarized above, the sense of load causing the failure in SR-8 was, either initially or as a result of cyclic progression,

. s .

TEB- 55 -87M June 3, 1987 Page 3 tension in the strut assembly which produced combined compression and shear on the W6 vertical member base plate and.

combined tension and shear on the W4 diagonal member base plate. Restraint SR-8 may, however, also experience significant loads in a sense of compression on the strut assembly. Load reversals should not, in this section of main feedwater line, be unexpected if initiated by a transient condition.

The structural steel assembly of SR-8 was visually inspected.

. There was no evidence of damage to welds or indication of permanent deflection in W6 ot W4 members or their base plates.

There'was possible indication (paint scraping) that the pin had come in contact with the pin bracket plate, but with no clearly definable sense of load magnitude or direction.

Further nondestructive examinations are to be performed on SR-8 i assembly welds.

Jtem A.1.a.1 From results of the inspections, the anchorage installation of SR-8 appears to have been in accordance with the design intent. The anchot bolt shells were found to be set at the 1

• proper depth, as best as could be determined, per l

. manufacturer's installation standards. The anchor bolts obviously developed the concrete shear cone type failure  !

l mechanism without premature pullout as evidenced by the observed concrete failure surfaces and configurations. This type of concrete shear cone failure mechanism is a common mode

" of ultimate load development for anchor bolts of this type and is provided for in establishment of design allowed loads, i The presence of base plate leveling nuts on the anchoc bolts below the base plates is not considered getmane in the SR-8 installation. Anchot bolt shells of the type used are set by impact which expands the plug on the bottom of the shell causing shell engagement and development with the conctete.

Leveling nuts would not inhibit the shell development.

l Proper engagement of expansion-type anchors, which are set by

expanding a sleeve at the end of the bolt by use of bolt torque, would be affected by the use of base plate levaling 1 nuts, but as explained above, that is not the case in the SR-8 anchorage.

In summary, the SR-S anchorage was concluded to be installed in accordance with the design intent.

e, 1

. s .

TEB- 55 -87M June 3, 1987 Page 4 Item A.1.d Upon inspection of Pipe Whip Restraint 54.4 for EBB-3-1, the following conditions were observed:

At first observation it appeared that there was an approximate 1/16-in. gap between the base plate and the grout at the bottom of the upper whip restraint base plate. A similar gap appeared i between the grout and the concrete at the top of this same base plate. There was no evidence of damage to the anchor bolts, welds, base plate, or structural steel members. There was no evidence of damage to the whip restraint bottom base plate, grout, welds, or anchor bolt's.

The grout chamfer was removed around the perimeter of the upper whip restraint base plate. It was evident that the chamfer had  ;

been added recently and, therefore, would not be a reliable indicator of structural performance of the costraint.

A portion of the original grout under the outside edge of the upper base plate was removed for closer inspection. Two flat bar steel shims were located behind the top and bottom of the base plate and were tight up against the concrete and base plate. A feeler gauge was inserted around the parimeter of the ,

base plate and the deepest penetration parallel to the base plate found was 2-3/4 in. Two layers of thin, brittle, and corroded metal sheets were found between the upper base plate  ;

and the original grout.

From these observations it was concluded that the gaps first observed were from the installation and shrinkage of the grout placements, and possibly from deterioration of the metal sheet  ;

I

> 1ayers.

Further examinations were performed of the area around the i I

upper base plate following additional grout removal and removal of damaged concrete around SR-8. Hairline-sized cracks were discovered on the concrete ledge directly behind the upper base plate of Restraint 54.4. Sounding of the concrete in the general area indicated a looseness of the concrete directly J behind the upper base plate measuring approximately 30 in, along the length of the ledge by 15 in, perpendicularly into ,

the ledge by 8 in. deep. The depth of this zone extended to  !

the approximate centerline of the 2-in.-diameter rock anchors I of the upper base plate.

) i l

TEB- 55 -87M (

June 3, 1987 l Page 5 l

Item A.2.a2 Of the six (6) concrete anchor bolts (1-in.-diameter wedge-type) in the base plate of Support EB8-3-1-SR-4, one (1) was found to have evidence of lifting approximately 1/16 i n.

No other evidence of support damage or failure was found, and the bolt was able to be retorqued to design values. This ,

support was reinstalled to its present configuration in 1979, using the plant installation. standards current at' that time.

This required inspections of anchor bolt i'nstallation to ensure proper installation. Due to the fact that the gap was approximately 1/16 in, and the gap was found on only one of the six anchor bolts, it is possible that the dynamic load from a feedwater line water hammer or transient jolted the support, l causing slippage of this anchor. At this point, the anchor probably took hold and performed its function.

Since the anchor bolt could be retorqued. and there were no indications of a concrete cone pullout, the retorquing of the bolt reestablished the design capacity of the support.

However, it is recommended that the support be reinspected -

during future refueling outages to verify its integrity. l l, . Item A.3.a_1--

Feedwater Support EBD-6-2-SR-17, 71-ft Elevation in Main Steam Support Structure (MSSS).

l Inspections of this support revealed the following: The top two anchor bolts were out from the base plate approximately 1/8 in. While the bottom left anchor bolt was no longer snug.

The pipe clamp was rotated such that the centerline of the clamp at the strut was 1-1/4 in, below the centerline of the j pipe. The strut was bound up tight at the clamp and painting I on the pipe and clamp showed that the clamp had not moved since  !

the painting was completed. The paint between the base paint and the wall had cracked, showing that the base plate had moved away from the wall.

The preliminary indication is that the probable cause for the as-found condition (more investigation is being performed as of June 4, 1987) is as follows:

The vertical movement of the pipe at this location is ,

i approximately 3/4 in. With the clamp rotated and the strut locked tight (ir. the cold condition), a vertical load and l moment will be imparted into the strut at the clamp (as well as '

the thermal tensile load). This vertical load and moment in the strut will cause a moment in the base plate due to the

! eccentricity of the pin from the base plate. Thia would in 1

,. l TEB- 55 -87M ~

June 3, 1987 Page 6 turn induce extra tensile forces in the top two bolts causing them to. slip. The lower bolt was probably pried loose at this point. With the thermal load off the pipe, the base plate  :

would-be pushed back to the wall.

Since the paint on the clamp indicates that it has been rotated for some time. The clamp was probably either installed that i way or was rotated by someone climbing on it when the pipe was cold and set in its position when the pipe heated up.

After our further investigation has been completed, the clamp position will be corrected and the support repaired to meet I design loads.

Item B.2 Following is a summary of the analysis performed in responce to ,

tne request Cor an initial evaluation of the range of loads i that could have caused the observed failure in Restraint SR-8.

First, it is important to state that the analysis was based on l static load calculations, not dynamic loads and effects. l Although the loading condition causing failure of SR-8 is now believed to have been dynamic in nature, rational translations  ;

between static and dynamic load regimes are available. These translations are described further in this response.

I Until noted otherwise, the following discussions are based on static principles. l

1. Significance of sense (strut assembly tension or

compression) of failure load.

' 1 As described in the response to item A.1.c. the evidence ,

indicates that the SR-8 anchor bolts were adequately i I

developed to cause, primarily, a tension failure mode in  :

the concrete due to vertical reactions at the base plates.

Vertical equilibrium. static or dynamic, must be maintained (ie, equal and opposite vertical teactions at the W6 and W4 -

member base plates), and the failure load should be essentially the same for either tension or compression in i- the strut assembly. Thus, within the context of other i analytical considerations used and described herein, the sense of load (tension or compression in the strut 4 assembly) which resulted in the anchorage failure of SR-8 should~not significantly affect the overall conclusions.

I i

I l,

= . .- ._ -

q l

l . TEB- 55 -87M l

! June 3, 1987 ,

l Page17 .

i l l

L 2. Distribution of horizontal load imparted by the strut -!

assembly to members of SR-8. i l  ;

l Restraint SR-8 was designed to resist loads transmitted by i the feedwater line through the' strut assembly in a l l horizont.a1 direction. When the strut load is imparted to  !

l

-the SR-8 framing, two bounding case load paths are '

possible: (a)'considering effectively complete rotational  ;

l resistance at the welded interface of the W6 vertical and i W4 diagonal members (likely), and at the member base f plates, and (b) considering effectively no rotational  :

resistance at these locations. In case (a), calculations l demonstrate that 92 percent of the horizontal - load is resisted by the W4 diagonal, and in case (b), 100 percent ,

of the horizontal load is resisted by the W4 diagonal. For i purposes of this evaluation, the difference is by no means i

significant.

3. Concrete Strength ,

The actual versus der..ign concrete strength, which is a -

parameter in anchor bolt development, was of necessity due i i to lack of any other specific data, treated by judgment.

l the design concrete strength (measured in terms of 28-day ,

ultimate compressive strength) was 5,000 psi. Concrete 1 l strength genecally, but not always, increases with age.- ,

For these caleclations, a concrete strength of 5,000 psi was consiuered reasonable, ,

The possiele variations in concrete strength should not also result in intolerable differences in conclusions cince l both concrete and anchor bolt strength parameters are a i square-toot function of the concrete compressive stren'gth.

4. Effects of anchot bolt performance with respect to sheat-tension interaction and base plate flexibility: {

a. Shear-tension interaction considerations - The effects i of combined sheat and tension on the ultimate failure i l load capacity of an anchor bolt of the type ntudied l are, at best, unclear to the writer. Tests (Hanford l and others) have shown that sacar in combination with I tension could contribute to premature anchor bolt tensile failure. The interpretive difficulty is that the test data failure mode (anchor bolt shear pull-out or bolt shear versus concrete failure cone development) l

+

TEC- 55 -87M June 3, 1987 Page 8 de'es not seem to lead to any clear conclusion regarding capacities at conceete failure, which is the case of present interest.

b. Base plate flexibility considerations:

Because the SR-8 framing memoers are welded to their base plates and ara of such dimension (particularly the W4 diagonal) as to effectively stiffen the base plate, potential base plate flexibility is not considered to be a significant contribution to lower bound failure of the anchor bolts due to base plate prying action.

5. Static Failure Load Evaluation As stated previously, the static failure load evaluation was based on a linear elastic analysis. The statically appi'ed strut load predicted to cause ancnorage failura was determined based on the anchorage configurations (base I plate and anchor bolt geometrics), bolt type and embedment, estimated concrete strength, and the type of failure observed (concrete cone-type failure). Considering the above, anchor bolt failure loads wbre (1) taken from applicable industry test data (Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory) and (b) theoretically derived from failure load models (which are also based on test data) taken from American Concrete Institute (ACI) Standard 349, Appendix B. By both methods used and some variations in assumptions considered reasonable, the statix strut failure load was calculated to be on the order of 40,000 lbs,

6. Dynamic Effects As is well known, the effect of a dynamic load can be translated to an equivalent static load to allow a static failure analysis if the character of the dynamic load can be estimated or bounded. Use of a dynamic load factor (DLF) is a convenient means to perform this type of translation. The DLF is simply the factor by which the peak value of a dynamic load is multiplied to de : ermine the static load which produces the same effect. For an impulsive load, the DLF can vary between 1,0 and 2.0, ie, for a DLF of 2.0, the peak value of an impulsive load causing failure of SR-8 could have been as low as 20,000 lb.

As another example, although simplistic, if tTM synamic load were te have resulted in a system resona' andition of sinusoidal character, for low system dampi (for example, use 5 percent), as few as five resonant cycles could have resulted in a DLP on the order of 8.

i.

TEB- 55 -87M -

June 3, 1987  !

Page 9 In summary, the static equivalent strut assembly load resulting in SR-8 anchorage failure could have been on the order of 40,000 lb. If the load causing failure were dynamic in character, which is believed toEbe the case, the value could have been much less than 40,000 lb.

7. Pre-existant Anc..orage Degradation As is obvious, a pre-existing weakened condition in the SR-8 anchorage could have a. dramatic effect of the failure load. At present, there is no clear evidence known to the Writer which would indicate that the SR-8 anchorage was or was not degraded prior to failure load application.

Ltem C.1.a Repal:s to SR-8 are presently being performed. The repair dasign concept was to provide a new anchorage system which would develop the capacity of the W6 and W4, welds, etc. This i design capacity for SR-8 repaired, with normal factors of l safety included, is greater than 40,000 lb. If desired, a final capacity calculation can be performed when SR-8 as-built '

information is received.

Please advise of any questions you may have concerning this memo.

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ENCLOSURE 2 FEEDWATER RESTRAINT DAMAGE CHRONOLOGY On May 19, 1987, damage to a seismic restraint (EBB-3-1-SR8) was discovered by PGE on the feedwater line to the "B" steam generator. The anchor bolts for the knee brace restraint had been pulled out of the concrete floor.

On May 22, an engineer from Nuclear Plant Engineering examined the restraint damage and commenced an investigation to determine the cause of tho failure.

On May 23, walkdowns were completed of all Containmant piping penetrations to the second support from the Containment wall both inside and outside of Containment. Additionally, the failed restraint was disassembled and further examined on this date.

During the week of May 24, a urstematic evaluation of the "A" and "B" feedwater lines was performed. The evaluation included modeling of the "B" feedwater line by Bechtel in order to perform dynamic analyses fut root cause identification. Additionally, nondestructive examinations are being Performed on all feedwater lines to identify potential damage to these lines.

To date, the following discrepancies have been observed:

. "B" feedwater line Restraint SR-8 anchor bolts pulled out of floor.

. "B" feedwater line pipe whip restraint has minor grout damage at top support.

. "B" feedwater line snubber (SS-7) visual inspection discrepancy.

. Surface examination has revealed several lineal indications in "B" feed-water line inside containment.

. Abnormal buildup observed inside of pipe on radiographs of "B" feedwater line in vicinity of pipe whip restraint (54.4).

. "A" feedwater line Restraint SR-4 under compressive load indicating perma- ,

nent set in piping.

l

. Loose anchor nut observed on SR-4.

. Crack observed in 45-degree elbow in "A" feedwater line.

. Restraint SR-17 on "D" feedwater line outside Containment appears to bave gaps between base plate and anchor bolt heads, and strut is bound tightly in the clamp.

Repairs have been completed to SR-8, SR-17, SS-3 and SS-7. An evaluation of I the event has been completed and an engineering report has been issued. l Bechtel has performed analyses to size the steam bubble collapse required to cause the observed impact on SR-8. Additionally, the auxiliary feedwater control valves will be throttled to prevent excessive flow to the steam generators when the pumps auto start. The throttle position is being deter- 1 mined by the performance of TPT-213. Following the completion of TPT-213, changes to the Emergency Operating Procedures to limit the auxiliary feed-water flow to the oteam generator to prevent steam bubble formation will be completed.

SAB/kal/1344p.587 1

+

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~

Page 1 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results l

A. Inspection.

1. "B" Feedwater Line.

l

a. Inspect as-is condition Gil Koerger Complete. Restraint installation was of failed seismic determined to be satisfactory.

restraint SR-8 on "B" feed line.

1) Evaluate restraint Ted Bushnell Complete.

Insf.allation.

I

b. Inspect pipe whip Gil Koerger Complete.

restraint (54.4) in Kevin Marshall as-found condition.

c. Inspect failed seismic Kevin Marshall Complete.

i restraint (SR-8) fol- '

lowing disasaembly.

d. Perform destructive Kevin Marshall Complete. No clearance between base examination of pipe plate and shias. Apparent i whip restra.5nt upper damage to pipe whip restraint i anchorage (ie, remove upper anchorage is minor. -

grout and inspect clearance between base .

plate and shims).

e. Inspect pipe hangers Cil Koerger Complete. All snubbers bench tested. -

and supports. Steve Chalk

Page 2 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results i

1) Evaluate Snubber Cil Koerger Complete. Snubber functionally tested SS-7 visual inspec- satisfactorily. NCAR written a tion discrepancy. 5/29 because inservice inspec-tion of this snubber did not identify discrepancy (resolu-tion not necessary for feedwater restraint issue).

f. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete. Several lineal indications nation of line from Quality Control observed.

Containment penetration to fourth elbow.

1) Perform volu- Don Wheeler Complete. Radiographs were clear, j-metric examination Quality Control of selocted indications.

g. Perform volumetric Don Wheeler Complete. Radiographs are clear.

examination of welds Quality Control at flued head penetra- ,

tion and first and second elbows inside ',

Containment.

f-

h. Perform surface and Don Wheeler Complete. Radiographs are clear. Abnormal +

volumetric examination Quality Ccntrol buildup on inside pipe surface of feed line where determined to be normal sludge. ,

brackets for pipe whip restraint bumper con-tact pipe.

Page 3 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

1) Perform ultrasonic Bill Dickinson Complete.

measurement of wall NPE thickness of first three elbows inside containment.

1. Perform volumetric Bill Dickinson Complete. Possible indication identified examination of feed- NPE on weld. Refer to Action water to steam genera- Plan VI.

tor nozzle.

1) Evaluate indication Arlen Wogen Closed. Refer to Action Plan VI.

on B" nozzle weld.

J. Perform inspection of Al Cohlmeyer Complete. Results acceptable.

main feed check valve. Don Schumacher

k. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Co71ete. No problems noted.

nations of selected welds outside Containment. 4

)  !

1. Perform visual examina- Jeff Duncan Complete. No abnormalities noted.

ation of feed ring and Alex Krawchu': -

J-tubes. -

2. "A" Feedwater Line.

a. Inspect pipe hangers Gil Koerger Complete. SR-4 found loaded with a loose i and supports. nut on one anchor bolt.

Page 4 of 13 -

I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comuments/Results

1) Evaluate load on Cil Koerger Complete. Restraint was in compression. ,

SR-4. When restraint removed, pipe ,

moved 33 mils toward restraint.

Approximate compression load on strut of 1200 lbs prior to release.

2) Evaluate loose nut Kevin Marshall Complete.

on an' hor bolt on NPE SR-4.

b. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete. Several indications observed.

nation of line from Quality Control One indication observed in containment penetration 45' elbow weld.

to fourth elbcw.

1) Perform volumet- Don Wheeler Complete. Minor surface indication only.

ric examination Quality Control of indication in 45' elbow and Indications.

~

2) Perform ultrasonic Bill Dickinson Contplete.

wall thickness NPE  ;-

measurements of '

first three elbows ,

inside Containment. i

c. Perform volumetric Bill Dickinson Complete. Examination results were satis- ,

examination of feed- NPE factory. Refer to Action Plan.

water to steam genera- ,

tor nozzle.

Page 5 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comuments/Results

d. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete. No problems found.

nations of selected welds outside Containn-nt.

e. Inspect main feed Al Cohlmeyer Complete. Results acceptable.

check valve. Don Schumacher -

3. "C" and "D' Feedwater Lines.

a. Inspect pipe hangers Alex Krawchuk Cosiplete. On SR-17 there were gaps between and supports. Craig Dirkson the heads of three anchor bolts and the base plate. SR-17 strut tightly bound in clamp.

1) Evaluate gaps Ted Bushnell Complete. Not related to SR-8 failure.

between anchor bolt NPE ,

heads and base plate for SR-17.

2) Evaluate SR-17 Cil Koerger Complete. Resolution to be included in i strut condition. NCR disposition for Item 3.a.l. ,

b. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete.

nation of welds. Quality Control  ;

c. Perform volumetric Bill Dickinson Closed. Indication identified on examination of feed- NPE "D" steam generator nozzle-to-water to steam genera- reducer weld. Refer to <

tor nozzles. Action Plan VI.

1) Evaluate indication Arlen Wogen Closed. Refer to Action Plan VI.

On "D" nozzle weld.

_ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ ___._ _ _ . . _ __ . . __ _ .. _ =

Page 6 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

d. Perform surface exami- Don Wheeler Complete. No problems noted. k nations on selected I welds outelde Containment.

e. Inspect main feed check Al Cohlmeyer Complete. Results satisfactory.

valves. Don Schumacher

4. Other Inspections.

l

a. Inspect first two sup- Brian Fritz Complete. No discrepancies noted.

ports inside and out- NPE side of Containment for

all piping systems.

b. Repeat above inspection Brian Fritz Complete. l following heatup. NPE l

ii c. Develop inspection plan Don Schumacher/ Complete. Results satisfactory.

] and inspect aux 111ary Mainter.ance feedwater check valves.

1 .

B. Evaluation / Analysis. i t

l 1. Develop list of significant Don Schumacher Complete. ',

operating transients Dan Seely j experienced by the feed- Frank Rogan ,

water lines over the last i year and prior to the November 1979 outage.

i

- . =- . - - - - _ _ _ _ - -__ _ _ . _ _ - . - - - - ..

Page 7 of 13 E I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE i ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987

,i Action Action Party Status Comunents/Results f II

• 2. Calculate load required to Ted Bushnell Complete. Static load required to damage it impart observed failure NPE SR-8 determined to be 40 kips.  !!

to SR-8. Calculation (TC-450) reviewed {!

by Bechtel. Provided to NRC i) 6/5. 'l

• 3. Prepare model for "B" line Bechtel Complete. Initial analysis of a 100 psig and perform dynamic loading transient with a ramp of analysis. 1 millisecond complete. Load at SR-8 determined to be 6.5 kips.

a. Determine stresses on Bechtel Complete. To identify adequacy of system line from transients supports and potential causes.

(ranging from normal to abnormal) on system with SR-8 intact.

I.

b. Determine stresses on Bechtel Complete. To identify potential system line from transients with SR-8 failed, damage while SR-8 was non-functional.

[

i; o

• 4. Use hydraulic model for "B" line to perform Bechtel conplete. I l

j, bounding analysis.  ;;

i-

85. Calculate the effect on Brian Fritz Complete. Load determined to be 1.6 kips I; SR-8 from performance of NPE at SR-8.  !;

an integrated leak rate I.

test.

• Analyses provided to NRR.

1

_ - .__ . - _ _= _ . - _ . .

4 o. .

~

i

o Page 8 of 13 l I. MAIN FEEDWATEM RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of

September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Cn-mants/Results

6. Determine adequacy of sup- Don Schumacher Complete. Support scheme is satisfactory. l Port scheme for feedwater NPE - Civil and [

lines. Mechanical _

Bechtel .,

'l

• 7. Review the "A" feedwater Bechtel Complete.  !

line stress analysis with l

respect to present as-built conditions. i

8. Calculate deflection of Brian Fritz Complete. Deflection upwards of approxi- I line going from full to NPE mately 2 inches. i empty.

9. Westinghouse to provide Westinghouse Complete. List provided to Eechtel 6/3.

list of events and bounding case to result in forces needed to damage SR-8.

10. Determine if modifications Frank Rogan Complete. Modifications were considered ,

to the "B" line were con- but were determined to be l sidered when the "A" line unnecessary.  ;

restraint failed in 1979.

• e

11. Compare Trojan design and Mike Malmros Complete.  !'

event to San Onofre water hasuner event.  !

l  !

12. Evaluate WNP-2 thermal Mike Malmros Complete.  !

stratification issue for applicability to Trojan. 2 i

}

• Analyses provided to NRR.

9 4

w . , - -,-,,,-.-e- ,,, m-.-- .~,....-...,_e.. , - . - - - . - - . , . - .

c1. - - , . . ~< r- _.r ._ . . . .-- , , - , , . - .---.mo- ,m- . ,,_ __- _ ._ _ _ _ . ____s

~

l e l Page 9 of 13 l I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Cosunents/Results C. Repairs / Modifications.

1. Modify / repair supports. NPE Complete. Restoring SR-8 to original configuration with additional margin.

a. SR-8. Ted Bushnell Complete.

2. Remove indication in 45* Al Cohlmeyer Complete. No indication on radiograph.

elbow in "A" feedwater line.

a. Verify wall thickness Al Cohlmeyer Complete. Wall thickness satisfactory, following conditioning.

3. Orde pipe clamps and a Brian Fritz Complete. Purchase Requisition Q24-1912 variety of struts. NPE (5/30/87).

4 Identify locations for Frank Rogan Complete. No new hangers / supports additional restraints and Bechtel required.

provide preliminary design, if necessary.

t

5. Replace SR-17 ("D" line). Don Schumacher/ Complete.

Maintenance

6. Repair anchors on SS-3 Don Schumacher/ Complete.

("A" line) and SS-1 Maintenance

("B" line).

_ _ _ - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . -__ -- _ _ _ . +, e--a e- v - , g

Ic e Page 10 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comuments/Results D. Post-Startup Test / Inspection.

1. Prepare post-startup Jack Selbel Complete. TPT-208. Instrumentation l monitoring / test program. Installed.

I

2. Determine monitoring Jack Selbel Complete. Will be part of procedure for requirements during D.1 above. Procedure will operation. Include actions to be taken for ,

indications on monitoring l equipment. 1 l

3. Evaluate monitorir.g/ testing Bob Fowler Closed. Post-startup issue. Will be I requirements in future based on results of observations years. this cycle. To be tracked by CTL Item 20674.

1

4. Prepare test procedure to Bill Sherwood Complete. TPT 213.  !

establish throttle setting Jay Fischer for CV 3004 valves.

E. Long-Tern Evaluation.

i

1. Determine if evaluatlan of Rodger Wehage Complete. Main feed support scheme is I support scheme for other BPE adequate. See Item B.6.

systems is necessary if main feed system support scheme is deterinined to be inadequate.-

l

Page 11 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comuments/Results F. Independent Evaluation.

1. Perform third party review Impell Corporation Complete.

of 2ngineering activities.

2. Form oversight committee Paul Yundt Complete. Evaluation complete.

to evaluate event.

G. Feedwater Line Reducer to Closed. See Action Plan VI.

Steam Generator Nozzle Indication.

H. Report.

1. Prepare letter to NRC Scott Bauer Complete.

providing requested analyses.

2. Prepare letter to NRC

{ Region V.

a. Attachment A - Frank Rogan Complete.

PCE Report.

1) Introduction. Frank Rogan Complete.

2) Description of Frrank Rogan Complete.

feedwater system.

3) Description of Frank Rogan Complete. 4 failure.  ;

'4 k

o Page 12 of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

4) Action plcn. Frank Rogan Complete.

f f

- Inspection plans  :

and results.  !

5) Industry Mike Malmros complete. I expetlence, i

• San Onofre and Frank Rogan Complete.

WNP-2 events.

f j

6) Analyses Bechtel Complete.  ;

Westinghouse

7) Conclusions. Frank Rogan Complete.

8) Corrective action. Frank Rogan Complete. '

9) Monitoring program. Jack Selbel Complete.

b. Attachment B - Paul Yondt Complete. See Item F.2.

Oversight Conunittee Report. .

3. Submit Bechtel analyses Scott Bauer Complete. PCE letter of 7/27/87.

and third party review I to NRC.

I. Procedures.

1. Revise Emergency Dave Modeen Closed. See CTL Item 20953. l .

Operating Procedures Mike Hoy to modify auxillary feedwater operation.

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• E' 13 Of 13 I. MAIN FEEDWATER RESTRAINT FAILURE ACTION PLAN Updated as of: September 11, 1987 Action Action Party Status Comments /Results

2. Determine need for test Pete Norton Closed. See CTL Item 20943. l to periodically verify position of CV 3004s.

3. Revise OI 8-2 and GOI 2 Don Pearson Closed. See CTL Item 20944.

to set CV 3004 valves at Rich Russell throttle position when setting up for auto-start.

SAB/kal 1343P.787 l

1 l

-. ~ . . .

..,.~s ENGINEERING COORDINATORS: Rodger Wehage (8039)

Ted Bushnell (8061)

Pete Morton (1914-235)

Mark Hoffmann (3253)

Lead Person Support Person I. Mark Hoffmann Brian Fritz, Don Schumacher II. Gary Van Bladeren Karl Bohlander

) III. Rodger Wehage Jeff Wheeler 4 IV. Ted Burhnell Mike Gandert V. Pete Morton Bob Rupe VI. Mark Hoffmann Rodger Wehage Action Plan Maintenance: ScottBaber(8108)

Lead Person

• Primary responsibility for all activities.

• Approvo any work on the equipment and/or system.

Support Person Assembles report. Collects input from all action parties. Performs other tasks as assigned by lead person.

Dates in the action plans are target dates.

SAB/rc 8248C

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• ENCLOSURE 3 ,

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l MAIN FEEDWATER PIPING RESTRAINT I -

4 CALCULATION OF LOAD REQUIRED FOR OBSERVED FAILURE TO SR-8 l DYNAMIC LOADING ANALYSIS FOR THE "B" FEEDWATER LINE i

! A. TRANSIENT LINE STRES$5S WITH SR-8 INTACT .

B. TRANSIENT LINE STRESSES WITH SR-8 FAILED l CALCULATION OF EFFECT ON SR-8 DUE TO INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST (LATER)  ;

'i STRESS ANALYSIS OF "A" FEEDWATER LIiE I

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