IR 05000272/1985026

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Insp Repts 50-272/85-26 & 50-311/85-28 on 851101-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Including Followup on Outstanding Insp Items,Operational Safety Verification & Maint Observations
ML18092A931
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 12/16/1985
From: Limroth D, Norrholm L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18092A928 List:
References
50-272-85-26, 50-311-85-28, NUDOCS 8512230258
Download: ML18092A931 (9)


Text

U. S. mJCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272/85-26 Report No /85-28 50-272 Docket No DPR-70 License No DPR-75 Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 050272-851006 050272-851122 050311-851006 Facility Name:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:

November 1, 1985 - November 30, 1985 Inspectors:

T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector R. W. Borchardt, Resident Inspector Reviewed by:

Approved by:

W. Oliveira, Reactor Engineer B. M. Hillman, Reactor Engineer ol~ct Engineer Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, DRP CkJL Chief, Reactor Projects Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:

/,2./f.? *85 date Inspections on November 1, 1985 - November 30, 1985 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/85-26 and 50-311/85-28)

Areas Inspected:

Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, ESF system walkdown, review of special reports, licensee event followup, International Atomic Energy Agency inspec-tions, and license examination The inspection involved 159 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector *

Results: No violations were identified in this repor PDR ADOCK 05000272 G

PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspec-tion activit.

Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Violations (50-272/84-15-02, 50-311/84-15-05, and 50-311/84~16-0l).

These violations were issued for inadequate training and misinterpretation of the Master Equipment List (MEL) in the process of classifying safety related components for maintenanc The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions which included retraining of engineers and more defini-tively identifying safety related equipment on the ME These items are considered close (Closed) Violation (50-311/84-15-01).

This violation was issued because procedural guidance had not been issued to the operators for the loss of a vital bus and corrective actions were not take The inspector has re-viewed the licensee's response to this violation and has reviewed the cor-rective actions and the procedure issued by operations that delineates the operators' actions in the event of a loss of a vital bu The inspector considers this item close (Closed) Violation (50-311/84-27-02).

Inspector Follow Item (50-311/

84-27-01).

Both of these open items were related to an event which led to a failure to follow a procedure (OP II-4.3.1) and to verify proper safety injection system line-u The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and has verified that corrective action has been taken to preclude the events recurrenc The procedure had been found inadequate and has been reviewed and revise The inspector ~onsiders this item close (Closed) Open Item (50-272/84-40-02).

Quality assurance (QA) audits of the transportation program were weak and lacking in technical dept The 1 i censee has deve 1 oped a new and separate annua 1 "-a_udi t area for the Rad-waste Program that includes the transportation progra An audit was conducted in June 1985 which addressed the criteria in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A and 10 CFR 71, subpart H QA Programs, and the implementation of 10 CFR 61 regulations discussed by the inspecto The next audit is scheduled in June 198 This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/83-20-01).

Audits of transportation package did not include applicable criteri This item was closed by 50-272/

84-40-0 (Closed) Open Item (272/84-19-01, 50-311/84-19-01).

Licensee was requested to provide an evaluation of the effects of steam venting on cable trays.

The licensees' Manager - Nuclear Systems Engineering memorandum of

  • August 8, 1984 advised the Manager of Nuclear Licensing and Regulation that their safety evaluation (S-C-G210-MSE-268) concludes there are no safety concerns associated with this plant transien The cable is quali-fied for two days of operation at 300 degrees fahrenheit and steam venting will not exceed these requirement The cable was also inspecte There was no physical damage as a result of this plant transien This item is close (Closed) Open Item (272/84-07-01; 311/84-07-01).

QA/QC monitoring of Opera-tional Technical Specification (TS) surveillances is conducted without any detailed instructions or mechanism in place that ensures coverage of TS surveillances over a given time perio An instruction, QA 217, Revision 0, Surveillance of Technical Specification Surveillances, describing the mechanism for monitoring the operation TS surveillances was developed in April 198 QA does monthly surveillances of scheduled TS action The checklists required in QA 217 for monthly surveillances provide guidance in the selection of TS actions to assure all surveillances are covered over a given tim QA Supervision continually reviews the implementation of QA 217 and will be computerizing this monitoring effort in the near futur This item is close (Closed) Violation (272/84-16-01 and 311/84-16-01).

Management failure to take adequate measures to correct discrepancies in the Master Equipment Lis The above violations identified the inspector 1 s concern with the adequacy of the licensee 1 s program for developing, updating, and utilizing the ME The MEL is used to make classifications of equipment and systems which contain safety-related component The inspector reviewed the licensee 1 s responses dated July 13, 1984, August 9, 1984 and September 21, 1984 and performed a spot-check to verify that the licensee 1 s commitments were being mad In addition, the inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Audit S-84-30 which was conducted from November 28 through December 14, 198 Although a few minor discrepancies were found in the use of the MEL the program was found to be adequat The licensee recognizes the fact that the MEL is a living document that re-quires frequent updatin In an effort to keep the MEL as current as pos-sible the licensee has changed from a biannual reissue to a monthly page change with a complete reissue on a biannual basi Continual management attention is warranted in this area to prevent the misclassification of safety-related wor The inspector has no further questions at this tim.

Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators* Logs Senior Shift Supervisor 1 s (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)

Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REP)

Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log

3.2 The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).

During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, techni-cians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administra-tive Procedure On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the fol-lowing areas:

Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LCOs directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio On a weekly basis, the inspectors confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:

Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the cor-rect positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrica-tion, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operat-ing conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operability.

  • On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:

Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gas-eous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were prop-erly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:

The inspectors selected phases of the units' operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulation The inspectors determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not consti-tute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:

During the inspector's routine review of the Jumper and Lifted Lead Log a number of discrepancies were identifie When the inspector discussed these discrepancies with the licensee he was* informed that a detailed review of the use of jumpers and lifted leads throughout the plant was already in progres At the completion of the licensee's study the inspector will review the findings and correc-tive actions as part of the routine inspection activitie Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period except for brief periods to facilitate turbine valve testin At 5:30 a.m. on November 22, 1985 the licensee entered an unusual event when an equipment operator inadvertently tagged out No. 12 charging pump (Unit 1) instead of No. 22 charging pump (Unit 2).

Unit 1 No. 11 charging pump previ-ously was tagged out of service because maintenance was being performed on No. 11 charging pump, No 13 charging pump (positive placement) was runnin The equipment operator was intending to tag out No. 22 charging pump

(Unit 2) for maintenance and went to Unit 1 switchboard instead of Unit 2 and opened the breaker.' The control room operator from Unit 1 noticed the out of normal breaker posi-tion on his computer print out and called the supervisor to find out why No. 12 charging pump breaker was being opened manuall At the same time the equipment operator realized that he made an error and returned No. 12 charging pump breakers to the correct positio No damage occurred to equipment, No. 12 charging pump was out of service for two minutes and the pump was test run prior to returning it to operable statu The unusual event was terminated at 5:35 The licensee is conduct-ing an investigation into the event and the resident in-spector will followup on the results of the investigatio Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout this report period ex-cept for brief periods to facilitate turbine valve testin.

Maintenance Observations The inspector witnessed a number of corrective and preventative mainte-nance activities associated with the 2A diesel generato The activities and work packages for the following safety related work orders were reviewe Work order 85-09-06-019-3 Work order 85-10-14-024-3 Work order 85-07-25-054-8 Work orders 85-09-17-026-6 85-09-19-007-1 85-09-17-027-4 Replacement of HFA relays in accordance with field directive S-C-EOOO-EFD-031 This work order was performed in response to IE Bulletin 84-0 Preventative maintenance to clean and inspect the 21 Day Tank Flame Arreste Adjustment and calibration of the 2A diesel generator jacket water high tempera-ture alar Repair of various oil leaks on 2A diesel In addition, the following work orders were witnessed and inspecte Work order 85-11-22-022-4 No. 22 Charging Pump Drain Lin Reinstall drain line and install blank downstream of 22CV5 *

Work order 85-10-05-031-7

Replacement of T-54 Transformer and Hl and H3 fuses (See LER 85-021 Section 8 of this report)

As a result of the maintenance observations the inspector concluded that qualified personnel performed the maintenance in accordance with estab-lished procedures using calibrated equipment where necessar The inspec-tor also concluded that replacements were ordered and inspected in accordance with established QA procedure No violations were identifie.

Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveil-lance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillance was reviewed in depth with portions of the pro-cedure witnessed by the inspecto lIC-16.3.007 Power range channel calibration check NIS PR-1N41 2PD-2.6.040 Channel functional test No. 2 Stearn Generator pressure protection channel No violations were identifie.

Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by per-forming a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configura-tion, to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to veri-fy that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Unit 1. Containment Spray System was inspecte No violations were identifie.

Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receip~, the inspectors reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:

inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for

  • resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:

Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - October 1985 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - October 1985 Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accGr-dance with Technical Specification Unit 1 LER 85-012 Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip From 99% Due to False Low Condenser Vacuum Signal On October 6, 1985 the unit experienced a turbine trip on low condenser vacuum which was caused by an operator who was attempting to troubleshoot a false Low-Low vacuum alar This event was discussed in Inspection Re-port 50-272/85-2 The licensee 1 s corrective actions include personnel counseling, discussion of this event in the requalification program and design changes to remove the subject vacuum lines and pressure detectors although the 11 Low-Low 11 vacuum alarm and the 11 Low-Low 11 vacuum trip will remain operationa Unit 2 LER 85-021 28 Diesel Generator Test Failure (Also reviewed Supplement 1 to this LER)

On October 6, 1985 during routine surveillance testing, the 28 Diesel Gen-erator experienced a valid test failure when the generator output breaker tripped ope The licensee 1 s investigation showed that the voltage regu-lator control power transformer had failed resulting in elevated generator output voltage and curren The output breaker tripped on overcurren The failed voltage regulator control power transformer was installed in 1983 as corrective action for a similar event discussed in Unit 2 LER 83-065/03 These transformer failures are the only two ever to be expe-rienced and are considered isolated incident The licensee intended to send the failed transformer to the manufacturer but when the transformer was recovered from the scrap bin it was discovered that it suffered casing damag The damage was considered too extensive to give any meaningful data and might even lead to false conclusions, so the transformer was not sent as originally planne.

International Atomic Energy Agency Inspections In accordance with the Treaty for Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the State Department of the United States agreed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be allowed to inspect fuel at selected sites in the United State Salem Generating Station was one of these selected sites and the IAEA arrived on site on November 25, 1985 for an initial meeting with the licensee to discuss the methodology for the forthcoming inspection These inspections are expected to be conducted bimonthly for the next two year The NRC and the site residents will cooperate with the IAEA throughout the course of the inspection cycl.

License Examinations During the weeks of November 18 and 25 fifteen license candidates were examined by the NR During the course of the examinations it was found that the simulator experienced difficulty establishing a steady state con-dition in cold shutdown due to the POPS system operating inadvertentl The condition was traced to the upgrade modifications being installed into the simulator and has been correcte The resident inspector will witness the operation of the simulator when the licensee is ready to perform the testin This is expected to be done within the next two week.

Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia j