IR 05000272/1985012

Insp Repts 50-272/85-12 & 50-311/85-13 on 850507-31. Violation in Area of Security & Two Unresolved Items Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observations & Licensee Event Followup Review

ML20127G182
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/18/1985
From:	Limroth D, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127G156	List: IR 05000272/1985012 ML20127G153
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.09, TASK-TM 50-272-85-12, 50-311-85-13, NUDOCS 8506250379
Download: ML20127G182 (16)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

050311-850413 050311-850417 050311-850423 050311-850502 50-272/85-12 Report No /85-13 50-272 Docket No DPR-70 License No DPR-75 Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: May 7, 1985 - May 31, 1985 Inspectors: T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector R. W. Borchardt, Resident Inspector Reviewed by: d ./7. B5 D. F. Lintroth, Project Engineer dat'e Reactor Proje ts Section No. 2B, DRP Approved by: h L. J./Nderholm, Chief, dite' Reactor Projects Section No. 28, DRP 8506250379 850621 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G PDR

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Inspection Summary: Inspections on May 7, 1985 - May 31, 1985 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/85-12 and 50-311/85-13) Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations including: operational safety verification, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, review of special reports, licensee event followup review, engineered safety feature system walkdown, onsite review committee, licensee self-identified security violation, new Radiation Protection Manager, review of Event V isola-tion valves, followup of pressurizer transient, and review of a potential unanalyzed condition. The inspection involved 130 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector Results: This report identifies a violation in the area of security. The violation was self identified by the licensee. Two unresolved items also appear in paragraphs 9 and 15. The first identifies corrosion on safety related pipe supports and, pending the licensees evaluation, there is a question about the seismic quality of the supports. The second is a poten-tially unanalyzed condition identified by Westinghouse dealing with the incore instrumentation system being dislodged during a seismic event and falling on the seal table causing a small break LOCA. The licensee is investigating both unresolved items.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit . Licensees Actions on Previous Finding $

(0 pen) Open Item (311/79-26-01). Licensee designated inspectors are not performing actual physical inspections. The licensee is still reviewing the advantages of their inspectors performing actual physical inspections. This item remains open pending licensee's completion and the required revie (0 pen) Follow Item (311/83-24-08). Followup to LER 311/83-35/0IP; Enthalpy hot channel factor limit versus rod insert limit LCR 83-15 is being withdrawn. The problem no longer exists because of the new design fuel loading and rod configuration. This item remains open pending submittal by the licensee of the new design fuel loading and rod configuratio (0 pen) Follow Item (311/83-37-02). Supplemental report required for LER 83-63/03 Diesel Generator 2C failed to start during testin Engineering Evaluation S-2-E300-MEE-026 indicates that Engineering is still investigating spurious field ground indi-cations. This item remain open pending completion of the inves-tigation by Engineerin (Closed) Violation (272/84-14-01; 311/84-14-01). NRC approved revisions to the Technical Specifications were not properly reviewed, and departments responsible for performing the surveillances were not identified and formally notified. Administrative Procedure No. 3 has been revised to assure that NRC approved revisions to Technical Specifications are reviewed, and the responsible departments are identified and formally notifie This item is close . Operational Safety Verification Documents Reviewed
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 -Selected Operators' Logs
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Senior Shift Supervisors (SSS) Log

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Jumper Log

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Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)

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Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REPS)

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Selected Chemistry Logs

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Selected Tagouts

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Health Physics Watch Log B. The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible). During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, tech-nicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commit-ments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure (1) On a daily basis, particular attention was directed in the following areas:

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Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;

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Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control room;

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Proper control room, shift manning and access control;

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Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm;

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Proper use of procedures;

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Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and,

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Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio (2) On a weekly basis, the inspectors confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:

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Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; j

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Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions;

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Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; I l l

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Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrica-tion,' vibration, cooling water supply, and general operable conditions; and,

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Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit Systems Inspected:

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Service Water (Unit 1)

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Radiation Monitoring (Unit 1)

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Safety Injection (Unit 2)

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Component Cooling (Unit 2)

(3) On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:
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 ' Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system;
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Observed a shift turnover;

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Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents;

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Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established;

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Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented;

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Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and,

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Verifiedselectedportiobsofcontainmentisolation lineu C. Inspector Comments / Findings: The inspectors selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulations. The inspectors determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personnel. The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:

(1) Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of minor power reductions to perform surveillance testin _

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(2) Unit 2 began this report period at 100% power and operated at 100% power with the following exception. At 5:12 p.m. on May 10, 1985, the unit tripped from 100%

power. All systems functioned normally. The cause of the trip was a reactor power rate flux trip from channels 42 and 44. The high flux rate of change experienced by channels 42 and 44 of the power range was caused when Rod 2C4 dropped into the core. Subsequent investigation by the licensee found a loose connection to the stationary gripper coi At the time of the trip the licensee was performing a surveil-lance which is required to test freedom of rod movement. When bank C was moved, Rod 2C4 fell into the core. After a check for loose connections of surrounding amphenol connections identi-fied no further problems in the immediate vicinity, the licensee began a startup on May 12, 1985, and found that Rod 2SA1 in shutdown bank A was not moving from the core. The rod bottom light had failed to extinguish when the other rods in that bank stepped out (about 35 steps). The operators drove the shutdown bank A rods in and began another investigation. The investi-gation of Rod 2SA1 eventually found another loose pin in the amphenol connector (this was in another sector of the head region). Another startup was attempted and two more shutdown bank rods fell into the core from 65 and 75 steps. The' licensee entered Mode 3 and began to examine all of the connector Additional information:

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Resistance checks were performed on the connections after the reactor head had been replaced following the last refueling. These resistance checks were satisfactory; however, resistance checks only indicate that contact is made, not that the connections are correctly made u The construction of the present connectors is such that the pins are not positively made up unless the male (spring loaded) and female (also spring loaded) pins are properly mated. This can only be checked by physically removing a protective cover on the female end to check the connection. The licensee checked all these connections prior to startup on May 14, 198 Resistance checks were also performed satisfactoril The licensee is changing the connection reassembly procedures to insure that QC is performed when these connectors are being made up to preclude reccurrence in the futur .

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After the licensee completed checking all the rod drive connectors, the resident inspector witnessed rod testing and criticality. All rods functioned normally during the testing and approach to criticality. The unit was paralleled to the grid at 3:05 a.m. on May 15, 1985, and proceeded to 100% powe No violations were identifie . Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, thes activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the " skills of the trade," appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, ignition / fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to servic During the process of the Event V review the inspector reviewed the following maintenance work orders in dept Repair of Valve 21SJ56 945960 Repair of Valve 22SJ56 945961 Repair of Valve 23SJ56 945962 Repair of Valve 24SJ56 947172 Repair of Valve 22SJ144 948222 Repair of Valve 22SJ43 931747 Repair of Valve 22SJ156 The inspector determined that all maintenance was performed in accordance with station approved procedures. Post maintenance testing was performed as noted in paragraph 13 of this repor No violations were identifie . Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in progress surveil-lance as well as completed surveillance packages. The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee-approved procedures and NRC regulations. The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillances.

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The following surveillances were reviewed in depth with portions of the procedures witnessed by the inspecto SP(0)4.1.3. Rod control Assemblies - demonstration of Unit 2 operability of all control rods SP(0)4.3. Post Accident Instrumentation test for Unit 2 operability SP(0)4.8.1. Test operability of all Diesel Generators Unit 2 SP(0)4.3. Test overspeed protection of main Unit 2 Turbine / Generator SP(0)4.6.1.3a Containment Air Lock test for operability and Unit I leakage SP(0)4.4.5.2d 72 hour leak rate test of Reactor Coolant System No violations were identifie . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, thc inspectors reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications;

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planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:

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Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - April 1985

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Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - April 1985 7. NRC Resident Inspector On April 21, 1985, Mr. Richard W. Borchardt assumed the duties of Resident Inspector. Previously, Mr. Borchardt was assigned to Region I with signi-ficant inspection responsibilities at Limerick Power Statio . Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accor-dance with Technical Specifications.

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Unit 2 The following events were discussed in detail in Inspection Report 50-272/ 85-09 and 50-311/85-11. During his review, the inspector concluded that the licensee took appropriate action and noted the following long term corrective actions for each even Reactor Trip from 25% During Reactor Startup The trip was caused by low steam generator level while steam generator level control was in manual. Licensee management discussed the event with the operators and supervisors involved and a discussion of the event is included in the Operators Requalification Progra Reactor Trip from 17.5% Power During Reactor Startup Improper steam trap operation was attributed to be the cause for this tri The licensee is reevaluating the need for blowing down traps during plant warm-up after extended shutdowns. The traps have functioned normally since a continuous blowdown was initiated after the trip had occurre The valves are lined up for normal operation at this writin Reactor Trip from 54% This trip occurred during transfer of lube oil coolers. Additional guid-ance has been incorporated into OP-III - 3.3.1 " Main Turbine Lubricating Oil System - Normal Operation" to specifically address the shifting of inservice lube oil cooler Reactor Trip from 69%.- Main Generator " Loss of Field" Relay Actuation. Improperly wired relay The relay was correctly rewired, and the schematic and wiring drawings were corrected. To preclude recurrence, the licensee's review of revised driwings will not be limited to those portions which have been revised, but will include a review of any portions which were re-drawn during implementation of the revisio . Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configura-tion, to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriate. The Service Water and Unit 1 Containment Spray Systems were inspected.

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During the walkdown of the service water (SW) system the inspector identi-fied a number of SW pipe supports in the Unit 1 penetration area which exhibited significant corrosion. The inspector questioned the capability of these supports to adequately perform their function during a seismic event. These degraded pipe supports were discussed with the licensee's management. A staff engineer was assigned to accompany the inspector through selected areas of the plant and the inspector specifically pointed out the supports in questio The licensee stated that an evaluation would be made for these supports. A more general concern of how to prevent corrosion on pipe supports was also identified by the inspecto This item is unresolved pending review of the licensee's evaluation (50-272/85-12-01).

No violations were identifie . Onsite Review Committee The inspector attended an onsite Review Committee meeting (No. 85-88) as an observer. The inspector ascertained that the licensee is in compliance with TS Section 6.5.1 regarding membership, frequency, and review process as follows: The SORC secretary took attendance to ensure there was a quorum (chairman and four members and alternates). Each department was called upon to present their agenda item (s) and written matter was distributed with regard to the agenda item (s). The presenter was questioned by the members for additional details. The vice chairman was in control of the meeting and sought assurance that preventive as well as corrective actions were adequat Items Discussed;

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Notice of Violation reported in Inspection Report 50-311/85-08 regarding the QA program controls over activities affecting the quality of wor SORC members were thorough in assuring that the actions recommended by the responsible department were achievable as well as adequat New procedures, revisions and changes. Departments involved included Maintenance, Fire Protection, and Radiation Protectio No violations were identifie _

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11. Licensee Self Identified Violation The licensee responded in a letter, dated April 16, 1985, to allegations identified in an NRC letter, dated March 13, 1985. As a result of that response, Region I identified that the licensee failed to meet the require-ments of their Training and Qualification Plan for members of their physical security force; specifically, Section 2.3.5 that prescribes personnel qualification requirements. (50-272/85-12-02).

Region I, in its reply to the licensee's letter, dated May 24, 1985, notes that corrective actions have been completed; therefore, the item is considered closed. Region I will follow up on the actions during a future inspection at Sale . Newly Hired Radiation Protection Manager The licensee recently hired a new Radiation Protection Manager, M John Trejo. The inspector examined Mr. Trejo's qualifications and compared them to ANSI /ANS3.1, 1981 " Selection, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants" and found him to be qualified for the positio . Review of Event V Isolation Valves Documents Reviewed

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Maintenance Procedure A-21 " Maintenance Department Testing and Retest Nofification Procedure."

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SP(0)4.4.6.3, " Emergency Core Cooling Systems - ECCS Subsystems Unit 1"

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SP(0)4.4.7.2.1, " Emergency Core Cooling Systems - ECCS Subsystems Unit 2"

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Inspection Report 50-272/83-13, 50-311/83-19

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WASH 1400 10/75 Inter System LOCA

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Order Issued by NRR April 20, 1981, to include mandatory surveillance and LCO for certain valves in Technical Specifications

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Assorted Maintenance - Work orders pertaining to selected work performed on valves from the Technical Specification list

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Completed surveillance testing on the Technical Specification

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Selected system prints The resident inspector reviewed the above documents to ascertain that:

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Leak testing is being performed on all valves identified as isolation and on check valves for Event V system Test conditions are compatible with the testing being done and in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the Order issued April 20, 198 Precautions and prerequisites to prevent overpressurization of low pressure piping are in plac Acceptance criteria are within the guidelines set forth in the Order issued April 20, 198 Regulatory requirements are being satisfied with regard to Technical Specifications, ASME Section XI and surveillance testin (See comments in C below)

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Maintenance activities incorporate the proper use of personnel and equipment, as well as QA/QC coverage during critical fit-ups, surface testing and NDE while repairing valve The inspector also reviewed records and conducted interviews with operators, technicians and supervisors to determine the licensee's awareness of the potential accidents that could occur if one of the Event V valves carried away or leaked by. The results of these reviews are:

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Operators utilize various methods to determine if leakage is present through one of these valves by performing a primary system water inventory every 24 hours and by checking, various pressure and temperature indicators outside of the pressure boundary valves on a shift basi Maintenance planners and supervisors were aware of the importance of these valves and have listed them in the master planning document which is used to prepare work packages including post maintenance testin No one interviewed could remember an overpressurization that had occurred at Salem, although several instances were identified where larger valves (accumulator check valves) had leaked in excess of allowable limits during testing. These valves were repaired and retested satisfactorily prior to returning them to servic _

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l During the review the inspector noted that, although a document (Maintenance Procedure A-21) was used to prepare a maintenance package for repairs to the valves listed in Technical Specifications, the document was in error in two place four valves listed did not require leak checks to be performed on them after maintenance; however, Technical Specifications stated leak checks would be performe where the document illustrated leak checking of the valves after maintenance, the wrong department was listed as the responsible part Leak checks were actually performed by the correct department after maintenance and in accordance with Technical Specifications and sur-veillance procedures because Technical Specifications require that leak checks be performed on all the valves listed in Technical Speci-fications prior to leaving cold shutdown, and the only time mainten-ance was performed on the valves was when the unit was in cold shut-dow The resident has had discussions with the licensee management con-cerning the errors in document A-21. The licensee has agreed that these errors need correcting and have made the necessary correction The resident concludes that the licensee has taken the necessary actions to remain in compliance with the Order issued April 20, 198 No violations were identifie . Follow Up to Pressurizer Transient On April 13, 1985 a pressurizer transient caused the 2PRI Pressure Operated Relief Valve on the pressurizer to lift. (For details of the actual event see Inspection Report 272/85-09,311/85-11)

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The control system for pressurizer control at Salem is a Hagan (Westinghouse) 7100 Series control loop (PPCS) which consists of a master controller (PC-455K) which drives one controller to activate PORV 2PR2, one controller for pressurizer heaters, and two controllers for the two spray valve Note: The second PORV 2PR1, is controlled from a separate process device not connected to the PC-455K master controlle _

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As a followup to the event the resident inspector had discussions with the Nuclear Safety Review Group (NSRG) on site, which performed an indepth evaluation of the event. The following are the findings that resulted from the investigatio The system operation, as originally set at startup, is sluggish in its response, but is in accordance with Westinghouse original recommendation The sluggish operation is manifested when the master controller process variable falls outside the calibrated range. When this occurs, upon reentering the calibrated range, excessive lag times result which result in overshoo In the case of the transient which resulted in 2PR1 lifting (not part of the PPCS), 2PR2 did not lift which is part of the PPCS, and the spray valves failed to automatically open, illustrating that the system experienced excessive lag time sometimes called " reset windup".

- When item II.K.3.9 of NUREG 0737 had been addressed by the licensee two options were given 1) The interlock bistable trip setpoint could be raised to the PORV setpoint (2335 psig). (Previously the Salem bistable was set at 2185 psig) or, 2) The derivative action of the master controller (PC-455K) could be reduced to zero (setting the controller to zero reduces the lag time in the controller) The licensee selected option I which is currently installed in both units at Sale Westinghouse made a recommendation in NSD-TB-84-12 to make modifications to the PPSC if Foxboro instruments were use Salem uses Hagan instruments so modifications were not made at that tim By polling other utilities, the licensee found that most licensees took option two of NUREG 0737 II.K.3.9. The licensee also learned that further adjustments can be made to the master controller to further enhance its operation. By adjusting the integral (reset) setting to 900 seconds / repeat, the controller would increase its response in getting off the lower part of the calibrated settin As a result of the NSRG findings they have recommended to the Engineering Department the possibility of two alternatives to eliminate the " sluggish" operation of the PC-455-K control loo . r 15 To change both the derivative (rate) and integral (reset) settings of the PC-455K controller. (This, reportedly, has had very good success at Diablo Canyon which uses the same 7100 Series control module as Salem)

. To modify the equipment and add an " anti-reset wind up" Circuit to the controller which would eliminate unwanted lag time when the signal to the controller falls outside of its caliberated rang The resident inspector will continue to follow the progress of the licensee on this matte No violations were identifie . Potential Unanalyzed Condition On May 31, 1985, Westinghouse informed the licensee that a potential unanalyzed condition may exist at Westinghouse facilitie The condition is that a seismic event could cause the flux mapping system, which is a non-nuclear safety system, to fall on the seal table, which is a Class 1 pressure boundary, and cause a small break LOCA. Westinghouse issued the information to the licensees because of differences in design at the facilities. The letter refers to two other facilities which apparently have been analyzed for the event. The licensee is currently analyzing the configuration of the flux mapping components and the seal table to determine if the condition exists at Salem. Preliminary reviews using as-built drawings and photographs of the equipment indicate there is not an immediate concern. This item is unresolved pending licensee evaluation of the design (50-272/85-12-03).

16. Unresolved Item An area for which more information is required to determine acceptability is considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in paragraphs 9 and 1 . Exit-Interview

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At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting period. The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia ,

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. MODULE INFORMATION: Rec- Module Direct Percentage Module Re ord N Insp. Hr Complete Status Followup 530703 A 001

 [[B 001
'561726__A 002 100% C

__B ' 005 100% C 562703 A 006 100% C

 [B 005 100% C 571707 A 025 100% C
 [[B 026 100% C 590712 A 000 100% C
 [B_

003- 100% C 590713 A 001 100% C

 [[B 001 100% C 592705 A 006
 [[B 006 592706 A 009
 [B

_ 009 593702 A 000

 [[B 009 571710-A 12 100% . C

_B 3 100% C _

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O PSIEG Pubhc Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bndge. New Jersey 08038 Nuclear Depadment June 7, 1984 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention: Mr. Thomas T. Martin, Director Division of Engineering and Technical Programe, Gentlemen: NRC COMBINED INSPECTION 50-2 72/84-14 AND 50-311/84-14 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNITS NO. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 During the subject inspection, conducted on April 2-5, 1984, one violation was identified. The following is PSE&G's response to this Notice of Violatio Item of Violation Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification Section 6.8.1 states: " Written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment..." Station Administrative Procedure No. 12 (Revision 6),

" Technical Specification Surveillance Program," Section 5.1, requires that:
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All Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approved revisions to Technical Specifications be reviewed; and the

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Department responsible for performing the Technical Specification surveillance be determined and formally notified using Form AP-12- n ip ! ! r!( W myi,,je+ 99- g The Energy People L

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Mr. Thomas T. Martin -2- 6/7/84 Contrary to the above Station procedure, as of April 5, 1984, the following NRC Approved revisions to the Technical Specifications:

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Unit 1 Amendment No. 54 (Dated October 31, 1983) and Amendment No. 55 (Dated November 22, 1983), and

-- Unit 2 Amendment No. 22 (Dated November 22, 1983) and Amendment No. 23 (Dated January 27, 1984),

were not reviewed and the department responsible for performing the surveillance were not determined and formally notifie Reply: Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved: A review of Amendments 22, 23 & 55 was performed and it was determined that no formal notification was required as these changes were administrative in natur ~ For Amendment 54, the department responsible for performing the Technical Specification surveillance was immediately notified by Form AP-12-1. The responsible department was made cognizant that an increased surveillance program for Local Leak Rate tests needed to be implemented prior to and including the next refueling outag Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations: Procedures for amendments have been revised such that upon receipt of an amendment, two (2) copies will be immediately transmitted to the Technical Manager Salem Operations. The Technical Manager will transmit the amendment to the Operations Manager via the Response Request Program. A minor change to Administrative Procedure Number 3 (Document Control Program) has been issued describing the routing of all amendments to the Technical Specification F

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Mr. Thomas T. Martin -3- 6/7/84 Date when full compliance will be achieved: We are now in full complianc Although the corrective actions taken will ensure positive review, identification and distribution of amendments to the Technical Specifications, PSE&G, in an effort to improve the overall quality of the program, is continuing the review of AP-12. Appropriate action will be taken, if deemed necessary, based on the results of the revie

Sincerely, E. A. Liden Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation C Mr. Donald C. Fischer Project Licensing Manager Mr. James Linville Sr. Resident Inspector j l }}