IR 05000272/1985013
| ML18092A660 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1985 |
| From: | Limroth D, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092A659 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-85-13, 50-311-85-15, NUDOCS 8507180149 | |
| Download: ML18092A660 (11) | |
Text
Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/85-13 50-311/85-15 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050311-850510 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
June 1, 1985 - June 30, 1985 Inspectors:
Reviewed Approved by:
Inspection Summary:
Senior Resident Inspector Resident Inspector DRP Chief, Reactor Projects Projects Branch No. 2, DRP
"/;r1/Pr
~
Inspections on June 1, 1985 - June 30, 1985 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/85-13 and 50-311/85-15)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, review of special reports, licensee event followup, and regional reques The inspection involved 147 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspectors.
Results:
There were no violations identified in this repor (~ 8507180149 850712.
PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
- DETAILS Persons Contacted*
Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed)
Unresolved Item (272/80-21-01): Change Battery Room Fire Detector Test In Accordance with LER 80-30.
The inspector verified that a caution had been added to surveillance procedure SP(0)4.3.3.6.l titled "Smoke and Thermal Detectors Channel Functional Test 11 to warn the operator that application of the heat gun to the detector for greater than five seconds could dama~e the detecto If the detector was damaged, the annunciator for that detector would alarm and the detector would have to be replaced prior to clearing the alar The inspector has no further question (Closed)
IE Circular (50-272/80-CI-10) This circula~ will be closed out when Bulletin 79-01 is addresse (Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-272/81-25-01) This item identified that in a monthly report, certain design change modifications had not been reported after completio A recent review of performed design changes revealed no deviations between design change completion and reportin However, some of the reports were sketchy as to; (1) the reasons for the change and (2) the safety evaluatio A further.review by the inspector indicated that all of the design change information*
was not 1ncluded within the report but that the design changes were properly implemente The inspector had discussions with licensee management with regard to the need to be explicit in their reportin This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation (50-272/82-01-03) This violation was issued when personnel were observed in the controlled area and not in adherence to the Radiati~n Exposure Permit The licensee has taken corrective measures as indicated in their response to the violation dated April 2, 198 Based on controlled area entries by the resident inspectors, no further violations have been identified. This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation (50-272/82-17-01; 311/82-17-01) This violation was issued because operators did not have the necessary 11as-built 11 drawings to operate the plant when design
changes were being implemente The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated August 28, 198 The inspector has verified that the commitments have been implemented and has done random checks of the controlled drawings with no finding This item is considered close (Closed)
Violation (50-272/83-02-02) This violation was issued because Catalytic Inc. (a contractor) did not have qualified personnel performing NO The licensee responded to this violation in a letter dated March 25, 198 The inspector verified that the commitments have been implemente This item is considered close (Closed)
Licensee Identified Item (272/83-06-01; 311/83-05-01):
Safety Tagging Program The licensee has initiated a color coding program that is intended to enhance equipment and unit identificatio Under this program all Unit 1 areas (floors, switchboards etc) are painted blue, while all Unit 2 areas are painted yello This should significantly reduce the likelihood that equipment in one unit would be mistaken for the similar piece of equipment in the other uni This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
Follow Item (272/83-12-01): Non-Seismic Modification to Diesel Generators As described in LER 83-006/03L the modification was reworked in order to meet seismic specifications immediately after the non-seismic condition was identifie The design verification process has also been reviewed on numerous occassions and most recently during the Unit 2 inspection 311/85-0 The design verification process has been found to be acceptable and this item is close (Closed)
Violation (272/83-12-02; 311/83-13-02): Late Submission of LER This violation resulted from the late submission of a number of reports required by Technical Specification Increased licensee attention in this area has resulted in improved performanc Based upon the licensee's recent performance, this item is close (Closed)
Un re so 1 ved Item ( 50-272/83-13-01) This item was identified because operators were performing evolutions in the wrong uni The licensee has color coded the two units and is currently painting the diesel generators, primary auxiliary building and turbine building components with the appropriate colors to conform with the color cod This item is considered close *
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (311/85-12-02): Delays in Gaining Site Access for Inspectors The licensee has made an effort to streamline the training and badging process for NRC inspector The relocation of the security photobadging facility to the main security building has helped to speed up the badging proces The licensee has displayed the ability to complete the badging process for NRC inspectors in one hour and all recent visiting inspectors have been granted site access without dela (Closed)
IE Bulletin 81-01: Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers A region-based inspector specialist has evaluated the licensee's responses and has determined they are techrically adequate and satisfy the IE Bulletin action requirement Verification has been made by the resident inspector that the licensee's responses were enacte This item is closed for Units-1 and.
Operational Safety Verification Documents Reviewed Selected Operators* Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiatton Exposure Permits (REP)
Selected Chemistry Logs
- Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected area~ of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure (1)
On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LC0 1 s directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control;
- Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio (2)
On a weekly basis, the inspectors confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where pd~sible, for proper operabilit Systems Inspected:
Auxiliary Feedwater (Unit 1)
Safety Injection (Unit 1)
Chemical and Volume Control (Unit 2)
Containment Spray (Unit 2)
. (3)
On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established;
Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspectors selected phases of the units operation to determine
~ompliance with the NRC's regulation The inspectors determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth: Unit 1.1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of minor power reductions to perform surveillance testin Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 100% power from June 1-27 with the exception of a 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> period to repair a condenser leak and minor power reductions to perform surveillance testin On June 28, 1985 Unit 2 was shutdown to make repairs to Pressurizer Safety valve PR-4 and remained shutdown for the remainder of the report perio On June 12, 1985, the Unit 2 control room operator observed that the steam generator number 24 narrow range level indication did not meet the channel check acceptance criteria of OD-2 Operations Directive OD-23, "Operations Log 3 Control Console Reading Sheets Modes 1-4 11 requires that each of the 3 narrow range level channels for each steam generator be within 3%
agreement with the redundant channel Because channel III was approximately 5% lower than the other narrow range channels, it was placed in a tripped condition as required by Technical Specification 3. Continued operation is allowed in this condition until performance of the next required channel functional tes The inspector reviewed Deficiency Report Number SIC 85-0219 and Safety Evaluation No. S-2-RlOO-CSE-0320 which documented the licensee's evaluation of the channel III narrow range level indication erro The error was assumed to be caused by entrapped air in the instrument sensing lines which is supported by the fact that the transmitted level is less than the actual steam generator
- leve Required corrective actions include venting and purging of the instrument sensing lines; however, ALARA considerations make this approach impractical while the unit was in Modes 1 or Until the unit was shutdown and the sensing lines could be vented, the licensee took the following action An on-the-spot change was made to 00-23 to allow channel III narrow range level indication operation with up to a 6%
difference when compared to redundant channel The channel III High - High level trip setpoint was reduced from 67% to 61% to compensate for the fact that actual level is higher than indicated level on channel II These temporary actions are applicable to Nos. 21, 23, and 24 steam generators *since channel III is used in each of these level instrument loop The High - High level trip is used to trip the main turbine in order to prevent possible damage from moisture carryover and is not required by Technical Specifications (TS).
The Low - Low steam generator water level.trips required by TS do not require adjustment since the induced error is conservative in that the indicated water level is lower than the actual water leve When Unit 2 was placed into Mode 3 the licensee planned to complete the following:
Vent channel III instrument loop Calibrate channel III instruments Return High - High level setpoints to original value Return 00-23 to original format The licensee 1s actions to date have been adequate and the inspector has no further questions at this tim This item remains open pending completion of the Mode 3 corrective actions discussed in Safety Evaluation S-2-RlOO-CSE-0320 (50~311/85-15-01). On June 13, 1985 at approximately 7:05 a.m., the licensee detected a high conductivity condition in the Unit 2 steam generators along with a decrease in condenser vacuu The licensee began to reduce power at 7:40 a.m. to clean up the condensate using the full flow condensate polishing syste Power was reduced to 53% which allowed portions of the condensers to be taken out of service and inspected for possible leak After the 238 waterbox was isolated and drained, a previously plugged tube sheet hole was discovered to be unplugge This allowed circulating water to mix with
the condensate and thereby cause conductivity to increase to a peak value of 17 Micro-MHO The tube sheet plug was originally installed when a condenser tube had been removed from the condense A new plug was installed in the outlet side of the waterbox and the condenser was returned to servic A power increase was commenced after steam generator conductivity was reduced to normal values of less than 1 Micro-MH The unit was at 100% power by 2:00 p.m. on June 14, 198.3 On June 28, 1985, the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System-Water Inventory Balance (SP(0)4.4.7.2d) indicated an unidentified leak rate of 0.995 GPM as compared to the Technical Specification limit of 1.0 GP The previous leak rate determination performed on June 27 indicated an unidentified leak rate of 0.72 GP A containment entry was made and steam was observed leaking from the inlet flange of Pressurizer Safety Valve -
PR-Because of the valve's physical location in relation to interference, and the extreme temperatures in the immediate area the licensee decided to make repairs in Mode 5 (cold shutdown).
The inspector witnessed the plant shutdown and will monitor the licensee's activities throughout the outage perio No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to verify that redundant components were operable, these activities did not violate the Limiting Conditions for Operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approv~d procedures were used or the activity was within the 11 skills of the trade, 11 appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, ignition/fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to servic During this inspection period the following activities were observed:
ITT Grinnel Diaphragm Valve Preventative Maintenance (Maintenance Procedure MP 7.2 Rev. 0) per work orders 85-06-03-053-6 and 85-06-03-054-Replacement of the Component Cooling Heat Exchanger number 11 drain line and service water valve 11 SW 124 per work order 85-06-18-119-Lubrication of Unit 2 Reactor Trip Breaker 2A (SIN 02YN219-1)
per work order 85-06-10-081-0 (see paragraph 5) The licensee submitted a response to Bulletin 83-06 11 Nonconforming Materials Supplied by Tube-Line Corporation" and stated that further nondestructive examination (NOE) would be performe Additional NOE
.
was performed on February 26, 1985 and rejectable indications were found in the construction welds of previously identified Tube Line fitting The licensee replaced all nine of the fittings that were installed in the chill water systems with new fitting The inspector reviewed Work Orders 85-02-22-082-9 and 85-03-08-061-3 and verified that all the work was done in actordance with station procedures.
. The inspector reviewed the test results of Speci a 1 Test "#22 Auxiliary Feed Pump Endurance Run" which was conducted on April 10, 11, and 12, 1985 after installation of a new Ingersoll-Rand Auxiliary Feedwater Pum Engineering evaluation S-2-F400-MEE-0060 dated June 5, 1985 determined that the new pump ran satisfactorily and met all acceptance criteria. This test was required by item II.E.1.1 of supplement 5 to the SER and consisted of a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> pump run followed by an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> cooldow After the cooldown, a cold pump start and a one hour run was conducte The inspectors review of the test results verified that the pump vibration and temperature measurements met all acceptance criteri No violations were identifie.
Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regul~tions. The inspector also verified that the instruments used w~re within calibration tolerinces and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed in depth with porti~ns of the procedures witnessed by the inspecto SP(0)4.5.4.2(A)
Unit 1 Procedure M3M Unit*l 2 PD 16.2.013 Unit 2 2 PD 16.2.014 Unit 2 SP(0)4.8.1. Unit 2 Procedure M3Q-2 Unit 2 Vital Heat Tracing Periodic Battery Inspection (Quarterly)
Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument functional check Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument functional check Electrical Power Systems - Emergency Diesels Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass Air Circuit Breaker Semi-Annual Inspection Lubrication
- 6.
The inspector witnessed portions of maintenance procedure M3Q-2, 11 Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass Air Cfrcuit Break.er Semi-Annual Inspection Lubrication and Testing 11 *
During the performance of this test, the Westinghouse DB-50 reactor trip break.er (RTB) 2A (serial number 02YN219-1)
failed to meet the trip bar force acceptance criteria of step 9.4.2 The maximum acceptable trip bar force is 885 grams and RTB 2A required a trip bar force ranging from 650 - 950 gram The surveillance test was immediately stopped and NRC notifications made per the Event Implementation Classification Guide section 17, 10 CFR 50.72, and Technical Specification 3. 3. Bypass break.er 11 B 11 which had just successfully comp 1 eted its six month surveillance test was installed into the Reactor Trip Break.er A position and the reactor protection system was returned to norma On June 26, 1985 a Westinghouse technical representative inspected the break.er and determined that no maintenance was required other than lubricatio The trip mechanism pins, bearing points, and latch surfaces were lubricated with 53701 GW Molybdenum Disulfid The break.er was then retested and the trip bar force measurement varied from 460 - 490 grams over five separate trip The licensee completed the surveillance test and returned RTB 2A to service on June 28, 198 No violations were identifie Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspectors reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informatio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - May 1985 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - May 1985 Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LER to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification Unit 2 LER 85-009 Reactor Trip from 100% - Dropped Control Rod This event was discussed in detail in Inspection Report 50-272/85-12 and 50-311/85-1 The root cause of the reactor trip was a high resistance connection in Rod 2C4 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CROM) cable connector which caused the rod to drop while attempting to move the rod for surveillance testin The high resistance was a result of the male and
\\.
female connectors not being properly made up during cable reassembly following the refueling outag The licensee disassembled and inspected all of the CROM connectors and found that four additional connectors required rework, one connector contained pins that were not fully seated, and two connectors had pins that required replacemen The licensee's immediate corrective actions were ad~quate; however, LER 85-009 does not describe the licensee's plans to prevent this problem from recurring again other than stating that 11 the obsolete connectors will eventually be replaced with an improved design 11 *
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the changes to the connector reassembly procedures as discussed in Inspection Report 50-272/85-12 and 50-311/85-1 He was informed that no procedure changes had been made nor had any formal process been started to initiate a chang The inspector informed the licensee that the long term corrective attions for the dropped control rod as discussed in LER 85-009 do not appear to be adequat This item is unresolved (50-311/85-15-02). Regional Request The Resident Inspector received a request from the Region to verify that the spent fuel pool could not be siphoned out with certain valve line-up The potential for this occurrence had been identified at Turkey Point Power Statio The inspector verified that no valve line-up at Salem could siphon out the spent pool due to the design of the cooling syste In no case could water be drained from the spent fuel pool to a level below 20 1 above the top of the fuel because of piping configurations and installed anti-siphon breakers (drilled holes in the cooling water return piping). Unresolved Item An area for which more information is required to determine acceptability is considered unresolve An unresolved item is contained in paragraph.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.