IR 05000272/1985020

Insp Repts 50-272/85-20 & 50-311/85-22 on 850901-30. Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Adequate Procedural Guidance Re Calculating Reactor Coolant Inventory Balance (leak-rate)

ML18092A852
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/10/1985
From:	Limroth D, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18092A850	List: IR 05000272/1985020 ML18092A851
References
50-272-85-20, 50-311-85-22, NUDOCS 8510220192
Download: ML18092A852 (12)

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No /85-20 50-311/85-22 50-272 Docket No DPR-70 License No DPR-75 050311-850808 050311-850827 050311-850911 Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:

September 1, 1985 - September 30, 1985 Inspectors:

Reviewed by:

Approved by:

J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector Borchardt, Resident Inspector DRP Chief, Reactor Projects Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:

li>-8-B:J date Inspections on September 1, 1985 - September 30, 1985 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/85-20 and 50-311/85-22)

Areas Inspected:

Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, ESF system walkdown, management changes, Hurricane Gloria, review of special reports, licensee event followup, and NRC Commissioner's visi The inspection involved 190 inspector hours by, the resident NRC inspector Results: This report documents one violation of practices in the calculations of Reactor Coolant Inventory Balance (leak-rate).

It also documents, in the maintenance section, the results of an extensive review of the Furmanite valve repafr proces *

DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activit.

Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/79-26-01).

QA practice of performing inspections without the use of actual physical inspection ('1hands-on 11 ).

PSE&G 1 s current management philosophy does not preclude 11 hands-on 11 inspectio This practice is now delineated in QA procedure QAP 5-This item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/82-05-02).

Inspector's concern was that certain items with a shelf life were not being inspected for expiration date The licensee has included in the inspection order system (computerized) all known items with shelf live This item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/85-07-05).

Two bolts were not properly installed during the installation of lC batter The inspector has reviewed a safety evaluation performed to insure that the Hilti-bolt embedments used to install lC battery are capable of seismic suppor The evaluation provides assurance that the current installation will support the battery for design seismic load This item is considered close (Closed) Violation (311/85-08-02).

Improper installation of safety related equipment (2C battery) with regard to Hilti-bolt embedment QA coverage during and after installation was non-existen The installation has been verified correct by the licensee and the inspector has reviewed the licensee's changes to the QA practices involving work activities for contractors without an internal QA progra This item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/85-07-06).

The first out alarm system did not appear to operate properly on a surveillance tes Subsequent testing by the licensee has documented that the system functions as designe This item is considered close (Closed) Violation (311/85-17-01).

Operator failure to follow procedure resulting in a reactor tri The operator has been counseled and disciplined and subsequently retraine Management has stressed to all operators through the retraining program the need to follow procedure This item is considered close (Closed) Violation (272/85-15-01; 311/85-17-02).

Inadequate review of on-the-spot change to waste gas sampling procedur The inspector

reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated September 20, 1985, and determined that it adequately addressed the inspector's concern Immediate corrective action consisted of removing the improper on-the-spot change from the chemistry sampling procedure and performing a review and analysis of plant releases to verify that no hazard to the public existe The licensee has also taken administrative and training actions to prevent recurrence of this even In an effort to improve the review process associated with on-the-spot changes, the licensee significantly revised the administrative procedure governing on-the-spot change The Technical Specification amendments and the qualification of station qualified reviewers are both complet This area will continue to receive close review by the inspecto On September 6, 1985, the inspector attended a session of Station Qualified Reviewer Training for purposes of evaluatio The inspector has no further question.

Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)

Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REP)

Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).

During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure (1)

On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the fo 11 owing a re as:

Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; *

Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio (2)

On a weekly basis, the inspectors confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:

Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit (3)

On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:

Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu Inspector Comments/Findings:

The inspectors selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1s regulation The inspectors determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant

personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:

During the inspector's routine review of the Jumper and Lifted Lead Log a number of discrepancies were identifie When the inspector discussed these discrepancies with the licensee he was informed that a detailed review of the use of jumpers and lifted leads throughout the plant was already in progres At the comple-tion of the licensee's study the inspector will review the findings and corrective actions as part of the routine inspection activitie Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of those periods discussed belo The licensee entered a Technical Specification action statement (3.4.6.2.d) at 3:55 a.m. on September 16, 1985 when the identified leak rate exceeded 10 gp The licensee identified the source of the leak (packing on spray line isolation valve PS-25).

PS-25 was placed on the back seat and the leak was returned within Technical Specification limits for primary system leakag The licensee completed repairs to the valve and the rupture disk in the Pressurizer Relief Tank (located within the containment) that prematurely ruptured during the leak even The licensee declared an unusual event and made all the necessary notification The unit remained at 100%

power throughout this evolutio The unusual event was terminated at 10:15 a.m. and the action statement was terminated at 11:15 a.m. when the corrected leak rate was 0.77 gp On September 22, 1985, from 5:46 p.m. to 8:53 p.m. the licensee performed a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Water Inventory Balance in accordance with surveillance procedure SP(0)4.4.6.2 The results of this leak rate test indicated a total uncorrected leak rate of 1.3 gp In accordance with the surveillance procedure this total uncorrected leak rate may be corrected by subtracting the total identified leakage into 1) the Pressurizer Relief Tank plus 2) the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank plus 3) other 11 identified 11 leakag After applying corrections for the identified leakage into the Pressurizer Relief Tank and the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank, the unidentified leak rate was calculated to be 1.19 gpm which is in excess of the gpm Technical Specification (TS) limi An operator and the shift supervisor made a containment entry in an effort to determine the source of the increased RCS leakage and found that pressurizer spray isolation valve, 1PS28, had a packing lea The packing leak rate was "visually estimated" to be 0.35 gpm and categorized as identified

-~--

-

---

• leakag After applying this new correction, the revised RCS unidentified leak rate was calculated to be 0.84 gpm (1.19 -.35) which is within TS limi However, making a 11 visual estimate 11 of RCS leakage is not an authorized means of identifying that leakage for purposes of compliance with T The inspector's review of the RCS Water Inventory Balance surveillance procedure revealed that the operators are not given sufficient guidance on how to identify and quantify a primary to containment atmosphere lea The failure to provide adequate procedural guidance concerning RCS identified leakage is a violation (272/85-20-01).

When upper management learned about this practice they ordered the unit to be placed in the action statement called out in Technical Specifications. After entering the action statement the leak was repaired within the time frame of the action statement and the unit continued operatio The licensee declared an unusual event on September 23, 1985 at 8:28 a.m., when the reactor coolant system water inventory balance determined the unidentified leak rate to be in excess of the Technical Specification limit of gp An inspection inside the containment identified a body to bonnet leak from pressurizer spray isolation valve (1PS28) to be the source of the increased unidentified leakag The body to bonnet leak was repaired and the unidentified leak rate determined to be 0.62 gp The unusual event was terminated at 4:23 p.m. on September 2 The licensee declared an unusual event on September 26, 1985 at 7:50 a.m. when the unidentified leak rate was determined to be in excess of the Technical Specification limit of 1.0 gp The increased leak rate was determined to be from the pressurizer spray isolation valve (1PS28)

that was repaired on September 2 A Furmanite plug installed on September 24 failed and required rework by Furmanit The licensee completed repairs to the pressurizer spray isolation valve and terminated the unusual event at 2:11 p.m. on September 26 when the reactor coolant system unidentified leakage was verified to be within Technical Specificatio The repairs that were conducted on the leaking primary system valve are described in the maintenance section of this repor Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of those periods discussed below.

r

At 5:23 a.m. on September 21, 1985 the control room operators initiated a manual reactor trip when normal primary system pressure could not be maintained due to leakage past pressurizer spray valve 2PS2 The pressurizer spray valve failed to completely close resulting in a continuous spray into the pressurizer for which the pressurizer heaters could not completely compensat An investigation by Instrument and Control technicians determined that the electric-to-pneumatic (E/P) converter for 2PS23 was providing an incorrect signal which caused the valve to remain partially open when the valve should have been fully shu The E/P converter was replaced and the unit brought critical at 9:05 a.m. on September 22, 198 The unit returned to 100% power at 6:00 a.m. on September 23, 198 One violation was identifie.

Maintenance Observations As a result of an unusual number of repairs accomplished by the Furmanite process during this month, the resident inspector conducted an indepth inspection into the repairs as well as the entire Furmanite proces The inspector reviewed the following documents:

Work orders 85-09-17-049-5 Repair of 1PS28 85-09-19-027-3 Repair of lPSl 85-09-19-028-3 Repair of 1PS3 85-09-26-009-5 Repair of 1PS28 Certificate of conformances for materials used to accomplish repair Maintenance Procedure T-172 Furmanite repai Safety Evaluations All-1 for all repair Furmanite procedures for various applications of their proces (QA-4)

Chemistry records Engineering evaluation SMD85-3712 Onsite Review Committee (ORC) review of the Furmanite process, evaluations and procedure Chemical analysis of Furmanit The inspector concluded the following as a result of this review.

All repairs were performed using approved procedures, the records reviewed were complet Furmanite utilized two processes to perform the repairs reviewe The first process was to repair a body to bonnet leak and involved placing a clamp around the flanged area, securing it and then pumping in the Furmanit This process forms a new gasket in the void space between the fla~ges. The external clamp is non-pressure retaining and remains in place after the Furmanite is injecte The second process was used to repair a body to bonnet leak also but a torque axial nut was installed on one of the studs that hold together the body and bonne The Furmanite is injected through the nut down along the stud and into the void space, outside the gasket, between the body and bonnet of the valv Certificate of conformances for the materials used met or exceeded the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, ANSI/ASME N45.2, ASME Section 3 and that 10 CFR 21 applie The engineering evaluations were concurred in by PSE&G engineering and approved by the SOR The chemical analysis concluded that the only significant substance to monitor for in the system being Furmanited was total organic carbon (TDC).

The licensee performs routine analysis for TDC in the primary coolant system and since the use of Furmanite no increase in TDC has been detecte No violations were identifie.

Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillance was reviewed in depth with portions of the procedure witnessed by the inspecto Procedure M2T Unit 1 Undervoltage and underfrequency Trip Check and Time Response of Vital and Group Buse No violations were identified.

• • Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functio~ing, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Unit 1 Safety Injection system was inspecte No violations were identifie.

Recent Management Changes The licensee recently reorganized the station management structure in order to place the emphasis on the operation of the station plants rather than on plant bettermen The new structure changes the operating philosophy by:

Placing the station planning effort directly under the General Manager of the plan Combining the chemistry and H.P. department under one manage Combining the I&C and Mechanical Maintenance Groups under one manage Establishing an Engineering Settion reporting to the Technical Manager which will directly oversee plant changes and maintenance within assigned system The resident inspector reviewed the qualifications for the personnel involved in the change and determined that all newly appointed positions are staffed by people that exceed the qualifications as outlined in ANSI/ANS 3.1, 198 Selection, Qualification and Training for Nuclear Power Plants 11 and ANSI 18.1 "Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel.

No violations were identifie.

Hurricane Gloria The licensee began making preparations for Hurricane Gloria on September 2 The preparations included:

Testing the Gas Turbine (located on site)

Moving all solid radioactive waste, which had been packaged for shipment, inside Checking all water tight bulkhead doors and repairing damaged ones as necessary

• Tying down all trailers on site Placing additional sump pumps in class I structures as well as the turbine building Testing communications Sand bagging all doors and low lying areas of the site The resident inspectors monitored the licensee 1 s actions in preparation for the hurricane and remained on site during the duration of the projected times for the hurricane passing through the are The licensee also increased the staffing on the site to cope with any emergencies that might aris The projected forces of the hurricane as to winds and tides were never realized at Salem Statio The maximum winds reached were gusts up to 70 mph and sustained 15 minute averages of 54 mp The tide level reached a maximum elevation of 94 feet. The licensee 1 s Technical Specifications and emergency plan allow operation to continue with winds up to 90 mph and tides up to 101 feet. The units operated without incident throughout the period that the hurricane was in close proximity to the statio The licensee and resident inspectors exercised portions of the emergency plan during the hurricane period, although the emergency plan was never required to be implemente The following portions of the plan were tested:

Communications between NRC Region I and the site The Technical Support Center (TSC)

Various equipment located throughout the site in the TSC and Operational Support Center (DSC)

The licensee fully manned the TSC and DSC No abnormalities were note. Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspectors reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:

inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informa-tio The following periodic reports were reviewed:

Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - August 1985

• • .

Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - August 1985 1 Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification Unit 2 LER 85-017 Reactor Trip From 100% During Solid State Protection System Testing This item was discussed in Inspection Report 50-311/85-2 The inspector has no further questions at this tim LER 85-018 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Service Water Flow Rate Below Required Value This event was described in Inspection Report 50-311/85-20 and was reportable due to the completion of a unit shutdow The vibration induced failure of the 22 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger (CCHX) outlet isolation valves (22SW356) has been attributed to the removal of the Cavitrol tube bundle from the 22 CCHX flow control valve (22SW127).

The tube bundle had been removed from 22SW127 because it had become plugged and deteriorate The licensee replaced 22SW356 prior to the unit startup and is investigating long term solutions to minimize vibration in the service water line while waiting for delivery of a new Cavitrol tube bundle for 22SW12 The inspector has no further question LER 85-019 Service Water Leak in Containment On September 11, 1985, the No. 23 Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU)

developed a service water leak from a vent lin The CFCU was quickly isolated preventing an accumulation of water inside the containmen The vent line was repaired and the 23 CFCU returned to service on September 23, 198 No equipment was damaged during this event; however, it was reportable in accordance with IE Bulletin 80-2.

NRC Commissioner 1s Visit Commissioner Zech met with licensee management and toured the Salem facility on September 20, 198 The tour included the control room, auxiliary building, emergency diesel generator rooms, turbine deck and the PSE&G Nuclear Training Cente At the conclusion of the tour an exit meeting was held with the licensee followed by a short press conference.

' "'

"

a,

'I

1 Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify any 2~790 material.