IR 05000272/1985023
| ML18092A896 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1985 |
| From: | Kenny T, Limroth D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092A895 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-85-23, 50-311-85-24, NUDOCS 8511130086 | |
| Download: ML18092A896 (12) | |
Text
Report No Docket No License No Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/85-23 50-311/85-24 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050272-850913 050272-850919 050272-850922 050311-850921 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
October 1, 1985 - October 31, 1985 Inspectors:
Reviewed by:
Approved by:
T. J. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector R~~ent Inspector D. F. Li~th;PrOJeCt Engineer Reactor Pro*ects Section No. 2B, DRP
/l-1 cting Chief, Reactor Projects
, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Inspection Summary:
11-5*85 date
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Inspections on October 1, 1985 - October 31, 1985 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/85-23 and 50-311/85-24)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, ESF system walkdown, cold weather preparations, NRC contractor review of post-accident effluent monitoring, review of special reports, and licensee event followu The inspection involved 179 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector Results: No violations were identified in this repor One inspector follow item, which has been expanded upon in the cover letter to this report, is of concern to the resident inspector The item involves the training of operating personnel in the use of newly installed equipment (Waste Gas Analyzer).
Details are found in Section 10 of this report.
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8511130086 851108
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PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspec-tion activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection 1tems (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (311/78-27-01 and 311/79-BU-Ol).
Both of these items are part of the Environmental Qualification (EQ) program and will be addressed when the EQ program inspection is performed at Sale (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (311/80-CI-10). Failure to maintain Environmental Qualification of Equipmen This item was closed out on Unit 1 and will be re-addressed during the EQ program inspectio (Closed) Deviation (272/83-22-05 and 311/83-22-05).
Licensee failed to meet IE Bulletin 79-19 commitments with regard to training of personnel for transport and packaging of radioactive materia The licensee has established the required training progra This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (311/83-30-03).
Violation against LCD 3. during mode change The licensee counseled the personnel responsible for the non-compliance and issued a directive to address the lack of attention in this are No similar incidences have occurred since the violatio This item is considered close (Closed) Licensee Identified Item (272/82-15-R2 and 311/82-15-R2).
Security upgrade to be complete by October 198 The licensee has completed a major upgrade of the security system including installation of key card access doors and a new guard house to serve both Salem and Hope Cree The licensee 1 s security program will continue to be mon1tored on a regular basis by the resident and region based inspector (Closed) Follow Item (272/82-23-01). Licensee to Expand Scope of IST Program to Include Pumps and Valves in Fire Protection and EOG Auxiliary System (Closed) Follow Item (272/82-23-02). Licensee to include valves lRH-1,-2 in Leak Test Procedure SP(0)4.4.6.3 and Change Classification of 26 RCS Isolation Valves in the IST Progra (Closed) (272/82-23-03).
Licensee to provide information on minimum safety analysis system flow rate to confirm acceptability of check valve testing.
(Closed) Follow Item (272/83-16-03).
Various first out panel spurious alarm The inspector was concerned about a number of spurious alarms on the First Out panel of the overhead annunciator syste During trouble-shooting activities a number of faulty circuit cards were replaced which may have caused the spurious alarm The system has operated satisfac-torily since that tim (Closed) Follow Item (272/83-25-02) Revise AP-This item was previously closed in Inspection Report 272/84-0 (Closed) Follow Item (272/83-29-03 and 311/83-31-03).
Periodic Measurement of Moisture Content in Ventilation Systems to Ensure System Integrity for Normal and Emergency Operation The inspector reviewed safety evaluation S-C-M941-MSE-234 which concluded that the licensee's filtration systems are capable of performing their intended safety function under accident and normal condition It should further be noted that section 3.7 of Technical Specifications details a number of surveillance tests which are required to monitor the system's operabilit (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/83-32-02).
Method for Calculating RCS Unidentified Leakage Takes Credit for Steam Leaks Quantified by Best Guess Techniqu This item was the subject of a violation documented in Inspection Report 272/85-2 This item is closed and the licensee's actions in response to violation 272/85-20-01 will be reviewed in a future inspection repor (Closed) Follow Item (272/84-13-06).
Resolve deficiency report for RTB testin In March 1984, the' licensee and the inspector questioned the method for determining the trip bar force required to trip the reactor trip breaker Inspection Report 272/84-15 documents the inspector's review of the Engineering Department's evaluatio The licensee changed the method of force measurement from lifting the trip bar by hand to the use of a weight and pulley arrangemen The weight and pulley method has proven to be more accurate and consisten The inspector has no further questions at this tim (Closed) Follow Item (272/84-15-01 and 311/84-15-04). Containment Fan Coil Units have exhibited cracks on stator strap The licensee took correc-tive actions to replace the defective containment fan unit and inspected all of the remaining units to identify any similar problem A number of minor problems were identified and correcte In order to prevent future fan coil unit failures the containment fan coil units have been placed on a periodic inspection schedul The inspector has no further questions at this tim (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-311/84-32-01).
Primary Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) stuck in mid strok The licensee performed a safety evalu-ation that hypothesized that when the valve was reversing midway in the opening stroke, the thrust required exceeded the normal closing thrust and subsequently, the torque switch opene The control circuits have been modified by adding seal-ins to prevent repositioning during mid strok Also torque switch setpoints were increase Other similar valves
- throughout the station were also evaluate Thrust requirements are being formulated to reset them as necessar The inspector considers this item close (Closed) Violation (50-311/85-07-03).
Individual Rod Position Indication (IRPI) procedure violatio The procedure was not consistent with Technical Specification The licensee has identified the root cause which was that I&C supervisory personnel failed to consider the difference between the Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specification The inspector has reviewed the licensee 1 s corrective actions and considers this item close (Closed) Violation (50-311/84-42-01). Adequate procedures were not provided for the installation of an expansion joint for the service water system, and certain steps had not been taken with regard to the storage and pre-servation of expansion joint The inspector has reviewed the licensee 1 s response and corrective actions and notes that the appropriate procedure and storage guidelines have been upgraded to prevent further occurrenc This item is considered close (Closed) Violation (272/84-42-05).
Scaffold erected in areas with operable safety related equipment and no SER writte (Closed) Unresolved (272/84-32-02).
Licensee to resolve the scaffold in safety related area The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the above violation and Administrative Procedure (AP) 32 titled "Scaffolding Program 11 *
AP-32 was issued on October 9, 1985 and it details the procedures and evaluations required for the placement of scaffolding in areas that contain safety related equipmen The inspector has no further questions at this tim.
Operational Safety Verification Documents Reviewed Selected Operators* Logs Senior Shift Supervisor 1 s (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and
compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure (1)
On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LC0 1 s directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio (2)
On a weekly basis, the inspectors confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubri-cation, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit (3)
On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents;
Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspectors selected phases of the units* operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1 s regulation The inspectors determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not consti-tute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth: Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of those periods discussed belo On October 6, 1985 at 4:59 a.m. the reactor tripped following a turbine trip which was caused by a condenser low vacuum signa The low vacuum signal occurred when the Senior Shift Supervisor was troubleshooting the sensing devic It was later determined that a slug of condensa-tion in a condenser vacuum sensing line had reached the sensor and generated a low vacuum signa This resulted from the supervisor opening the tell tail drain line, with his finger over the end to test for the presence of liquid He was convinced that no liquids were present however, the air that was let in during this evolution was apparently sufficient to cause the trip signa As designed the turbine tripped on low vacuum and the reactor tripped on the turbine trip with power greater than 11%.
This trip terminated the licensee's longest continuous run at 278 day On October 7, 1985 at 5:10 p.m. the licensee entered mode 5 (cold shutdown) in preparation for a number of outage required work activitie During the resulting 16-day outage the licensee completed the following major work items:
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repair/replace #13 steam generator manway Electrical Generator 'crawl through' inspection repair of various pressurizing system valves
No. 14 Reactor Coolant Pump balancing Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
hydrostatic test Polar crane modification modification to the condenser vacuum sensing lin Although not required for plant startup, the licensee scheduled and completed the polar crane modification and the eves hydro in an attempt to shorten the critical path of the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outag On October 21, 1985 a unit startup was commenced, however it had to be terminated because control rod 1C2 could not be fully withdrawn from the cor The reactor trip breakers were opened and repairs made to the control rod connector At 1:33 a.m. on October 22 the unit was taken critical and brought on line at 2:25 The unit was brought to 100% power where it remained for the rest of the report period with the exception of short time periods used for testin.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of those periods discussed belo At 10:01 a.m. on October 7, 1985 the unit tripped from 100%
power due to the signal 11 23 reactor coolant pump breaker open 11 *
The actual breaker did not open and all reactor coolant pumps remained runnin The cause has been attri-buted to an instrument technician who caused a momentary ground on 11 C 11 vital bus while performing frequency testing on that bu Unknown to the technician, the wiring at the panel (2RP1) is not of conventional design and the ground is on a pin other than that of the standard frequency test mete The panel is wired in accordance with station drawing During the trip there was a safety injection due to actual high steam flow signals and false signals for low steam line pressure which were set up by the momentary ground on 11 C 11 vital bu After repairs were made which included the replacement of a coil in #23 reactor coolant pump breaker the unit returned to service at 9:06 p.m. on October 9, 198 *
The resident inspector reviewed the Post Reactor Trip report and SORC minutes and witnessed portions of the startup and return to powe At 8:01 p.m. on October 30, 1985 the licensee declared an unusual event and commenced a controlled shutdown in accor-dance with Technical Specifications when both centrifugal charging pumps were made inoperable to effect repairs to a small weld crack on a 1-inch charging system instrument lin The controlled shutdown continued until the weld repair was completed at 12:56 a.m. on October 31, 198 The licensee terminated the unusual event and began to increase power at 1:03 The resident inspector reviewed the weld repair package and determined that a 1/4 inch long weld crack was repaired in accordance with the station 1s procedures which conform to NRC regulations and the applicable ANSI codes and standard The inspector has no further questions concerning the weld repai No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspectors reviewed the following safety related maintenance activi-ties to verify that repairs were made in accordance with approved proce-dures and in compliance with NRC regulations and recognized codes and standard Two extensive maintenance activities were reviewed, the replacement of the cold leg manway for #13 Steam Generator and the repair and repacking of Spray Valve 1PS In his review the inspector verified, by review of the following documents, that the maintenance accomplished was performed in accordance with the approved procedures, and that these procedures were in compliance with the appropriate codes and standard The inspector also verified that the materials used were in compliance with that purchased for the repair and were installed using properly calibrated equipment by personnel trained in the use of the equipmen Documents reviewed:
Work Order 85-09-19-030-5 Work Order 85-10-07-001 Work Order 0090179679 Procedure Ml4#
Replace and repack 1PS3 Remove air operator, reinstall test and stroke 1PS3 Replace Primary Manway on a Steam Generator (#13 Cold Leg)
Pressurizer Spray Valve Repair
Procedure M9-11P-2 Procedure T-175 Westinghouse Procedure Procedure M2Q Retests OD-10 M9-IIP-2
Inservice Inspection of Bolting and Internal Surfaces and Visual Examinatio Steam Generator Primary Side Manway Removal Steam Generator Manway repair Usage, Control, Inspecting, Testing and Maintenance of Rigging equipmen For testing the integrity of the primary manway The inspector concluded that the maintenance was properly performed and has no further questions at this tim No violations were identifie.
Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillances were reviewed in depth with portions of the procedures witnessed by the inspector during the Unit 1 outag PD16.2.013 Intermediate Range Channel 1N35 Functional Test 1PD16.l.013 Intermediate Range Channel 1N35 Calibration IIC-2.5.00(2)
Various Sensor Calibrations Through (16)
No violations were identifie.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, to identify equipment conditions that might
degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Unit 2 Safety Injection system was inspecte No violations were identifie.
Cold Weather Preparations The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities associated with the preparation for station operation during extreme cold weather condition The licensee completed the Operational Directives-71 "Station Preparations For Winter Conditions" checklists during this inspection period and found the station to be prepared for cold weather with minor exceptions for which work orders were writte These checklists will be completed again in December and February to ensure adequate freeze protection remains operable throughout the winte The inspector performed an inspection of the entire facility including the turbine and auxiliary buildings, service water structures, fire pump structure, fuel handling building, radwaste areas, and external water storage tank The inspector did not identify any areas of concern rela-tive to the prevention of cold weather induced problem No violations were identifie.
NRC Contractor Review of Post Accident Effluent Monitoring On October 7, 1985, the licensee's post-accident monitoring system, installed pursuant to the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1-2,
"Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents", was reviewed by a specialist from Battelle Laboratories accompanied by an NRC inspecto This review was for the purpose of comprehending problems associated with representa-tive sampling of effluent release paths in accident condition The review included examination of the system design, the evaluation of operating data and the determination of operational parameters that could effect representative samplin It is expected that the data and infor-mation acquired in this review will assist the NRC in the development of generic guidance in this are The licensee representatives assisting in this review were cooperative and helpful in understanding system design and performance capabilitie No unsatisfactory conditions were note.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspectors reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report informa-tio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
I2 Unit I Monthly Operating Report - September I985 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - September I985 I Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accor-dance with Technical Specification Unit I LER 85-009 Fire Watch Not Continuously Maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications (T.S.)
On September I3, I985 the low pressure CO 2 fire suppression system for the IC diesel was taken out of service in order to perform maintenance on the IC diese A fire watch was posted as required by T.S. Action Statement 3.7.I0.3.a; however, he left his station prior to the C02 system being returned to servic The violation of this T.S. action statement appears to be an isolated cas The inspector will continue to monitor the licensee 1 s performance in this are LER 85-010 Waste Gas Holdup System Not Continuously Sampled for Oxygen On September I9, I985, the licensee discovered that the inservice Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) was not being continuously sampled for hydrogen and oxygen as required by Technical Specification 3.II. An improper valve lineup was identified to be the cause of this incident; however, a general lack of understanding of the new waste gas analyzer system appears to be the root cause of this LER and a number of other problem The licensee has committed to develop and place into use by November I5, I985, a 11 user fri endly 11 troub 1 eshoot i ng guide for the gas analyzer syste In addition, improved training for the operations department and chemistry personnel is needed to prevent additional problem A repetitive source of confusion is the low flow alarm on the gas analyze As the analyzer automatically shifts from one sample point to the next (3 minutes per sample) it provides a 11gas analyzer trouble 11 alarm in the control room if it cannot obtain sufficient flow for a sampl However, by the time an operator gets to the gas analyzer panel the analyzer has shifted to another sample point and there is no way to tell which sample flow was too lo The operator then clears the alarm and no real corrective active action is take The licensee is evaluating two design changes which would place the analyzer on hold when an alarm is received and separate the hydrogen and oxygen low flow alarm The licensee 1 s corrective actions including the implementation of a trouble-shooting guide will be reviewed in a future report (50-272/85-23-0I).
r
LER 85-011
Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Exceeded Allowable Limit This event was cited as a violation in Inspection Report 272/85-2 The inspector has determined that the licensee's corrective actions are adequat In addition to the immediate corrective actions the licensee has committed to develop and issue a new surveillance procedure SP(0)4.4.6.2.b titled 11 Reactor Coolant Leak Detection
which will replace Operating Instruction DI II-1.3.5 (Reactor Coolant Leak Detection) and surveillance procedure SP(0)4.4. (Unidentified/Now Identified Leak Rate Determination).
The new procedure will also incorporate guidance on the quantification of steam leak This procedure will be reviewed after its scheduled issuance date of November 15, 1985, as part of the violation closeou Unit 2 LER 85-020 Reactor Trip Manually Initiated due to Lowering Pressurizer Pressure On September 21, 1985, leakage past pressurizer spray valve 2PS3 caused system pressure to decrease until the reactor was manually tripped from 25% powe This event is discussed in Inspection Report 50-311/85-2 The inspector has no further questions at this tim.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.