IR 05000272/1985018
| ML18092A772 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1985 |
| From: | Limroth D, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092A771 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-***, TASK-TM 50-272-85-18, 50-311-85-20, NUDOCS 8509170156 | |
| Download: ML18092A772 (21) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No Docket No License No /85-18 50-311/85-20 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050272-850708 050272-850729 050311-850706 050311-850707 050311-850708 050311-850711 050311-850720 050311-850723 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
August 1, 1985 - August 31, 1985
- Inspectors:
Reviewed Approved by:
Inspection Summary:
Inspections on August 1, 1985 - August 31, 1985 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/85-18 and 50-311/85-20)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, ESF system walkdown, calibration program, review of special reports, licensee event followup, and TMI Item The inspection involved 177 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector Results:
This report does not contain any items of concern with respect to NRC requirement It does however document the licensee's identified items of concern with regard to plant operation The report also documents the current status of NUREG 0737 TMI Lessons Learne :-:-8509170156 850913
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PD A DOCK 05000272 I
G PDR
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspec-tion activit.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Follow Item 272/82-22-02; 311/82-21-02: Evaluate Need for Master List to Control the Calibration of Technical Specification (TS) Related Instrument The scheduling of safety related instrument and gauge cali-bration is controlled by the Inspection Order (IO) Program and the station computer scheduling syste The plant staff conducted a detailed review of TS during the development of these systems to ensure that all TS
- surveillance requirements would be me As changes are made to the TS the staff then updates the IO program as applicabl The inspector verified that selected safety related instruments and gauges were properly covered by the station calibration program (see paragraph 7).
This item is close.
Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor's (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, techni-cians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant managemen The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Admini-strative Procedure (1)
On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;
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Adherence to LC0 1 s directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio (2)
On a weekly basis, the inspectors confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubri-cation, vibration, cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operabilit (3)
On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established; Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and,
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Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineu.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspectors selected phases of the units' operation to determine compliance with the NRC's regulation The inspectors determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not consti-tute a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personne The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth: Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of minor power reductions to perform surveillance testin.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout this report period with the exception of those periods discussed belo The licensee declared an unusual event at 9:14 p.m. on August 1, 1985 and began to place the unit in hot standby, when an action statement relating to RWST minimum water level could not be satisfied within the one hour prescribed by Technical Specification The cause of the decreasing water level in the RWST has been attributed to a faulty valve lineup which allowed RWST water to flow to the CVCS holdup tan The tank was brought back to level specifi-cation and chemistry results were satisfactory at 12:45 a.m. on August The licensee terminated the unusual event and began to increase reactor powe The results of an investigation by the licensee and a followup by the resident inspector identified the followin The faulty lineup was brought about when the normally closed discharge valve from the primary drains tank transfer pump to the RWST was opened to provide a path for the primary drains tank pump discharg This would allow isolating the normal discharge path to the eves holdup tank, which was to be tagged out for valve maintenanc It is not PSE&G company policy to tag valves in the open position, and therefore the valve change to the RWST was not included in the valve tagout for main-tenanc However, it was included in the off normal valve list within the computer.
When the maintenance job was completed all valves except the RWST valve were returned to normal as per the tagou When this was completed there was a path from the RWST to the waste holdup tank thus the water flowed from the RWST to the holdup tank and caused the low leve The inspector has had discussions with the licensee as to the need to include valves that are opened to be treated as part of the system tagout to preclude a similar event from taking plac The licensee is considering this need and the resident inspector will follow up when the licensee issues guidanc At 1:35 p.m. on August 8, 1985 Salem Unit 2 tripped from 100% power due to the P-7 turbine tri (Turbine trip caused by reactor trip breaker 11 open 11 indication)
The trip occurred when surveillance testing was being performed on the reactor trip breakers (RTB).
Several systems did not function as require (1) No. 22 auxiliary feed pump (AFP)
did not start because the 118 11 train was blocked and in test due to breaker surveillance, (2) No. 23 AFP (steam driven)
started and came up to speed but the speed demand was such that the pump output pressure could not overcome steam generator (SG) pressur The operator manually started N AFP and fed SG 1 s per procedure 1 (3) because of erratic operation of the power operated relief valves 11A 11 SG safety valve lifte The licensee subsequently determined that:
(1) the cause of the reactor trip breaker opening was a loose wire on terminal #11 (under voltage coil) in the upper portion of the reactor trip breaker housing assembl The licensee demonstrated the trip for the resident inspectors. (2) The steam driven feed pump would have delivered water to the two steam generators that were not receiving water, because #22 motor driven feed pump did not start, if the operator had waited for it to come up to speed (56-58 seconds).
The operator started #22 auxiliary feed water pump 18 seconds into the incident. (3) The safety lifting was at the desired set point, and lifted because the main steam stop was shut by the operator (permitted by procedure on rapid cooldowns).
The power operated relief valves were operating within design and were subsequently tested by the licensee who determined that the instrumen-tation associated with them is of a slower reaction time than required for this scenari The licensee has brought the vendor (Westinghouse) into the plant to perform evalu-ations to determine where improvements can be made to enhance the valves performanc The unit was returned to service on August 10, 1985.
An unusual event was declared and a unit shutdown commenced at 3:12 a.m. on August 27, 1985 due to having both com-ponent cooling heat exchangers (CCHX) inoperabl The 21 CCHX was out of service for maintenance on the temperature control valve when the 22 CCHX service water (SW) isolation valve failed to a closed positio Attempts by maintenance personnel to jack the valve open failed to adequately restore flow and the 22 CCHX was declared inoperabl The unit was in Mode 2 at 4:45 a.m. and Hot Standby at 4:50 At 8:20 a.m. the 21 CCHX was returned to service and the unusual event was terminate The unit was taken critical at 5:03 a.m. on August 28, 1985 after completion of repairs to the 22 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger (CCUX) Service Water outlet isolation valv The valve malfunction has been attributed to a vibration induced failure which caused the valve actuator to separate from the valve ste The subject valve is a 20 inch manually operated butterfly valv During the unit startup both CCHX's were in service and no abnormal vibrations were observe The licensee management has formed a study panel to investigate why Unit 2 is experiencing more plant malfunc-tions than Unit The thrust of the group will be to investigate causal links, if an They will also be in-vestigating the recent number of service water related malfunction The resident inspector witnessed the approach to critica During the unit startup on August 28, 1985 the licensee experienced difficulties with the operation of the 22 Steam Generator main steam line isolation valve (22MS167) while opening the valve hydraulicall The problem was identi-fied to be a faulty opening directional solenoid for the hydraulic pump and bypass valv The solenoid was replaced and 22MS167 was tested satisfactorily including emergency closure timin While the problem with 22MS167 was being investigated the reactor was being maintained at approxi-mately 2% powe During this hold period a safety valve on the 22 Steam Generator (22MS14) lifted for approximately 2 minutes while Tave was 550 degrees (corresponding to 1045 psi).
The required lift setting is 1100 psig +/- 1%.
At 9:11 p.m. on August 28 the unit was shutdown to Mode 3 and the lift setpoint for 22SM14 was adjusted to 1106 psi MS14 was declared operable at 11:30 p.m. and a reactor startup commenced at 11:40 p.m. August 28, 198 The reactor was critical at 3:18 a.m. August 29, 1985 and the unit was on line at 8:06 The unit was at 100% power at the close of this inspection period.
No violations were identifie.
Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related mainte-nance activities to verify that redundant components were operable, these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for opera-tion, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the 11 skills of the trade, 11 appropriate radio-logical controls were properly implemented, ignition/fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to servic During this inspection period the following activities were observed:
No. 13 Charging Pump Seal Leak repair per work order 85-07-26-069-No. 23 Charging Pump Speed Increaser Repair per work order 85-08-13-016-3 No violations were identifie.
Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress sur-veillance testing as well as completed surveillance package The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulation The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillance The following surveillance was reviewed in depth with portions of the procedure witnessed by the inspecto Procedure M3Q-2 Unit 1 Procedure M3Q-2 Unit 1 Semi-Annual Inspection of Unit 1 Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker A (3-24Y7269-B)
Semi-Annual Inspection of Unit 1 Reactor Trip Breaker A (Serial Number 02YN201-1)
During the performance of M3Q-2 on the Unit 1 11 B11 bypass reactor trip breaker the shunt trip clearance was found to be.018 inches which is less than the minimum acceptable value of.032 inche Incident report N and deficiency report No. SMD-3644 were written to document this finding and the required notifications were mad Work order 85-08-05-051-8 was written to replace to the shunt trip coil mounting screw and retap the screw hol After completion of corrective maintenance, the applicable portions of M3Q-2 were satisfactorily reperforme *
The inspector witnessed portions of maintenance procedure M3Q-2, "Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass Air Circuit Breaker Semi-Annual Inspection Lubrication and Testing 11 *
During the performance of this test, the Westinghouse DB-50 reactor trip breaker (RTB) lA (serial number 02YN201-1)
failed to meet the trip bar force acceptance criteria of step 9.4.2 The maximum acceptable trip bar force is 885 grams and RTB lA required a trip bar force in excess of 1160 gram The surveillance test was immediately stopped and NRC notifications made per the Event Implementation Classi-fication Guide section 17, 10 CFR 50.72, and Technical Specification 3. On August 29, 1985 a Westinghouse technical representative inspected the breaker and determined that no maintenance was required other than lubri-catio The trip mechanism pins, bearing points, and latch surfaces were lubricated with 53701 GW Molybednum Disulfid The breaker was then retested and the trip bar force measurement averaged approximately 700 gram The licensee completed the surveillance test and returned RTB lA to service on August 30, 198 No violations were identifie.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The inspectors verified the operability of the selected ESF system by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the system to confirm that system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configura-tion, to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that instrumentation is calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves are properly positioned and locked as appropriat The Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System was inspecte No violations were identifie.
Calibration Program An inspection was conducted of the licensee's programs for calibration of instruments and gauges used to satisfy Technical Specification require-ments and for the control and issuance of measuring and test equipment (M&TE).
During the course of this insepction the following documents and references were reviewe CFR 50 Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria Technical Specifications ANSI 18.7 - 1976 Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants Maintenance Procedure A-9 Control and Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE)
Administrative Procedure (AP)-10 Inspection Order Program AP-20 Non-Conformance Program AP-22 Measuring and Test Equipment Control Program Individual component history files M&TE Issuance and Inventory Records The insepctor determined that the licensee's procedures and programs were in compliance with the applicable regulations and industry standard A representative sample of instruments and gauges installed in safety related systems was selected by the inspector for a detailed review of:
compliance with TS surveillance requirements including frequency the accuracy and content of completed test documentation relating to the chosen instrument surveillance procedure technical content test equipment usage, and qualification of individuals performing surveillance testing and calibratio The licensee's system for control and calibration of M&TE was inspected through a review of:
Master Equipment List Test Equipment Signout Log Test Equipment History Files and the Calibration Recall Progra The inspector selected various M&TE instruments that had been used on safety related systems and verified that they were in calibration at the time of use, and that their use was traceable back to the test or surveillance procedur In addition, the inspector verified that the M&TE calibration records were up to date and that the calibration standards were traceable to national standard No violations were identified.
10 Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspectors reviewed periodic and special report The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report infor-matio The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - July 1985 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - July 1985 Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LER's to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accor-dance with Technical Specification Unit 1 LER 85-007 No. 14 Waste Gas Decay Tank - Inadvertent Release of Contents On July 8, 1985 an inadvertent release was made from the No. 14 waste gas decay tan This release was caused by seat leakage through valve 1WG41 (Tank Vent Control Valve) during a leak check of the waste gas analyzer syste Although a pre-release sample was not obtained as required by Technical Specifications (TS) the release was monitored by the plant vent monitors, and the release was determined to be within TS limit The licensee has revised the leak rate procedure to require a pre-release waste gas tank sample to be obtained prior to leak rate testin The inspector has no further questions at this tim LER 85-008 Service Water Leak Inside of Containment This report was made in accordance with IE Bulletin 80-24 and *was a result of a minor service water leak inside of containmen There was no accu-mulation of water inside of containment and no equipment was damage The inspector has no further question Unit 2 LER 85-011 Reactor Trip from 33% - High-High Level No. 21 Steam Generator/Turbine Trip
- During the unit startup on July 7, 1985 a reactor trip occurred from thirty-three percent power due to a turbine trip which in turn was caused by a high-high water level in the 21 steam generato The root cause of this event was a personnel error and is discussed in Inspection Report 311/85-1 This event was cited as a violation for failure to follow procedure LER 85-012 Reactor Trip from 10% Due to Low-Low Water Level in No. 23 Steam Generator During the unit startup on July 8, 1985 the reactor tripped due to a low-low water level in the No. 23 steam generato This event is discussed in Inspection Report 311/85-17 and was a result of a lack of coordination between the operators and the supervisors in the control roo The inspector witnessed a session of the simulator command and control training which is intended to help improve control room communication The inspector has no further
- question LER 85-013 28 Diesel Generator Test Failure During routine surveillance testing on July 6, 1985 the operator initiated a diesel shutdown after receiving a generator field ground alar The licensee determined that no generator ground condition existed and the alarm was due to a malfunctioning field ground rela Because (1) the field ground relay provides only an alarm function and not an automatic shutdown and (2) the diesel generator was in an operable status at all times this event was classified as a non-valid test failure in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.10 The field ground relay was readjusted and satisfactorily teste The diesel generator surveillance test was then satisfactorily complete The inspector has no further question LER 85-014 28 Diesel Generator Test Failure Due to Fuel Oil Leak On July 11, 1985 a fuel oil leak developed on the number 3L cylinder during post maintenance surveillance testing of the 28 diesel generato The licensee entered the appropriate action statement, performed correc-tive maintenance, and satisfactorily retested the 28 diese This was the first diesel generator test failure in the last one-hundred valid test The inspector has no further question LER 85-015 Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Greater Than TIS Limit On July 20, 1985 the unit was shutdown due to a reactor coolant system leak rate calculation which measured greater than 1 GP This event is discussed in Inspection Report 311/85-17.
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LER 85-016
Boric Acid Tanks and Boron Injection Tank Boron Concentration Below Specifications On July 23, 1985 the licensee determined that the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST) and Boron Injection Tank (BIT) boron concentrations were below the minimum required value of 20,000 pp The cause has been determined to be a malfunctioning check valve (2CV173) located between the boric acid blender and the BAST 1s and BI This malfunctioning valve allowed the BAST 1 s and BIT to be diluted during reactor coolant system dilution operation The unit was shutdown and the boron concentration returned to allowable values in all tank Because 2CV173 did not leak during sub-sequent testing no further corrective actions were require The licensee continued to monitor boron concentration in these tanks on an increased frequency and verified that 2CV173 was operating correctl Once satisfied that boron concentrations were stable the normal TS sampling frequency of at least once per 7 days was initiate The inspector has no further question.
Status of TMI Action Plan Requirements In Accordance With NUREG-0737 The inspector conducted a review of the licensee 1 s compliance with the TMI Action Plan Requirements of NUREG-073 The review consisted of in-plant inspections, and a review of previous inspection reports, correspondence, and Safety Evaluation Report The inspectors also reviewed the following generic letters, which are related to NUREG-0737 and concluded that where required the licensee resonded in a timely manner to the lette Issued Subject 81-10 2/18/81 III.A.1.2 & 0696 81-17 3/5/81 III.A.1.2 & 0696 81-25 6/15/81 III. /81 I.A. /29/81 II. /8/82 I.A. No Date I. c. 5 82-05 3/17 /82 ALL 82-08 4/15/82 I. c. 5 82-10 5/5/82 I.A.1.3.l & II.K.3.18 82-12 6/15/82 I.A. /20/82 ALL 82-28 12/10/82 II.F.2, 3, 4 82-33 12/17/82 Supplement to 0737
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83-04 83-lOa 83-14 83-16 83-37 85-12 2/1/83 2/8/83 3/17/83 3/24/83 10/24/83 6/28/85
Supplement to 0737 II.K. Letter 82-12 1. c. 5 II.F.2, 3, 4 II.K. The results of this review are documented in Tables 1 and 2 of this inspection repor These tables are intended to provide the latest status of the TMI Action Plan Requirements applicable to Salem 1 and 2 with the exception of items I.D.1, II.B.3, II.F.1, II.D.3.3, III.A.1.2, III.A. which are being tracked by Region I specialist inspector Those docu-ments listed under the reference heading provide information the inspector utilized to determine the status of each action ite.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting perio The licensee did not identify 2.790 materia...
TABLE 1 SALEM UNIT 1 (ON 50/272) TMI ACTION PLAN REQUIREMENT STATUS Shortened Item Title I.A.1.1 Shift technical advisor References
Inspection Report
272/80-23 311/80-04 272/81-04 Letter Starostecki to Eisenhut June 14, 1983 Comments This item is close The shift technical advisor has now become part of the shift complemen He is part of the shift complement and maintains a Senior Operators licens This was enacted under the current rule on STA 1 s -
Li~en to Varga June 14, 1983 I.A.1.2 Shift
Inspection Report
This item is close I.A. I.A. supervisor 50-272/80-23 responsibilities 50-311/80-07 Shift manning Immediate upgrade of RO
& SRO training and qualifica-tions
Inspection Report
272/80-23 311/80-07 Letter Varga to to Schneider Novembe.r 11, 1981
Inspection Report
272/81-05 Letter Varga to Uderitz May 4, 1984 I.A.2.3 Administration of training programs I.A. Revise scope I. c.1
& criteria for licensing exams Short-term
Inspection Report
accident & pro-272/80-07 cedure review 272/80-23 272/80-32 272/81-04 311/81-09 311/80-03 311/80-16 This item is close Although modified since the closeout, Administrative Procedure AP-5 retains the necessary directions to meet the intent of NUREG 0737 This item is close The licensee has incorporated segmented train-ing since the closeout of this ite Letter Varga to Uderitz documents NRR concurrence in this practic The licensee currently does retraining in accordance with accepted practice This item is close This item is close This item is ope See Inspec-tion Report 272/85-15 for status of open item All other items are close *
I. c. 2 Shift & relief Inspection Report This item is close turnover pro-272/80-23 cedures 311/80-07 I. I.C. 4 I. c. 5 I. c. 6 Shift super-visor responsibility Control-room access Feedback of operating experienc Verify correct performance of operating activities I. Plant-safety parameter display II. Reactor-coolant system vents II. Plant shielding II. Training for mitigating core damage II. Relief &
safety-valve test require-ments
Inspection Report
272/80-23 311/80-07
Inspection Report
272/80-23 311/80-07
Inspection Report
272/81-04 272/81-27
Inspection Report
272/81-04 This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is ope See Inspection Report 272/85-15 for status of open item This item is ope See Inspection Report 272/85-15 for status of open item Inspection Report This item is close /82-06
Inspection Report
This item is close /80-20 272/81-05 272/81-27 Letter Varga to McNeill June 17, 1985 This item is ope The letter asks for information from the licensee because insufficient information was provided to com-plete the revie The letter further states the licensee should reply in 60 day II. Valve position Inspection Report This item is close indication 272/80-23 272/80-16 II.E.1.1 Auxiliary Inspecbion Report This item is close feedwater sys-272/81-14 tern evaluation
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II.E.1.2 Auxiliary f eedwater system initiation and fl ow II.E.3.1 Emergency power for pressurizer heaters II.E.4.1 Dedicated hydrogen penetrations II.E.4.2 Containment isolation dependability II. Instrumenta-tion for detection of inadequate core-cooling
Inspection Report
272/81-14 Letter Varga to Schneider June 16, 1981
Inspection Report
272/80-23
Inspection Report
272/80-23 Letter Varga to Schneider August 24, 1981
Inspection Report
272/80-23 272/80-32 272/81-14 Bulletin 80-06
Inspection Report
272/80-23 This item is close Letter June 16, 1981 NRR asks for additional technical specifications to address manual initiation of AFW from the control roo The licensee complied and Amendment 56 added this requiremen This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is ope See Inspection Report 272/85-15 for the status of the remaining open item II. Power supplies Inspection Report This item is close for pressurizer 272/80-23 relief valves, block valves, &
level indicators II. IE Bulletins
Inspection Report
This item is close /79-28 II. Orders on B&W plants Only II.K.2.1.B 1 Apply to Salem II. Final recom-mendatins, B&O task force Bulletin 79-06 NRR Letters -
Varga to Uderitz June 18, 1984 January 30, 1984 Varga to Schneider October 1, 1984 Applicable Items to Salem:
By these letters NRR closes out the applicable item This item is open Refer to Inspection Report 272/
85-15 for status of open item l
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1 Letter Varga to This item is close Uderitz October 6' 1985
Letter Varga to This item is close Uderitz October 6' 1985
Letter Starostecki This i tern is ope to Eisenhut January 14, 1985
See comment This item is open pending tech-section nical specification submitta Inspection Report This item is close /81-05
Letter Varga to This i tern is close Schneider August 24, 1981
Letter Varga to This item is close Schneider August 24, 1981
This item is close Inspection Report This item is close /85-15
Letter Varga to This item is close McNeill June 17, 1985
Letter Varga to This item is ope Analysis due McNei 11 June 17, to NRR in one year from letter 1985 dat III.D.1.1 Primary
Inspection Report
This item is close coolant out-272/80-20 side contain-ment III.D.3.4 Control-room
Inspection Report
This item is close habitability 272/85-15
TABLE 2 SALEM UNIT 2 (ON 50-311) TMI ACTION PLAN REQUIREMENT STATUS Shortened Item Title I.A.1.1 Shift technical advisor I.A.1.2 Shift supervi-sor responsi-bilities I.A. I.A. I.A. Shift manning Immediate upgrade of RO & SRO train-ing & qualifications Administration of training program I.A. Revise scope &
criteria for licensing exams I.B.1.2 Evaluation of organization &
management I. c.1 Short-term acci-dent & procedure review References T.S. Inspection Report 311/80-04 311/81-05 SER Supplement 4 Part II Comments This item is close The STA position is being filled by one of the on-shift supervi-s~rs who has received all required training and meets the educational qualifica-tion SER Supplement 4 This item is close Part II - Inspection Report 311/80-07 SER Supplement 5 Letter Varga to Schneider November 5,1981 - T.S. Inspection Report 311/81-06 LS. 6.4 - NRC Letter Denton to all licensee's dated March 28, 1980 This item it close The inspector has verified that the requirements of this item are delineated in the station Administrative Procedures and are being satisfied in prac-tic There is an ample num-ber of licensed operators to preclude excessive use of overtim This item is close This item is close No documentation was require This item is close No documentation was require SER Supplement 4 This item is close Part II - Inspection Report 311/80-07 SER Supplement 4 Part I I SER Supplement 5 Licensee condition 2.C(24)(b) to DPR-75 - Inspection This item is ope See Inspection Report 311/85-17 for outstanding item..
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I. I. c. 3 I. I.C.5 I. c. 6 I. c. 7 I. I. I.G. l Shift & relief turnover procedures Shift supervisor responsibility Control-room access Feedback of oper-ating experience Verify correct performance of activities NSSS vendor review of procedure Pilot monitor of selected emergency procedures for NTOLs Plant-safety-parameter display console Training during low-power testing II. Reactor-coolant-II. II. system vents Plant shielding T ra i n i n g fo r mitigating core damage
Report 311/81-27 SER Supplement 4 Part II - Inspection Report 311/80-07 SER Supplement 4 Part II - Inspection Report 311/80-07 SER Supplement 4 Part II - Inspection Report 311/80-07 SER Supplement 4 Part II - Inspec-tion Report - 311/
80-07
Inspection Report
311/81-05 SER Supplement 4 Part II Licensee condition 2C.(24)(b) In spec-tion Report 311/
81-27 SER Supplement 4 Part II SER Supplement 5 License Condition 2.C.(25)(c) SER Supplement 5
Inspection Report
311/82-05 Inspection Reprot 311/80-16 311/81-06 SER Supplement 4 Part II - Inspection This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is discussed as part of TMI Action Item I.B.1.4 -
Operating Experience Evalua-ti on Capabilit This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is ope See Inspection Report 311/85-17 This item is close This item is open: See Inspection Report 311/85-17 This item is close This item is close SER Supplement 4 closed the low power portion of this ite II. Relief & safety-valve test requirements II. Valve position indication II.E.1.1 Auxiliary feed-water system evaluation II.E.1.2 Auxiliary feed-water system initiation and fl ow II.E.3.1 Emergency power for pressurizer heaters II.E.4.1 Dedicated hydro-gen penetrations II.E.4.2 Containment isola-tion dependability II. II. II. Instrumentation for detection of inadequate core-cooling Power supplies for pressurizer relief valves, block valves, & level indicators IE Bulletins
Report 311/81-27 SER Supplement 4 Part II (See II.D.2) SER Supple-ment 5 - Letter Varga to McNei 11 June 17, 1985 This item is ope NRR has requested additional infor-mation to complete their evaluatio SER Supplement 4 This item is close Part II - Inspection Report 311/80-18 (open item 80-18-02 Environmental Qualification)
Licensee conditons 2.C.(24)(c)
2.C.(14) - Letter Varga to Uderitz September 20, 1982 This item is close OCR 2EC-125B installed auxiliary feedwater storage tank level indications and alarm SER Supplement 4 This item is close Part II - Inspec-tion Report 311/80-18 NRC Letter Tedesco to Mittl June 12, 1981
Inspection Report
311/80-18 SER Supplement 4 Part II
Inspection Report
311/80-18 311/81-11 - IE Bulletin 80-06
Inspection Report
311/80-18 SER Supplement 4 -
No Restriction thru 100% Power This item is close This item is close This item is not applicable to Salem Unit This item is close This i tern is ope See In-spection Report 311/85-17 for status of remaining open item SER Supplement 4 This item is close Part II - Inspection Report 311/80-18 SER Supplement 4 Part II This item is close ~-------
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II. II. III. III.D. III. Orders on B&W plants Final recommen-dations, B&O task force
2
5
10
17
30
Emergency pre-paredness, short term
NRR Letters:
Varga to Uderitz June 18, 1984 January 30, 1984 Varga to Schneider October 1, 1984 SER Supplement 4 Part II Letter Varga to Schneider August 24, 1981 Letter Varga to Schneider August 24' 1981 Letter Varga to Schneider August 24' 1981 Letter Varga to Uderitz July 6, 1982 - Inspection Report 311/85-17 Letter Varga to McNeill June 17, 1985 Letter Varga to McNeill June 17, 1985 SER Supplement 4 Part II - SER Supplement 6 Primary coolant SER Supplement 5 outside containment Control-room habitability SER Supplement 5 This item is close See Inspection Report 311/
85-1 This item is close This item is close Thts item is ope This item is ope This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is close This item is ope Plant specific analyses due to NRR June 17, 198 This item is close This item is close This item is closed.