IR 05000272/1985098
| ML20197C965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197C962 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-85-98, 50-311-85-98, NUDOCS 8701290021 | |
| Download: ML20197C965 (63) | |
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ENCLOSURE
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SALP BOARD REPORT
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L
REGION I
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SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION REPORT 5U-272/85-98 AND 50-311/85-98 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ASSESSMENT PERIOD: OCTOBER 1, 1985 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1986 BOARD MEETING:
DECEMBER 11, 1986 MEETING WITH LICENSEE: JANUARY 21, 1987 chi ADO
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SUMMARY..............................
TABLE 3 - ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY...................................
TABLE 4 - LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA...................
TABLE 5 - LER SYN 0PSIS.........................................
TABLE 6 - UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC TRIPS AND SHUTDOWNS.............. 53 TABLE 7 - SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES......................
ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - TIME SHUT DOWN PER MONTH IN DAYS................
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INTRODUCTION A.
Purpose and Overview The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an inte-grated NRC staff effort to collect the available observations and data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based upon this information. The SALP program is supplemental to normal regulatory processes used to ensure compliance to NRC rules and regulations.
SALP is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic in order to provide a rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to the licensee's management to promote quality and safety of plant operation.
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on December 11, 1986, to review the collection of performance observa-tions and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance with the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance." A summary of the guidance and evaluation criteria is provided in Section II of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety performance at the Salem Generating Station for the period October 1, 1985 through September 30, 1986. The summary findings and totals reflect the twelve month assessment period.
B.
SALP Board Members Board W. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Chairman S. Collins, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Part-time Chairman T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards W. Johnston, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety P. Eselgroth, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP L. Norrholm, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 28, DRP T. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem D. Fischer,. Licensing Project Manager, NRR Attendees K. Gibson, Resident Inspector, Salem R. Summers, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 28, DRP W. Borchardt, Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek D. Allsopp, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch, DRSS M. Shanbaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS T. Dragoun, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS
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BACKGROUND C.1 Licensee Activities Both Salem units have achieved availability factors well above the national average (68.5%) during the assessment period.
For the period through August of 1986, Unit I was available 82% of the time, and Unit 2 was available 90% of the time.
The Salem Urits historically have experienced high forced outage rates.
The lifetime forced outage rate for Unit 1 is about 27%, and for Unit 2 about 35%. This has improved in most recent years.
In 1985, Unit I was operated with an availability of 95.3% while surpassing the U.S. record for annual gross generation by a nuclear unit.
Unit 1 Unit 1 began the assessment period operating at 100% power.
On October 6, 1985, the unit tripped when a senior shift supervisor opened the vent line resulting in a condenser low vacuum signal during troubleshooting of a condenser vacuum sensing device.
This trip ended the unit's longest continuous run at 278 days.
The plant then entered a 16 day outage to per-form maintenance and testing activities. The October 21, 1985, unit startup was terminated because a control rod could not be fully withdrawn from the core.
The control rod connectors were repaired and, on October 22, 1985, the unit was returned to 100%
power.
On December 16, 1985, the unit surpassed nine million megawatt hours electrical generation, establishing a new United States recntd for gross electrical generation in a calendar year.
The unit tripped from 100% power on January 16, 1986, when an equipment operator closed a breaker cabinet door too hard caus-ing 1A vital bus to trip and shutdown control rod banks C and D to drop into the core resulting in a high negative neutron flux rate trip. On January 31, 1986, the unit tripped from 100%
power due to No.11 Steam Generator (SG) Low Feedwater Flow -
Low Level caused by a nalfunction of feed regulating valve 11BF19. On February 4, 1986, the turbine was taken off line to repair a lube oil leak on the lube oil regulating valve to No. 4 bearing. The plant was maintained in Mode 2 during the repairs.
The unit tripped from 100% power on February 20, 1986, due to No. 14 Steam Generator Low Feedwater Flow - Low Level caused by a broken electrical connection to the solenoid valve resulting in loss of air to feed regulating valve 14BF19. The electrical connections on all four feed regulating valves were replaced and the unit was returned to power on February 21, 1986.
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On March 21, 1986, the unit was taken off line for its sixth refueling outage.
Replacement of three moisture separator reheaters, upgrade of condensate pumps, 45 design changes, and reduction of the backlog of outage-related maintenance work requests were accomplished during the 46 day outage. The unit-was returned to service on May 6, 1986.
Subsequently, the unit tripped from 95% power on May 12, 1986, due to No. 14 Steam Generator Low Feedwater Flow - Low Level as a result of a limit switch going off its normally closed position and the subsequent loss of both main feedwater pump.
On June 6, 1986, the unit tripped from 100% power due to i e failure of the auxiliary power transformer (APT) and resuiting actuation of the generator protection system. The unit returned to power on June 7, but was limited to 90% power due to loading restraints on Nos. 11 and 12 station power transformers. On June 12, 1986, the ur.it tripped due to a feed flow / steam flow mismatch in conjunction with a No.13 Steam Generator low level signal. The cause was a feedwater heater control PC board that became wet due to rain and the cabinet door being left open to facilitate test leads used for testing following the refueling outage.
Resulting false signals led to faulty feedwater system response and eventual tripping of No. 11 feedwater pump.
During the ensuing restart on June 13, 1986, following the unit synchronization, the unit tripped while shifting the turbine lube oil coolers.
On July 21, 1986, the licensee initiated a normal shutdown of the unit to inspect and repair a main generator hydrogen leak into the stator water cooling system.
The unit returned to service on July 29 and operated until August 5, 1986, when the unit tripped on No. 12 Steam Generator (SG) Low Low Level due to the loss of No. 11 SG feed pump caused by a failed suppression diode in the Woodward governor circuit which resulted in an overspeed condition. During the August 6, 1986, startup, the unit tripped from 35% on No.11 Steam Generator low flow in conjunction with Nos. 11 and 13 SG low level.
This condition resulted from No. 12 SG feedwater pump sustaining a runback during troubleshooting on No. 11 SG feed pump. Also on August 6, the licensee identified an environmental qualification dis-crepancy in wiring for Limitorque motor operators and placed the unit in cold shutdown to replace the wires. On August 12, 1986 the unit was returned to 100% power.
On September 2, 1986, limited loading requirements on the station power transformers (SPT) were imposed as a result of the Unit 2 reactor trip, safety injection, false loss of offsite
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power event of August 26, 1986.
The unit was placed in hot shutdown on September 17, 1986, to repair a steam leak on high pressure turbine cold reheat piping to the moisture separator reheater and reheat steam system. The unit was returned to power on September 24, 1986.
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Unit 2 Unit 2 began the SALP period operating at 100% power.
On October 7,1985, the unit tripped from 100% power due to a momentary ground on "C" vital bus caused by an I&C technician performing surveillance on the bus. On October 30, 1985, the licensee declared an unusual event and commenced a controlled shutdown to repair a weld crack on a charging system instrument line which rendered both charging pumps inoperat,le. The unit was taken to hot shutdown on December 10, 1985, (Mode 4) to repair high pressure turbine steam line leaks and seat leakage from main steam safety valves. On December 19, the unit was taken to cold shutdown (Mode 5) to repair leaks on Nos. 21 and 23 Reactor Coolant pumps (RCP) seals. The unit returned to power on January 5,1986. Again, on January 19, 1986, a controlled shutdown and cooldown (Mode 5) was performed to replace Nos. 22 and 24 RCP seals due to excessive leakage. The unit returned to power on February 3,1986.
On April 16, 1986, the unit tripped on No. 23 Steam Generator High-High Level as a result of a transient following loss of No.
22 Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) due to an accumulation of water in the control oil. On May 2, 1986, a controlled shutdown was initiated to perform environmental equipment qualification inspection in containment.
The unit returned to power on May 3.
The unit tripped on July 14, 1986, due to the loss of No. 2B Vital Instrument Bus Inverter, which caused a false reactor trip signal.
Following inverter repair, unit startup was commenced on July 15. During the startup, a reactor trip occurred as a result of a voltage spike on No. 2B Vital Instrument Bus caused by personnel error during testing of the instrument inverter.
The unit was synchronized on July 16. However, later that day, a reactor trip occurred on No. 23 Steam Generator High-High Level as a result of governor control problems on No. 21 SGFP.
Following repairs, the unit returned to service on July 20, 1986.
The unit was placed in cold shutdown (Mode 5) from August 6-14, 1986, to replace Limitorque motor operator wiring to correct an environmental qualification discrepancy.
On August 26, 1986, I&C troubleshooting activities caused spuri-ous signals in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) result-ing in a reactor trip and safety injection (SI).
This event was compounded by a false loss of offsite power (" blackout") signal that resulted when, during vital bus transfers between station power transformers (SPT), 2 of 3 vital busses were momentarily unpowered coincidentally.
Following the event, as a result of commitments made at an NRC/ licensee meeting on August 30, 1986, and in a licensee justification dated August 31, 1986 for
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restart of Unit 2 and continued operation of Unit 1, NRC granted permission for restart of Unit 2 and for continued operation of Unit 1.
The commitments consisted of limiting loading on the station power transformers, powering the group busses from the SPTs, and performing additional analyses on the electrical system. On September 1, 1986, the unit was returned to power.
On September 11, 1986, the unit tripped on loss of Nos. 22 and 23 Reactor Coolant Pumps due to the deenergizing of 2F and 2G non-vital (group) busses caused by an electrical short on a non-vital transformer coincident with an internal failure of No. 22 Station Power Transformer.
Spare transformers were installed and the unit returned to power on September 28, 1986.
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C.2 Inspection Activities
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An NRC senior resident inspector was assigned for the entire assess-ment period; a resident inspector was assigned in July, 1986.
The total NRC inspection effort for the period was 2679 hours0.031 days <br />0.744 hours <br />0.00443 weeks <br />0.00102 months <br /> (resident and region-based). Table 2 (Inspection Hour Summary) shows inspec-tion time distribution in each of the appraisal functional areas.
During the period, two NRC team inspections were conducted in the following areas:
Environmental qualification of electrical equipment.
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Special inspection of the false loss of offsite power event of August 26, 1986.
An NRC Emergency Preparedness inspection team observed the annual emergency exercise on September 16, 1986.
Tabulations of Inspection Activities ard Violations are attached as Tables 1 and 3, respectively.
This report also discusses " Training and Qualification Effectiveness" and " Assurance of Quality" as separate functional areas. Although these topics, in themselves, are assessed in the other functional areas through their use as evaluation criteria, the two areas provide a synopsis.
For example, quality assurance effectiveness has been assessed on a day-to-day basis by resident inspectors and as an integral aspect of specialist inspections.
Although quality work is the responsibility of every employee, one of the management tools to measure this effectiveness is reliance on quality assurance inspec-tions and audits. Other major factors that influence quality, such as involvement of first-line supervision, safety committees, and work attitudes, are discussed in each functional area.
The topic of fire protection is not discussed as a separate functional area in this assessment period because of insufficient inspection activity. The available observations on fire protection and house-keeping are included in the various relevant functional areas.
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II. CRITERIA Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas.
Each func-tional area represents areas significant to nuclear safety and the environment, and are normal programmatic areas. The following evaluation criteria were used, as appropriate, to assess each area:
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Management involvement and control in assuring quality.
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Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
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Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
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Enforcement history.
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Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
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Staffing (including management).
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Training effectiveness and qualification.
Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional area evaluated is classified into one of three performance categories.
The definitions of these performance categories are:
Category 1:
Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
Licensee manage-ment attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 2: NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels.
Licen-see management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 3:
Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
Licen-see management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear strained or not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory perform-ance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieve.-
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Trend:
The SALP Board may determine to include an appraisal of the performance trend of a functional area. Normally, this performance trend will only be used where both a definite trend of performance is discernible to the Board and the' Board believes that continuation of the trend will result in a change of performance level.
Improving _
Licensee performance was determined to be improving near the close of the assessment period.
Declining Licensee performance was determined to be declining near the close of the assessment period, t
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III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 3.1 Facility Performance Category Category Last Period This Period (9/1/84 -
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Recent Functional Area 9/30/85)
9/30/86)
Trend A.
Plant Operations
2 Improving B.
Radiological Controls
1 and Chemistry C.
Maintenance
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Surveillance 2-
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Emargency Preparedness
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Security and Safeguards
1 G.
Outages and Engineering Support
2 H.
Licensing Activities
2 I.
Assurance of Quality N/A
Improving J.
Training and Qualification N/A
Effectiveness 3.2 Overall Facility Evaluation During this rating period, our assessment of performance included the results of changes to your organization and a new management philosophy.
Your performance has shown improvements and has established some strengths, however, there remain some weaknesses that warrant attention.
Your management philosophy and oversight which stress responsibility, accountability, and ownership, have resulted in the placement of managers who are technically competent and effective leaders. Quality improve-ment programs have been instituted to identify and correct not only discrepancies within the station programs, but also the material condition of the facility. As a result of your initiative to utilize union personnel in these programs, the relationship between management and workers has improved. Your organization displays cooperation and responsiveness to NRC concerns and initiatives, and all levels of management maintain an open dialogue with NRC representative.
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The root cause analyses following plant occurrences are now being performed in more depth.
These analyses and investigations have been successful in identifying and correcting the causes of events leading to trips and plant safety concerns.
Employee-management relationships have improved. Outage planning and perform-ance have become more structured as evidenced by the more timely completions of outages.
There have been a number of identified personnel errors. The programs in place seem to be sound and have identified problems that were caused or missed by personnel performing operations, surveillance or trouble-shooting activities.
There have been a number of identified const-ruction deficiencies and equipment failures that have led to plant problems. The majority of these were the result of balance of plant problems. Although the engineering support to the station has improved we acknowledge that you have identified, through a contractor, that additional concerns within the engineering organization need correction.
The above listed observations are further amplified within the speci-fic sections of this report.
You have continued to operate a safe and efficient facility.
You have developed effective programs to operate the facility and should continue to refine those programs with specific emphasis on addressing the personnel errors and construction / material deficiencies that were identified during this evaluation period.
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IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A.
Plant Operations (47.7%,1278 hours0.0148 days <br />0.355 hours <br />0.00211 weeks <br />4.86279e-4 months <br />)
1.
Analysis This area was under continuous inspection by the resident inspectors.
Two special team inspections related to plant trips with accompanying
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electrical faults were conducted.
The last assessment period identi-
fied deficiencies in procedure adherence, on the spot changes that led to improper plant operation and a high number of reactor plant trips. The last assessment also requested the licensee to make a presentation of their assessment of the reactor trips to Region I management and recommended that the order issued May 6, 1983 concern-ing the ATWS event be rescinded.
The licensee has a strong management team committed to plant better-ment, which clearly understands NRC policies and regulations. There is consistent evidence of prior planning and the assignment of prior-
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ities by the licensee when dealing with plant operations.
Reviews,
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decisions and corrective actions are clear, timely and in keeping with NRC and industry standards.
Often the corrections to identified concerns and procedural policies presented by the licensee exceed the requirements.
The licensee's new organization, which was in place at the beginning of this evaluation period, emphasizes plant operation with a focus on responsibility, accountability and ownership. Management has esta-
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blished new standards for the nuclear department with emphasis on goals and objectives for all management positions as far down as the engineer level as part of their performance ratings.
Personnel are then graded on the results of their performance. Additionally, a strong emphasis has been placed on control of radiation exposure in day-to-day activities as well as outages. There has been very good success in this area.
(Refer to Section B of this report.)
The SORC (Station Operations Review Committee) continues to be a strong influence on operations. The meetings are focused on plant safety and integration of the new issues into the overall operations i
of the facility. All reactor trips and their cause and analysis are reviewed and concurred in by the SORC prior to unit startup.
The committee stresses root cause analysis of the trips and considers refinements that should be taken to prevent recurrence. During the review of the events which surrounded a reactor trip with an accomp-anying electrical fault in the switchyard that led to a false black-out signal, the SORC organized a series of task forces to focus on the cause and analysis of the event. These task forces analyzed the event, identified cause and effect and presented their findings to the SORC prior to restart.
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The licensee has strengthened procedure adherence and "on the spot" changes. During this assessment period, there were no identified concerns in these two areas. There was however, a concern identified with regard to a long-standing item which management had failed to correct that led to a plant trip. The event began when the operators tied closed a limit switch, that in the past has been identified as a contributor to plant trips. The breaking of the tie down line initi-ated the trip because the limit switch opened. The concern has been resolved and licensee communications with all parties have reiterated management policy on the consequences of bypassing limit switches.
Long-standing fire protection issues referred to in the last assess-ment period, such as a continuous action statement in effect because of improper, broken or otherwise disabled fire doors, improperly installed fire dampers, and deficiencies within the sprinkler and detection system have been corrected. A new fire chief has been hired and the staffing of the on site protection organization is considered to be adequate.
The licensee has identified several problems within the fire protection program that led to a violation.
The responses correcting the problem, which included the use of fire watches and identification of technical specification related doors, was generally timely and no additional problems of this nature have been identified. However, the licensee is still identifying concerns within the fire protection program. Actions have been taken to correct the identification of fire barriers that are not readily identifiable without special markings.
In general, the fire protec-tion program has improved; and, the current staff is identifying deficiencies that have always existed within the program but had not been previously detected.
Housekeeping at the facility has improved. The good material appear-ance in all areas of the facility is readily apparent.
In the auxil-iary building, the radiologically controlled areas have been reduced and the material appearance has significantly improved. Ground water in-leakage has been addressed and virtually eliminated. The itcensee has a full time staff devoted to plant material condition and clean-liness. Most of the facility has been painted (utilizing a color coding scheme) and a component identification program is underway.
The appearance, cleanliness, and condition of the facility is consi-dered to be outstanding.
During this assessment period, the licensee has been very responsive to NRC initiatives, including closing out old NRC open items by dedt-cating a staff to work with the resident inspector to address these items.
The licensee (all major departments) conducts quarterly
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meetings with the resident inspectors to address future initiatives, current events and programmatic changes. The licensee has a strong Licensee Event Report (LER) reporting system. Thirty-eight nonsecurity events were reported for the station during this reporting period in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 procedures. Twenty LERs regarding Unit 1, and eleven LERs regarding Unit 2 were submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. A summary of these event reports is found in Tables 4 and 5 of this report.
In addition, based on a limited sample review,
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the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data concluded that the Salem Generating Station LERs were of a very high quality.
The licensee met with NRC Region I on two occasions during this period. On May 6, 1986, a meeting prompted by the last SALP dealt with the licensee's initiatives for trip reduction at the Salem Station.
(The trip analysis for this period is discussed later in this section.) On August 26, 1986, a meeting was held to discuss the licensee's intentions regarding the restart of Unit 2 following a reactor trip and safety injection with an accompanying false loss of offsite power signal.
The licensee has been responsive to identified plant conditions that warrant plant shutdown. Without hesitation, on five occasions, rela-ting to Environmental Qualification and plant degraded conditions, the licensee placed the units in a condition to expedite repairs.
In several cases the units were brought to the cold shutdown condition.
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An above average number of trips (18) continued to be evident at Salem Station.
Six of these trips are attributable to operator error. Although the errors are not causally linked, they are avoid-able trips that should be addressed by the licensee.
The mean trip rates per 1,000 critical hours, for the units are 1.8 for Unit 1 and 1.1 for Unit 2.
The rates attained for both units are
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above the 1985 average for Westinghouse plants which was about 1.0 per 1,000 critical hours.
The overall staffing of the facility is essentially complete. There are several proposed new positions which are currently being evalu-ated and filled within station engineering, site protection (fire protection) and radiation protection departments. During this assessment period, a new President and Chief Operating Officer was
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selected, a Senior Vice President position was eliminated, the oper-ations engineer was replaced, and a radiation protection engineer was hired. The organizational changes are designed to remove some of the management chain between the higher levels of the organization and the individuals actually performing the work.
This change is
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In summary, the licensee exhibits consistent evidence of prior plan-ning and assignment of priorities. Decision making is consistent at
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all levels.
Reviews are generally timely, thorough and technically sound.
Corrective actions taken are effective and thoroughly address
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the root cause.
The licensee has an aggressive approach to the
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problems encountered in the operation of a nuclear facility and is generally' effective, timely and thorough with regard to overall operations of the facility.
However, trips remain excessive and need to be addressed.
2.
Conclusion Rating: Category 2 Trend:
Improving.
3.
Board Recommendations Licensee None NRC None l
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B.
Radiological Controls and Chemistry (9L 241 hours0.00279 days <br />0.0669 hours <br />3.984788e-4 weeks <br />9.17005e-5 months <br />)
1.
Analysis In the previous assessment period, this area was rated as Category 1.
During that period, the licensee demonstrated a strong commitment to collective man-rem exposure reduction and radwaste reduction. Due to poorly written and ambiguous radiological controls procedures, minor performance difficulties were encountered resulting in several minor violations. However, overall licensee performance in this area was excellent.
In the current period, one radwaste violation was cited but was with-drawn when the licensee presented additional information.
There were no escalated enforcement actions, civil penalties or confirmatory action letters.
There was one routine inspection in each of the following program areas: Radiation Protection; Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation; Confirmatory Chemistry Measurements; and Non-radiological Chemisfry.
There was one special inspection to observe the packaging and shipment of primary resin.
During this period, there was a major physical rearrangement of the main access control point to increase controls over access to radio-logical areas of Units 1 and 2.
In addition, a computer system was installed that controls personnel entries via interactive terminals, performs required recordkeeping, and provides entry / exit data trends for management review.
New office space was built adjacent to the control point providing convenient access for the Radiation Protec-tion Manager and his entire staff.
Frisking of personnel is now accomplished with very sensitive automatic machines installed at the control point exit. This has enhanced control of radioactive material.
During this period, the licensee's performance continued at the high level noted in the previous assessment except in the chemistry program, where a persistent lack of improvement was noted, as discus-sed below.
A weakness regarding the need to consolidate radiation protection (RP) procedures and provide better control of changes to chemistry procedures was not resolved by the licensee, although this matter was highlighted in the previous SALP. Although, the licensee has commit-ted to complete implementation of the new procedures prior to the beginning of the 1987 refueling outages.
Radiation Protection There is consistent evidence of management involvement in outage planning to achieve good radiation protection performance and to keep exposures ALARA.
Emphasis on ALARA and support of ALARA by upper
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management is substantial. The contract for the major refueling work included a limit for total exposure with financial penalties if the specification was exceeded. The stem packing on approximately 400 valves was replaced with a low leakage design that will reduce main-tenance requirements in radiation areas and minimize contaminated areas.
The management review of an entry by two personnel into the reactor sump area while the flux thimbles were withdrawn, creating very high radiation levels, was thorough and technically sound from a radiation protection perspective. However, the licensee was requested to review the breakdown.in controls afforded by the operations shift supervisors. A review of licensee action plans indicates that the response to this NRC initiative will involve sweeping changes involv-ing most station departments in an attempt to permanently prevent a similar event from recurring.
The radiation protection department has demonstrated a consistent ability to resolve technical issues from a safety standpoint. The major effort and expense to improve the effectiveness of the control
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point was already discussed. The Radiation Protection Manager has established the policy that no tools or equipment are allowed to leave the controlled area in order to reduce the amount of material brought into the area. The radwaste department found that signifi-cant exposure occurred to personnel attaching the lid on a waste container. A new tool was designed and fabricated to reduce such exposure.
The RP department staff was expanded during the latter part of the previous assessment period. All of the key positions were filled by qualified and experienced personnel within a reasonable time.
Certain programs in common with Hope Creek station such as personnel dosimetry, respiratory protection training, and whole body counting have been transferred to the corporate RP staff. The station RP staff can now concentrate on the day-to-day and outage activities.
Improvements in the training program have resulted in improved under-standing of the work and adherence to procedures. A screening exam is now administered to contractor technicians hired for outage support to verify their understanding of basic regulations. A prac-tical factors portion has also been added for senior contractor tech-nicians to demonstrate the plant-specific RP techniques in use at Salem Station. The training department staff is given in plant assignments during the outage to provide first hand experience and give a good understanding of training need i e
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Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation Management involvement and control in the radioactive waste manage-ment program continued at the level noted during the previous assess-ment period.
Specific goals for reducing the volume of solid radio-active waste generated were established, monitored and generally met by an aggressive campaign involving corporate and plant staffs.
Quality control and assurance activities (including appropriate inspection hold points in preparation, packaging and shipping proce-dures, periodic surveillance of ongoing activities and audits of radioactive waste preparation, classification, packaging and shipping activities) were evident and contributed to adequate adherence to packaging and' shipping requirements. Although a minor deviation from previous licensee commitments was noted in the retraining program for Quality Control inspectors, the training program \\gdnerally provided instruction in all aspects of radioactive wasts preparation, classi-fication, packaging and shipping activities.
l Records of waste disposal are complete, well maintained and provide additional information which the licensee effectively' utilizes in managing and planning solid radioactive waste processing, preparation and packaging activities. The computer program utilized for activity determination and classification is frequently updated as additional waste stream analysis data are provided by the licensee's vendor.
Effluent Control and Monitoring
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A generally effective program for liquid and gaseous effluent control was evident.
Followinp a reorganization, chemistry has responsibil-ity for chemical and radigchemical analyses of primary and secondary coolant and other liquid and gaseous process streams in the plant, control of liquid and gaseous effluents including offsite dose calcu-lations and performance of HEPA and charcoal filter system testing.
During the period, one violation of the chemistry quality control program was identified concerning the use of expired chemicals and reagents. This, and other weaknesses in the licensee's chemical and radiochemical quality control program, as discussed below, indicates inadequate attention to detail and insufficient oversight.
In 1984, chloride measurement procedures lacking the sensitivity and detectubility necessary to meet Technical Specification requirements were identified.
During this assessment period, delay in the resolu-tion of this technical issue contributed to a disagreement in the measurement of standard chloride solutions submitted by the NRC for analysis by the licensee. Disagreement in fluoride, chromium, Iron-55 and Xenon-133 determinations were also noted, suggesting a more general problem with laboratory quality control. An apparent lack of management attention to technical detail in quality control was evidenced by bias in a multichannel analyzer, lack of prescribed warning or control limits on control charts and poor agreement in
-,
s
infrequent intercomparisons with the licensee's participating labor-atories..Although several of these weaknesses were brought to the licensee's attention by contractor audits in August 1984, December 1984, and May 1985, timely improvements in quality control were not provided.
The licensee's corrective action system apparently failed to adequately evaluate and correct the weaknesses noted in the vendor audits.
The licensee possesses an ion chromatograph that can meet the sensitivity requirements for the anion analyses; but, the licen-see has not aggressively pursued the use of this instrument.
In the beginning of the assessment period, inadequate control of procedure changes was demonstrated when changes in chemistry proce-dures for obtaining pre release samples from Waste Gas Decay Tanks were not reflected in Operations procedures resulting in failure to continuously monitor the Waste Gas Heidup system for oxygen.
In another~ event, inadequate procedures resulted in oxygen concentra-tions in excess of Technical Specification limits in two Waste Gas Decay Tanks. These events suggest that the problem with the control of procedure changes as was noted during the previous assessment period, also occurred early in this period. However, these problems were resolved during this period and the events have not recurred.
In summary, the licensee's radiological control program continues to be effective and procedural enhancements are currently being resolved with implementation scheduled prior to the 1987 Refueling Outage.
In contrast to the radiological control program, the licensee's chemis-try and radiochemistry programs need to be strengthened.
2.
Conclusion Rating:
Category 1 Trond:
None
!
3.
Board Recommendation Licensee Increased licensee attention in the area of laboratory QA/QC is warranted in order to assure the quality of the analytical results.
NRC None
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e s
C.
Maintenance (12.4%, 332 hours0.00384 days <br />0.0922 hours <br />5.489418e-4 weeks <br />1.26326e-4 months <br />)
1.
Analysis The previous SALP identified an increasing backlog of Maintenance Work Requests (MWR's), an adequate, but cumbersome method of record storage and the need to assess the combining of the I&C, Maintenance and Electrical departments under one manager. Also, the previous SALP was based primarily on the day-to-day observations of the resi-dent inspectors.
This SALP, similarly was based on observations by the resident inspectors; however, a programmatic inspection by region-based inspectors was also conducted.
The last SALP identified a concern involving an increasing backlog of maintenance work requests in conjunction with the elimination of contract maintenance personnel. During this assessment period, the backlog has been reduced to a manageable, constant number by licensee traintenance personnel with safety-related work requests being addres-sed as top priority. The internal planning organization within the maintenance department plans the work and work requirements includ-ing: post maintenance testing, special instructions, tools needed, manpower and procedure requirements.
The maintenance worker then is only tasked with the actual work and documentation.
,
The maintenance work order system is now totally computerized and includes the scheduling of preventive maintenance, surveillance tests, and environmental qualification type preventative maintenance.
Overall, this system has allowed the licensee to prioritize the main-tenance work and to further refine the preventive maintenance program.
This system is used in the planning, management, and control of main-tenance activities.
With regard to record storage methods, an inspection of station records was conducted during this assessment period with no problems being identified.
The control of activities, decision making on the part of management, and policy adherence has substantially improved because of the new alignment within the maintenance organization.
The new alignment includes one manager and two engineers, one for mechanical and one for electrical and I&C.
This change, in conjunction with the newly
created system engineers, has contributed to a more " root cause" oriented troubleshooting approach to plant problems. This was evidenced in the troubleshooting of several feedwater pump problems that occurred on both units.
Two trips during this period were I
attributed to maintenance related troubleshooting.
Maintenance support during outages is one of the contributing factors to timely completion of outages. During the outages, the maintenance
{
department has been actively involved in two programs that have l
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a s
proved very beneficial to the operability, dependability and safety of the units. They are: MOVATS (Motor Operated Valves Analysis and Test System) which, when implemented, gives a more positive indica-tion as to the status of motor operated valves with respect to their settings for safety purposes; and the repacking of valves, both accessible and inaccessible, during operations. The new packing consists of a live loaded special packing that has reduced the number of leaks in key safety related systems, and has also reduced the amount of man rem that had been previously expended in the repacking effort, especially in the inaccessible areas (high radiation).
In summary, the Maintenance department shows consistent evidence of prior planning and assignment of priorities.
The management struc-ture is suited to the methods of performing maintenance in order to meet deadlines and resolve issues in a timely manner.
During this assessment period there were no violations identified within this area. The Maintenance department has an adequate staff with each supervisor having 8 to 10 individuals assigned to him. There is almost no turnover of personnel and the experience level of personnel
.is high.
2.
Conclusion Rating: Category 1 Trend:
None 3.
Board Recommendations Licensee None
,
NRC None
,
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-
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D.
Surveillance (10.1%, 272 hours0.00315 days <br />0.0756 hours <br />4.497354e-4 weeks <br />1.03496e-4 months <br />)
1.
Analysis The previous assessment identified a lack of strict adherence to procedures and an incorrect interpretation of RCS leakage classifi-cation. The assessment also acknowledged that both areas had been corrected but adequate time had not elapsed to properly assess the long-term results.
Surveillance tests performed by the licensee are the responsibility of several departments, depending on the type of surveillance.
The operations, maintenance, chemistry, and site protection departments participate in surveillance testing. This section addresses surveil-lance tests performed without reference to the particular department involved.
There has been no recurrence of RCS leakage identification or proce-dure adherence problems during this period. However, testing led to two reactor trips directly attributable to surveillance activities.
Several surveillance tests were performed late because of lack of attention on the part of the responsible party.
Several diesel surveillance tests were performed late (by as much as several hours)
by the operations department and chemistry sampling of waste holdup tanks, plant ventilation, and waste gas tanks was delayed due to procedural and personnel errors. About 2500 safety related surveillance tests are performed at the station per year.
During a QA audit of the valves within the IST program, the licensee identified valves that required testing both in the IST program and for containment integrity testing. These valves were added to the proper surveillance tests and an assessment was performed on the valves that had been missed.
No adverse conditions were identified.
The containment valves were normally closed valves which were proven to be closed.
There is evidence that the licensee has programs in place that comply with the technical specifications.
These programs were the reason the licensee identified its own missed surveillance tests and omis-sion of valves on the surveillance program. The reviews of these programs, by the licensee, has identified the discrepancies in a timely manner for resolution. The problem with missed surveillance tests and troubleshooting practices by the licensee is not program related, but rather personnel related, indicating that more awareness on the part of plant personnel to prevent similar occurrences is warranted.
, _ _
_
.
.
In summary, the licensee has an excellent system for the identifica-tion and scheduling of surveillance tests (as described in the main-tenance section). The computerized system automatically identifies
,
surveillance tests and when they are due, however, personnel have not performed all surveillances in a timely manner.
The completed surveillance procedures are complete, well maintained, and available.
Corrective action, if warranted, is effective and thorough. Training received by the various departments is adequate and the direction and practical lessons taught by the training department appear to be effective.
2.
Conclusion Rating: Category 2 Trend:
None 3.
Board Recommendations Licensee None NRC None
,
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s
E.
Emergency Preparedness (10.1%, 272 hours0.00315 days <br />0.0756 hours <br />4.497354e-4 weeks <br />1.03496e-4 months <br />)
1.
Analysis During the previous assessment period, the licensee was rated as Category 2 in the area of Emergency Preparedness. That assessment was based on observation of the annual exercise held on October 23, 1984, a followup inspection, and subsequent enforcement action.
The deficiencies identified during the October 23, 1984 exercise were resolved.
Evidence of this was verified during a team inspection on July 8-11, 1985. All of the deficiencies which resulted in the civil penalty were closed by the inspection team. All licensee nuclear activities have been relocated to the site area. A new Vice Presi-dent - Nuclear was selected and has placed a strong emphasis on emer-gency preparedness. A full-time emergency preparedness manager was assigned, the emergency training program has been substantially improved, and an attendance / record / qualification system put in place.
During this assessment period, there were two announced inspections of emergency preparedness activities consisting of obserwation of two partial participation exercises conducted on December 4, 1985, and September 16, 1986.
Licensee responsiveness to NRC initiatives was demonstrated by management attention and detailed corrective actions.
The NRC scenario review and the licensee changes to the scenarios also fully satisfied NRC concerns.
Each exercise scenario tested a major portion of the Event Classification Guide, the Emergency Plan, its implementing procedures, and provided an opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate areas previously identified by the NRC as needing corrective action. Areas identified during the preceding exercise were corrected and did not recur during the subsequent exer-cise.
The licensee's staff correctly identified Emergency Action Levels, effected offsite notifications within the prescribed time, followed appropriate response procedures and formulated protective action recommendations. No significant deficiencies were identified and only a few areas for improvement were noted.
The licensee is currently installing a state-of-the-art notification feedback system for offsite sirens. The Artificial Island generating station received FEMA 44 CFR 350 approval for Delaware state and local plans in January 1986 and submitted revised state and local plans for New Jersey on October 10, 1986 for FEMA RAC review.
A commitment by management to strong emergency preparedness and training programs has been made by licensee management as evidenced by the quality of emergency response facilities and equipment, response of the licensee's staff during exercises, increase in staf-fing of the emergency preparedness group, and enhanced training acti-vities for the emergency preparedness staf..
.
.
-
In summary, the licensee has significantly improved performance in this area since the last SALP.. Continuing management support for this program is demonstrated in the hardware upgrade currently in progress, and in the staff's technical expertise.
2.
Conclusion Rating:
Category 1 Trend:
None 3.
Board Recommendations Licensee None NRC None r
,
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,
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.. - -.
.. - -, - - -,
.
. -.- -- - -. - -. -- -
-
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- _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _
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F.
Security and Safeguards (2.0%, 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br />)
1.
Analysis During the previous SALP, the licensee was Category I with an effec-tive and closely monitored site security program. During this assessment period, the licensee completed the incorporation of Hope Creek into the security program.
During this assessment period, there was one unannounced physical protection inspection of the security program, a special inspection of the training and qualification program, and routine resident inspections performed throughout the period. No violations were identified.
During this assessment period, NRC followed up on the licensee's commitments relative to deficiencies identified during an NRC Regula-tory Effectiveness Review (RER) which was conducted in 1982.
The licensee promptly took correctivo action on those deficiencies that
.
could be immediately addressed. Many of the remaining corrective actions were of a long-term nature, including a major upgrading of security facilities, systems, and equipment and incorporation of the security program for the Hope Creek facility.
Specific long-term actions included the construction of a new access control facility (opened October 1, 1985), installation of a new integrated security computer system and associated hardwart, computerized access control devices, state-of-the-art assessment aids, and new personnel search equipment. The licensee's plans were developed and implemented in a thorough, organized manner. The security upgrade program was carried out in increments so that the activities would have a minimal adverse impact on the existing Salem security program. The licensee provided NRC with thorough and clear progress reports on the activities and promptly identified changes to schedule. The performance of the new systems and equipment has been sound and relatively maintenance free, after the initial startup period. This performance results from the extensive design, procurement and engineering effort expended on the project.
The licensee rarely had to rely on the use of extensive human resources for compensatory measures while the upgrade project was in progress.
Housekeeping of the access control facility and security facilities is noteworthy. The general state of cleanliness demonstrates a high degree of pride and morale on the part of the security force.
_-
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
,
Management's interest in establishing and maintaining a quality program is further evidenced by the high quality of performance indi-cated during a special NRC inspection of the security force training and qualification program that was conducted to determine the quality of the training program and to measure the ability of security personnel to carry out their assigned duties.
The licensee has required its security force contractor to establish and maintain a strong training program. The training is conducted by individuals who are experienced and assigned to security training only. Training facilities have adequate classroom space and good training aids.
Lesson plans are well developed, thorough, and kept current through feedback from supervisory personnel who perform on-the-job surveil-lance of performance. The results of the special inspection indica-ted that the security training program is broad in scope, of high quality, and administered in a highly professional manner.
The licensee's security plans, procedures, and instructions are clear, concise and thorough.
Letters and reports submitted to NRC are also clear, promptly submitted, technically accurate and seldom generate questions from the NRC.
Corporate security management is actively involved in the Region I Nuclear Security Organization and other nuclear industry groups engaged in security innovations and the development of security program standards. This is evidence of support of the securtty program at a high management level in the licensee's organization.
To provide for continued effectiveness of the security program, the licensee conducts in-house surveillances to monitor the performance of the security organization.
Experienced and knowledgeable person-nel perform these surveillances and the results are aggressively pursued to ensure prompt and effective cc,rrective action and feedback to the training program. These survefilances are conducted in addi-tion to the annual security program audit required by NRC.
The security program is strongly supported by the other plant opera-ting divisions on site and frequent interface is evident.
Security force personnel exhibit excellent morale because they are recognized and respected on site and they have been provided excellent security-related equipment in order to perform their function. As a result, they carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities in a professional and dedicated manner.
The licensee submitted two security event reports pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(c) during the assessment period.
Both events were bomb threats that were adequately responded to by the licensee and were subse-quently determined to be hoaxes.
__ _
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__________________---_-__-)
.P
During the assessment period, the licensee submitted complete revi-sions to the security and contingency plans in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The changes -were clearly described in a summary transmitted with each revision, plan pages were clearly marked to facilitate review and the revisions were of high quality.
The revisions were considered acceptable.
In summary, the licensee's performance remained strong throughout the period during which it successfully completed incorporation of Hope Creek into the security program. The relative smooth transition that occurred is a direct result of the management oversight that the licensee commits to this program.
2.
Conclusion Rating:
Category 1 Trend:
None 3.
Board Recommendations Licensee None NRC None
_
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G.
Outaces and Engineering Support (8.7%, 232 hours0.00269 days <br />0.0644 hours <br />3.835979e-4 weeks <br />8.8276e-5 months <br />)
1.
Analysis During this assessment period there was a refueling outage (46 day duration), and 8 other outages resulting from unplanned shutdowns.
(See Table 6 for details.)
The last SALP assessment discussed management changes which added a planning department reporting directly to the station manager. The assessment also illustrated the need to evaluate the new planning department and how it would function during outages.
During the above outages, pre planning and oversight by the planning department influenced the station's expedient completion of the outages within the time allotted.
The licensee also conducted pre-planning meetings, held at least one per shift during outages, and post-outage critiques to discuss the need for improvements in future outages. At these meetings, the various departments are held accountable for their progress during the outage. Afterwards, the departments are responsible for refinements which could be made to enhance future outages.
During major outages, photographs of the outage managers, coordina-tors, department heads, contractor managers and coordinators are posted in a conspicuous place to aid site personnel in determining the proper contact for grievances or problems that develop. This has improved communications.
During the outages the following good practices were noted by the inspectors:
Supervisor and management presence at the work areas.
-
Accountability for work performed.
-
QA and QC direct involvement where required.
-
Direct portable radio communication between the key management
-
directors and contractors.
All of the above have contributed to closely directed and responsible outages that reflect prior planning, aggressive management, and organized decision making.
The licensee previously hired contractors for outages on a cost plus basis with the contractors supplying their own QA and QC. The licen-see has now adopted a different approach to the control of contrac-tors in that their outage contract work is awarded on fixed price contracts with the licensee supplying their own direct QA and
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--
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QC. This practice brings about more thorough and complete design change packages in order to assist in preparing bid packages. The licensee has also attached monetary incentives and penalties for exposure goals. During the refueling, the incentive was, for Westinghouse to complete steam generator work, rewiring of the control rod drive assemblies on the reactor head, head removal and replacement, refueling, and reactor coolant pump seal work within 100 man rem. Westinghouse achieved this goal during the refueling outage.
Changes were made in engineering support during this assessment period. The Systems Engineering support organization completed training and was assigned to the station.
This organization, which reports directly to station management, is not yet fully implemented.
However, the department has provided a strengthening of root cause analysis, become involved in the day to day operations, and has a direct input to the Design Change Requests and Safety Engineering Reviews.
Another change has been the establishment of a corporate engineering
" single point of contact" to the station which has opened the line of communication between the corporate engineering department and station operations. This communication difference has improved corporate support to the station and aided in the resolution of defi-ciencies identified during outage meetings. There has also been a concentrated effort in assuring the presence of sponsor engineers at the site. These engineers sponsor the design changes being instal-led. Disagreements and discrepancies are resolved in a timely manner and the design caange packages are more complete from a documentation perspective.
Inspections were conducted for followup of degraded piping systems and their associated LER's. These inspections determined that management involvement was evident concerning actions taken following some 50 instances of degraded piping during the past six years. The licensee's resolution of these failures was technically sound and thorough.
Extensive analysis and subsequent corrective actions taken or planned were comprehensive and documented through complete, well-maintained and available records.
Management involvement was not as evident with regard to followup of IE Bulletins 79-02 and 82-02. The licensee demonstrated a lack of effective followup to NRC concerns which were previously identified during an earlier review of the licensee response to IE Bulletin 79-02.
In addition, the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 82-02 was incomplete, and inadequate quality assurance measures were also identified.
For both of the IE Bulletins, records were not complete nor properly maintaine t
30 Two additional areas of concern were identified in the engineering support area during this assessment period. They are 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and environmental qualification (EQ).
In the area of 50.59 evaluations, one of the reviews was not researched in suffici-ent depth to identify dynamic loading of the station electrical system which led to significant electrical problems. However, this was the only problem area identified during the review of 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. With regard to this issue, the licensee took immediate effective corrective action and has committed to a long term program to reanalyze the station loading.
In addition, the licensee has met with the staff on several occasions to discuss their analysis and longer term corrective action programs. With regard to environmental qualification, it appears that not enough resources were devoted to the effort both in the completeness of records and staffing. While the plant site staffing was adequate, the engineer-ing staff devoted to EQ was minimal as demonstrated by only two dedi-cated engineers to support the EQ effort.
The Engineering Department has self-identified the need for further improvement and contracted an independent evaluation of the depart-ment with the following results; The need to establish a performance measurement system
-
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The need for simplification of management processes in the following areas:
-
DCR's (Design Change Requests)
-
MB0 (Management By Objective)
Work Prioritization
-
-
Project Tracking and Control
-
Procurement Decision Making / Communication
-
More effective resource utilization and,
-
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More engineering technology utilization The licensee has established a task force to address the above concerns and is currently taking trips to identified utilities who have demonstrated proven performance in these areas. The task force members are conducting biweekly reviews with the Vice President -
Nuclear with a completion date set for mid-February,1987.
,
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In summary, outages have been pre planned with definite priorities
"
and emphasis on timely completion; controlled, using knowledgeable personnel; and, completed within the time constraints of the sche-dule. The Engineering Department has demonstrated evidence of prior planning and assessment of priorities, has generally provided timely responses to NRC and industry concerns and has performed a self-initiated program evaluation designed to improve the department's effectiveness. Although weaknesses still exist there has been improvement noted along with an aggressive program to attain further improvement.
2.
Conclusion Rating: Category 2 Trend:
None 3.
Board Recommendations Licensee
!
The licensee should meet with NRC to present the results of Engineering task force findings, and plans for addressing the findings.
NRC None
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e s
H.
Licensing Activities (NA)
1.
Analysis During the previous assessment period, the licensee was rated as Category 2.
The two areas that had the most adverse impact on performance were the long delays in processing licensing actions and realignments in the licensee's staff.
During this SALP evaluation period, the licensee has shown good management overview in the area of licensing activities. This was especially evident through the timely submittal and subsequent approval of several license amer.dments in anticipation of improving cycle reload efficiency for Unit 2.
The licensee's management demon-strated active participation in licensing activities, and kept abreast of current and prospective licensing actions.
During the rating period, a system for prioritizing both the licensee and the NRC action items was formally initiated.
The licensee's submittals are usually timely. However, in many instances additional information or revisions are necessary before review can be completed. This occurs most often in the area of
'
plant-specific licensing actions. The licensee's treatment of the no significant hazards standards of 10 CFR 50.92 has shown steady improvement, and is almost always adequate.
In some cases, the licensee needed to provide more detail.
The licensee maintains a significant technical capability in almost all engineering and scientific disciplines necessary to resolve items of concern to the NRC and the licensee.
In addition, the licensee utilizes the services of other nuclear support groups to assist in the resolution of technical problems or to utilize new and proven techniques that will enhance the operation and safety of the plant.
The licensee's good technical capability is reflected in the submit-tals made in support of, or in response to, licensee or NRC initiated actions. The licensee, though, does not always provide all of the information necessary to complete a review without requests for addi-tional information.
However, few licensee responses to NRC requests for additional information required subsequent questions. Also, during the staff review of several safety issues, the licensee requested meetings with the staff in anticipation of review diffi-culties, thereby eliminating delays.
The licensee has been responsive to NRC initiatives in many instan-ces. Schedules are negotiated with the licensee based on priorities.
The licensee has had difficulty meeting many of these negotiated schedules. However, these schedular delays seem to be more a resource management problem than a responsiveness problem.
The licensee appears to be more responsive to those items for which it
_ _,
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- has placed a high priority rather than those for which the NRC has indicated a high priority. As discussed earlier, a new policy has been formalized whereby both the licensee and the NRC agree on prior-itization of certain licensing actions.
This has helped alleviate some of the past problems in this area.
The licensing group has exhibited a high degree of cooperation with the NRC staff. The good communication between the licensing group and the NRC has been beneficial to both in the processing of licens-ing actions. Areas of expertise are well defined within the group.
In addition, the group does an excellent job of coordinating the effort when input is required from the different groups within Public Service Electric and Gas Company.
The licensing group holds informal training sessions on topics of current and future interest. The group also participates in corpor-atewide training program, and participates in industrywide training programs provided by various organizations.
In addition, the licen-see has a training simulator located at the site.
The licensee's licensing activities are conducted by a well staffed, and well trained group resulting in an overall efficient operation.
Management overview is evident in that the licensing groups is well integrated into other plant activities and licensing activities reflect a uniform approach. Upper management becomes involved in licensing actions when necessary to assist in resolving potential deadlocks.
Further, during the reporting period, licensee manage-ment, in their continuing effort to improve their SALP rating, met with NRR management to discuss the issue.
In summary, one of the licensee's strengths appear to be in their approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
The licensee has extensive technical capability that is reflected in their submittals and discussions with the NRC. Another strength is in their staffing. The licensee continues to upgrade the experience, capability and effectiveness of the licensing group, and the support-ing administrative and technical personnel required to operate a good facility. However, greater licensee attention needs to be focussed on management involvement and control in assuring quality, where the l
licensee needs to put more emphasis on assuring that thorough details l
are provided in submittals in order that fewer iterations are required during the review process; and, responsiveness to NRC initi-atives, where the licensee needs to pay closer attention to submittal schedules in order that the number of short-term schedular slippages are reduced.
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_
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _
\\
',
2.
Conclusion Rating: Category 2 Trend:
None 3.
Board Recommendations Licensee None NRC None i
s s
I.
Assurance of Quality (NA)
1.
Analysis Assurance of Quality is a new separate functional area for this SALP period and is a summary assessment of management oversight and effectiveness in implementation of the quality assurance program and administrative controls affecting quality. Activi-ties affecting the assurance of quality as they apply specific-ally to a functional area are addressed under each of the sepa-rate functional areas.
Consequently, this functional area is not an assessment of the quality assurance department alone, but is an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of management's initiatives, programs, and policies which affect or assure qual-ity.
Corporate and station managers are present and actively involved in station activities commensurate with their level of responsi-bility.
They have displayed a thorough knowledge of plant issues, and decisions have been timely with a proper perspective on safety.
For example, numerous elective plant outages were undertaken by the licensee during the assessment period to investigate and correct EQ deficiencies and random equipment malfunctions.
Licensee investigation, evaluation and response to SG feed pump problems, electrical transformer faults, and the August 26, 1986 false loss of off site power event were thor-ough, timely, and technically adequate.
Two inspections were conducted during the assessment period to review the implementation of the licensee's quality assurance (QA) program.
The QA Department has demonstrated significant involvement with site activities. QA/QC involvement with daily activities has been expanded and includes backshift coverage.
QA has expanded their valve and breaker surveillance program and has instituted an audit program to perform in-depth reviews and walkdowns of plant systems. Management support of QA involve-ment is evidenced by the allocation of personnel to support reorganization of the QA engineering department along with a complete rewrite of the department procedures manual.
Continuing personnel assignments and departmental realignments in maintenance, emergency planning, radiation protection, QA engineering, and fire protection indicate that management fore-thought and planning strive to enhance the departments' overall performance.
Increased management attention is warranted in the chemistry department, however, as evidenced by weaknesses in the chemical and radiochemical quality control program including lack of control of chemical solutions which resulted in a viola-tion, delay in correcting identified technical issues, and continuing disagreements between laboratory comparison analyses.
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Additionally, weaknesses identified in IE Bulletin followup and 50.59 reviews indicate a need for management's attention in these areas.
Cooperation between departments and between management and workers has improved significantly during this assessment period.
Fire protection discrepancies caused by poor communica-tion between operations, site protection, and maintenance departments have been discussed and resulted in procedure changes. Training personnel are more integrated and involved with plant activities such as being coordinators for outage activities and reviewing LERs for lessons learned. Senior Shift Supervisors are cycled through the training department as instructors for two year periods.
The licensee has instituted
"On-the-job" Team (0JT) Evaluations" in which representatives from management, supervisory, and bargaining unit ranks period-
%
ically form a team and critique selected station activities. A central planning and work control center located outside the control rooms is in the initial stages of implementation and is a joint effort of the planning, operations, and maintenance departments.
The licensee has exhibited aggressive and effective self-assess-ment programs. The OJT evaluations noted above are one example.
QA department audits identified IST and containment integrity surveillance deficiencies which resulted in improvements in these areas.
The security and fire protection staffs have conducted in-house surveillances which have identified and resulted e correction of deficiencies. The Engineering and Plant Be t department initiated two self-identification program n e end of the SALP period, to improve the depart-ment's effe veness. Results will be assessed in future SALPs.
Licensee i atives in planning and job activity control have proven effect e in successful completion of outages and in meeting occup onal exposure goals.
Innovative programs such as fixed price ontracts for outage work and incentives for achievement of exposure goals are indicative of licensee initi-atives.
Programs to promote quality awareness and employee involvement have been instituted during this SALP period and appear to be well received by station personnel.
Examples of these programs are:
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Plant Material Improvement Programs which include cleanup, painting, and labeling activities in the plant.
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Employee Involvement Program facilitates management /warker interfaces and awards for good performance.
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-37
~ v Quality Awareness Committee comprised of nuclear department-
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volunteers who periodically issue a " Quality Gram" promot-ing improvements in quality performance.
Quality Awareness Days are sponsored by individual depart-
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ments and inform other departments of quality-improvement activities in progress within the sponsor department.
Quality Concerns Reporting Program enables plant personnel
-
to confidentially express quality concerns to be investi-gated by licensee QA personnel.
Assurance of quality problems at Salem tend to be personnel-related rather than programmatic deficiencies. Licensee manage-ment has identified this weakness in their organization and has been aggressive in putting programs in place to promote quality work performed in a quality environment.
Licensee management
'
may want to expand QA efforts in the balance of plant since most of the reactor trips were related to secondary systems. The effectiveness of these programs will be monitored in future inspections and assessed in future SALPs.
2.
Conclusion Rating: Category 2 Trend:
Improving 3.
Board Recommendations Licensee None NRC None i
e
e--
,- -, -
,
-e
-- - - -, - - -
- -, - -
-_
.n,
- - -
--,- - ------
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _. -
s
J.
Training and Qualification Effectiveness (NA)
1.
Analysis This is a new functional area in this assessment period.
In the prior assessment period, training was discussed within each functional area and in the Section " Summary of Results." There were no adverse findings identified during the last assessment period.
The licensee operates and maintains well equipped training facilities which provide training for all of the nuclear depart-ments including operations, I&C technicians, electricians, mechanics, chemists, health physics technicians, machinists, and welders.
INP0 recognizes ten training areas at Salem and all ten areas have been accredited. The NRC performed a post-accreditation audit on the licensee's training program in June, 1986. The report concluded, "that a strong management commit-ment to training program improvement exists at Salem. Also, it is apparent that there is an effort to continually update and revise the training programs and task lists based on feedback and experience.... Deficiencies identified... are an incom-plete task analysis... for deriving learning objectives and a failure to identify which tasks are appropriate for continuing training. The learning objectives at Salem were complete and easily traced to tasks and test items."
During this assessment period, Region I administered three exam-inations. In November, 1985, fifteen candidates were given writ-ten and simulator / oral examinations for initial licenses. Of the eight candidates for Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), one failed the written exam and one failed the simulator / oral exams.
Of the seven candidates for Reactor Operator (RO), three failed the written exam and two of those three also failed the simula-tor / oral exams. In April, 1986, one SRO and three R0 candidates from the November exam were reexamined. All received their licenses.
Overall, Salem continues to have a satisfactory program for the initial training of candidates; however, the failure rate on the November exam implies that the utility needs to better screen the candidates prior to the NRC examination.
One evaluation of the requalification program was made during this reporting period in September, 1986. The utility training staff submitted their written exams to the NRC for review.
Several questions were replaced by the NRC, and then the exam was administered to seven SR0's and five R0's.
Six of the SRO's and all of the RO's passed the examination.
The written
.
..
.
s s
examination was graded by both the utility and by the NRC, and examination grades agreed within 5%.
The one SRO that failed the examination has subsequently passed another examination.
No simulator / oral examinations were given during the September portion of this year's requalification program. The requalifi-cation program was found to be adequate to ensure that the oper-ators maintain the requisite knowledge for safe operation of the plant.
Staffing is adequate as is the training and qualification effec-tiveness of the QA/QC staff. A full time QA department coordi-nator has been assigned to the training center and is responsi-ble for developing and maintaining QA portions of training programs. The operations department has assigned a Senior Shift Supervisor to the training department for a period of two years.
Licensee management has stated that this is a pilot program and intends to rotate a new Senior Shift Supervisor into the train-ing department every two years. The purpose is to lend opera-tional expertise to the training department for operational training and to give Senior Shift Supervisors a change from shift work and the continuous pressure of operations.
Salem does not use a separate individual as a Shift Technical Advisor (STA).
Instead, they have instituted a policy that at least one of the SRO-licensed individuals on shift will have an engineering degree. This provides the flexibility for the indi-vidual who is technically most competent to also be the indivi-dual who is making the decisions.
Training effectiveness in the day-to-day operations should be reviewed by the licensee. When evaluating the types of operator and personnel errors at the facility, it appears that the train-ing received is excellent and personnel perform within the confines of that training.
However, the training department may need to expand training programs, especially in the area of
" troubleshooting", methodology of performing surveillance test-ing on a running unit, and operator simulator training in the area of feedwater losses and plant recovery.
In summary, the training and qualification program makes a posi-tive contribution, commensurate with procedures and staffing with a modest number of personnel errors. There is a well defined program that is implemented for a large portion of the staff.
Inadequate training has been identified as a root cause for several plant trips that have occurred during this assess-ment period.
,
__
-
s
2.
Conclusion:
Rating:
Category 2 Trend:
None 3.
Board Recommendations:
Licensee:
None
_NRC :
None i
.
t
!
l l
l
!
-,
-
-
-
-
_,. -
- - - -,
-.,
.
. _.. _
_
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
s
%
V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A.
Investigations and Allegations Review Three allegations were received, followed-up, and closed during this assessment period.
The allegations involved (1) radiation protection program practices for laborers working in contaminated areas and bringing contractors on site as visitors if they fail the GET exam; (2) health physics concerns including working in reactor building at power, neutron doses and monitoring, and resulting health problems; and (3) decontamination work circumvented health physics procedures and falsification of radiation level readings.
All three allegations were found to be unsubstantiated.
B.
Escalated Enforcement Actions 1.
Civil Penalties None.
2.
Orders The order issued May 6, 1983 was rescinded on March 18, 1986.
3.
Confirmatory Action Letters None.
C.
Management Conferences Two management meetings were held during the assessment period. The first (May 6,1986) was held as recommended in the last SALP and involved a licensee presentation of the comparison and analysis of Salem Unit I and Unit 2 trip histories. The second (August 30,1986)
meeting was held regarding the false loss of offsite power event of August 26, 1986.
D.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
Thirty-one LERs were submitted for the two Salem units during this period. The LERs are listed in Table 5.
A causal analysis concluded that; twelve were due to personnel error and were related to reactor trips, six resulted from equipment failure and were also related to reactor trips.
The analysis of these LERs is delineated in Table 6.
AE00 provided an evaluation of quality of Salem Generating Station LERs as part of the SALP process. AEOD concluded that the LERs reviewed were of a very high quality, additional details of this analysis were provided to the licensee by letter dated November 19, 1986.
No causal link between the remaining LERs was determined.
l
-w o.
TABLE 1 INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES REPORT / DATES UNIT 1 UNIT 2 INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 85-23 85-24 RESIDENT 179 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 10/01/85 10/31/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS 85-24 85-27 SPECIALIST 0 OPERATOR EXAMINATIONS 11/18/85 01/03/8 85-25 85-26 CANCELLED 85-26 85-28 RESIDENT 159 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 11/01/85 11/30/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS 85-27 85-29 SPECIALIST 200 OBSERVATION OF THE LICENSEE'S ANNUAL 12/03/85 12/05/8 PARTIAL SCALE EMERGENCY EXERCISE 85-28 85-30 SPECIALIST 48 UNANNOUNCED INSPECTION OF DESIGN 12/09/85 12/13/85 CHANGES / MODIFICATIONS PROGRAM, COMPLETED
,
MODIFICATIONS & QA PROGRAM ANNUAL REVIEW 85-29 85-31 RESIDENT 68 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 12/01/85 12/31/85 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS 86-01 86-01 RESIDENT 152 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 01/01/31 01/31/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS 86-02 86-02 SPECIALIST 80 LIQUID & GASEOUS EFFLUENTS CONTROL PROGRAM 02/01/86 02/14/86
& RADI0 CHEMICAL MEASUREMENTS PROGRAM 86-03 86-03 SPECIALIST 31 INSPECTION OF THE NONRADIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY 1/27/86 1/30/86 PROGRAM 86-04 86-04 RESIDENT 101 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 02/01/86 02/28/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS 86-05 86-05 SPECIALIST 40 SOLID RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE PREPARATION, 02/24/86 02/28/8 PACKAGING AND SHIPPING PROGRAM 86-06 86-06 RESIDENT 138 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 03/01/86 03/31/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.
86-07 86-07 SPECIALIST 50 INSPECTION OF OPEN ITEMS RELATING TO 02/24/86 02/28/8 BULLETIN 79-07 & 79-14. ALSO ASSESSMENT OF LERS BETWEEN 1981 & 1985 ON PIPING FAILURES t
.
.. _
.-
..
~, - _
.-
%
%
TABLE 1 (CONT'D)
REPORT / DATES-UNIT 1 UNIT 2 INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 86-08 86-08 CANCELLED 86-09 86-09 SPECIALIST 0 OPERATORS EXAMINATIONS 4/8 /86 4/10/86 86-10 86-10 SPECIALIST 82 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES 3/17/86 3/21/8 86-11 86-11 RESIDENT 128 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 4/01/86 5/12/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS 86-12 86-12 SPECIALIST 14 AUDIT SECURITY PROGRAM 4/21/86 4/22/8 86-13 86-13 SPECIALIST 68 INSPECTION OF THE RADIATION SAFETY PROGRAM 4/21/86 4/25/8 86-14 86-14 SPECIALIST 44 FOLLOWUP OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS 4/28/86 5/2 /86 EVALUATION OF LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING RESULTS AND FACILITY TOURS.
86-15 86-15 RESIDENT 116 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 5/13/86 6/16/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS 86-16 86-17 SPECIALIST 39 INSPECTION ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS 5/19/86 5/23/86 PART 21 REPORT ON ASCO VALVES AND ACTIVITIES INCLUDING QA.
86-17 86-17 SPECIALIST 21 INSPECTION OF THE LICENSEE'S PREPARATION, 5/28/86 6/3 /86 PACKAGING AND SHIPPING OF SPENT PRIMARY DEMINERALIZER RESIN.
86-18 86-18 CANCELLED 86-19 86-19 RESIDENT 89 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 6/17/86 7/21/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.
86-20 86-20 SPECIALIST 93 INSPECTION OF QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 6/30/86 7/8 /86 86-21 86-21 RESIDENT 133 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 7/22/86 8/18/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.
86-22 86-22 SPECIALIST 72 OBSERVATION OF LICENSEE'S PARTIAL-SCALE 9/15/86 9/17/86 EMERGENCY EXERCIs2 CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER 16, 198 s
.
TABLE 1 (CONT'D)
-l REPORT / DATES I
UNIT 1 UNIT 2 INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 86-23 86-23 SPECIALIST 192 E.Q. INSPECTION-8/11/86 8/15/86 86-24 86-24 RESIDENT 121 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED 8/19/86 9/30/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.
86-25 86-25 SPECIALIST 33 FOLLOWUP OF BULLETIN 82-02.
9/8/86 9/12/86 86-26 SPECIALIST 150 SPECIAL INSPECTION TO EVALUATE A REACTOR
8/26/86 8/30/86 TRIP WITH SAFETY INJECTION COMPOUNDED BY FALSE LOSS OF-OFFSITE POWER (BLACK 0UT)
SIGNAL.
86-26 SPECIALIST 0 OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION
9/11/86 9/12/86 86-29 SPECIALIST 40 SPECIAL INSPECTION TO FOLLOWUP ON FAILURE
9/12/86 9/19/86 0F LOAD CENTER TRANSFORMER AND STATION POWER TRANSFORMER RESULTING FROM REACTOR 1 RIP.
i
___
.
-
-.
-.
-.
.
.-
. -
.
-
.
-
-
t
- .
4 TABLE 2'
INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY (10/1/85-9/30/86)
-
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION AREA HOURS
% OF TIME A.
PLANT OPERATIONS 1278 47.7 8.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS AND CHEMISTRY-241 9.0 C.
MAINTENANCE 332 12.4 D.
SURVEILLANCE 272 10.1 E.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 272 10.1~
F.
SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS
~52 2.0 G.
OUTAGES AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT 232 8.7 H.
LICENSING ACTIVITIES N/A N/A I.
ASSURANCE OF QUALITY
.
N/A N/A J.
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS N/A N/A TOTALS:
2679-100.0
4
l i
'
t
.
,
..
TABLE 3 ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY (10/1/85-9/30/86)
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
,
SEVERITY LEVEL AREA
2
4
DEV TOTAL PLANT OPERATIONS
1
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS AND CHEMISTRY
1
MAINTENANCE
1 SURVEILLANCE O
'
SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS
OUTAGES AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT
.
LICENSING ACTIVITIES
'
'
ASSURANCE OF QUALITY
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
>
TOTALS:
1-
2
,
a I
I-
,
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._.
-
_ - -. _
. -, -.
,
-..
.
, _.
-
-
-
-
_
s c..
TABLE 3 (CONT'D)
ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION INSPECTION VIOL.
FUNCTIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENT LEVEL AREA VIOLATION 272/86-05 Bulletin 79.19 DEV.
Rad Control Failure to provide training to Quality Control Inspectors. Rad Waste Shipping.
272/86-06 Tech. Specs.
Rad Control Failure to comply with quality assurance procedures with regard to shelf lives of
,
reagents and chemicals.
272/86-07 10 CFR 50
Operations Inadequacies in base APP B plate flexibility criteria.
272/86-13 Tech. Specs.
Rad Control Failure to follow procedures when entering high radiation
,
areas.
(Violation not issued due to licensee good practices - 10 CFR 2 Appendix C)
272/86-19 Tech. Specs.
Rad Control I&C technician helper l
entered containment j
without proper i
dosimetry.
(Violation
!
not issued due to licensee good practices
272/86-24 Tech. Specs.
Operations Failure to post fire watch (Violation not issued due to licensee good practices - 10 CFR~
2 Appendix C)
i
!
l
,..
_ _ _
-
_ __
_.
-
.
.
.
..
8
,
48 TABLE 3 (CONT'D)
'
INSPECTION VIOL. FUNCTIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENT LEVEL AREA VIOLATION
'.
272/86-25 Bulletin 82-02 DEV.
Maintenance Failure to control Neolube and Felpro 5000 (Lubricant for threaded
.
fasteners).
,
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.
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.
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,
-
,
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_ _. _ _ - _ _.. _
.
., - _. _. - -,.
,,
_
.
-
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..
,
..
TABLE 4 LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA AREA NUMBER /CAUSE CODE A
B C
D E
X TOTAL 1.
. Plant Operations
1
6
17-
'
2.
Radiological Controls and Chemistry 1
1
3.
Maintenance
4.
Surveillance
1
8
'
5.
6.
Security and Safeguards
7.
Outages and Engineering Support
1
8.
Licensing Activities
Total
3
3
6
Cause Codes Unit 1 Unit 2 Total
'
A.
Personnel Error
4
B.
Design / Man./Const. Install.
0
C.
External Cause
0
D.
Defective Procedure
1
- i E.
Component Failure
4
X.
Other
2
Total
11
l e
i
,
,
_,
._.
.
-
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TABLE 5 LER SYN 0PSIS (10/1/85-9/30/86)
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION-UNIT 1 LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION 85-012-00 10/06/85 A
TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP FROM 99% DUE TO FALSE LOW CONDENSER VACUUM SIGNAL 85-013-00 11/22/85 A
INADVERTENT LOSS OF TWO EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM SUBSYSTEMS 86-001-00 1/16/86 X
REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% ON HIGH NEGATIVE FLUX RATE 86-002-00 1/31/86 X
FAILURE T0 IMPLEMENT PORTIONS OF THE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM 86-003-00 1/31/86 E
REACTOR TRIP FROM 100%
CAUSED BY PARTIAL CLOSURE OF 11BF19 86-004-00 2/9/86 A
PLANT VENT SAMPLE NOT OBTAINED AS REQUIRED BY THE RETS 86-005-00 2/18/86 A
DIESEL GENERATOR SURVEILLANCE PERFORMED LATE 86-006-00 2/20/86 B
REACTOR TRIP FROM 100%
CAUSED BY THE CLOSURE OF
,_
14BF19
-
86-007-00 4/8/86 X
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION DISCREPANCIES 86-008-00 4/14/86 *
X NOT ALL REQUIRED VALVES LISTED IN VALVE POSITION VERIFICATION SURVEILLANCES
.
l i
!
[..
.
s
.-
TABLE 5 (CONT'D)
UNIT 1 LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION
,
86-009-00 4/25/86
OXYGEN CONTENT OF WASTE GAS DECAY TANKS EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE LIMITS 86-010-00 5/12/86 A
REACTOR TRIP FROM 95% DUE TO THE LOSS OF BOTH STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMPS 86-011-00 6/27/86
FIRE WATCH NOT CONTINUOUSLY MAINTAINED 86-012-00 6/6/86 E
REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% -
MAIN GENERATOR PROTECTION (APT DIFFERENTIAL RELAY ACTUATION)
86-013-00 6/12/86 A
REACTOR TRIP FROM 64% -
NO. 13 S/G STEAM FLOW / FEED FLOW MISMATCH WITH LOW S/G WATER LEVEL 86-014-00 6/13/86 A
REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% -
'
TURBINE TRIP AND P-7 86-015-00 7/8/86 B
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF RAYCHEM HEAT SHRINKABLE TUBING DEFICIENT
,
86-016-00 8/5/86 E
REACTOR TR1P 70% - NO. 12 SG LOW-LOW LEVEL / REACTOR TRIP 36% - NO. 11 SG LOW LEVEL & SFFF 86-017-00 7/31/86 A
FIRE 000R C-8-1 INOPERABLE -
FAILURE TO ENTER T.S.
ACTION STATEMENT 86-018-00 8/6/86 B
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR VALVE OPERATORS
. _ -.
em -
-
TABLE 5 (CONT'D)
UNIT 2 LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION 85-021-00 10/6/85 E
DIESEL OUTPUT BREAKER FAILURE DURING DIESEL SURVEILLANCE TESTING 85-022-00 10/7/85 X
REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY A WIRING DIFFERENCE.
86-001-00 3/20/86 D
WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM NOT CONTINUOUSLY SAMPLED FOR OXYGEN
. 86-002-00 4/16/86 E
REACTOR TRIP / TURBINE TRIP 50% - NO. 23 S/G HIGH-HIGH LEVEL 86-003-00 5/2/86 A
REACTOR TRIP / SAFETY INJECTION FROM 5% DURING CONTROLLED SHUTDOWN 86-004-00 7/16/86 X
REACTOR TRIP FROM 100%
-POWER - LOSS OF 2B INVERTER 86-005-00 7/15/86 A
REACTOR TRIP DURING STARTUP - VOLTAGE SPIKE ON 28 INVERTER 86-006-00 7/16/86 E
REACTOR TRIP FROM 52% POWER -
23 STEAM GENERATOR HIGH-HIGH LEVEL 86-007-00 8/26/86 A
REACTOR TRIP / SAFETY INJECTION FROM 100% & LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER INDICATION (f EQUIPMENT HATCH BETWEEN 86-008-00 9/17/86 A
ELEVATIONS REMOVED WITH NO
<
FIRE WATCH INSTITUTED 86-009-00 9/11/86 E
REACTOR TRIP - TRANSFORMER FAILURE
f
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _.
%
TABLE 6 UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC TRIPS AND SHUTDOWNS
.The reactor trips occurring during this assessment period fall into two cate-gories. These categories include personnel error, and equipment failure or malfunction. This section assesses the root cause of each trip within each category from NRC's perspective.
Personnel Error There were 12 of 18 trips attributed to personnel error.
For the purposes of this table, personnel error has been broken into four groups:
(1) Personnel error poor judgement, the individual should have known that the outcome of the action could cause a trip; (2) Personnel error - lacking knowledge, the individual had not been instructed, or the procedure did not address the issue, did not have the knowledge that an act performed would cause a trip; (3) Personnel error - inattention to detail, the individual took a haphazard
{
approach to an unrelated task which subsequently led to a trip; and (4) Personnel error - equipment malfunction, an equipment failure or malfunc-tion in conjunction with a personnel error, where both were necessary to cause the trip.
Equipment Malfunction / Failure There were 6 trips attributed to equipment malfunction or failure.
For the purposes of this table, equipment malfunction / failure has been broken into three groups; (1) Random failure - isolated failures which are not considered generic, (2) Design deficiencies - failures attributed to equipment design, and (3) Construction deficiencies - failures attributed to improper installation durint construction.
Unplanned outages resulted from either of two reasons: (1) shutdown to repair random equipment failures, or (2) outage to inspect, identify, or correct environmental qualification deficiencies. During this assessment period there were 8 forced outages, 5 due to equipment failure - random failures and 3 due to EQ.
,
Unit 1 Power Functional Date Level Description Root Cause Area 1. 10/06/85 99% Condenser low vacuum signal caused Personnel Operations by Senior Shift Supervisor opening error / poor sensing device vent line during judgement troubleshooting - 16 day outage entered for maintenance and testing activities.
10/22/85 Restart.
-.
.
_
_ - _____ _ - _ ___-.
-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(
- *.
TABLE 6 (CONT'D)
Power Functional Date Level Description Root Cause Area 2. 1/16/86 100% High negative flux rate trip due Equipment to equipment operator closing malfunction /
breaker cabinet door too hard Design causing vital bus trip and 2 Deficiency shutdown rods to drop into core.
1/18/86 Restart.
(
3. 1/31/86 100% No.11 SG Low Flow - Low Level Equipment due to partial closure of feed malfunction /
regulating valve 11BF19 caused random by air leak on bypass valve failure positioner.
-
2/02/86 Restart.
[
4. 2/20/86 100% No.14 SG Low Flow - Low Level Equipment due to broken solenoid valve failure /
connection and loss of air to construction 14BF19. The wire broke as a deficiency result of a faulty installation during construction and normal vibration.
2/21/86 Restart.
5. 5/12/86 95% No. 14 SG Low Flow - Low Level, Personnel Operations loss of both main feedwater error / poor pumps due to the closure of judgement 14BF19 caused by operators tying down and overriding a limit switch on Train "A" Feedwater Isolation Solenoid circuit.
5/13/86 Restart.
6. 6/6/86 100% Actuation of generator Equipment protection system on failure failure /
of auxiliary power transformer.
random failure 6/7/86 Restart.
7. 6/12/86 64% No.13 SG Feed Flow / Steam Flow Personnel Surveillance Mismatch with SG Low Level -
error /
Wetted PC board caused false Inattention feedwater.ignals and response to detail and No. 11 feed pump trip.
PC board cabinet door left open following refueling outage.
6/13/86 Restart.
.
.
.
.
._.
..
-
l
.
,
e, g
TABLE 6 (CONT'D)
Power Functional Date Level Description Root Cause Area 8. 6/13/86 15% Turbine trip /P-7 during shifting Personnel Operations of lube oil coolers.
error /
Lacking knowledge 6/14/86 Restart.
9. 7/21/86 100% Normal shutdown to inspect and Equipment repair main generator hydrogen failure /
leak.
Random failure 7/29/86 Restart.
10. 8/5/86 70% No. 12 SG Low-Low Level due to Equipment loss of No. 11 SG Feed pump failure /
caused by blown suppression Random diode, failure 8/6/86 Restart.
'
11. 8/6/86 35% No.11 SG Low Flow, Nos.11 Personnel Maintenance
'
and 13 SG Low Level resulted error /
from runback of No.12 SG Feed Lacking pump during troubleshooting of knowledge No. 11 Feed pump.
(screwdriver grounded control circuitry for both pumps.)
12. 8/6/86 Unit placed in cold shutdown to EQ replace Limitorque wiring with EQ wires.
8/12/86 Restart.
13. 9/17/86 90% unit placed in hot shutdown to Equipment repair steam leak on high failure /
pressure turbine piping, Random resulted from erosion, failure corrosion of piping.
9/24/86 Restart.
Unit 2 1. 10/7/85 100%
"C" Vital bus momentarily Equipment grounded during troubleshooting malfunction /
caused by I&C technician Design plugging test leads into an deficiency incorrectly wired vital bus receptacle.
10/9/85 Restart.
-.
.
.
.
---
- _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
s
.~*.
TABLE 6 (CONT'D)
!
Power Functional
Date Level Description Root Cause Area 2. 12/10/85 100% Controlled shutdown to repair Equipment /
- high pressure turbine steam Random line leak failures main steam safety valve seat
-
leakage 3. 12/17/85 N/A Cooldown to Mode 5 to repair Equipment /
Nos. 21 and 23 reactor coolant Construction pump (RCP) seal leakage.
deficiency 1/05/86 Restart.
4.
1/19/86 100% Controlled shutdown to replace Equipment /
Nos. 22 and 24 RCP seals.
Construction deficiency 2/03/86 Restart.
5.
4/16/86 50% No. 23 SG High-High Level Personnel Operations due to transient following loss error /
of No. 22 SG Feed pump due to Equipment water in control 011.
malfunction Operators initiated significant turbine runback causing SG 1evel fluctuations.
4/17/86 Restart.
6.
5/2/86 100% Controlled shutdown for EQ EQ -
inspection in containment.
Regulatory requirement 7.
5/2/86 5% Safety Injection on high steam Personnel Operations flow and low Tave resulting in error /
Reactor Trip and as a result of Equipment operator driving rods in to malfunction reduce reactor power in conjunction with spikes in steam flow indication.
5/3/86 Restart.
8.
7/14/86 100% Loss of 2B Vital Instrument.
Personnel Bus Inverter due to inadvertent error /
re positioning of AC output Lacking deion switch causing blown AC knowledge outage fuses.
..
..
.
.
.
.
s ' *.
.
TABLE 6 (CONT'D)
Power Functional Date Level Description Root Causes.
Area 9.
7/15/86 0%
Voltage spike on 2B Vital Personnel Surveillance Instrument Inverter during error /
testing caused by I&C Poor technician connecting leads judgement incorrectly.
7/16/86 Restart.
10. 7/16/86 52% No. 23 SG High-High Level -
Personnel Operations due to sluggish response of error /
No. 21 SGFP caused by sediment Equipment-in the governor actuator.
malfunction Operator brought No. 22 SGFP up too quickly.
7/20/86 Restart.
11. 8/6/86 100% Controlled shutdown to replace EQ Limitorque wires with E0 wires.
12. 8/26/86 100% Spurious Solid State Protection Personnel Maintenance System signals caused by I&C error /
technician error during Inattention troubleshooting (probe slipped to Detail shorting 2C Vital Instrument bus)
9/1/86 Restart.
13. 9/11/86 75% Loss of Nos. 22 and 23 RCP's as Equipment /
a result of electrical failures Design of a non-vital transformer deficiency and No. 22 Station Power Transformer.
9/28/86 Restar.
-
3 * e.
,
u, TABLE 7 SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
,
1.
NRR/ LICENSEE MEETINGS Procedures Generation Package 10/10/85
,
Semiautomatic Switchover 12/03/85 RVLS (Reactor Vessel Level System)
12/03/85 Service Water Header T/S Changes 12/19/85 Appendix "R" Exemptions 08/21/86 DCRDR (Detailed Control Room Design Review)
07/01/86
,
DCRDR (Detailed Control Room Design Review)
09/23/86.
2.
NRR SITE VISITS / MEETINGS Preventive Maintenance Program 10/28-30/85 SPDS (System Parameter Display System)
12/04-06/85 Salem Training Accreditation 06/24-26/86 EQ Audit 08/11-15/86 3.
COMMISSION MEETING I
None 4.
SCHEDULAR EXTENSION GRANTED None 5.
RELIEFS GRANTED ASME Section XI Relief
'
6.
EXEMPTIONS GRANTED Appendix "J"
-7.
LICENSEE AMENDMENTS ISSUED t
AMENDMENT NUMBERS TITLE DATE Unit 1 Unit 2
,
43 Surveillance Testing of Hydrogen Analyzers 12/30/85
.
44 Coolant Loop Operability While in Mode 3 12/30/85 t
i
, -,
,,, -, -,.
-n.-
-, -.-,,-,
-,.,,
--,n-,
-- - - - -,- -,, -, - - -., - - -
-
-. - - - - - -,
. - - - - - - -, - -
g
.e, o.
TABLE 7 (CONT'D)
AMENDMENT NUMBERS TITLE DATE Unit 1 Unit 2
45 Surveillance Testing of Batteries 01/29/86 71-Increase rated Thermal Power 02/06/86
--
46 RHR Operation While In Modes 5 and 6 03/07/86
Revise RCS Pressure / Temperature Limits 03/10/86
--
48 Modify Analog Rod Positions Indication 03/19/86
. System
49 Safety Valve Operability Requirements 04/03/86 While Shutdown
--
Revise RCS Pressure / Temperature Limits 06/10/86 8.
EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ISSUED None 9.
ORDERS ISSUED None
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