ML20127B788: Difference between revisions
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| number = ML20127B788 | | number = ML20127B788 | ||
| issue date = 05/31/1984 | | issue date = 05/31/1984 | ||
| title = Responds to Encl City Council Resolution 84-193 Adopted on 840517.NRC Recently Established Coordinating Team to Gather Necessary Info to Make Remaining Licensing Decisions on Facility.Press Release | | title = Responds to Encl City Council Resolution 84-193 Adopted on 840517.NRC Recently Established Coordinating Team to Gather Necessary Info to Make Remaining Licensing Decisions on Facility.Press Release Encl | ||
| author name = Collins J | | author name = Collins J | ||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| case reference number = FOIA-84-455 | | case reference number = FOIA-84-455 | ||
| document report number = NUDOCS 8506220058 | | document report number = NUDOCS 8506220058 | ||
| title reference date = 04-04-1984 | |||
| package number = ML17198A241 | | package number = ML17198A241 | ||
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENT, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENT, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE | ||
Latest revision as of 07:37, 22 August 2022
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81 NAY 1984 The Honorable Joseph I. Giarrusso, President New Orleans City Council Room 2E09 City Hall 1300 Perdido St.
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
Dear Councilman Giarrusso:
This letter is in response to City Council Resolution 84-193 (as amended),
adopted May 17, 1984. The resolution requests that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission make public "the nature and subject matter of their current investigations" as well as "a preliminary stat;. ment of their findings" related to the Waterford-3 nuclear power plant.
I assure you that we intend to do just that. The NRC recently established a coordinating team to gather the necessary information to make the remaining licensing decisions on the Waterford plant. I have enclosed a copy of a news announcement issued in early April describing the tasks facing this team. As the announcement states, the results of the team's work will be published in the form of a Safety Evaluation Report. This effort, of course, will be completed and the results published prior to a licensing decision being made.
We will provide Council with several copies of this report, which we anticipate being available in late June. If, after receiving the report, members of Council have any additional questions, we would be pleased to respond to them.
In closing, I would like to say that this agency's goal of ensuring that the plant has been designed and built in accordance with accepted safety standards is consistent with Council's resolution. I am confident that we can resolve Council's concerns.
Sincerely,
Onginal usaeJ Dys J L COLLINS.*S John T. Collins Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
As noted FREEDOM OF INFORMATION cc: Councilman Wayne Babovich Councilman Sidney J. Barthelemy ACT REQUE.ST Councilman Lambert Boissiere T*f- M f Councilman Mike Early Councilman James Singleton C[ 7(,3 Councilman Bryan Wagner SGRS RI/WAT DRSP NRR UllA /
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.+ 7 %5 UNITED STATES
.f. . < a ' i, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l (1 f OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION IV
%, ' U # 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000, Arlington, Texas 76012 RIV:
Contact:
[/
f 84-32 Clyde E. Wisner FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (Wednesday, April 4, 1984)
Telephone: 817/860-8128 (Office) ,
817/571-9907 (Home) ,/
,/
NRC ASSEMBLES C0ORDINATING TEAM FOR WATERFORD 3 The Nuclear Regulatory Comission staff has assembled a coordinating team that will be gathering information at the Louisiana Power & Light Company's Waterford 3 site for the next few weeks as the construction of the facility nears completion at Taft, Louisiana. The team will operate under the direction of Darrell Eisenhut, Directo'r, Division of Licensing in Washington, D.C.
A number of outstanding technical matters remain to be completed before the Nuclear Regulatory Comission is ready to make its licensing decision.
Included are: (1) completion of review of LP&L's Final Safety Analysis Report, (2) completion of the NRC inspection activities related to construction completion and preoperational testing, and (3) resolution of allegation received by the NRC regarding improper practices during construction of the Waterford 3 facility.
Mr. Eisenhut and John T. Collins, Region IV Administrator, Arlington, Texas, were in New Orleans on April 2 to kick off the NRC team effort. The team is composed of staff from NRC headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, Region IV and other NRC Regional Offices, and NRC consultants. The information developed by this team will be used in making licensing decisions on Waterford 3 plant. Areas to be examined include the installation and testing of I equipment as well as the quality assurance aspects of construction. Of l specific concern are allegations received by the NRC staff of improper construction practices. For these, the staff intends to determine the accuracy of the allegations, assess their overall importance and implications, and evaluate their safety significance.
The results of this team review will be published in an NRC safety evaluation report. In that document the NRC will describe the areas reviewed and the safety signficance of any concern identified, and set forth any necessary corrective actions.
Questions concerning these efforts should be directed to either Mr. Eisenhut or Mr. Collins.
FREEDOM OF INFOftMATt0N ACT REQUESI g 4-HT d[7fas
bec: G. Sanborn R. Denise -
R. Doda J. Gagliardo C. Wisner L. Constable P. Check # Crutchfield, NRR W. Brown D. Eisenhut, DL W. Kerr, OSP l
l FREEDOM OF INFORM A.T10N ACT REQUEST
$4 *WS T c/76r 1
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RESOLUTION I R-84-193 (AS AMENDED)
CITY HALL: May 17,1984 BY: COUNCILMAN GIARRUSSO SECONDED BY: COUNCILMAN SINGLETON WHEREAS, Louisiana Power and Light has undertaken the construction of Waterford 3, a 1165 megawatt nuclear fission reactor, located on the banks of the -
Mississippi river at Taft Louisiana and has made application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requesting that they be granted a full power license for the operation of said reactor; and WHEREAS, due to the nature and location of the reactor, the question of structural design, and operational integrity is of critical importance not only to the -
economy of our region but also to the health, safety and welfare of the City of New Orleans; and WHEREAS, Waterford 3 has been the subject of controversy culminating recently in allegations which, if true, could lead to grave doubt as to the suitability of the facility for full power operation; and WHEREAS, in response to the above allegations the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has undertaken to investigate questions regarding the safety of Waterford 3 by commissioning a Construction Analysis Team as we!! as a special thirty-four member task force; and WHEREAS, this Council, on behalf of the people of the City of New Orleans, wishes to express its interest and concern about this matter and hopes that the Nuclear i
Regulatory Commission's inquiry will result in an accurate conclusion as to the suitability of the Waterford 3 reactor; and WHEREAS, full information is absolutely necessary to insure a responsible result; now, therefore BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, That the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is earnestly requested to make full public disclosure as to the nature and subject matter of their current investigations concerning Waterford 3.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the nuclear Regulatory Commission make public a preliminary statement of their findings when available so as to fully inform all interested parties.
ffi.iL>OM OF INFORMAllON ACT REQUEST
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. 2 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Council of the City of New Orleans hereby expresses its appreciation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their -
diligence in this matter and for their consideration of this Resolution.
THE FOREGOING RESOLUTION WAS READ IN FULL, THE ROLL WAS CALLED ON THE ADOPTION THEREOF AND RESULTED AS FOLLOWS:
YEAS: Babovich, Barthelemy, Boissiere, Early, Giarrusso, Singleton, Wagner - 7 NAYS: 0 ABSENT: 0 AND THE RESOLUTION, AS AMENDED, WAS ADOPTED.
CRS 84-419r igb THE FOREGOING IS CERTIFIED TO C2 A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
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' E t T+CE S. SIEGEL. Council Clatt l
FRtc.vv.<i vr i.u m n. .. . . .v n ACI REQUESI,
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-:UC L E A R R E G U L A TO R Y C.^ .'. " 13S T
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July 26, 193.'.
Docket :1c. 50-282 APPL !CA'iT: Louisiana Power and Light FACILITY: Waterford Unit 3 SUSJECT: SUPPARY OF JULY 10, 198' PEETD:G A meeting was held between the GC Staff and Louisiaret Pct.er anc cirr:
(LP3L) representatives on Tuesday, July 10, 1934 at t"e '<.a:erf;rd Siea, Electric Station, Unit 3 site. Also attending the r.eeting ere representatives of Muenew and Associates, a consultant tc tre apclicant anc E3ASCO Services Inc., the Architec: engineer. A list c# acterdees is included as Enclosure 1.
The purpose of the ceeting was to discuss LP&L's proposed :r: gram #:r the non-destructive examination of cracks in the.Waterfnrd concrete casemat. The program was presented to the staff cbycn fc' ncaticr -
P. A. Muencu. - --
of Muenow and Associates who will be performing the non-cestructive .
microseismic evaluation of the concrete using the pulse echo e9cd. The program will define the vertical exten' tion of East '<lest cracks locatSc at the top of the mat including those beneath the reactor building. Ir addition, cne .' E-S'.I crack, northeast of the reactor butiding and one '/..'-SE crack, northwest of the reactor building will be examined are evaluated.
The examination will attempt to define crack capth, widtn, !er;:' ,
orientation, and proximity to, or linkage with, etner cracks in tne lher cortion of the mat.
It is expected that the examination of the cracks and the evaluaticn cf tre collected cata will take approximately three weeks. At tha t time LPiL and their consultant Mr. Puenow will present their findings tc the staf#.
Their report will include the effect of the findings on the baserat cesign assumptions, and any corrective actions recuired.
The staff will review the data prior to making a safety determinaticn cf the cat's integrity.
M 7t M af jf , Licensing cranen .o. a y ep ' -
Division of Licensing
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FREEUO.'4 OF IN.-Uha.. i tun 4l; y ACT REQUEST wec C,af ](,y h '/ {#
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!;ATERFCP.C EASEMAT fiCE FF.0 Gutt "EE :'.'G July 10, 1984 '
ATTEt! DEES 1RC L. Lazo D. Crutchfield J . f>a L. Consta.ble T. Fliopo APPLICA.T X. Cock, LP 4 L T. Gerrets, LP & L G. Leddic'<, LP & L
. Hasan, Ebasco A. Wern, Ebasco P. !!uenow, Muenew & Assoc. -
T. Hedgecce, Muenew & Assoc.
FREEDOM OF INFORM.$, TION ACT RtQUEST
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/* **. NUCLEAR REoULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 4p..OV,/
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dennis Crutchfield, Waterford Team Leader Division of Licensing FROM: Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD 3 BASEMAT EVALUATION On April 27, 1983, a report entitled, " Safety Evaluation of the Structural Adequacy of the Waterford 3 Basemat" was sent by George lear to you. As stated in your May 8,1984 memorandum-to-file, the April 27, 1983 report "may be revised". Accordingly, upon the receipt of additionalinformation from the NRC consultants (BNL and R. Philleo) and after discussions with the various members of your review team, a revision of the earlier report was prepared and is enclosed.
Included in the report are affidavits prepared by the staff's geotechnical engineer reviewer, Dr. John Chen and the structural engineer reviewer, Dr. John Ma. Also, enclosed eitner as a part of the doctaient or referenced therein are the reports by staff consultants, BNL and R. Philleo, as well as the Chemical Engineerjng Branch.
Briefly, the conclusions common to the reviewers and consultants are:
- 1) the basemat can perfonn its intended function; 2) a surveillance (monitoring) program will be needed to assure its continued adequacy; and 3) additional response from the applicant for confinnation of certain issues and.the preparation of acceptable technical specifications for the surveillance program are needed. Should a hearing be required or should
_ the applicant be unable or unwilling to do certain confimatory studies, then additional funding for further participation by BNL may be needed.
We are ready to meet with the applicant to initiate resolution of confinnatogissues and to develop the technical specifications.
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
Enclosure:
As stated cc: J. Knight .-
L. Shao FREEDOM OF INFChiiON T. Novak ,
ACT REQUEST
- 5. Turk p _gy G. Lear - .
C,[770 x /.
. . ~ .
WATERFORD 3 BASD1AT EVALUATION STRUCTURAL & GE0 TECHNICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH DIVISION OF ENGINEERING In response to a March 12, 1984 memo from the Executive Director for Operations, subject: " Completion of Outstanding Regulatory Actions on Comanche Peak and Waterford", the Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering (SGEB, DE) was assigned the task of re-evaluating the structural adequacy of the basemat structures at the Waterford Nuclear Power Plant. Concern ws focused on the effect of cracks which had occurred in the concrete during construction at the site.
The SGEB staff and its c'onsultants from the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) met with the applicant, Louisiana Power and Light, and its architect-engineer consultant fim, EBASCO, a number of times. A visit at the site on March 27, 1984 provided the opportunity to see the cracks, question the builders, and examine records. Additional information was requested,0( the applicant.
Based upon the observations at the site and the review of infomation available to the staff, the DE staff and its consultants have completed evaluations of the structural adequacy of the basemat.
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ACT REQUEST 94-4 fr Cf778
2 These evaluations are found in the affidavits of the SGEB reviewers for geotechnical enginering and structural engineering (Attachments 1 and 2).
The Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, has provided an evaluation (Attachment 3) of corrosion potential. The SGEB consultant.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BN'.), has provided an independent evaluation (Attachment 4) with conclusions that are supportive of those of the NRC staff.
Robert E. Philleo, a consultant to Mr. Larry Shao, (NRC supervisor for allegations research and resolution of other civil / mechanical issues at Waterford) has also pr* pared a report which has been considered and included as a reference in the SGEB structural engineer's affidavit.
Briefly, the conclusions common to all of the reviewers or consultants are:
- 1. The basemat can provide its intended function.
- 2. An acceptable surveillance (monitoring) program is needed to
, assure continued adequacy of affected structures.
~
- 3. Additional response from the applicant for confimation of certain issues and the preparation of acceptsble technical specifications Mr the surveillance program are needed. .
Details of these conclusions with related reccmmendations are presented in the attached docur.ents.
FREEDOM OF INFORMM10N ACT REQUEST 88f-yrr ch7e
-- _ = .- .- - . _ _ - -. - - _ . . - - - - - . . - - _ _ _ . _-
attachment 1 Geotechnical Engineering Evaluation of Concrete Cracking in the Basemat -
Waterford No. 3 John T. Chen, Geotechnical Engineer i
- 1. INTRODUCTION The safety class structures at Waterford are supported on a contin-uous mat 270 feet wide, 380 feet long and 12 feet thick. The concrete mat was poured in 28 separate blocks from Dec.1975 to May 1976. Each block had a thickness about 12 feet and an area which varied from 2000 to 5000 square feet. The construction of the superstructure was started in May 1977 with all concrete work completed in Dec. 1980.
In July 1977, a num$er of east-west oriented cracks were discovered at the top of the mat within the ringwall for the containment structure (Ref. 3 & 4). Weeping water was reported to be low and
. just enough to show the cracks and to moisten surrounding concrete.
Epcxy grout was used to seal all the observed cracks in the mat insidfAhe.ringwall.
In May' 1983, new cracks (not reported in 1977) and accompanying
'I weeping water were discovered in the , base mat outside the contain-mentstructure(Ref.3). Some of tho'e s cracks were found to extend to vertical walls and to extend up those walls by an NRC inves-1 tigation team (Lear, Ma, Jeng and Chen) 1.*. March, 1984.
l FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 4
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l Thirr evaluation of the geotechnical engineering related causes .
which may have contributed to the observed cracking presents foundation conditions and anticipated future behavior of the mat and was based on the review of the referenced documents, field -
observation, and meetings held with the applicant on March 23 and 27, 1984 Other possible causes of the observed cracks are discussed elsewhere (Ref. 8). The subsurface conditions and significant soil characteristics were presented in the Waterford SER Section 2.5.4.1. The construction sequence was presented in SER Section 2.5.4.2.
- 2. EVALUATION The plant, as stated in Reference 1, was designed to give a net reduction, by about 200 psf, of the applied effective soil loading '
at foundation level (El.-48 ft.). Before construction began, the initial effective overburden pressure at foundation level was 3300 psf; after construction was completed the final effective static
~
loading of the plant and backfill was 3100 psf. Therefore, the futurJdettlement of the completed plant should be negligible. The ultimate bearing capacity was calculated to be 15,~000 psf,;thus, there'is no potential for bearing type failure and the bearing capacity is adequate. .,
During construction, the insitu vertical stresses were controlled by lowering the groundwater level simultaneously with the
,8 1
excavation of soils. The lowering of the groundwater level would . .
give an increase in effective overburden pressure which compensated for the soil removed. Later, as structural loads were applied, the groundwater level was raised to reduce the effective overburden pressure and compensate for the structural loading. By this tech-nique, the total and differential settlement of the foundation soil would be reduced and its effects on structures would be minimized.
The construction procedures are generally sound. However, the control of insitu vertical effective stresses and groundwater levels was quite difficult because the subsurface soil conditions were somewhat different than anticipated. Numerous construction difficulties, encountered during construction, may have caused some differential settlefnents which may have contributed directly or indirectly to the observed cracking of the foundation mat; those difficulties encountered during construction included:
I (a) Dewatering:
~
s ydi,scussed in Waterford SER Section 2.5.4.2 (Ref.1), the tips of the dewatering wells were located at E-1. -40 ft., in I .the recent alluvium stratum, for shallow wells and at El. -95 ft., in the silty sand layer, for deep wells. Thesiltysand layer is an identified aquifer at the site. Because of the very low permeability of the upper Pleistocene clay, all the wells did not completely lower the groundwater level in the
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,, - foundation soils to below El. -48, as evidenced by some ,of the .
l piezametric readings (Ref. 6). Locally, those high <
groundwater conditions appear to have caused soil disturbance, j 4
mud spurt, standing water in some area of the excavation and difficultic.s'in\compac1!fonofkhe hell blanket (Ref f).
(b) t'ariable foundation soil conditions:
e The foundation mat was founded at elevation-47 on the upper Pleistocene clay. These clays were considered to be fairly, _ ,
f uniform and over-consolidated in the design and construction f
] of the mat (Ref.1 &,7). However, within the boundary of the foundation mat, the permeability and the compressibility of the clay layer varied significantly from one location to($
another as evi'denced by the results of the piezametric and heave monitoring during construction (Ref. 6). The measured heave at various locations was 2 to 4 timef the anticipated maximum heave used in the mat design; this indicates that the differential settlements of the mat during construction would be'gr, eater than antMI:n:ed End the induced stresses might be l significant enogt t ,tse concrete cracking; (c) Variable degrees o'f compaction.in .,
the six clam shell filter strips: ,,
The compaction procedures, using a vibratory roller for 10
?
- passes, were selected based on the results of a test fill .
program (Ref. 1 & 5). However, due to the variability of the supporting soil and groundwater conditions, despite occasional greater effort up to 40 passes, the degree of compaction-achieved in these shell filter strips varied widely, from 80 to 98 percent (Ref. 5). Compaction of fill (shells) over a spongy subgrade is more difficult than over a solid subgrade.
Filter strip number 1, 97.5 feet long and 270 feet wide, was compacted to an average of 95 percent. Filter strip number 2, 58.5 feet long and located immediately north of strip number 1, was compacted to an average of 80 percent. Shell filter ,
was placed in standing water in the west half of strip number
- 2. A mud spurt area of about 120 sq. ft. occurred in strip number 2 durin'g compaction. Filter strip number 4, 48.5 feet long, was compacted to-98 percent. All filter strips were to be 1 foot in thickness.
~
These variable degrees of shell compaction reflect the condi-
, tjon and consolidation of the underlying foundation soils
/
indicating that the subgrade moduli varied amohg these strips.
Settlements.of the mat due to uniform structural loads would be expected to vary accordingly; strip number 2 would be expected to settle more than strip number I while strip number 4 would settle less. The resulting differential settlement may have inducsc bending stresses in the mat and caused
- east-west oriented cracking in the newly placed foundation .
mat. Subsequently, differential settlements would be experienced by the superstructure founded over different strips with variable soil properties and rates of consolidation.
(d) Foundation mat construction sequence:
As stated above, from December 1975 to May 1976 the foundation mat was constructed in 28 blocks with a thickness of 12 feet and an area which varied from 2000 to 5000 square feet. The load on the subgrade due to pouring of the first block of concrete caused a measured settlement about 3/4 of an inch and, later, some additional consolidation settlement (Ref. 6 &
7). After the# second and third blocks were poured adjacent to the first block, differential settlements between the top of the completed blocks were observed. This type of settlement pattern occurred for all later constructed blocks. These differential settlements may have induced some residual stfes.ses in the concrete. If the residual stresses were large enough, they may have caused concrete cracking or may have caused preexisting cracks to expand further.
(e) Significant hydrostatic pressure change:
- During the construction of the concrete mat and superstruc-tures, the groundwater levels were changed significantly three
. times, ranging from 20 to 30 feet (Ref. 6). These changes in .
i hydrostatic pressure changed the effective stresses in the foundation soils and caused movements of the foundation soils and the concrete mat. . Because of the non-uniform nature of the foundation soils, differential movements within the mat would be expected. These differential movements may have
, induced stresses in the concrete when it was still in the process of curing, contributing to the concrete cracking.
The p.lant foundation design, the " compensated" foundation concept, is a sound one. The cracks which may have been initiated due to thermal stresses or shrinkage (Ref. 8), in the foundation mat appear to have been affected significantly by the differential settlements experienced and, to a lesser degree, by superstructure loads as they were applied during construction. The differential settlements were caused mainly by the variable soil conditions, high groundwater levels, variable compaction of the shell filter strips, and foundation mat construction sequence. The hydrostatic pressupe changes, affecting the effective stress state in supporting soils, may have aggravated the growth of the cracks after the mat was completed.
The applicant performed a detailed soil-structure interaction analysis to evaluate the effects of changes in the values of the subgrade modulus used in the design of the concrete mat (Ref. 2 &
ommm _ _. -~--w
.~ _ _ _ ._
7). - However, those difficulties encountered .during construction -
and mentioned above have not been considered in the applicant's analysis. To evaluate the potential for future cracking, the effects of differential settlements during construction should be determined so that the current state of stresses in the base mat can be .better assessed. The soil shear moduli to be used in such
. an analysis should reflect more closely the soil conditions that existed during construction, when the foundation soil was in the process of being consolidated.
?
The future settlement is expected to be negligible because of the
" compensated" foundation design. The results of the current settlement monitoring program show that the overall settlement of the mat has been es'sentially stable since 1979, with some minor movements (about i inch) due to seasonal groundwater level fluctuations (Ref. 6). The cracks reported in 1983 and vertical wall cracks discovered in 1984 seem to indicate that movements of the foundation mat and growth of cracks are continuing. The current / settlement monitcring program reveals that the mat moves in conjunction with fluctuation of groundwater levels. Unfortunately, the scope and accuracy of the current monitoring program are not
~
sufficient to provide accurate information to assess and relate the actual differential settlements to th^e growths of the cracks in the mat. Sensitive mea urements are essential to determine this relationship.
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The scope of the applicant's current monitoring program should be -
expanded to collect more useful and accurate information about the differential settlements in the mat and about the precise growth of all prominent cracks. More accurate differential settlement monitoring can be achieved by installing additional monitoring points on the mat with increased monitoring accuracy. The added points can be located on the outside walls of the mat. The crack monitoring program should provide information about the development of new cracks and the propagation of the cracks, particularly those cracks that extend to the vertical walls.
4
- 3. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION Based on the information reviewed, it is concluded that:
4 (a) The plant foundation design, the " compensated' foundation
, concept, is sound and acceptable. The soil bearing capacity is adequate and the future settlement should be negligible.
(b) The east-west oriented cracks in the foundation mat and
,s.tfuctural walls may have been caused or further aggravated by I
differential settlements that occurred mainly'during c'onstruction.
I (c) These differential settlements resulted from complicated soil conditions, high groundwater levels, variable compaction of i
l shell filter strips and foundation mat construction sequence.
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- 10 -
, (d) Movements of the foundation mat, probably less than an inch, -
as the mat rises and falls in conjunction with seasonal groundwater level fluctuation, will continue. In addition the cracks may be expected to continue.
(e) A more refined analysis using the soil conditions disclosed during construction should be performed to determine the
. effects of past and future differential settlement on the potential for cracking of the concrete mat.
(f) In order to better examine and evaluate differential settlement and possible cracking of the foundation mat, it is recommended that the currently proposed monitoring program be
/
expanded to enable more accurate measurements of differential settlements and crack growths. All prominent cracks should be mapped and included in the monitoring program.
l- .
I
f References -
- 1. Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Related to the Operation of Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3 (NUREG-0787. July 1981) (2.5.4);
- 2. Letter from the Applicant to the NRC Staff dated June 24, 1981
(
Subject:
Response to SER Open Item 49, " Reevaluate Founda-tion Mat for Changes in Value of Subgrade Modulus");
I
- 3. Harstead Associates, Inc., Waterford III SES Analysis of Cracks and Water Seepage in Foundation Met, Report No. 8304-1, September 19, 1983; 4 Amended and Supplemental Motion to Reopen Contention 22, December 12, 1983, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appe'al Board;
- 5. Nonconformance Report W3-5997, Clam Shell Filter Blanket Under the Nuclear Island, LP&L, June 23, 1983.
- 6. LP&L's Draft Responses to NRC's Question on Waterford 3 Baser.at, March.26, 1984;
- 7. Affidavit of R. Pichumani on the Stability of the Foundation Underlying the Concrete Mat at Waterford 3. Nov.1983; I
- 8. R. E. Philleo, Evaluation of Concrete in the Basemat, j Waterford 3, May 8, 1984.
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Attachment II Structural Engineering Evaluation of Concrete Cracking in the Basemat Waterford Unit No. 3 John Ma, Structural Engineer
- 1. 'NTRODUCTION The adequacy of the Waterford Unit 3 foundation base mat in light of the discovery of concrete cracking and water seepage in the mat was assessed and documented in my earlier affidavit.1 The adequacy of the same mat is reassessed in light of new information. The new 1
information was obtained from: (a) observation during a one day site visit, (b) a geotechnical engineering staff report prepared by Dr. J. Chen,2 (c) a report prepared by Mr. Robert E. Philleo3, and (d) data furnished by Ebasco Services, Inc. (Enclosure 1).
In the evaluation, the observation of cracks on concrete surfaces, the review of records, and the interviews of various individuals during the site visit are described first. The possible existence of diagonal tension cracking inside the mat is then hypothesized.
. The adequacy of the analysis and design methods used for the mat is reexamined in light of the new information. Surveillance
/
(monitoring) programs are discussed. Conclusions and recommendations are finally stated.
- 2. CRACK OBSERVATION, RECORD REVIEW, AN INTERVIEW I visited the Waterford 3 site on March 27, 1984, and observed cracks on the ring wall and wet cooling tower walls. These cracks had not been mapped or brought to my attention until the Mcrch 27, FREEt)OM OF INFORMA[H)h ACI W I M -tii C C(1P.-_-- _ . -
1984 visit. Scme of the cracks were inclined to the vertical axis -
(perpendicular to the mat) and were joined by a crack on the mat.
This type of crack seems to be more' complicated and severe than the flexural cracks on top of the mat as previously reported.
At the site, I also reviewed construction records and interviewed various individuals who participated in the construction of the foundation base mat. Based on the review of construction records and interviews, I found that despite the effort of Applicant's quality assurance organization, the first three blocks of concrete placement, where major cracks occurred, did have quality control problems. These problems included (1) dropping concrete beyond 5' height at times, (2) using a concrete vibrator improperly and providing insufficient vibration, as well as (3) one instance of sledge hammering a reinforcing bar to make room for a con-crete-placing elephant trunk, thus transmitting shock waves to the concrete below through vertical reinforcing bars. Such action
~
could lead to cracking concrete or creating voids around reinforc-l ing b,3d. . Deficiency notes were written for observed cracking and honeycombing detected in vertical walls of the con' crete blocks on concre'te surface, and the records showed that the deficiencies were repaired. These quality control prob,lems were later evaluated and reported by Mr. R. Philleo3 as not significar.t enough to impair the structural integrity of the foundation base mat. Action to elimi-nate such deficiencies resulted finally in a stop work order,
, . . - . , .-- . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , . _ _ _ , __, , - - . _ - - ,Y
~
issued by LP&L after the concrete placement of the first three -
blocks. When the construction was resumed, quality control was improved.
- 3. THE HYPOTHESIS OF DIAGONAL TENSION CRACKING s
The most dominant cracking pattern observed on the top face of the
, mat is the numerous parallel cracks generally running in the East-West direction. The lengths of these cracks almost extend to the entire width of the mat. This type of cracking pattern suggests that one-way slab (beam) action in the longitudinal (North-South) direction is predominant. Diagonal tension cracking associated with this type of beam action is possible and is be-lievedtohavethebstpotentialtoaffecttheintegrityofthe mat.
i The me:hanism of forming diagonal tension cracking is fairly well understood, having been studied in the laboratory as well as theorgt4cally. An element at the neutral plane (axis) of the mat
~
in the longitudinal direction would be subject to a shear stress but wo'uld'not be subject to flexural stress. Along the 45' line (diagonal) with the neutral plane, te,nsile (diagonal tension) stress with a magnitude equal to the shear stress will develop.
1 Whenthetensile(diagonaltension)stressexceedsthetensile strength of cone ete, a crack of 45' slope opens. This type of i
crack is termed a diagonal tension crack. When the crack propa- -
gates away from the neutral plane, the slope of the crack changes gradually due to the influence of flexural stress. Since diagonal tension stress is related to shear stress,'and shear stress is nomally computed, but diagonal tension stress is not, in struc-tural analysis, shear stress has long been and is still being used as a measure of diagonal tension stress. Therefore, shear capacity in concrete beams or one-way sla,bs usually means diagonal tension capacity, and the reader is reminded that the shear capacity referred to in Enclosure 1 is actually diagonal tension capacity.
For better understanding, a diagonal tension crack in a test beam and its development is shown in Enclosure 2, which is an excerpt from a text book " Reinforced Concrete Fundamentals" 4th edition by
, P. M. Ferguson.
Diagonal tension stress was introduced in the foundation base mat during construction, even before any external load was applied.
There were three contributing factors to the diagonal tension stress during construction and all related to foundation soil.
/ -
The concrete placement of the mat was poured one b' lock at a time.
Each n'ewly poured block experienced an immediate settlement of about 3/4 of an inch while the existi,ng blocks adjacent to it then settled to a much lesser extent. The restraint provided by means of a shear key and reinforcing bars at the interface between the old and new blocks created shear stress and, in turn, diagonal
tens-ion stress. Concrete placed on top of the foundation soil -
under strip number 2 tended to settle more than the concrete in strip number 1, due to the differences in foundation soil stiffness under these strips (discussed in the goetechnical engineering evaluation). This uneven settlement would have generated diagonal tension stress . Significant hydrostatic pressure changes (dis-cussed in the geotechnical engineering evaluation) in conjunction with the non-uniform nature of foundation soil underneath the mat, during concrete placement of the mat, similarly would have produced diagonal tension stress. Whether these factors acted alone or in combination in causing diagonal tension cracking within the mat is unknown, because the cracks are not visible on the surface, except as flexural cracks. None of these factors was included in the design analyses performed for the mat. Thus, the effect of these factors in contributing to the diagonal tension cracking has not been quantified.
If a diagonal tension crack does exist in the mat, it is possible andljkely,tojointheflexuralcracksnearthetopofthematand to extend to the flexural cracks likely to be prese~nt at the bottom of the' mat. My experience in testing has indicated that the
, joining of a diagaral crack and a flexural crack is not only possible and likely, but also almost'certain is this case. This type of through crack would permit the ground water, under i
_ - _ _ _ . .- - . -~ - _--- . _ . ... .- . _ - . .-
hydrestatic pressure, to seep up through the mat. The effect of -
this type of' crack is discussed in the next section.
- , 4. REASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 4
In my previous affidavit, I had detennined that the analysis and s 4 design of the mat were adequate. I further stated that any conclu-sion was not altered by the concrete cracking that had been dis-l
- covered. This was because the cracks were reported as " hairline" in size and were believed to be flexural cracks. This type of j flexural crack was considered in the (ultimate) strength design method, which was used by Ebasco Services, Inc. in designino the i
mat. However, certain quality control problems experienced during I concrete placement,'the new infonnation on differential settlemerts of foundation soils, and the new discovery of additional floor cracks which extend to and up the wet cooling tower wall and ring wall, point to the need for a re-examination of the adequacy of the
- analysis and design of the mat.
l-Concrete quality control problems were evaluated by" Robert E.
l Phille'o, an NRC staff consultant on concrete construction adequacy.
3 His report indicates that the assume,d concrete compressive j , strergth of 4000 psi in design was attained. He also indicates that the assumed transfer of force from one reinforcing bar to the adjacent one tnrough caldweloing may be assumed to have been I
.m., ...;,_ - . , , _- _..~.5 #.2.._,,,_ - . , ,, . , , . . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . , . _ , , - . , , . - _ - , ..___,___,_____.y..
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attained, and that the bcnd between the concrete and reinforcing -
steel was attained. In short, the quality control problems were not significant enough to invalidate the original reinforced concrete base mat analysis and design.
The new information on uneven settlements of foundation soil and differential ground movements raise other concerns. When one portion of the mat is pushed upward or settles down relative to another portion of the mat, shear stress (diagonal tension stress) is created. These particular types of movements and associated stresses had not been included in the original design analysis, and thus were not specifically designed for. It is not clear as to whether the diagonal tension capacity of the mat can accomodate the additional shear stress (diagonal tension stress).
To permit further evaluation of the diagonal tension capacity of the mat. Enclosure 1 provides diagonal tension capacity and stress-es in the mat in two regions where I believe that diagonal tension crack3,Were most likely to occur. Shear stress calculations shown in Enclosure 1 do not include those induced due to'6neven set +1e-ment o'f foundation soil and differential ground movements. It is reported in Enclosure I that shear st,resses along major crack in Block 5A (see Enclosure 3) were 64 k/ft for nomal operating loads (no earthquake) and 166 k/ft for loading combinations including DesignBasisEarthquake(DBE)whichisequivalenttoSafeShutdown
... ~~
Earthquake (SSE), while in Block 1 (see Enclosure 3) they are 52 -
k/ft for normal operating loads and 210 k/ft for loading combinations including SSE. It is also reported that the shear capacity was 274 k/ft for both blocks with shear reinforcing steel contributing 98 k/ft and concrete 176 k/ft. Based on the above numbers, it is shown that the diagonal tension capacity is substantially greater than the diagonal tensile stresses under normal operating loads. Under the DBE (SSE) condition, there is still some margin lef t between the shear stress generated under DBE
'and the ultimate shear (diagonal tension) capacity . The lack of physical information on the potential existence of diagonal tension .
cracks in the mat combined with a yet uncalculated diagonal tension stress due to uneven settlement of foundation soil and differential ground movements, as noted before, makes it difficult to draw con-clusions on the adequacy of the above noted margin. Therefore, additional analysis, which accounts for the actual soil condition during concrete-placement, should be perfomed and non-destructive testing should also be used to detect and locate any major diagonal tensfo(cracks.Theinformation,thusobtained,shouldprovidea high level of confidence in assessing the adequacy'of the cracked mat.
At present, the adequacy of the mat in tems of diagonal tension can only be judged based on the infomation contained in Enclosure l 1, and the pattern and size of surface cracks. Since the diagonal e
mx_ __ . _ . - . . . - .
tensrile stress is much'less than the diagonal tension capacity -
under normal operating loads and the widths of surface cracks are small, the mat is safe under operating loads. However, there are not enough data or information to predict, with a great confidence, the adequacy of the margin to a diagonal tension failure under DBE (SSE). When the diagonal tension capacity is exceeded within a partial mat width or over an entire mat width, one portion of the mat may slide downward, and/or rotate relative to the other along the face of the crack. If this failure mode were to occur, the slidirig movement of the mat itself will be gradual, limited, and not catastrophic because the foundation soil underneath it has adequate bearing capacity. The vertical shear (diagonal tension) reinforcing steel may yield and the horizontal flexural reinforcing steel may fonn a kink, but none will break. Although the mat will not collapse even when the diagonal tension capacity of the mat is exceeded, the response of the mat under DBE (SSE) may deviate from what was originally predicted in elastic analysis assuming the mat was a monolithic piece.
/ .
The degree of such deviation depends on the size o Ithe diagonal
! tension crack and the length across the width of the mat. However, the current knowledge can not provide,a quantative relationship.
If the response of the mat deviates from its original prediction as a result of diagonal tension failure, the respor.ce of Category I structures, safety class equipments and piping which are supported
by the mat will also deviate from their original predictions. This -
situation should not be allowed to occur and it must and can be prevented by providing localized prestressed tendons to tighten the diagonal tension cracks. Moreover, repair to the mat may be difficult and costly after the zigzagged type of a crack surface (interface) is destroyed by the hypothesized sliding action, rrom engineering and economic point of view, the sooner the non-destructive testing and additional analysis data are available the better for LP&L. However, these data are not required prior to licensing, because (1) it is believed that the mat possesses enough diagonal tension capacity against DBE (SSE) although the confidence level of this believe is not confortably high due to information yet to be obtained from the non-destructive testing and additional analysis as described earlier and (2) in the event of the DBE, that the diagonal tension failure was to occur, the mode of failure will be gradual and limited.
- 5. SURVEILLANCE (MONITORING) PROGRAMS
/ -
- In my previous affidavit, I recomended a surveillance program for the ground water. It is now apparent that a surveillance program for the concrete cracks should also be instituted. ,
- There are two types of causes of concrete cracking, namely volume l change and external load. Thermal contraction and shrinkage of 2
.,- . -,,.m,...-w--w, ~.+-,,,,4~.-,,,,,m. r,----,-e---,c..-..,..-.....-,-m-,--_--~y--m, -
,,-e,,.---,-.,-,-,--.e-y-m,.-- .----------e, ._ ,--
concrete both belong to the type of volume change. Concrete con- .
tracts following the dissipation of the heat of hydration as the concrete hardens. Concrete shrinks when it loses moisture by evaporation. If restrainted, the concrete strain due to con-traction or shrinkage may cause cracking. This type of cracking, if it develops, would have occurred during the concrete construction stage, and would not occur to the mat now or in the future. The other type of cracking is related to external loads.
The pattern of cracking, the width of the cracks, and the propagation of the cracks reflect how a structure responds to 1
external loads.
The surveillance program for concrete cracking should include the marking and recording of the length of a crack and its propagation against time. For those cracks which appear to have greater impact on the structural integrity than others, the width of those cracks should also be recorded as a ' function of time. The result of the non-destructive testing should be used as a basis to modify the crack,ygrveillance program.
- 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION The adequacy of the Waterford Unit 3 foundation base mat was reassessed in light of new information presented. It is concluded that the as-built mat is adequate to serve its intended purpose.
The most likely failure mode of the mat is believed to be of the -
diagonal tension type in one-way slab action in the longitudinal direction. The concrete placement sequences, uneven settlements of foundation soil, and differential ground movements under the mat have all contributed to potential diagonal tension problems. None of these contributions was included in Ebasco's design analysis.
Therefore, the additional analysis earlier described, which ac-counts for the actual soil conditions during concrete placement l
should be performed.
4 Since diagonal tension cracks are not visible from the surface of i the mat, non-destructive testing should be conducted to detect and locate such cracks. The data obtained from non-destructive testing may be used in conjunction with the results from the additional analysis, thereby providing useful information as to whether there is a need for strengthening diagonal tension capacity.
~
Diagonal tension failure in the mat is judged to be unlikely but possib)( ur) der the design loads and, should it occur, will not be a catastrophic one, but a gradual and limiting sliding, and/or rotating movements between the two faces of a crack. This is because the foundation soil underneath it has adequate bearing capacity. However, this typ of failure must and can be elimina'ed with a great confidence by providing localized prestressed tendons to tighten the cracks.
The Applicant must develop and implement a surveillance (monitor- .
ing) program for ground water and concrete cracking.
T l
I i
/ -
t 9
L %
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References ,
- 1. Affidavit of John S. Ma, Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in the matter of Louisiana Power and Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3). NRC Docket No. 50-382.
- 2. "Geotechnical Engineering Evaluation of Concrete Cracking in the Basemat Waterford No. 3" by J. T. Chen.
- 3. " Evaluation of Concrete Construction Adequacy in the Basemat, Waterford Unit No. 3", by R. E. Philleo, May 18, 1984.
e-
/ -
6 4
, .-- . , ----.. - . _ _ . . . . . - - - --- _ . _ .. - . _ . - . _ _ - _ ~ - , _ _ - . . - - , - - . - . . , . _ - _ _ _ . . . . - . . . -- . . - - - - _ _ - ,
ENCLOSURE 1 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAI, INFORMATION
~
1
- WATERFORD NPP - STRUCTURE ENGINEERING J. Ma's Question on 4/4/84 Provide shear capacity and design shear stress in the mat in two
- regions:
A. Bounded by column line 2.2M and 7FE in N-S direction and - ~
T2 and R in E-W direction. This shear stress and shear capacity is measured along the 450 line from R column line toward column 12M.
B. Bounded by column line 12M and 7FH in N-S direction and column I
line R and P. This shear capacity and stress should be E-W direction. '
, Resconse A. The design shear stress under normal c'peration condition (Load Factor = 1.0) along the 45* line as defined is 64 K/ft.
The ultimate shear capacity of the mat is 274 K/ft which in-l cludes 98 I/ft. from shear reinforcement ($11 e 3'-0 center .
each way), and 176 K/ft. from concrete. The allowable con-crate unit shear stress is calculated based on 29 6 ', where 9 = 0.85 and fe' are 4,000 psi.
The design shear stress under DBE loadi.191 cem$.natten is-166 K/ft. / ,
f B. The design shear stress under normal operation condition is 52 K/ft, and the ultimate shear capacity same as "A",
274 K/ft.
The design shear stress under DBE Ica' ding combination is
! . 210 K/ft.
i l
ensue
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,._._x-_. y, ..
ENCLOSURE 2
.~
- 104 SHEAR IN BEAMS AND ONE WAY St. ABS P
1 F
- y,
' + V
, t c z ; Nn O .
'8 die K ini (b)
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e., ',~'i: w.yL- .g
..su 'w[?g.rCA.As 4
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- .. fk.fM 4
- l$'t,"$Y.L
- 5. . . ,r
.'.* 1
- (c)
FIGURE 5.2 Development of a diagonal tansion crack when loads and j reactions are far apart. (a) Diagram showing sequence in crack formation. (b) f Equilbrium sketch for portion of beam. (c) Failure of beam. The failure crack developed from the Sexural crack faintly seen about one beam depth from the end. This crack turned gradually into the diagonal crack, as at 1 in the sketch.
The anal wide crack is comparable to 2-1-3 -4 in (a) (The failure picture has been inver.ed to make this comparison easier).
's
ENCLOSURE 3 42'O ' 60'0 ' 47'9 ' 75'3 42'O
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s .
2096CY 1296CY e 4-1-76 4-15-76 5-4-76 (20) *-
(23) h8) (21) (26) C 1344CY 2068CY 1507CY 4-13-76 4-23-76 (2 1- 76 -
1 76 $
(6 (10) 7) f 2-3-76 1654CY 1842CY 2-9-76 1625p ,
D 12-22-75 D1 12-11-75 12-2-75
(\ 12-10 12.Q-75 D e
(5) 1(3)l (1) (2)) -75 6 ,
1269CY 1688CY 1794CY 1598CY (4)
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8 /
2-5-76 @N\-@30-76 1-22-7 6a @ E 1 2 18-76 (13) (8) % (11) y *
(15)
, 1916CY 1-27-76 1009CY I
1619CY 1697CY 1654CY 1675CY -
(16) (25) (19) (17) $
e 3-17-76 3-30-76 4 9-76 3-19-76 ,
2338CY 2221CY 2173CY 2323CY (28) (24) y l '
- (@22) @ (@27) -@ 2 4 21-76 5-25-76 5-11-76 4-23-76 P
KEY:
- 3 LOCK NUMBER ,
l - BLOCK PLACEME?rr SEQUENCE 1794CY y
~
BLOCK PLACD.Ein DA*E l LOUISlANA CCMP051TE FCUNDATICH MAT l
POWER & LIGHT CO.
Waterford Steem Electt c Station
,e - e s='-en- *- - + , - - , - - > ,
v ew - ,,o---p96=- msw s re - w , - *V t-- c~e- - - ~ - -
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jv" w e, UNITED STATE .
E 3e ~% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION m s m oros.o.c.2osis 3
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l APR 121964 NOTE TO: George Lear, Chief, SGEB 1 FROM: Victier Benaroya, Chief CMEB a
SUBJECT:
CORR"0SION EFFECTS ON BASEMAT REBAR AT WATERFORD III We have reviewed the licensee's proposed Limiting Conditions for Operation -
on the possible corrosion of basemat rebar due to groundwater penetration through cracks in the concrete basemat.
We considered the following factors in our evaluation:
- 1. Analysis of groundwater at the site indicated a chloride concentra-tion of approximately 35 ppm, which is significantly below the 710 ppm chloride corrosion threshold for rebar in the presence of oxygen (D. A. Hausmann, Materials Protection, pp. 23-25, October, 1969).
- 2. The rate of seepage of groundwater through the 12-foot thick basemat is small, which restricts the access of disolved oxygen, chlorides and carbon dioxide to the rebar-concrete interface.
- 3. The slow movement of water through the basemat causes the water to .
become alkaline (pH=12,5) by contact with the calcium oxide and -
calcium hydroxide content of the concrete.
4 The corrosion rate of steel by alkaline water is low.
On the basis of our evaluation, we find that there is reasonable assurance that the basemat rebar will not be significantly corroded by the penetration of groundwater of the acidity and chloride content observed at the Waterford site.
The board required monitoring the quality of groundwater at the Waterford site. The li_Sefisee has prepared a Limiting Condition for Operation requiring the analysis of a sample of groundwater at least once per 92 days to verify that the chloride content does not exceed 25'O ppm. On the basis of the above evaluation, where the time element is not critical, we conclude that the proposed Limiting Condition for Operation is acceptable.
t '.
\(
Victor Bonareya, Chi f Chemical Engineering Branch
.. ATTACHMENT 4
(
b s.
( )
- i A
REVIEW OF WATERFORD III BASEMAT ANALYSIS b
Structural Analysis Division ,
Department of Nuclear Energy Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, NY; 11973
/ .
April 16,1984 l
9
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,' FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST
$4-Spf 6/774 j \fA.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
3 g Page No. j k -
INTR 000CTION a................................................. 1 i GENERAL COMif NTS . . . . . . . . . . . .. ................................ 2 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS TOPIC REVIEWED ........................... 3 .
- 1. Dead Loads . . . . . . . . .. ................................ 3
- 2. Buoyancy Forces . . . . . ....'............................
5
- 3. Variable Springs Used For the Foundation Modulus .... 6
- 4. Vertical Earthquake Effects . . . . . . ................... 6
- 5. Side Soil Pressure . . ................................ 7
- 6. Boundary Constraints ................................ 7 o
- 7. Finite Element Mesh and Its Effect .................. 8
- 8. BNL Check Calculations .............................. 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................. 8 APPCNDIX A LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS ............................. A-1
/ '
/ . .
e 4
6 e .
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( FREEDOM OF INFORM AT10N ACT REQUEST 94-Vrf Cl?7o .
- -- - _ = .- . - . _ = _ _ _ .. .. .
e
,1 INTRODUCTION At the request of SGEB/NRR, the Structural Analysis Division of the Department of., Nuclear Energy at BNL undertook a review and evaluation of the ,
j HEA WaterfordlEII mat analysis documented in Harstead Enginee'.-ing Associates (HEA) Reports) Hos. 8304-1 and 8304-2. Both reports are entitled, " Analysis of CracksandWaIerSeepageinFoundationMat". Report 8304-1 is dated September J
'19, 1983, while Report 8304-2 is dated October 12, 1983. Majortopics ..
addressed in the first report are:
),
(l) Engineering criteria used in' the design, site preparation and con-struction of the Nuclear Power Island 3tructure basemat.
(2) Discussion of cracking and laakage in the basemat.
(3) -Laboratory tests on basemat water and leakage samples.
(4) Stability calculations for the containment strt:ture. ,
. g 2 rd@'d i The second report concentrates on the finite element analysis and its results.
Specifically, it describes:'
(I.) The gecmetric criteria and finite element idealization. ,
(2) The magnitude and distribution of the loads. i-j (3) The final computer 'results in tems of moments and shear versus '
the, resistance capacity of the mat structure.
Supplemental' infomation to these reports were obtained at meetings held in Bethesda, MD, on March 21 and 26, 1984, at the Waterford Plant site in
- Louisiana on Ma'ch r 27, 1984, and at Ebasco headquarters in New York City on April 4,1984. At t,he close of the EBASCO meeting, a complete listingo'f the f HEA computer run was made available to BNL.
1
,. FREEDOM OF INFOftMM ION . '
ACT REQUEST i T 4 -4 f f~
~
C-[ 77a
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The BNL ef forts were concentrated on the review of the results presented i n report no:@302-2 and on the supplenental information contained in the com-
,k puter run givi b to us by HEA. This coniputer run contains 9 load cases and ,
their variou ombinations. The input / output printout alone consists of roughly two t iousand pages of information. Selected portions were reviewed in j detail, while the remaining sections were reviewed in lesser detail. Com- ,
ments regarding the reviewed work are given in the sections that follow.
GENERAL COMENTS Basically, the HEA report concludes that large primary moments will pro-duce tension on the bottom surface of the mat.- For this condition, it is shown that the design is conservative. Furthennore, the shear capacity vs.
the shear' prod'uced by load combinations are concluded to be adequate although' a few elements were found to be close to the design capacity. Accordingly, the cracking of the top surface is attributed to " benign" causes such as l
shrinkage, differential soil settlement, and tenperature changes.
Based on the disuniu'ns held with EBASCO and HEA, and on the review of data given to BNL, it is our judgement that the bottom reinforcenent as well as the mat shear capacity is dequate. The statenent that the cracking of the top surface is attributable to " benign" causes however has not been analyti-l /.
I cally demonstrated by HEA. In the BNL review of the reports and data, an at =
terpt was mace to ascertain the reasons for the existing crack patterns that appear around the outside of the reactor shield building as depicted in Figure .
f.
D-1 Appendix.-0 of the HEA Report 8304-2. Other effects influencing the structural behavior and safety were also investigated. Specifically, the
/
struOur i aaaissis topics revi=*** ia = ore d tati iac1ade: ,
l .
e l
- .. . . . . . . ~ . . . . . ..
=-s. y - -..- - _ . . - . , . , _ . -
%,,,,-.,...m.,#,.,~ ...,,,,,.w%,,w.. .w.,.4 ,,.g. ..e. . -. - , _ . -
- 3-(1) Dead loads and their effects.
~
(2) Buo'yancy forces and their effects.
.k If Ii (3) Vggable springs used for the foundation modulus.
(4) Vertical earthquake effects.
(5) The side soil pressures. , ,
(6) The boundary constraint conditions used for the mat.
(7) Finite element mesh size and its effects, b
(8) BNL checkA calculations.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS TOPICS REVIEWED
- 1. Dead Loads .,
As mentioned. EBASCO in their discussion and HEA in their reports have not l
shown analytically, the cause of the top surface cracks. In reviewing the HEA computer outputs, it was found that element moments and shears for individual loadings are explicitly given. Thus, for the case involving dead loads only,
_ a number of elements in the cracked regions exhibit moments that can produce tension and thus create cracking on the top surface. This situation is shown ,
in Table 1 wh'Tch g'ives moment data for elements in some of the cracked re-gions. Frcm the HEA report (page C-2-1-9) it seems that' the top reinforc.e-ment, which is #110 6" in each direction
- is the minimum requirenent for temperature steel according to the Anerican Concrete Institute Buildir.g Co'de
- In a subsequent phone conversation, P.C. Liu of EBASCO stated that some additional reinforcenent was added on the top surface in one direction. Even if this is the case the statement that follows is true for the unstrengthened
! direction and perhaps even for the strengthened direction.
-we =g -, a w%- -,-e .*
TABLE 1 i. . :,t- .. . . .
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i
- '.+ ' ' Normal Prcssuro i
I("O;' '
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Mx i
W ';
Mxy g ,, ,,6 ,.
, , . i ..
g Side Pressura
^
Mxy s
- $ 8 Mx ELEMENT D B. D 8 D Mu i)
-574 197 116 - 31 -294 -196 93 I 4 37 -242 173
-663 -392 79 644 595 207 91 106 - 25 212 '
-296 48 -2 19 -416 - 76 211 -605 205 -412 217 50
- 81 15 -319
- E 207 64 99 -136 136 Q- -489 37* *
- 66
,' -105 -170 39 - 12 -347
- 7 el 'k168 172
-1193 357 531 -130 -274 -258 117 3 5 430 -7 19 '
269
-159 158 - 60 26 -730 -347 27
! E7 4 38 269 142 210 88 248 - 55 -653 -339 -127 l
T 44'l 665 59 87 569 72 -143 28 -361 -420 24
- 204 193 32 898 - 24 -241 75 -354 -771 - 49
- 208 350 -574 -247 30
- i
-676 260 -995 - 236 39 - 21 l 203 - 65 -171 .-486 61 l -542 157 -705 310 332 i 426 i' -
148 -133 ' '81 154 - 36 i 259 62 *
?.
5 71 - 531 75 0 18 p 253 41 10 30 58 670 5 4 0 - Dead Load .,>.
E55 NOTE:
$ 252 86 24 611 - 55 87 .
8 50 26 412 - 41 ~ 69 9
,,, j 254 j ,
- 23 44 12 1'8 - Bouyancy -
E, 251 37 5 162 l - 38 57 15 - 81 - 15 ",N,'.'f,'"7, I "i" 257 320 16 - 29 - 6 .
248 255 - 26 29 "'
i
-236 80 87 118 - 64 28 .
267 - 82 32 m, , ,.
-173. 59 434 10 .
269 .....;
- i
. 't i -
-314 137 -635 313 - 30 12 4 19
-642 238 270 - 29 5 410 71 ,
-371 108 -774 275 - 44 41 4 400 -315 42 -201 102 108 - 23
- 2% 401 -180 44 - 19 e .', 414 -304 118 -130 440 17 8 41 - 11 * - 15 i . -200 93 4 11 428 - 32 98 - 18 404 - 64 17
. - --e. .
.. . . - . J. . . . . . - . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . .
Speci fication (i .e. , As = .0018 x 12 x 144 = 3.11.in2/ft). The resisting moment capaci,ty based on working stress design is about M = Asfsjd = 3.12 ~
i x24x131/12j=817ft-kips /ft. The steel reinforcement strain for this momentisehu' alto N '
\ 'l- f l
e s (" *c) " " 29 000
=
0.00083'in/in ,
, s g;;n ,
while, the corresponding concrete stress is,
/ k *^ ^ ,, :
fg =cI = 0.00083 = 3 ksi c s/n 8
..Oi In checking the data in Table 1, it~ can be seen that element 208 has exceeded the working load capacity under the dead load condition and, thus the local area could have exhibited a crack when this load acted alone. Similarly, ' -
concrete cracking could occur under this load condition in elements 447, 212, 204, 253, 255, 269, 257, 417, and 404. Thus, the cracks on the upper surface 6utside of the shield wall could have been initiated after construction of the superstructure, before placement of the backfill. It should be noted that since no analysis is available for dead load withcut the superstructure, the reason for the basemat cracks inside of the shield wall cannot be explained by this reasoning. .
- 2. Buoyancy Forces The moment results from this analysis show that these forces when acting alone would mostiy ,cause tensile stress on the upper surfaces. T'he moments causing these stresses are tabulated in Table 1 for grcups.cf elements in the cracked regions. As can be seen, these moments are not as severe as those due to dead weight. By superpositon they could in some cases contribute to higher tensile stresses and thus result in further. cracking in some of the upper surface areas. ,
., .. . ,: q
~ l .s ,"**-(q. ~
( . .- _-,,.-....-- ..__ . . . . . - . . . . - . . . ... .
~' - ~ ~
i #
- 3. Variable Springs Used for the Foundation Modulus .
. ... n .
s
, Moments agd shears developed in the basemat were computed using the con-cept of the Wjnkler foundation; namely the soil is represented as a series of
~
relatively uniform independent springs. The stiffness of the springs is ob-. /
! 5 tained from approximate analyses which are based on generalized analytical ,
,. 1
' 4 solutions available for rigid mats on the surface of elastic soils. The
- I actual design of the mat was based on a series of iterative computer runs in which the soil stiffness was varied'until the computed contact pressures under
, the sat were fairly uniform and equal to the overburden stress at the eleva-tion of the foundation mat. This approach appears to be reasonable since the j long term consolidation effects can be anticipated to cause effective 4 redistribution of loads and cause the mat to behave in a flexible manner.
- 4. Vertical Earthquake Effects Vertical earthquake effect was not discussed in the HEA reports. However, from the finite element analysis print out and conversation with HEA engi-neers, it was stated that this effect was included r in the load combination cases by specifying an additional factor of 0.06]<whf ch was then applied to the dead and equipa.eni, load case. From the discussions and the review it is not clear to BNL whether an kmhlification facto)due to vertical mat frequency was used or not. A rough check by the reviewers indicates that this factor could have some influence on the results. vy
~'
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- 5. Side Soil P/ essure According tc the STARDYNE conputer results obtained from HEA, the normal l
l side soil pressures produce large moments that are opposite to those c::sett by the dead loads.'" As shown in Table 1 dere moments of elenents located in one of the cracked regions outside of the shield building are ccrnparec. The total
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moments in some cases (i.e. element 447 or 208) become quite small. In other regions there,is in fact a reversal in the total bending monent which causes tension on-thy bottom surf ace and compression on the top. This compression '.}
would tend to close the cracks on the unoer surface. Thus, it appears that F
-this pressure 71s a very important load case for the mat design. .
For the static or nonnal operating condition the lateral pressures are based on the at-rest stress condition and are uniform around the periphery of the structure. For the seismic problems the pressures are computed to ap -
proximately account for relative movements between the structure and the soil.
On one side the structure will move away from soil (active ' side) and reduce the pressures while the opposite will occur on the other side (passive side).
The actual computations made use of triaxial test data from site soils to arrive at.the so1_1_gtessures rather than use the standard Rankine analyses #. -
However, no dynamic effects on either the lateral soil or pore pressures was
~
~ included. The sensttivith of the calculated responses to these effects are ~
~ Au~r~rUdy unknown. 3 , , ., , .,,. ,
,5 Ta k / ajd ' /: ..= x
- 6. Boundary C:..:trcints 3.A '. 4/s,.. :. -: v c _. ~
For equilibrium calculations no.special consideration need be made for vertical case since the soil springs pr, event, unbounded structural motion.
However, the same cannot be said for the horizontal _ case. since soil springs are not used to represent the soil reactions.dather the lateral soil forces are directly input to the model. To prevent unbounded rigid body motion, ' '
artificial latertl . constraints must be imposed on the model From the output presented in the EBASCO and HEA reports, it is not possibl.e to evaluate the impact of these assunptions. _Th_e stra"ac caused by the artificial boundaries should be calculated and compared with those presented. .
e 4
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- 7. Finite Element Mesh and its Effects
' ~
In. genera} finite element models for plate structures require at least }
four elements between supports to obtain reasonable results on stress comp-utations. Th'p models used by 'both EBASCO and HEA violate this " rule of thumb" in the vicinity of the shield wall. The significance of this effect is '
denonstrated in Figure D-3 which presents a plot of moment taken through the center of the slab. The computed moments in adjacent elenents 193,194 and 455 are -3800, -2500 and +400K. The elements used in the HEA analysis are constant curvature elements so that the computed moments will be constant
. within each element. The steep moment gradient between the elements indi-cates that a finer mesh would be advisable. A similar effect was also noted when investigating the elements fonning the junction between the lateral earth retaining walls and the base mat. . .
- 8. BNL Check Calculations, .
Due to the questions raised in the items above (4 through 7), it was de-cided to ,Mdem saveral equilibrium calculations to check the order of mag-nitude of the shear stress computed in the detailed finite element analyses presented by EBASC0/HEA.
Two types of average vertical shear stresses were computed in the base mat. The first type considers the average shear through a vertical section
' across the entire mat (one section in the E-W direction and the other in the N-S direction)pThese sections were chosen to include those elerients sich indic:.ed high shear stresses in the HEA analysis and where the actual crack-ing pattern war' noted. The highe a[e age si5 ear Mirtemputed for any de-l s ig- load co-bination is 50 51.' The allowable shear stress for the case .is
'107;IsD(26vQ). ,
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The second type of section considered is a circular punching shear section located a distance of d/2'outside the reactor shield wall?' The peak value of
~
shear streds 'due to both SSE overturning moments and nonnal operating loads (plus proper load factors) wefe always less than the allowable design shear
' N (4&fc).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (a) The Waterford plant is primarily a box-like concrete structure sup-ported on a 12 foot thick continuous concrete mat which houses all Class 1 structures. The plant island is supported by relatively soft overconsolidated soils. To minimize long term settlement effects, the foundation mat was designed on the floating foundation principle. ,
The a'verage contact pressure developed by the weight of the structure -
1s made approximately equal to the existing intergranular stresses l
developed by the weight of the soil overburden at the level of the bottom of the foundation mat. Thus, net changes in soil stresses due to construction and corresp'o nding settlements can be anticipated to
^
be relatively small.
'\ In reviewing the infonnation, reports, and computer outputs sup-(b) piled to BNL by EBASCO, HEA, and LPL, it is concluded that nor-mal engineering practice and procedures used for the analysis
~
of nuclear power plant structures were employed.
(c) Accepting'the infornation pertaining to loadings, geometries ..
of the structures, material properties and finite element mesh.
data,' it is the judgement of the reviewers that: ,
(1) tiie bottom reinforcement as will as the shear capacity of the base mat are adequate f'cr the loads considered.
I t
I .
(ii) the computed dead weight output data can be used to explain
. some of the mat cracks that appear on the top surface. The ,
- cracks that appear, could have occurred af ter the construction of the superstructure but before the placement of the backfill.
Their growth would then be constrained by subsequent backfill soil pressure. ,
d) Due to the existance of the cracks, it is recommended that a sur-veilance program be instituted to monitor cracks on a regular basis.
Furthernore, an alert limit (in terms of amount of cracks, and or crack width, etc) should be specified.- If this limit is exceeded, specific structural repairs should be mandated.
e) It is also recommended that a program be set up to nonitor the .'
water leakage and its chemical content.
(f) BNL has re' viewed the infonnation provided by EBASCO, HEA, and LPL. The following questio'ns concerning their analyses were developed:
(1) , dynamic coupling in the vertical direction between the reactor building and the base mat.
l l
- (ii) dynamic ef fects of lateral soil / water loadings.
i (iii)drtificial boundary constraints in finite elenents rodels.
(iv) fineness of base mat mesh.
Based upon~our approximate calculations ,together with engineering judge-ment, we do not anticipate that the above questions will lead to major changes in calculated stress levels. Thus, it is ou. opinion that the safety margins in tt.> design of the base mat are acequate. However, it is recommended some
[ detailed ccafirmatory calculations be performed in the near future.
l
~ ~ ~ - - ~ - ~ . - . . . _ _ _ ,
A-1
. APPENDIX A-1 ,
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Listed below in alphabetical order are the names of the contributors to this report: -
Costantino, C.J.
Miller, C. A.
Philippacopoulos, A.J.
Reich, M.
Shanna, S.
Wa ng, P.C.
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QAI-9 1-A . . . ,-
' CONSTRUCTION INSTALLATION RECORDS REVIEV & TRANSMITTAL 'i *
. . t To: Quality Assurance Documents /fiecords Supervisor No. Fill #7 - Vol.# fo ,,
e
. Dates: 9.z&.-n n s2-m >7 Tron: Site Quality Assurance Engineer Sheet / of f Date: . /c//7[f ,
Prepared By: B. Dickson Transmitted herewith are the completed reviewed documents for Contract W%NY h Activity Civil-Soils' Backfill
=
Review Status Reference Document T'itle No. of No (1) No (2) No (3)
Require =ent Form Ilo. Sheets 3 , ,-
n,; 6 , ,- n,.j Arc n r. , Comments W-SITP Daily Backfill Insp. Report gjf, ,
OcTP9(f[>b'1) Daily Backfill Insp. Report feo /
m OA-11-6752 Field & Lab. Test of Soils /s/ g/
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Addendum to ..
REVIEW 0F WATERFORD III BASEMAT ANALYSIS Ultrasonic methods were used to perform nondestructive tests on the Waterford III basemat with the objective of defining the extent of cracking in the basemat. These tests were performed by Muenow & Associ-ates, Inc. On July 31, 1984 BNL personnel visited the site with the intent of visually observing the cracks, and disclosing the methodology of and results obtained by Muenow & Associates to date.
Visual Inspection of Cracks The major basemat cracks shown in Fig. 2 of the BNL report were inspect-ed. THe basemat crack patterns appear to agree with the crack map of Fig. 2 of the BNL report and no significant extensions or additions of these cracks were observed. The observed c-acks are closed at this time and no observable water seepage through the cracks was noted.
The cracks along the sidewall and shield wall were 61so inspected.
These cracks ,
were all small and mostly of a type normally associated with thermal and shrinkage effects. Leachate was noted frem many of these cracks. The leachate from the shield wall is most probably associated with rain water accumulated in the annulus between the steel containment and shield wall during the construction phase, before placement of the dome section. Leachate from the sidewalls is not ;- --
probably associated with water accumulated in the various cooling tanks.
. ._ FREE 00*i OF INFORMnTf0N ACT REQUEST g+-4sr M 73
All sidewall and shield wall cracks were restricted to about the lower twenty feet of wall above the basemat and within the first lift of concrete and are associated with relative shrinkage and thermal effects occurring between the basemat and the sidewalls. The visual inspection of these cracks supports the conclusion previously given in the BNL i
report that they do not present a structural safety issue.
Results of Ultrasonic Testing Program At the time of the inspection, the ultrasonic program conducted by Muenow and Associates had essentially been completed for those basemat cracks outside of the shield wall. Investigating of basemat cracks under the RCB was still being conducted, while the investigation of the side wall cracks had not as yet been undertaken. Mr. R. Muenow present-ed his interpretation of the results obtained to date as well as a detailed description of his procedures.
Fcr the visible basemat cracks, the procedures employed by Muenew &
Associates essentially measure time of arrival of a wave reflected off a discontinuity in the concrete. This wave is generated by a swiss spring loaded hammer applying an impact to the surface of the*basemat. For a single impact, a transducer near the hammer is focused in a restricted (but knewn) direction, and measures the arrival time. Knowledge of the arrival time and focusing direction leads to the determination of the location of the discontinuity. In addition, by restricting the viewing time of the sensor, only the reflection from the discontinuity being FREEDOM OF INFORMATiON ACT REQUEST fy-Hrr C/773
mapped is recorded. From a series of impacts at different locations, the extent (both length, depth and orientation) of the crack can be obtained. It is our opinion that this approach applied to the visible basemat cracks will give reliable information on the crack patterns.
i It should be noted that the procedures used are based upon recording and viewing only the relatively low frequency content of the reflected waves. Therefore, any discontinuity smaller than 10 to 20 inches cannot be observed in this program. (This cutoff frequency can be controlled by the operator to pick up smaller discontinuities, if desired).
Therefore, reflections from single reinforcing steel do not interfere with the crack measurements. However, the layers of closely spaced rebars in the bottom of the slab results in reflections being measured.
Therefore, data at these depths are not as reliable.
Based upon Mr. Muenow's presentation, the following characteristics of the basemat cracks were noted.
(a) All of the cracks were vertical.
(b) The E-W cracks exterior to the shield wall ran from the shield wall to the side walls. There depths varied along the length from a few feet to the depth of the bottom reinforcement.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST gu-+ct
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(c) Based upon preliminary data, he located three primary E-W cracks under the RCB. Two of these appear to connect to the E-W cracks exterior to the shield wall.
(d) Cracks emanating in a radial direction from the shield wall are not as deep nor as continuous as the E-W cracks.
(e) All of the basemat cracks are tightly closed. This observation is based upon the measured characteristics of the reflected signal.
O e
FREEDOM OF INFORMATiON ACT REQUEST s4-4rr c/m
INlERPRETATION OF N0T RESULTS ,
The basement cracks were most likely caused by bending moments developed during construction which resulted.in tensile stresses at the top of the slab. On. pages 4-10 of the BNL report (13 July 84), it is stated that the observed surface cracking in the slab was most likely caused by a i
positive bending moment which occurred during construction. While the bending moment data presented in that report would not explain the extent of the cracks that did occur, the strength characteristics of the slab as g1ven in Table 2 of the repcrt may be used to support such behavior. lne reinforcement in the top of the slab is very small (about U . 2*. ) . As a result the cracking moment for the slaD is about 1640 kip-ft/ft while the steel yield moment is only 1360 kip-ft/ft. It should be noted that the reinforcing steel carries little load until the concrete ciacks. For example, when the concrete reaches the modulus of rupture (475 psi) and cracks, the reinforcing steel stress is cnly 3e00 ps1. Once the com ate cracks, however, all of tne tensile load that had been carried by the concrete is transferred to the steel. Wnen the section is as lightly reinforced as the Waterford basement, the.r. teel '
yields immediately. Some of the applied moment will then be transferred to adjacent sections causing the cracks to extend across most of the slab.
Since such a failure is rather abrupt, one would expect the cracks to propagate to deeper depths tnan would normally be tne case if the failure occurred statistically. It should be noted that the neutral axts for .the basement is located about 16 inches above the bottom of the
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mat for bending moments which produce tension in the top of the slab.
therefore, one would expect bending cracks to run rather deeply into tne '
slab. -
Reinforced concrete structural members loaded in bending typically have s
such cracks in the bending tensile stress region. Such cracked sections can safely carry bending moments and the presence of the cracks do not degrade the strength of the section. Of course strengtn computations must be based on cracked section properties, but this is considered normal practice. It should also be noted that the presence of bending h
cracks 'do not affect the shear carrying capacity of the section, since interlocking between sections still occurs, and the cracks are not associated with diagonal tension failure.
The BNL report concluded that the basement was adequate and suggested that a few confirmatory analyses be performed to raise the overall confidence level for the mat. For the reasons stated above, this conclusion is still valid.'
I i
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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST 24-%TT .
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L0l[ISIANA POWER
, a LIGNT' COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT 3 J. A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY O APPROVED QA MANUAL AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 0
INSPECTIONS PERF RMED AND DOCUMENTED BY QUALIFIED & CERTIFIED PERSONNEL:
CADWELDING PREPLACEMENT CONCRETE PLACEMENT PO,ST PLACEMENT EBASCO SERVICES, INCORPORATED 0 APPR0vED QA MANUAL AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES E3ASCO QUALITY CONTROL 0 INSPECTIONS PERPORMED BY CUALIPIED 3 CERTIFIED PERSONNEL 0 PARALLEL OVERVIEW INSPECTION OF J. A. JONES FOR THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:
CADWELDING -
PREPLACEMENT CCNCRETE PLACEMENT POST PLACEMENT 0 CCNCRETE TESTING SY EsASCO QC
. SLUMP AIR CONTENT *
-' TEMPERATURE UNIT WEIGHT E3ASCO QUALITY ASSURANCE
.O REVIEW OF., CONTRACTOR QA PROCEDURESh . ,..... .
I "'I- o ' AUDITS 0F .. CONTRACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION FREEDOM OF'lNFORMATION ACT REQUEST 0 REVIEW AND PROCESSING OF NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS t
S+-4 ff LPal QUALITY ASSURANCE 4.h7f 0 APPROVED QA MANUAL AND PROCEDURES O AUDITS cF ESASCO AND CONTR' ACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION O SURvEILLANCES OF ESASCO AND CONTRACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATICN Cukh>hM~thh % LE w )
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IN0E?ENDEiiT EMGINEERING E!A!.UATION OF 3ASEMAT CONCERNS i
0 HARSTEAD ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES REPORT 8304-1, SEFTEMSER 19, 1933 0 EVALUATED EFFECTS OF CRACKS ON 3ASEMAT INTEGRITY 0 MAPPED BASEMAT CMAC%S (CRACKS WERE SO SMALL AS TO BE UNDETECTABLE EY STANDARD INSPECTIO1 TECHNICUES) l 0 REVIEWE SIGNIFICANT EVE?NS 'DURING CONSTRUCTION O S OP WORK ORDER NO. 1 0 ?LACEMENT DIFFICULTIES - PLACEMENTS 103 & 19 0 REVIEwe SciiLEMENT PLAN AND DATA .
O EVALUATED CORROSION POTENTIAL v~0 Ef LUATE [ STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL STABILITY .
O PERFORMED A GENERAL REVIEW OF BASEMAT ENGINEERING DESIGN.AND
- C
- :NSTRUCTICN 1
0 HARSTEAD ENGINEERING ' ASSOCIATES REPORT 8304-2, OCTOBER 10, 1983 0 PERFORMED AN INDEFENDENT STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE SASEMAT.
R CAD ENGIN m ING ASSOCIATES llE*0RT 8304-3, JANUARY 9, 1984 O REVIEW OF CONSTRUCTICN DOCUMENTATION TO EVALUATE WHETHER DESIGN OBJECTIVES WERE MET ,
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( -
f' BdSEMATCONCRETE -
,e 46,000 YD 3 TOTAL CONCRETE .
NUM3ER OF MON 0 LITHIC PLACEMENTS 28 CencwE E TESTtNo O COMPRESStVE STRENGTHS 464 TESTS (SETS OF 2) 0 AVERAGE (TOTAL MAT) 5304 PSI O LOWEST (OF ANY SET) 4065 PSI '
O HIGHEST (CF ANY SET) 6905 PSI O NIGHEST PLACEMENT AVERAGE 6106 PSI O LOWEST PLACEMENT AVERAGE 4698 PSI -
- 0 MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE 4000 pst 0 OTwEn Tests (Stump. Ata, untT wetoaT, TEMPERATURE) 0 APPROXIMATELY 1000 TESTS e
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BASEMA7 CADWELD
SUMMARY
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IOTAL BASEMAT CADwELDS APPROXIMATELY 3673 g
/
'i 81 TOTAL IENSILE TESTS PERFORMED (PRODUCTION TESTS) . - ,
AvsaAGE IENSILE STRENGTH 95,397 PSI ,
107,051 PSI
, HIGHEST TENSILE STRENGTH Lowest TENSILE STREMGTH 80,750 PSI 3 ,
e , ,
75,000 PS/
PiINIMun ACCEPTABLE IENSILE STRENGTH .
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L0l[ISIANA POWER a LI.C-NT ' COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT 3 J. A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY O APPROVED QA MANUAL AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 0 INSPECTIONS PERF RMED AND DOCUMENTED BY QUALIFIED & CERTIFIED PERSONNEL:
CADWELDING PREPLACEMENT CONCRETE PLACEMENT PO,ST PLACEMENT E3ASCO SERVICES, INCORPORATED O APPROVED QA MANUAL AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES E3ASCO CUALITY CONTROL O INSPECTIONS PERFORMED BY QUALIFIED 3 CERTIFIED PERSONNEL 0 PARALLEL OVERVIEW INSPECTION OF J. A. JONES FOR THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:
CADWELDING -
PF.?LACEMENT
- CC;4 CRETE PLACEMENT POST PLACEMENT 0 CONCRETE TESTING BY EsASCO QC
. SLUMP AIR CONTENT ,
TEMPERATURE UNIT WEIGHT E3ASCO QUALITY ASSURANCE
._0 REVIEWOF,CONTRACTORQAPROCEDURES[ . . . ,..-..
z _.. . . ,,
Y I "' o AUDITS OF, CONTRACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION FREEDO OF NF RMATION O REVIEW AND PROCESSING OF NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS S+-V rs' LP8L QUALITY ASSURANCE 4h f 0 APPR0vED CA MANUAL AND PROCEDURES O AUDITS OF EsASCO AND CONTR' ACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION O SURVEILLANCES OF EsASCO AND CONTRACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATIcN GLPp. Mcwh4 , h i l
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. IN0E?ENDEiiT EiG? NEE:.iHG E!ALUATibN OF 3ASEMAT CONCE:.NS 0 HARSTEAD ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES REPORT 8304-1, SEPTriSER 19, 1983 0 EVALUATED EFFECTS OF CRACKS ON 3ASEMAT INTEGRITY 0 MAPPE EASEMAT CRACKS (CRACKS WERE SO SMALL AS TO SE UNDETECTABLE EY STANDt,RD IllSPECTICM TECHNICUES) 0 REVIEWED SIGNIFICANT EVENTS DURING CONSTRUCTICN O S~0F WORK ORDER No. 1 0 PLACEiENT DIFFICULTIES - PLACEMENTS 103 & 19 O REVIEWED SETTLEMENT PLAN AND DATA .
O EVALUATED CORROSION PGTENTIAL O E75LUAisu ST A CONTAINMENT VESSEL STABILITY .
O PERFORMED A GENERAL REVIEW OF BASEMAT ENGINEERING DESIGN AND CCNSTRUCTION i
0 HARSTEAD ENGINEERING' ASSOCIATES REPORT 8304-2, OCTOBER 10, 1983 0 PERFORMED AN INDEFENDENT STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE SASEMAT.
l . . :.
i tic-p't.V.e-ge.
l .: t.HARSTEAD
+ . . . . .
ENGINSING ASSOCIATES 3EFORT 8304-3, JANUARY 9, 2984 l
O REVIEW OF CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTATION TO EVALUATE WHETHER DESIGN OBJECTIVES WERE MET l
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0 3ASEMAT MAP 0 3ASEMAT CONSTRUCTION SLIDES _
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o PLACEMENTS 6, 1 AND 2 -
- _'.- ~- a A.= . L . .;.
i o FACTS ,
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- O CADWELDING TENSILE STRENGTH I . .. ~
O CONCRETE COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH l -
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L0l[ISIANA POWER 8 LIGNT' COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT 3 J. A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY O APPROVED QA MANUAL AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 0 INSPECTIONS PERF RMED AND DOCUMENTED BY QUALIFIED 8 CERTIFIED PERSONNEL:
CADWELDING PREPLACEMENT CONCRETE PLACEMENT POST PLACEMENT E3ASCO SERV!CES, INCORPORATED 0 APPROVED QA MANUAL AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EBASCO CUALITY CONTROL 0 INSPECTIONS PERFORMED BY QUALIFIED 3 CERTIFIED PER30NNEL 0 PARALLEL OVERVIEW INSPECTION OF J. A. JONES FOR THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES: -
CADWELDING FREPLACEMENT CONCRETE PLACEMENT POST PLACEMENT 0 CONCRETE IESTING BY ESASCO QC
. SLUMP AIR CONTENT ,
-' TEMPERATURE UNIT WEIGHT EBASCO QUALITY ASSURANCE
.O_ REVIEW OF. CONTRACTOR QA PROCEDURES _. . ,.....
i -[;o AUDITS OF . CONTRACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION FREk~d0 0F F RMATION O REVIEW AND PROCESSING OF NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS S+-Vff LP8L QUALITY ASSURANCE 4 h7f 0 APPROVED QA MANUAL AND PROCEDURES O AUDITS CF ESASCO AND CONTR' ACTOR QA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION O SURvEILLANCES OF ESASCO AND CONTRACTOR CA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION CuCDA M&. 4 .
4 ha i 1
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- . . ~ _ - - . _ _ _ _ _
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BASEMAT CRACKING -
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CRACXING 0 HAIRLINE CRACKS IN BASEMAT 0 INITIALLY DISCOVERED AND DISPOSITIONED IN 1977 0 ADDITIONAL DISCOVERIES IN 1983 0 Evstu: TION e ENGINEERING EVALUATION PERPORMED IN 1977 e ENGINEERING EVALUATION IN 1983 0 SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE ACTION (1977)
. 6 CHIPPED TO SHALLOW DEPTH e EP0XY PATCH l 0 GENERIC CORRECTIVE ACTION e NONE REQUIRED - SUCH CRACKS ARE AN l EXPECTED PHENOMENON
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O INDEPENDENT ENGINEERING EVALUATION e HARSTEAD ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES 5j5g..l_- -
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. (NO3?ENDENT EiGINEEEiHG E!ALUATION OF 3ASEMAT CONCERNS O HARSTEAD ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES RE.:0RT 8304-1, SEPTEMBER 19, 1983 0 EvAtuATs E.=FECTS OF CRACKS ON 3ASEMAT INTEGRITY 0 MAPPE BASEMAT CRACKS (CRACKS WERE SO SMALL AS To SE UNDETECTABLE SY STANDARD INSPECTICN TECHNIQUES) 0 RF/IEWED SIGNIFICANT EVENTS DURING CONSTRUCTION O S OP WORK ORDER NO. 1 0 ?LACEMENT DIFFICULTIES - PLACEMENTS 103 & 19 0 REVIEWED SciiLEMENT PLAN AND DATA .
O EVALUAiu CORROSION POTENTIAL
~ "
0 ETituAie ST A CONTAINMENT VESSEL STABILITY .
O PERFORMED A GENERAL REVIEW OF SASEMAT ENGINEERING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION O HARST~ CAD ENGINEERING ' ASSOCIATES REPORT 8304-2, OCTOBER 10, 1983 0 PERFORMED AN INDEFENDENT STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE SASEMAT.
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.: c'fHARSTEAD ENGIN S ING ASSOCIATES RE:0RT 8304-3, JANUARY 9, 1984
< . ~ . .
O REVIEW OF CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTATION TO O/ALUATE WHETHER DESIGN OBJECTIVES WERE MET e
9 BASEMAT CONCRETE
,e TOTAL CONCRETE . 46,000 YD 3 NUM3ER OF MONOLITHIC PLACEMENTS 28 1
Cencas s TesrtNG 0 COMPasssivs STasNGTHs 464 tests (sets OF 2) 0 AVERAGE (TOTAL MAT) 5304 PSI 0- LOWEST (OF ANY SET) 4065 PSI ~
O HIGHEST (OF.ANY SET) 6905 PSI 0 HIGHEST PLACEMENT AVERAGE 6106 PSI O LOWEST PLACEMENT AVERAGE 4698 PSI -
0 MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE 4000 pst 1
O OTusa Tests (stump, Ata, untT wetGuT, TEM 9snATuns)
O APPROXIMATELY 1000 tests e
e 1
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3 CONCRETE COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH SY FLACEMENT PLACEMENT 28-DAY PLACEMENT N0. 28-DAY STRENGTH NO. STRENGTH l' , 5771 103 5632 2 5675 11A 5150 3 5748 12A 4916 4 5466 13A 4871 5A 5554 14A 4861 53 5558 15 4698 6 6094 113 5457
~
7A ' ' 5335 12B 5326-73 5844 133 5355 8A 5212 .14B 5386 83 5193 16 4826 9A 5457 17 4
5125 93 5644 18 c, 4924
- 10A ' y 4722 19 A yd 4769 s ,-
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IOTAL 3ASEMAT CADWELDS APPROXIMATELY 3573 81 IOTAL IENSILE IESTS PERFORMED (PRODUCTION TESTS) 95,397 PSI AvEaAGE IENSILE STRENGTH 107,051 PSI HIGHEST IENSILE STRENGTH 80,750 ps!
Lowest T:NSILE STRENGTH
- 75,000 PSI-MINInun ACCEPTABLE TENSILE STRENGTH g *a h
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PLACEMENTS 6, 1, AND 2 -
o PLACEMENT 6 (12/2/75) o FIRST CLASS I PLACEMENT o LARGE " INSPECTION" FORCE O STARTUP PRostEMS 0 PRostEMS.CcRRECTED IN .=ROCESS 0 ESASCO AND LPaL QA REPOPTS (2) DATED 12/2/75 0- MEETING 12/5/75 (LPaL, ESASCO, CONCRETE CONTRACTOR)
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TO DISCUSS AND RESOLVE PROSLEMS, o PLACEMENT 1 (12/8/75) o SECOND CLASS I PLACEMENT o LARGE " INSPECTION" FORCE o PLACEMENT CONDUCT IMPROVED o PLACEMENT 2 (15/11/75) 0 IHIRD CLASS I PLACEMENT o LARGE " INSPECTION" FORCE o PROBLEMS RETURNED, CORRECTED IN-PROCESS
.._.' , _' o LP&L QA SURVEILLANCE REPORT DATED 12/11/75
'o LPat STOP WORK ORDER No. L DATEU 12/16/75 O
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r 7 n.b i t~ n+wsp>per a of flew Orl+ ens published a s t or y entitl+d December of' 1982. A Pcce Founda t i cn At Wa ter f ord III?" in t > s :-ma t and The story cencerned cracMs in the quality deficiencies. Gambit assurance records tinding that implies that the Region IV in error because the basema of pecblems t's construc tion was scund is records review p+rformed identified during by the Assurance Installations E5ASCO's Quality Olmbit Review Group ( O A !.5 G ) .
the r+ cords states that the r eview ref1 +c t irregularities i den t i f i +d in that are directly relited ccnstructicn to d+fici+.cies acscciat*d weter seepage in the fcur.dation A
the ccScPs and Ind A ceries of ncncenformance repcets issued by base at.
CAI?G men:randum written in 1975 are used as the tesis for the stcry which also relies en infccmaticn
- revid+d cf CAIFu. to 9+mbit by G+ccge Hill, a fccm+c ember wr i t.t + n by F. 4he memo L.
dated December 12, 1975 w+s ccncrete pitctment Fhearson and d+ scribes ;ccr ct c;ncrete fcr the bacemat. activities during the plics +nt sttting that the memo describes Gambit quotes Hill as in yhich "everything tha t a concr e te pl ec +r en t uis dcne Wecng." cou l d h ave b++n den
- u cng was c ncrete plac+ ment no.
The subject of this descriptien foundatica mat. The 4??-302-2 in the cc non pisc+ments totaling 45,5?4 cubicen t ir e yards.
ma t wa s ccm;os+d28of no. 4??-502-2 Placement s+rcent involved 1.63? cubic yards cc 3.6 the seriesofofthe total and was the th ird p l acemen t in 23.
On Jsnuary 10, !??4, Region IV investigative interview with Hill who was ccnducted an main seurce of Gambit's concern with information. Mr. Hill expressed the Phearson m+mo because "that letter is on the placement that had the cracks in Hill f ur ther stated ,
"My poin t was, though, they it." Mr.
r.ev+r took assuming allthat ofletter into consideration. Th e y'r e concrete was this time that this placed strictly 12 foot of ACI." in accordance with The- poor pl acemen t no. plac+ ment practices which occur +d during Ceder No. 1, 4??-202-2 issued were addressed in Stop Work against J. A. by Louisiana Power & cight The Stoo WorkJones and EEASCO on December 16, 1975.
ebservaticns made Order was issued as a result et. FREEDOM OF INFORMATON by Engin++rs Eennett P. Scown LP&L Guality Assurance ACT REQUEST E5ASCO Quality end Themas Gerrets and by Their observations Assurance Engineer J. $8( y f f are documented on Gutierre:.
Surveillance Reports LPhL Site EEASCO W3S75-63S, W3S75-64S and on (-[776 No. JG-75-12-2. Guality Assurance Engineering Audit Report NRC Inspectors The Stoo Work Ceder was reviewed by and is addressed in NRC Inspec t i on
. _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ -R_ -- -
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~.e; cr t s 75-10 and 76-01. It was determined that the
-concrete was not edversely affected by the cbserved tractic+5 to the extent that it was not s truc tural l y s:vnd- and consequently the dispcsition to use-as-is ues not challenged.
Mr. Er:wn documented 13 observaticns which include And go beycod the items ilsted in the Phearson m+mo.
'n a signed and sworn statement to the NRC, Mr.
Irewn states that mcst of the im;rcper ;rnctices which he cb i+ r v+ d N+r e -s u bj ec t to corrective acticas kt 'he time he point +d th+m cut. He stat +d ' hat the
- ur;;Ie of documenting the ncted dis'r+
- anci+s c was to prevtat recurrence in future place. bents. It was his cpinion that what he cbserved was not in sny case of such a serious m+;nitude as to render the
- 1acement unsatisfactcry and that because of the acticns taken at the time cf the placement, all c.
- ncr e t e is placed satisfied the specification r+ quire ents.
Mr . - Fhearvon was +mpley+d by EEASCO as a Cuality Ccatrol Engineer - Civil. The Fhekrscn .+mo is a
' an dwr i t t en document en ti tl ed "Afteracticn Report" and is.not a result ct a required Cuality Assurance
?rscedure. The 7. + m o is addr+s:+d to W. C. Griggs
- ~ho at the time held the pcsition of Senior Cuality Ccntrol Supervisor. In a signed and sworn statem+nt to the NRC, Mr. Griggs stated that he did not recall the memo nor any. particulars _regarding the placement referenced. He did express satisfaction that as result of his supervisory overview of the inspection process during the construction of the basemat, any p r. ob l ems encountered were addr es s+d by the qu al i ty assurance program and that in his cpinien the concrete in the bas + mat is sktisfactory. A review cf the documentation package for the pl3c+=ent in question indicates that four placement inspection reports were generated. Two reports were ;ener a te d i by EEASCO Quality Centrol and two by J. A. Jones F Cuality Control. Inspection fincings include excess concrete on steel, improper vibrator usage, and spillage of dry concrete frcm disconnected pumping equipment.into the pitcement. The reports also t
indicate that corrective-measures were being taken at the time. The excess concrete was cleaned, the spillage was cleaned up and " vibrator operators FREEDOM OF INFORMATION required constant instructicns in proper use et ACT REQUEST
. vibrators." The reports also document the 39w$g3F inspectors tindings that the placement and consolidation cf the concrete was acceptable.
These inspection reports corroborate the statement - 77b frem Mr. Srown, the LP&L CA Engineer, concerning the corrective actions taken at the time of' the noted d i s c r e p an,c i e s .
- !.~~~
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In. addition to reviewing the concrete placement documentation, all nonconformance reports generated on the foundation basemat were reviewed for the purpose of verifying that ncne of the noted discrepancies ~ could lead to the generation of the ,
ccncrete cracks. Two nonconfc.-.snce reports were ,-
i nden t i f i e d - (W3-39 ' 'and W3-73) which document prcblems enccuntered with basemat placements no.
103 and 19. Placement no. 10S was contaminated by a heevy rain and pl+ cement no. 19 develep+d a cold-Jcint due to poor s t air-s t e;p ing t+chnique.
Ecth placements r+ceived extensive- evaluation by coring and were later repaired by7 pressure 9. outing and/or dry-packing of areas r-moved. Region IU '
m:nitored the status of and ebserved r+prics in
- rcy ess as monitored in NRC in
- ;ection reports 76-05, 76-07, 76-09, 76-09, 76-10, 77-03, 77-04, 77-06, and 77-09.
CracRs in the bas + mat were identified in 1977 and Main in 1983. The cracks were the subj +c t of nonconf or .ance r epor ts no. W3-535 and W3-f1143. *aC C.IV ebserved the sealing of the crac%s that occurr+d -
beneath the containment vessel as documented in fdC Feport No. 77-07 and the matter was cicsed in Re;ce t No. 77-08. It is the opinion of N.;.C RIV that the 1783 cracks are similar to the earlier cracks that were identified in 1977. The original cracks were located in the center of the mat and were the result of mat flexure._ The extent of cracking Gway from the center of the mat may not have been fully defined unti1 1983 because of: ccacern in 1977 only with stability of the containment, re turn to nor mal ground water pressure until July, 1979 and the minuteness of the crack width.
Based on Region IV's monitoring of concrete activities and it's confidence level in the Cuality Assurance program to identify and correct problems in the concrete placement area, it cannot support the argument that the cracks identified in 1983 result from localized porous
- enes due to unaddressed poor construction practices. The cracks result from flexure of the mat and occur in placements other than those which have been the subject of nonconfccmance reports or allegations.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST s t - y s' t" c[776
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be pur7 :se cf th's p re r.:n is to define the vertical c+:4 ti:n cf
":e t *'e s t ers:1s 1:cated at the ecp of the nat. ~:.e Tr ;rar . ill :: n;t te !='i e:
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- i. .- '. .;th C. c r tci cria ti. tion
- 3. 77 v'- i t ,. to c: ' # r t s c.2 vi:h et?.er cracks in t' e * . r,-' ' tne at. .
- c. ea: * : : =: cf c rac' .iith
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=. .::.:_..
Tna T' ... vill utili:e the serviccs cf F.A. ' San:v end * <: ' : .< c
< r"0;m c --- dc=t
- tive ric ro ceis"f c cva'.us* icn of the . nc: et * --
t'. t , u'..u. c :ho c.ethod. An cva'.us t ien c f Ea s t -e s t crient.:d cric's
- ce tted tc tre sa celeen line R and about 6 feet seuth of c':_ - Itne S,
't.cluding th:sa b+r.aath the reacter buildine vill be eccc .p:' d. In alditien, cne crack, NE-Sk' trending, northeast of the reacter buitdi.;
a.d one creck, Sh'-SE w trending, n:.rthwest of the rcactor buildi .g . i!1 'ce exani cd and evaluated.
The elements of the pregram are as follevs:
A. A test grid system will be es tablished by R. A. " .er .v and Asscciates, utilizing areas of the base at share ac +urface cracking appears. A construction jcint will be tes.ed to -
establish a baseline.
B. A Fulse Eche evaluatien of the concrete will he per~- nc! ly T.A. "uence and Arsociates, Inc. in accord:nce with :he Test FHr.r.~. v. "2th-d fer rulse Echo "c: hod which includes:
.. u un.,,n nun W REQUEST 1) tach test reint vill be established by R.A. 'Nen:v and g gg,, q,gge 'erceiates so that test data vill reveal inferr .: ion re r.tive te crack depth, length and crien:rtien.
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correctice acticas required.
I FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST l FV-4iT
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