ML20205K907

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Rev 0 to Alternative Safe Shutdown Procedure ASSD-00, User Guide
ML20205K907
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/13/1988
From: Bishop
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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References
ASSD, ASSD-00, NUDOCS 8811010391
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ATTACHMENT 1 ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES M

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O CAROLINA POWER & LIGNT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 0 PROC EURE TYPE: ALTERNATIVE SAFE SMUTDOWN PROC DURE NUMBER: ASSD-00  !

PROC EURE TITLE: USER'S CUIDE h REVISION 0

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E APPROVE BY: O Yf3 __

l General Managerl h anger p otations Date I I L

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6\ LIST OF EFFECTIVE .PAGi3 -. t Q$ ,

AS$D-00 USER'S GUIDE [

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l R$EP/Vol. XXIII/O ASSD-00 i Rey, o

s REFERENCES ASSD USER'S GUIDE

1. 10CTR50.48. Fire Protection, 10CIR50 Appendix R (App R), Fire s'rotection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 Sections III.C. J, and L as applicable
2. CP&L's BSEP Alternative chutdown Capability Assessment Report (ASCA)

, 3. CP&L's BSEP Appendix A and R Design Verification and Requirements for Conformance (AARDVARC) 4 CP&L's BSEP (EPN) Postfire Safe Shutdown Sequence for Fire in the Main Control koom (CE-23E). December 1983

5. CP&L BSEP OM Vol. 20. ENP-03 Plant Modification Procedure. Appendix R.

Impact Evaluation (Foru 9)

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, TABLE OF CONTENTS ASSD USER'S CUIDE i

11ECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE List of Effective Pages i References 11 Table of Contents 111 1.0 Pv pose 1 2.0 ASSD Definis %s and Acronyms 3 3.0 Safe Shutdown Performance Coals. Functions, and Systems 16 4.0 Assumptions 21 5.0 Use of ASSD Procedures 22 6.0 Manpower Availability 24

(,h) 7.0 Entry Conditicas 25 8.0 Exit conditions 26 9.0 Manual operations 27 10.0 Access / Egress Routes 28 11.0 Prefire/Postfire Rackout 29 12.0 Associated Circuits 30 13.0 System Restoration 31 14.0 Revision to Procedures 32 15.0 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation 33 16.0 System Monitoring Information 34 17.0 ASSD Procedure Implementation Cuidelines 35 18.0 ASSD Equipment Inventory List 36

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i 1.0 Purpose

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NOTE: The following two paragraphs are from 10CTR50, 50.48 Appendix R.

Section I, Introduction and Scope "When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boil off."

"Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under postfire conditions does not in itself impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents."

R 1.1 The Alternative Saf e Shutdown Procedures (ASSDs) satisfy the intent of the following paragraphs from 10CTR50, 50.48 Appendix R.

Sections II.D. III.L.1, and III.L.3.

II.D. "In areas where the fire protection features cannot ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire in that area, alternative safe shutdown capability shall be provided."

(h) III.L.1 "Alternative shutdown capability. Alternative shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area shall be able to (a) achieve and maintain suberitical reactivity conditions in the reactor, (b) maintain reactor coolant

, inventory (c) achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. (d) achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and (e) raintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter."

l III.L.3 "The shutdown espability for specific fire areas may be I

unique for each such area. Alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area (s) and shall accommodate postfire conditions where l off-site power is available and where off-site power is I not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Procedures shall be in effect to implement this capability."

1.2 The ASSD procedures provide an alternative method of operating systems and components that are needed to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

1.3 The ASSD procedures provide additional information, cautions, notes, and steps to be used concurrently and in conjunction with E0Ps and other approved procedures during and after a fire in an area where safe shutdown equipment has or may have been damaged.

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I:% 1.4 The ASSD procedures provide worst case supplemental guidance for

- using existing on-shift manpower, equipment, and approved procedures to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, with or without a coincidental 72-hour loss of off-site power in accordance with 10CTR50, Appendix R. Sections III.G. J. & L, as applicable.

1.5 The ASSD User's Guide provides information on:

1.5.1 Use of the ASSD procedures.

1.5.2 Basis, definitions, assumptions, and references used in the development of the ASSD procedures.

1.5.3 Revision of the ASSD procedures.

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{g 2.0 ASSD Definitions and Aeronyms 2.1 Alternative shutdown. Alternative shutdown is defined as safe shutdown activities requiring utilization of abnormal operational practices or nuclear system modifications as discussed belev.

2. L 5 Operations
a. Other than normal safe shutdown activities from the Control Room,
b. Operations from designated alternative control systems *$ cations, and
c. Manual operation at equipment location.

2.1.2 Modifications Retouting, relocation, or modification of existing safe shutdown system outside a fire area to assure the ability of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions.

2.1.3 Basis This definition recognizes that alternative shutdown may require deviation from normal operational practices and (g,

gs shutdown equipment. In this content, procedural l guidelines for postfire shutdown must address operation of i shutdown equipment in an unusual manner or from outside l the Control Room. Similarly, it may be necessary to I operate different combinations of equipment to achieve safe shutdown.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's definition for alternative shutdown as provided in 10CTR50. Appendix R.

Section III.L[1]. focuses exclusively on plant modifications. This analysis encompasses the Commission's definition and extends it to include the associated procedural aspects et postfire shutdown in an environment where plant equipment may be daarged.

2.2 AARDVARC. Appendix A and R Design Verification and Requirements for Conformance.

2.3 A SCA. Alternative Shutdown Capability Assessment Report.

2.4 Safe shutdown. A condition which exists when the plant is being maintained in a hot shutdevn. transition to cold shutdown, or cold shutdown mode.

2.5 Safe shutdown equipment. Equipment which may be used for achieving

.r's and maintaining the plant's safe shutdown condition.

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{'p 2.6 High/ low pressure interface. Components which have the potential of l causing uncontrolled or enrecoverable loss of primary coolant. l I

2.7 ASSD Train A Equipment i

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2.7.1 Emergency AC Power Systems  !

2.7.1.1 Diesel Generator No. 1 2.7.1.1.1 Starting air system 2.7.1.1.2 Fuel 011 Xfer Systou f 2.7.1.1.3 No. 1 four-day storage tank l

2.7.k.1.4 Diesel Generator Cell 1 exhaust fan l 2.7.1.2 Diesel Generator No. 3 j 2.7.1.2.1 Aux, systems are familiar to Diesel Generator l No. 1 l 2.7.2 AC Power Distribution System 2.7.2.1 Emergency Bus El i h 2.7.2.1.1 Compt AE9 Diesel Cenerator No. 1 l 2.7.2.1.2 Compt AFO RNR Pump 1C i i

2.7.2.1.3 Compt AF5 RHR Pump 2C  !

2.7.2.1.4 Compt AF6 Cony Serv Wtr Pump 2C 2.7.2.1.5 Compt AF7 Cony Serv Wtr Pump 13 2.7.2.1.6 Compt AF8 Unit Substa E5 2.7.2.1.7 Compt AF9 Nuc Serv Wtr Pump 1 A 2.7.2.1.8 Compt AGO Tie Breaker Emerg Swgr E3 2.7.2.1.9 Compt AG1 Tie Breaker Emerg Swgr E2 2.7.2.2 Emergency Dus E3 2.7.2.2.1 Compt AI5 Diesel Generator No. 3 2.7.2.2.2 Compt AI8 RHR Pump 1A Q:-

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i 2.7.2.2.3 Compt AJO Unit substa E7

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2.7.2.2.4 Compt AJ1 RHR Pump 2A 2.7.2.2.5 Compt AJ3 Nuc Serv Wtr Pump 2A 2.7.2.2.6 Compt AJ4 Cony Serv Wtr Pump 2A 2.7.2.2.7 Compt AJ5 Tie Breaker Energ $wgr El 2.7.2.3 Substation E5 2.7,2.3.1 AT5 Control Building MCC 1CA 2.7.2.3.2 AT8 Reactor Building MCC 2%A-2 2.7.2.3.3 AT9 Reactor Building MCC 1XC 2.7.2.3.4 AUO Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1E5 Supply Breaker 2.7.2.3.5 AU3 Service Water Intake Structure MCC IPA 2.7.2.3.6 AU4 Reactor Building MCC 1XA 2.7.2.3.7 AU6 Diesel Generator Building MCC DGA

@ 2.7.2.3.8 AU9 Sub E5 480V Main Breaker 2.7.2.4 Substation E7 2.7.2.4.1 AX9 Reactor Building MCC 1XA-2 2.7.2.4.2 AYO Reactor Building MCC 2XC 2.7.2.4.3 AY1 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 2E7 2.7.2.4.4 AY2 Reactor Building MCC 2KA 2.7.2.4.5 AYS Service Water Intake Structure MCC 2PA j

2.7.2.4.6 AY8 Diesel Generator Building MCC DCC l 2.7.2.4.7 AY9 Control Building MCC 2CA 2.7.2.4.8 AZ1 Sub E7 480V Main Breaker l

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1 2.7.2.5 Train A 480V MCCs

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NOTEt The A Train loads that are powered from these MCCs are identified in ASSD-01.

2.7.2.5.1 Train A MCCs are povered from Substations E5 and E7.

2.7.2.6 120V AC Distribution Systen NOTE: The A Train loads that are powered from the 120V AC distribution panels are identified in ASSD-01, 2.7.2.6.1 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 2E7 2.7.2.6.1.1 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 2A 2.7.2.6.1.2 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 32AB 2.7.2.6.2 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1A-DG and 2A-DG 2.7.2.6.3 Uninterruptible Power Supply 2A

,,, 2.7.2.6.3.1 Vital 120V AC Distribution Panel V-10A pe, 2.7.2.6.3.2 Vital 120V AC Distribution Panel V-BA 2.7.2.6.4 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 32A 2.7.2.6.5 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1A-SW nd 2A-SW 2.7.2.6.6 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1E5 2.7.2.6.6.1 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1A 2.7.2.6.6.2 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 31AB 2.7.2.6.7 Uninterruptible Power Supply 1A 2.7.2.6.7.1 Vital 120V AC Distribution Panel V-9A 2.7.2.6.7.2 Vital 120V AC Distribution Panel V-7A 2.7.2.6.8 Emargency 120V AC Distribution Panel 31A 2.7.2.7 Reactor Protection M-G Sets 14 and 2A (l; 2.7.2.7.1 Reactor Protection System Power Dio ribution

%;) Panel (A Bus)

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() 2.7.3 Emergency DC Power System 2.7.3.1 Battery 1A-1 and Battery Charger 1A-1 2.7.3.2 Battery 1A-2 and Battery Charger 1.',-2 2.7.3.3 Battery 2A-1 and Battery Charger 2A-1 2.7.3.4 Battery 2A-2 and Battery Charger 2A-2 2.7.4 Energency DC Power Distribution Systou NOTE: The A Train loads that are povered *. rom 125V DC distribution panels and 125V DC MCes are identified in ASSD-01.

2.7.4.1 125/25LF DC Switchboard 1A 2.7.4.1.1 125V DC Distribution Panel 3A 2.7.4.1.2 Reactor Building MCC 1XDA 2.7.4.1.3 125V DC Distribution Panel 11A 2.7.4.1.4 Power Conversion Unit 1A UPS 2.7.4.1.5 125V DC Distribution Panel 1A 2.7.4.2 120/250V DC Swit.chboard 2A 2.7.4.2.1 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A 2.7.4.2.2 Reactor Building MCC 2XDA 2.7.4.2.3 125V DC Distribution Panel 17.A 2.7.4.2.4 Power Conversions Unit 2A UPS 2.7.4.2.5 125V DC Distribut*on Panel 2A 2.7.5 HPCI System (Units 1 a.:4 2) 2.7.5.1 The necessary instruments and controls required to operate HFCI from the Control Room will be rporable or made operable when A Train is to be used 'lor plant shutdown.

2.7.5.2 The HPCI steam supply inboard isolation valve (E41-P002) receives its normal power from a B Train power source. To make HPCI independent of B Train, an altetuate power f eed f rom itCC-1XC (2XC) to E41-F002 has been made available. The HPCI turbine exhaust vacuum breaker valva (E41-F079) has an alternate A e, Train power feed f.wm MCC-1XC (2XC).

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{) The mechanical part of the ADS system (the relief 2.7.6.1 valves) is common to Train A and Train 3 Safe Shutdown Systems. The ADS system (electrical) is powered from Train A power sources or Train 3 power sources. The A Train power sources are part of the A Train Safe Shutdown System.

2.7.7 Service Water Systen 2.7.7.1 Train A Service Water Pumps 2.7.7.1.1 Cony Sw Pump 2C (E1) 2.7.7.1.2 Cony Sv Pump 13 (E1) 2.7.7.1.3 Nuc Sw Pump 2A (E3) 2.7.7.1.4 Cony Sv Pump 2A (E3) 2.7.7.1.5 Nuc Sv pump 1A (E1) 2.7.7.2 The Nuclear Service Water header for each unit is common to safe shutdown Trains A and B.

h 2.7.8 RNR Loop A (Units 1 and 2) 2.7.8.1 The necessary instruments and controls required to operate RNR Loop A from the Control Room will be operable or made operable when A Train is to be used for a plant shutdown.

2.7.8.2 The following support systems are part of Train At 2.7.8.2.1 RNR Room A f an cooler and seal water heat exchanger 2.7.8.2.2 Vital SW header to A sad C RNR pumps 2.7.8.3 Valves necessary to estab1 A6h a flev path for suppression pool cooling et' LiJ1 injection.

l 2.7.8.4 Valves necessary to este wita' & ' low path for l shutdown cooling.

l 2.7.8.4.1 The flow path for shutdown cooling thsouth l E11-F008 and T009 is common to shutdown Train A and Train 3.

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i Or,. . 2.7.8.4.2 Shutdown cooling suction valve (E11-F008)

We normally receives its power from MCC 1XDB (2XDB). Tne Train A alternate power supply is from McC-1XDA (2XDA).

2.7.9 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation Train A

2. '/ . 9.1 The following minimum instrumentation is required to achieve safe shutdown. These instruments will be reliable during a fire in an area that requires an A Train shutdown. These instruments are located on the RTGB.

2.7.9.1.1 C32-LI-R606A reactor water level 2.7.9.1.2 C32-PI-R605A reactor pressure 2.7.9.1.3 CAC-TR-4426-1 PT No. I suppression pool water temperatu.-

2.7.9.1.4 CAC-LR-2602 suppression pool level 2.8 ASSD Train B Equipment 2.8.1 Emergency AC Power Systems

({} 2.8.1.1 Diesel Generator No. 2 2.8.1.1.1 Starting air system 2.8.1.1.2 Fuel Oil Xfer System 2.8.1.1.3 No. 2 four-day storage tank 2.8.1.1.4 Diesel Generator Cell 2 exhaust fan 2.8.1.2 Diesel Generator No. 4

?. 8.1.2.1 Aux systems are similar to Diesel Generator No.

2 2.8.2 AC Power Distribution System 2.8.2.1 Emergency Bus E2 2.8.2.1.1 Compt AC7 Diesel Generator No. 2 2.8.2.1.2 Compt AG9 RHR Pump 2D 2.8.2.1.3 Compt AH1 Unit Substa E6 2.8.2.1.4 Compt AH2 Cony Serv Wtr Pump 1C BSEP/Vol. XXIII/O ASSD-00 9 of 39 Rev. 0

O s 2.8.2.1.5 Compt AHS RHR Pump 1D q{p 2.8.2,1.6 Compt AH6 Nuc Serv Wtr Pump 1B 2.8.2.1.7 Compt AH8 Tie Breaker Emerg Swgr El

?.8.2.1.8 Compt AH9 Tie Breaker Emerg Swgr E4 2.8.2.2 F.mergency Bus E4 2.8.2.2.1 Compt AK2 Diesel Generator No. 4 2.8.2.2.2 Compt AK3 RHR Pump 2B 2.8.2.2.3 Compt AK6 Cony Serv Wtr Pump 1A 2.8.262.4 Compt AK7 Unit Substa E8 2.8.2.2.5 Compt ALO RHR Pump 1B 2.8.2.2.6 Compt AL1 Nuc Serv Wer Pump 2B 2.8.2.2.7 Compt AL2 Cony Serv Wtr Pump 2B 2.8.2.2.8 Compt AL5 Tie Breaker Emerg Swgr E2 (hh 2.8.2.3 Substation E6 2.8.2 3.1 AV4 Sub E6 480V Main Breaker 2.8.2.3.2 AV8 Reactor Building MCC 2XB-2 2.8.2 3.3 AV9 Diesel Gene:stor Building MCC DGB 2.8.2.3.4 AWO Reactor Building MCC IXB 2.8.2.3.5 AW3 Service Water Intake Structure MCC IPB 2.8.2.3.6 AW6 Reactor Building MCC 1XD 2.8.2.3.7 AW7 Control Building MCC 1CB 2.8.2.3.8 AX3 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel IE6 supply breaker 2.8.2.4 Substation E8 2.8.2.4.1 A01 Diesel Generator Building MCC DGD 2.8.2.4.2 A02 Reactor Building MCC 2XB sv.

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-[{g 2.8.2.4.3 A05 Service Water Intake Structure MCC 2PB

.y 2.8.2.4.4 A08 Reactor Building MCC 2XD 2.8.2.4.4 A09 Control Building MCC 2CB [

2.8.2.4.5 AZ5 Sub E8 480V Main Breaker 2.8.2.4.6 AZ9 Reactor Building MCC IXB-2 2.8.2.5 Train B 480V McCs NOTE: The B Train loads that are powered from these MCCa are identified in ASSD-01.

2.8.2.5.1 Train 5 MCCs are powered from Substations E6 and E8.

c 2.8.2.6 120V AC Distribution System NOTE: The 3 Train loads that are powered from the 125V AC distribution "

panels are identified in ASSD-01.

2.8.2.6.1 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1E6 I 2.8.2.6.1.2 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1B l

@ 2.8.2.6.2 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 1B-DG and 2B-DG 2.8.2.6.3 Emergency 120V AC Distritation Panel 2E8 2.8.2.6.3.1 Emergency 120V AC Distribution Panel 2B ,

2.8.2.7 Reactor Protection M-G Sets 13 and 28 2.8.2.7.1 Reactor protection system power distribution panel (B Bus) 2.8.3 Emergency DC Power System i 2.8.3.1 Battery 1B-1 and Battery Charger 1B-1 '

2.8.3.2 Battery 15-2 and Battery Charger 18-2 2.8.3.3 Battery 2B-1 and Battery Charger 2B-1 2.8.3.4 Battery 2B-2 and Battery Charger 25-2 k

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O e 6 qg 2.8.4 Emergeacy DC Power Distribution System 2.8.4.1 125/250V DC Switchboard IB 2.8.4.1.1 Control Building 125V DC Distribution Panel 3B 2.8.4.1.2 Reactor Building MCC IXDB 2.8.4.1.3 125V DC Distribution Panel llB 2.8.4.1.4 Diesel Generator Building Distribution Panel 1B 2.8.4.1.5 Compt LG9 LTG Inverter Unit 1 2.8.4.2 125/250V DC Switchboard 2B 2.8.4.2.1 125V DC Distribution Panel 4B 2.8.4.2.2 Reactor Building MCC 2XDP 2.8.4.2.3 125V DC Distribution Panel 125 2.8.4.2.4 125V DC Distribution Panel 28 NOTE: The Train B loads that are powered from 125V DC distribution panels e, and 125V DC MCCs are identified in ASSD-01.

f 2.8.5 RCIC System (Units 1 and 2) 2.8.5.1 The necessary instruments and controls required to operate RCIC from the Control Room or the remote shutdown will be operable or made operable when B Train is to be used for a plant shutdown.

2.8.5.2 Although RCIC is considered a B Train system, it has two valves which are fed f rom A Train MCCs. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Valve.1 E51-F062 is fed from Reactor Building MCC IXA and IXC (Unit 2 has a similar arrangement). Because they are needed for a B '

Train shutdown, an alternate power supply from a B Train MCC (Reactor for Building MCC 1XD) has been provided to ensure operability when the RCIC System is required.

2.8.6. Reactor Safety Relief Valves (ADS System) 2.8.6.1 The mechanical part of the ADS system (the relief valves) is common to Train A and Train B Safe Shutdown Systems. The ADS System (electrical) is

. powered from Train A power sources or Train 3 power sources. The B Train power sources are part of the B Train Safe Shutdown System.

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1 2.8.7 Service Water System

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2.8.7.1 Train B Service Water Pumps 2.8.7.1.1 Nuc Sw Pump 1B (E2) 2.8.7.1.2 Cony Sw Pump 1C (E2) g 2.8.7.1.3 Nuc Sw Pump 2B (E4) 2.8.7.1.4 Cony Sw Pump 1A (E4) 2.8.7.1.5 Cony Sw Pump 2B (E4) 2.8.7.2 The Nuclear Service Water header for each unit is common to Safe Shutdown Trains A and B.

2.8.8 RHR Loop B (Units 1 and 2) 2.8.8.1 The necessary instruments and controls required to operate RHR Loop B from the Control Room and/or remote shutdown panel will be operable or made operable when B Train is to be used for a plant shutdown as applicable.

2.8.8.2 The following support systems are part of Train B Y$$

2.8.8.2.1 RHR Room B fan cooler and seal water heater exchanger 2.8.8.2.2 Vitsi SW header to B and D RHR pumps 2.8.8.3 Valves necessary to establish a flow path for suppression pool cooling and LPCI injection.

2.8.8.4 Valves necessary to establish a flow path for shutdown cooling 2.8.8.4.1 The flow path for shutdown cooling through E11-F008 and F009 is common to shutdown Train A and Train B.

2.8.8.4.2 Shutdown cooling suction valve. E11-F009, normally receives its power from MCC 1XA (2XA). To make this valve available for Train B, an alternate power supply from MCC 1XD (2XD) was made available.

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2.8.9 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation Train B  ;

2.8.9.1 The instruments listed below are the minimum instrumentation that is required to achieve safe shutdown. These instruments will be reliable during a fire in an area that requires a B Train shutdown.

These instruments are located on the remote shutdown panel.

2.8.9.1.1 B21-LI-R604BX reactor water level (Unit 1-B21-LI-R604BX) .

2.8.9.1.2 C32-PI-3332 reactor pressure 2.8.9.1.3 CAC-TR-778 PT No. 7 suppression pool water temperature  ;

i 2.8.9.1.4 CAC-LI-3342 suppression pool level ,

2.9 Prefire/Postfire Rackout ,

2.9.1 Prefire opening of a breaker means that the breaker is left open (racked out) during ncrual operations so that the component cannot spuriously actuate during any fire.

2.9.2 Postfire opening of a breaker indicates that the component must be opurable during normal operation; but, onc's it is

({l) determined that a fire could cause spurious operation, these breakers will be opened (racked out).

2.10 Associated Circuits of Concern Safety-related and nonsafety-related cables that have a separation from the fire area less than that required by 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, and have either 2.10.1 Category - CPS. A common poser source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the postfire shutdown circuit of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses, or similar devices jyt 2.10.2 Category - SPUR. A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/ nuclear boiler isolation valves) jg; 2.10.3 Category - CE. A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, such as a raceway, panel, or juction box, where

, the circuits are either not electrically protected from the postfire shutdown circuits of concern by circuit breakers, fuses, or similar devices or will allow propagation of fire into the ccmmon enclosure.

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g*) 2.11 Active Saf e Shutdown Co:nponents These components are defined as being required to achieve safe shutdown and their operating state or position must change from the normal position or operating state.

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3.0 Safe Shutdown Performance Coals, Functions, and Systems g

3.1 The safe shutdown performance goals of Appendix R,Section III.L.

establish the criteria for defining systems and components requiring protection. These goals are:

3.1.1 Reactivity Control. Insert sufficient negative reactivity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions.

3.1.2 Reactor Coolent Mak(up. Maintain the reactor vessel water above the top of the active fuel.

3.1.3 Decay Heat Removal. Remove the decay heat through cold shutdown conditions.

3.1.4 Process Monitoring. Provide direct reading of safe shutdown process variables.

3.1.5 Support Functions. Provide support to achieve all of the above perf ormance goals.

3.2 The above five goals are accomplished through the successful performance of the following safe shutdown functions:

3.2.1 Reactivity Control (f) Performance: Provide sufficient negative reactivity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

3.2.2 Reactor Presenre and Level Control Performance: Provide the capability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level and control pressure.

3.2.3 Reactor Overpressure Protection Performance: Provide a means to prevent reactor vessel overpressurication.

3.2.4 Torus cooling Perforrance: Provide a means to remove decay heat from the torus.

3.2.5 Shutdown Cooling Performance: Provide a means for removing decay heat, maintain reactor coolant temperatures below 212'F and provide reactor coolant makeup water.

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6'T 3.2.6 Plant Monitorina Instrumentation U

Performance: Provide a means for monitoring process variables.

'3.2.7 Safe Shutdown Support Performances a. Provide AC and DC power to switchgear, load evnters, and motor control centers feeding safe shutdown components (EPS).

b. Provide cooling water to emergency diesel generators (DGCW).
c. Previde cooling water to RHR heat exchangers, RNR pumps, and area coolers (RHRCW).

3.3 Principal Punctions There are six principal functione and three support functions required for safe shutdown.

3.3.1 Reactivity Control

(

.hh) Safe Shutdown Systems:

This function will be accomplished by the hydraulic insertion of control rods as a result of the deenergization of the scram solenoid valves. Once inserted, control rods are latched in the inserted position. Pire does not affect the ability to scraa.

3.3.2 Resctor Pressstre and Level Control Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and safety / relief valves Train B - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and safety / relief valves hPCI and RCIC rely on separate trains of de control power and are driven by noncondensing stars turbines served by the main steam headers upstream of the main steam isolation valves (13IVs).

Two sourceo of water are available to the HPCI and RCIC Systems in each unit. The primary source is normally aligned to supply these systema from the condensate storage tank b'yh e located in ths east yard.

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3- Reactor' pressure contrcl is.provided by a combination of.

(W manual safety / relief valve actuations and injection of cold high pressure water. Both systems (HPCI and 8tCIC) draw stears from the reactor vessel and augment reactor pressure control.

3.3.3 Reactor Overpressure Protection Safe Shutdown Systems: Safety / Relief Valves These valves are located on the main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs and are capable of automatic actuation, requiring no external source of power other than reactor vessel steam pressure.

3.3.4 Shutdown Coolins Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Residual Heat Removal System (A)

Train B - Residual Heat Removal System (B)

The cold shutdown decay heat removal performance goal is fulfilled by the shutdown cooling function. This function is initiated after the reactor vessel pressure is reduced

(') to approximately 125 psi. Makeup water is provided by the RHR System in the LPCI mode as required.

For this safe shutdown analysis, it is necessary to have one operating RHR pump and heat exchanger loop in the shutdown cooling mode and its associated service water (RNRCW) loop to assure stable cold shutdown conditions.

The ultimate heat sink is the discharge canal for the shutdown cooling function of RHR.

3.3.5 Torus coolina Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Residual Heat Removal System (A)

Train B - Residual Heat Removal System (B)

Placing the RHR System in the toros cooling mode provides the means to transfer decay heat from che torus to the discharge canal.

For this safe shutdown analysis, it is necessary to have one operating RHR pump and heat exchanger loop in the torus cooling mode. The service water (RHRCW) loop g provides the cooling water for the RHR heat exchanger.

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g 3.3.6: Plant Monitorina Instrumentation Safe Shutdown Systems:

Train A - Instruments for reactor pressure, reactor level, suppression pool level, and suppression pool temperature.

Train B - Instruments for reactor pressure, reactor level, suppreerion pool level, and suppression pool temperature.

In order to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, the operator must be able to monitor various plant parameters. These parameters provide the information required by the operators in order to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. This function ensures the instrumentation required to monitor reactor level, reactor pressure, and suppression pool level and temperature is available following any fire.

3.4 Support Functions The following three functions support the principal functions required for safe shutdown, as previously discussed.

3.4.1 Emersency Power System h Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Emergency AC and DC Power Distribution System (A)

Train B - Emergency AC and DC Power Distribution System (B)

For a postulated fire involving a loss of off-site power, the Emergency AC Power Supply and Distribution System is the ultimate source of AC electrical power for the safe shutdown systems. Essential components of this system include the diesel generators and supporting equipment (control power, air-start system, diesel fuel supply, etc.), the 4.16 kV emergency switchgear. 480V emergency switchgear, and'aotor control centers supplied by the emergency switchgear.

Safe shutdown also requires the availability of the 125/250V DC Power Supplies and Distribution System for 125/250V DC control power. For the postulated fire scenarios, at least one train of 125/250V batteries and distribution equipment for each unit is required for safe shutdown. Stored battery energy supplying 125/250V DC power is sufficient to support the needs of safe shutdown equipment until emergency AC on-site power and battery charging capability are restored.

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qg 3.4.2 Diesel Generator Cooling, Water Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Service water pumps supplying the nuclear service water header Train B - Service water pumps suppling the nuclear service water header Cooling water for the diesel engines is provided by the diesel generator cooling water function of the SW System.

This function requirss one service water pump per unit lined up to the nuclear service water header. This earvice water removes the heat rejected from the diesel

.:enerator jacket water heat exchanger.

3.4.3 RHR Cooling Water Safe Shutdown Systems: Train A - Service water pumps supplying the nuclear service water header Train B - Service water pumps supplying the nuclear service water header h Service water removes heat from the RHR heat exchanger, the seal coolers, and the RHR room coolers and delivers it to the ultimate heat sink. This process is the RHR cooling water function and is the final step in the removal of decay heat from the reactor vessel or the suppression pool.

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4.0 Assumptions g

4.1 A single fire occurs in any plant area coincident with a complete 72-hour loss of off-site power on both units.

4.1.1 Except where fire protection features exists, the functional integrity of electrical cables is assumed immediately lost when exposed to a postulated fire in an area.

4.1.2 Fire damage to valve piping and noncombustible tubing is not assumed to adversely impact their ability to function as pressure boundaries or as safe .hutdown components.

4.1.3 All squipment normally present in the plant is assumed to be functional at design capability and may be Icst only as a result of fire damage.

4.2 No other external events, accidents, or equipment f ailures are assumed to occur in connection with either the postulated fire or through achieving and maintaining a stable cold shutdown condition.

l 4.3 Considering installed automatic fire detection and suppression l capabilities, the fire brigade commitment is an initial 30 minutes i

to respond and extinguish the fire from time of detection, and a subsequent 30 minutes to assess the fire damage and restore suppression equipment. Access to restore safe shutdown equipment in a

,Q37 fire area is than said t be available one hour after the detection of a fire.

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() 5.0 Use of ASSD Procedures The following is the recommended method for using the ASSD procedures:

5.1 The General Fire Plan, PFP-013, initiates a review of the ASSD Procedure Index; ASSD-01 for the affected unit. The ASSD procedure will identify if the fire area contains safe shutdown equipment.

5.2 The Shift Foreman shall use and direct implementation of the ASSD procedure steps, as needed. The ASSD procedures provide worst case supplemental guidance to approved plant procedures. For example, if the E0P requires the use of HPCI for injection and HPCI will not start, possibly due to fire damage, then the E0P will attempt an RCIC start. RCIC may not start due to fire damage. The Shift Foreman must remain aware of the E0P actions and equipment problems and utilize the ASSD procedure to restore equipment operability.

The ASSD procedure steps could bypass a high temperature RCIC isolation from the Control Roca, or dispatch an operator to the Reactor Building to transfer RCIC isolation valves to an alternate power supply and then operate the valves from a local station, or the step may require that RCIC be operated from the remote shutdown panel.

5.2.1 The Shift Foreman is expected to review the information contained in the ASSD procedures to determine what is needed and when to execute the steps.

h' 5.2.2 Il a station is to be, or has been manned, but no accions ara required er ancicipated at that time, that station may be directed to essist another station, or may not be manned at Shift Foreman's direction.

5.3 The ASSD procedures are written on a knowledge level that a newly licensed Control Operator can initiate any required actions after receiving ASSD procedure training.

NOTE: The following information is f rom the BWR Owners Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines, Revision 4. For certain specific events (e.g.,

earthquake, tornado, blackout, or fire), emergency response and recovery can be further enhanced by additional auxiliary event-specific operator actions which may be provided in supplemental event-specific procedures intended for use in conjunction with the symptomatic procedures. As with actions specified in any other procedure intended for use with the symptomatic procedures, these event-speeffic operator actions must not contradict or subvert the symptomatic operator actions specified in the symptomatic procedures and must not result in loss or unavailability of equipment the operation of which is specified in these procedures.

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- ; 5.3.1 ASSD procedures ensure the operator knows what equipment should work and how to use it if needed. The steps in these procedures are intended to be additional auxiliary event-specific operator actions.

5.3.2 Except for 0-ASSD-02 and 2-ASSD-05, ASSD procedures are not intended to be used as stand-alone instructions. The ASSDs provide supplemental worst case guidance, to be used concurrently and in conjunction with approved operating and emergency operating procedures, that may be needed to achieve and maintain the units' cold shutdown condition. These procedures also provide a. list of reliable instrumentation.

5.3.3 ASSD procedures provide a means to document restorat#.on of equipment used to a normal OP lineup position. However, ASSD procedures do not track fire-damaged equipment to ensure proper return to service after the fire.

, 5.3.4 Some major steps may be performed concurrently; subsections i of major steps are intended to be performed in sequence; and j horisontal place keeping line is provided by each action step of the ASSD procedures. The steps should be checked off as completed or marked N/A as applicable.

i 5.4 The ASSD precedures (Volume XXIII of the OM) consist oft k

i 5.4.1 A3SD-00, User's Guide, contains information on how to use, i~h) maintain, and revise the ASSD procedures. The format of the ASSD procedures was modeled after the E0P End Path Manuals.

3pecific information on ASSD procedure format may be focad in j' OI-28 Preparation and Review of Operations Procedures,

Appendix D AS3D Writer's Guide. ,

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l 5.4.2 Each unit has a respective ASSD-01, ASSD Procedurn Tudex. t j The index is entered from PFP-013, General Fire Plan. The [

1 index directs the user to the propar ASSD procedure based on i

) fire area. Each index also contains tabulated cosmon l 4

information to minimise the size of other procedures. j i

5.4.3 0-ASSD-02, outside Control Room Shutdown, is an applicable

! stand-alone procedure for both units. This procedure is used

! when fire damage causes loss of control functions from the ,

i RTGS or when smoke from the ftre requires a Control Room evacuation. This procedure requires the reactor to be in hot I shutdown / manually scrammed prior to leaving the Control Room.

i 5.ae .4 2-ASSD-05 is an outside control Room shutdown fer Unit 2 l l only. This procedure is used when a fire in Unit 2 Reactor [

Building north causes loss of control functions from the [

l RTGB. This procedure requires the Unit 2 reactor to be in  :

L hot shutdown /r.anually scrammed prior to leaving the Control j i ^A Room.

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I 6.0 Manpower Availability

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R 6.1 The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate safe shutdown equipment and systems shall be on site at all times (10CFR50, Appendix R, L.4). These positions will be filled by shift operating personnel and defined by Fire Protection Procedure, FPP-031, Fire Brigade and ASSD Staffing Roster.

6.2 Alternate Safe Shutdown (ASSD) Nuclear Shif t Staffing / Assignments 6.2.1 Senior Reactor Operators (1) Shift Foreman (Unit 2): E0P/ASSD Reader Control Room or Unit 2 Remota Shutdown Panel (or as directed (by SOS)]

(1) Shift Foreman (Unit 1): E0P/ASSD Reader Control Room or Unit 1 Remote Shutdown Panel (or as directed (by SOS)]

6.2.2 Reactor Operators (1) Control Operator (Unit 2): RTGB CO/R0 Control Room or Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel (or as directed (by U/2 SF)]

bi[h (1) Control Operator (Unit 1): RTGB C0/R0 Control Room or Unit 1 Remote Shutdown Panel (or as directed (by U/1 SF)]

(1) Senior Auxiliary Operator CO/R0 Control Poom and Unit 1 Remete Shutdown Panel for Safety Relief Valve Operations or Plant Monitoring Instrumentation (or as directed (by U/2 SF))

6.2.3 Auxiliary operators (1) Unit 2 Reactor Building (or as directed (by U/2 SF))

(1) Unit 1 Reactor Building (or as directed (by U/1 SF)]

(1) Diesel Generator Operator (or as directed (by U/1 or 2 SF)]

(1) Emergency Bus Switchgear Operator (or as directed (by U/1 or 2 SF))

(1) Service Water Building Operator (or as directed (by U/1 or 2 SF)]

6.2.4 Operations Technician Vh

<' (1) U..it 2 Remote Shutdown Punel for Plant Monitoring instrumentation (or as directed (by U/1 or 2 SF)]

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, 7.0 Entry Conditions

! NOTE: It is not the intent of ASSD procedures to require drastic actions be taken for small fires where information from the fire scene confirms limited or no damage to equipment.

7.1 When a fire exists, the Shift Foreman is required to use PFP-013, General Fire Plan, to ensure the proper actions are taken. One of these actions is to enter ASSD-01. ASSD-01 contains a list of fire l areas that identify safe shutdown equipment and a cross-reference to the applicable ASSD procedure. If the fire area cannot be found in i ASSD-01, then the user can exit ASSD procedures. If the fire area l 1s found in ASSD-01, then the Shift Foreman will assess the situation. If the ability to confirm reactor power is < 3% is in jeopardy or an automatic scram has occutred, then the Shif t Foreman l will direct the initiation of a manual scram. When ths manual scram has been initiated, the E0P flow path will be entered and then

, supplemented by the respective ASSD procedure as required.

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8.0 Exit Conditions

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8.1 When the fire has been extinguinhed, equijnent returned to normal or placed under clearance, no infornation is needed from the specf.fic .

, ASSD procedure or ASSD Index, then exit the ASSD procedures. ,

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g 9.0 Manual Operations  ;

9.1 Manual operation of the following equipment outside the Control Room ,

may be required to achieve and maintain the cold shutdown condition.

Building ventilation is not expected to be available, resulting in potentially short stay times for high exertion activities.

9.2 The following have been found acceptable for manual operations:  ;

Unit 1/2 f All breaker and switch manipulation outside the Control Room.

All conventional and nuclear service water pump discharge valves.

Service water pump discharge strainer cleaning.

1/2-SW-V102 l 1/2-SW-V105  :

L 1/2-SW-V106 i 1/2-SW-V117

,o 1/2-SW-V118 UN 1/2-SW-PV136 1/2-E11-PDV-F068B l

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10.0 Access / Egress Routes

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R 10.1 Emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply are provided in access and egress routes to all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment (10CFR50, 50.48 Appendix R,Section III.J).

10.2 Drawing D-3412 sheets 1 through 12, illustrate locations of fire protection emergency DC lighting and each ASSD procedure contaias -

respective access / egress path drawings, as required.

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11.0 Prefire/Postfire Rackout i

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11.1 Frefire and postfire opening of breakers prevents spurious operation j of valves that could require manual actions to reposition, or spurious operation of valves which could cause a loss of vessel inventory. ,

NOTEt For normal operation, the breaker position should be as specified in the OF electrical lineup. ,

11.2 Breakers for the following valves shall be in the off position for normal operation:

Unit 1 Unit 2 E 1-E11-F006A 2-E11-F006A 1-E11-F006B 2-E11-E0065 1-E11-F006C 2-E11-F006C 1-E11-F006D 2-E11-F006D ,

1-E11-F008 2-E11-F008 i 1-E11-F009 2-E11-F009 l 1-Ell-F010 2-E11-F010 1-E11-F0115 2-E11-F011B 1-E11-F0265 2-E11-F0265 ,

1-E11-V32 2-E11-V32  !

1-E11-V33 2-E11-V33  !

((hI 1-E11-F049 2-E11-F049 f l  :

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l g 12.0 Associated Circuits 12.1 If the procedure specifies operating equipment that has no poveri  !

then, it may be assumed its source breaker has tripped due to a i combination of faults on the loads supplied by that source. All loads shall be disconnected from that source and only the safe .

shutdown loads restored before closing in the source or main -

breaker. The nonsafe shutdown loads shall remain deenergized and placed under clearance until checked out for electrical faults. r Placing the nonsafe shutdown loads under clearance provides a method l to ensure proper verification of position is reviewed when restoring i power to normal, j 12.2 ASSD Procedures 01, 02, and Unit 2 ASSD-05 contain tables of power  !

supplies and their safe shutdown loads. The tables are arranged in l the following sequencet 12.2.1 Switchgear - left to right f

12.2.2 Substations - top to botton - left to right 7 l

12.2.3 NCCs - top to botton - left to right 12.2.4 Distribution Panels - odd numbered circuits, then even numbered circuits ,

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13.0 System Restoration

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If an ASSD procedure changes the position of a component from its normal 0F lineup position, then the same ASSD procedure provides the steps to restore that component to the normal OP lineup position and provide independent verification, if necessary.

Except: 1-ASSD-01 2-ASSD-01 0-ASSD-02 2-ASSD-05 1-ASSD-10 2-ASSD-10 1-ASSD-11 2-ASSD-11 (h

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14.0 Revision to Procedures

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14.1 All revisions and/or subsequent additions to the ASSD procedures shall be reviewed by the Appendix R Review group.  !

NOTE: The format and style of writing is described in detail in 01-28, Preparation and Review of Operation procedures, Appendix D ASSD Writer's Guide. ,

14.2 The priority of the information presented in the ASSD l procedures is arranged in the same sequence as exists on the E0P flow paths, in most cases, as follows:

14.2.1 Reliable instrumentation  ;

14.2.2 Equipment needed and access / egress information 14.2.3 Correction of diesel generator cooling water problems i 5,4 . 2. 4 Restoring HPCI or RCIC for level control 14.2.5 Use of service water for torua cooling or S/D cooling t

14.2.6 Use of an RHR loop for torus or shutdown cooling NOTE: The diesel generator E-bus, and Service Water Building operators' (f) priority will be to ensure the diesel generators are supplying the E-buses and adequate cooling is being supplied to the diesel generators.

14.3 The following priority should be used when diesel generator operations are required:

14.3.1 For a Train A shutdewn, start No. I diesel generator

! fitst, then No. 3 diesel generator. No. 1 diesel '

generator will supply power for operation of Service Water ,

l Velve, 1-SW-V255, to supply cooling water for No. 1 and

.No. 3 diesel generators.

14.3.2 For a Train 8 stutdown, start No. 4 diesel generator first, cban No. 2 diesel gonarator. No. 4 diesel generator will supply power for operation of Service Water Valve, 2-SW-V255, to supply cooling water to No. 2 and No.

! 4 diesel generators.

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15.0 Plant Monitoring Instrumentation q{A 15.1 D-42018: Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis, PMI, Unit 1 15.1.1 Train A (At RTGB) 1-C32-PI-R605A Reactor Pressure  !

1-C32-L1-R606A Reactor Water Level ,

1-CAC-TR-4426-1 PT No. 1 Torus Water Temperature l 1-CAC-LR-2602 Torus Water Level 1

15.1.2 Train B (At RSP) l 1

1-C32-PI-3332 Reactor Pressure '

1-B21-LI-R604BX Reactor Water Level 1-CAC-TR-778 PT No. 7 Torus Water Temperature r 1-CAC-LI-3342 Torus Water Level 15.2 D-04218: Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis, PMI, Unit 2 I 15.2.1 Train A (At RTCB) 2-C32-PI-R605A Reactor Pressure 2-C32-LI-R606A Reactor Water Level 2-CAC-TR-4426-1 PT No. 1 Torus Water Temperature l 2-CAC-L2-2602 Torus Water Level  ;

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15.2.2 Train B (At RTCB) i 1

2-C32.PI-3332 Reacto't Pressure  !

2-B21-LI-R604BX R2 actor Water Level  !

2-CAC-TR-778 PT No. 7 Torus Water Temperature l l 2-CAC-LI-3342 Torus Water Level  ;

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g 16.0 Systen Monitoring Information 16.1 The following system instruments will provide reliable indication i for ASSD prc,cedures. I 16.1.1 RHR (RTCB)

Train A E11-FI-R603A RHR System A Flow 1-FP-50017 Sh 10 .

Train B E11-FI-R603B RHR Systen B Flow 2-FP-50017 Sh 10 l 16.1.2 RHR (RSP)

Train B E11-FI-3338 RHR Systen B Flow 16.1.3 HPCI (RTCB)

Train A E41-FIC-R600 Flow Control 1-FP-50039H Sh 6 E41-C002-4 Turbine Speed 2-FP-50039H Sh 6 16.1.4 RCIC (RTCB)

Train B E51-FIC-R600 Flow Control 1-FP-50098R Sh 5 E51-C002-2 Turbine Speed 2-FP-50098R Sh 5 16.1.5 RCIC (RSP)

Train B E51-FIC-3325 Flow Control 1-FP-50098R Sh 5 2-FP-50098R Sh 5 16.1.6 Primary Containment (RTCB)

Train A CAC-PI-1257-1 Dryvell Pressure D 4218 *

($ D 42018 16.1.7 Primary Containment (RSP)

Train B CAC-PI-3341 Dryvell Pressure D 4218 B 42018 (h

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. . e , t 17.0 ASSD Procedure Implementation Guidelines gi  ;

i NOTE: The following guidelines have been developed to assist the Shift l Fereman/ SOS in determining if a fire situation exists that would '

require implementation of ASSD procedures. If these conditions exist, a manual scram should be taken. l 17.1 Service Water Building l 17.1.1 4' elevation fire of subsequent size that involves cable  !

trays. ,

17.1.2 20' elevation fire involving more than one service water pump.

17.1.3 20' elevation fire involving more than one MCC. l 17.2 Diesel Generator Buf1 ding .

i 17.2.1 Any ftre resulting in the loss of any switchgear.

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17.2.2 Diesel Generator Bldg. Basenent - if a fire still exist (

after halon suppression has actuated and had sufficient  !

time to extinguish the fire. .

i 17.2.3 If there is a loss of off-site power and a fire of a l h magnitude that it is involving the No. 2 diesel generator cables located in the No. I diesel generator cell.

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17.2.4 If there is a fire of a magnitude that ic is involving the Diesel Generator No. 1 cables located in the E-6 f

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evitchgear room. j 1*/.3 Reactor Building l

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17.3.1 Elevations 17', 20' and 50' - if there is a fire 6 involving cable trays and the Control Room is experiencing l abnormal observations. {

17.3.2 If there is a fire involving more than one HCC.

17.4 Control Building I 17.4.1 If there is a ftre involving any cables or conduit in the l

Control Building and the Control Room is experiencing ,

abnormal observations. ,

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17.5 '"arbine Building  !

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6. 5.1 If there is a ftre involving any cable or conduit that may indicate or cause a loss of normal power to any 4 kV l

&!, emergency bus.  ;

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g 18.0'ASSD Equipment Inventory List _

18.1 The following equipment shall be kept available in locked storage and inventoried at a freqt.ency specified in 01-03.

18.1.1 Location: Control Room Two sets sound-powered phones Two twenty-five foot phone cords 18.1,2 Location: Control Building ASSD Equipment Cabinet 18.1.2.a 1 One package for Service Water Building operator containing:

One sound power phone headsets One 75' phone cord Ten T112 keys One flashlight One fuse pullsr h' One service water strainer tool One 0-ASSD-02 procedure i One 2-ASSD-05 procedure i

15.1.2.b 1 One package for Unit 1 PHI or RSP operator containing: l l

One sound power phone headset l

l l Two 25' phone cords i l One 1-APP-UA-29 annunciator procedure  !

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One flashlight i I

One logbook U-1  !

One 0-ASSD-02 procedure  !

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g; 18.1.2.c 1 One package for Unit 1 MCC operator containing:

One sound power phor.e headset Two 25' phone cords ,

Forty-nine T112 keys  ;

' l one flashlight One CO key One 0-ASSD-02 procedure 18.1.2.d 1 One package for Unit 2 PMI monitor or RSP c'perator containing:

One sound power phone headset one 25' phone cort One U-2 logbook Eleven Til2 keys one 8-inch phone jumper cord h)

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Two Y jacks One flashlight one 2-AP?-UA-29 annunciator precedure One 0-ASSD-02 precedure One 2-ASSD-05 procedure 18.1.2.e 1 One package for Unit 2 MCC operator containing:

One sound power phone headset Two 25' phone cords Fifty-ono T112 keys one flashlight One CO key One 0-ASSD-02 procedure

); One 2-ASS 9-05 procedure

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l' 18.1.2.f One package for diesel generator operator

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.{e* . containing l One sound _ power phone headset

,i Three 25' phone cords Fifteen T112 keys one flashlight one CO key one fuse puller Fourteen door stops Thirty-four GE-75 keys One 0-ASSD-02 procedure one 2-ASSD-05 procedure 18.1.2 3 1 One package for emergency switchgear opers*or containing

([h' Thirty-five GE-75 keys One 3' phone jumper cord One phillips head screwdriver One standard head screwdriver One 6' rope one fuse pullers l

One CO key one flashlight 1

One 75' phone cord j One sound power phone headset One 0-ASSD-02 procedure One 2-ASSD-05 procedure l-

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, .~ . .s s g 18.1.2.h 1 One package for Senior Auxiliary Operator for Control Building containingt ,

One flashlight '

One transfer switch cover tool One 0-ASSD-02 procedure I 18.1.2.1 1 One package for Unit 1 Shift Foreman containingt One sound power phone headset One 25' phone cord One 0-ASSD-02 procedure 18.1.2.j 1 One package for Unit 2 Shift Foreman containing One sound power phone headset one 25' phone cord One 0-ASSD-02 procedure 18.1.3 1,ocation: Control Building south stairwell / fire tower kt El. 23' (under stairs) 16.1.3.a 6 Six Scott 4.5 self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with each SCBA enclosure having an [

associated ear mic and earauff.

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