ML20205S766
| ML20205S766 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1988 |
| From: | Bishop E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205K904 | List:
|
| References | |
| EOP-01-UG, EOP-1-UG, NUDOCS 8811110166 | |
| Download: ML20205S766 (106) | |
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4 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT 4
UNIT 0 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE-01 E0P-01-UG USERS' GUIDE i
VOLUME VI de go h Rev. 005
- . y#ps
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- Approved By: '
[ [I N Dates N ((
Generdi Nanager0 //
Manager - Operatit .
Page 1 of 106 I
0711110166 001025 4' DR ADOCK 050
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES E0P-01-UG Page(s) Revision 1-106 5 P
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BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 2 of 106 Rev. 5
TAELE OF CONTENTS E0P USERS' GUIDE SECTION DESCRIPTION PACE (S)
List of Effective Pages 2 Table of Contents 3 Index of Figures and Tables 5 E0P Abbreviations 5 E0P Definitions 10 1.0 Purpose 17 2.0 Scope 17 3.0 Entry Conditions 17 4.0 Automatic Actions 18 5.0 Immediate Actions 19 6.0 Subsequent Operator Actions 21 7.0 End Path Manuals 21 7.1 End Path Procedures 23 1
7.2 Containment Control Procedure 25 7.3 Local Emergency Procedures 25 7.4 System Recovery Procedures 26 7.2 Contingency Procedures 26 8.0 , Generic Guidelines 27 9.0 Operator cautions 29 9.1 Detailed Discussion of Caution #6 41 10.0 Techniques of Flowchart and End Path Manual Use 50 11.0 E0P Limits 56 11.1 Discussion of Hajor E0P Limits 68 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 3 of 106 Rev. 5
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
SECTION DESCRIPTION PACE (S) 11.1 (a.) Heat Capacity Temperature Limit 68 -
11.1 (b.) RPV Saturation Temperature 70 11.1 (c.) Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit 72 11.1 (d.) Pressure Suppression Pressure 75 11.1 (o.) Primary Containment Design Pressurc 77 11.1 (f.) Primary Containment Pressure Limit 79 11.1 (3.) Heat Capacity Level Limit 80 11.1 (h.) Suppression Pool Load Limit 82 11.1 (1.) Maximum Acceptable Core Uncovery Time 84 12.0 Conditions Requiring Reactor 4 Depressurization, Flooding or l Primary Containment Spraying 86 12.0 (a.) Reactor Depressuriaation 86 12.0 (b.) RPV Flooding 88 12.0 (c.) Primary Containment Spraying 89 Attachment 1 Group Isolation Checklists 90 1
Attachment 2 Reactor Water Level Actuations/
Isolations/ Trips Checklist 103 Attachment 3 High Dryvell Pressure Actuations/Isolations checklist 105 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 4 of 106 Rev. $ I
. _6 INDEX OF FIGURES AND TABLES Piaure . Description F3 1 Plowchart 20 [
2 BSEP End Path Procedures I Manual 22 3 Brunswick E0P Network 24 [
l 4 Entry Conditions 28 :
[
5 Cold Reference Les RPV 42 Water Level Instrument 4 Caution #6 - Heated Reference Leg Instrument 46 ;
6a Caution #6 - Cold Reference Leg Instrument 47 :
7 Heated Reference Les i RPV Water Level Instrument 48 j 8 Brunswick Reactor Vessel level i Instrument Range 49 l t
9 Path Specific Parameter Change 53 l t
10 RER NPSH Limit 57 !
11 Core Spray NPSH Limit 58 l
12 EPCI Pump NPSH Limit 59 i
13 RCIC Pump 'JPSH Limit 60
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14 Best Capacity Temperature Limit 69 f i
15 RPV Saturation Limit 71 l t
16 Drywell Spray Initiation i Pressure Limit 74 l r
17 Pressure Suppression Pressure 76 j 18 Primary Containment Design [
Pressure 78 t l 19 Meat Capacity Level Limit $1 20 Suppression Pool Load Limit 83 l
21 Maximum Core Uncovery Time 85 l l
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F, E0P ABBREVIATIONS ACCP - ATWS Containment Control Procedure -
+
ADS - Automatic Depressurization System i AEP - Auxiliary Electrical Power t
ALRP - ATWS Level Restoration Procedure ,
ANS - American Nuclear Society !
ANSI - American National Standards Institute AOP - Abnormal Operating Procedure APRM - Average Power Range Monitor ARI - Alternate Rod Insertion ASDC - Alternate Shutdovn Cooling ATVS - Anticipated Transient Without Scram BOP - Balance of Plant CAC - Containment Atmospheric Control CAD - Containment Atmospheric Dilution CCP - Containment Control Procedure COND - Condensate
- CONV - Conventional l
l CRD - Control Rod Drive CST - Condensate Storage Tank CSW - Conventional Service Water DW/T - Drywell Temperature EBOP - Emergency Bearing 011 Pump ECCS . Emergency Core Cooling System EDP - Emergency Depressurisation Precedure EI - Emergency Instruction E0P - Energency Operating Procedure BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 6 of 106 Rev. 5
E0P ABBREVIATIONS EPP - End Path Procedure -
E&RC - Environmental Radiation Control ESOP - Emergency Seal Oil Pump EXCH - Exchanger FP - Flooding Procedure PW - Peedwater CM - General Manager HCLL - Heat Capacity Level Limit HCTL - Heat Capacity Temperature Limit HCU - Hydrualic Control Unit HDR - Header HI - High HPCI - High Pressure Coolant Injection HX - Heat Exchanger IA - Instrument Air IAI - Instrument Air Interruptible i
IAN - Instrument Air Noninterruptible IRM - Intermediate Range Monitor I/SA ,
Instrument / Service Air ,
KV - Kilo Volt LEP - Local Energency Procedure LPCI - Low Pressure Coolant Injection l l
LPCS - Low Pressure Core Spray LRP - Level Restoration Procedure MCC - Motor Control Center i HG - Motor Generator ;
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 7 of 106 Rev. 5 l
E0P ABBREVIATIONS MSIV - Main Steam Line Isolation Valve MSL - Main Steam Line NDTT - Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature NPSR - Net Positive Suction Head NSW - Nuclear Service Water WUC - Nuclear PC/P - Primary Containment Pressure PEP - Plant Emergency Plan RAD - Radiation RBCCW - Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RC/L - Reactor Control Level RC/P -
Reactor Control Pressure RC/Q - Reactor Control Power RECIRC -
Recirculation RHR - Residual Neat Removal RPS - Reactor Protection System RPV - Reactor Pressure Vessel RSCS - Rod Sequence Control System RTCB -
Reactor Turbine Cause Board RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup RWM - Rod Worth Minimiter RX - Reactor BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UC Page 8 of 106 Rev. 5 l
E0P ABBREVIATIONS SA - Service Air SAT - Startup Auxiliary Transformer SBCT - Standby Gas Treatment SJAE - Steam Jet Air Ejector SLC - Standby Liquid Control SRM - Source Range Monitor SORY - Stuck Open Relief Valve SOS - Shif t Operating Supervisor SpCP - Spray Cooling Procedure SP/L - Suppression Pool Level SP/T - Suppression Pool Temperature SRP - System Recovery Procedure SRV - Safety Relief Valve StCP - Steam Cooling Procedure SULCV - Startup Level Control Valve TBCCW - Ibrbine Building Closed Cooling Water TIP - Transversing In Core Probe BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 9 of 106 Rev. 5 l
E0P DEFINITIONS ANS 3.2 The ANS standard which provided early guidance for the preparation of Nuclear Plant Emergency Operating Instructions. The current source of EOP preparation guidance is NUREG 0899 and various generic guidelines.
ADEQUATE CORE COOLING Adequate core cooling is defined as removal of heat from the reactor sufficient to prevent rupturing the fuel clad. i Three viable mechanisms of Adequate Core Cooling exist. These methods i ares ;
- a. Core submergence i
- b. Steam cooling
A condition which should have initiated reactor scram, but scram did not occurt i.e.. exceeding any RPS scram setpoint without scram initiation t and control rods insertion.
- ACTION BLOCK (SYMBOL) ,
Sometimes referred to as a "performance block." This symbol contains a specific action or command which the operator should perform. It usually :
consists of a verification or action such as "verify certain pumps in se rvic e ." "place system in service." or "remove specific equipment from .
se rvic e ." l ALTERNATE INJECTION SYSTEMS F Systems which may be used to inject water to the reactor pressure vessel !
when the injection systems cannot supply suf ficient injection water to !
the vessel. They are as follows:
- b. Fire Protection System ,
- c. ECCS Keeptill System
- e. Condensate Transfer System
- f. Heater Drains System ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION A method which alternately scrans the control rods when a ATWS/RPT signal, i.e.. high RPV pressure or lov RPV vater level. is received.
Pilot solenoid valves (ARI valves) are energized to vent the scram air header and subsequently scran the control rods. A manual ARI feature is also provided.
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BORON INJECTION INITIATION TEMPERATURE The temperaturs of the water in the suppression pool at which boron injection must t e initiated to shut down the reactor before the heat capacity temperature limit is exceeded. This temperature for Brunswick ;
is 110*F. j i
BSEP E0P-01 t Five flowcharts and two End Path Manuals. [
I CAUTIONS OR OPERATOR PRECAtTTIONS
'there are a number of cautions which have been included in the flowcharts and in the End Path Manuals. These cautions are brief. concise red flags i tce the operators.
CHUGGING l An intermittent condensation phenomenon which occurs at the deacomer i ex.it when the dryvell is pressurized due to a high energy leak inside the j dryvell. Under certain conditions, the steam water interface in and ;
around the downcomers can begin to oscillate, imparting high loads to the suppression chamber valls and other components insiJe the suppression !
chamber. <
C01.D S5tUTDOWN BORON VEIGHT The amount of boron which will ensure the reactor will remain suberitical following cooldown to 68'F. ;
CONDENSATE SYSTEM For the purpose of this E0P. the Condensate System consists of a minimum of one condensate pump capable of injecting water into the reactor pressure vessel.
CONTAINMENT CONTR01. CUIDE Each End Path Manual contains a separate section for containment control i in the event that containment limits (pressure, temperature, and ;
suppression pool water level) are exceeded. [
CONTINGENCY (UNUSUAL Pl. ANT SITUATION)
I I The guidance contained in the contingency section of the Brunswick E0Ps provide an alternate course of action to be taken in the event of the i unusual degraded operating situations identified in this section of the l l End Path Manuals. .
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DECISION BLOCK (SYMBOL)
Sometimes referred to as a "question block." This block always contains a decision or question which should be answered les or no. The question 4
will concern a specific parameter, setpoint, switet position, or system condition.
DRYWELL SPRAY INITIATION PRESSURE LIMIT Primary containment canditions of temperature and pressure which allow spraying of the drywell without damage to the containment, due to internal negative pressure.
EKERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION PROCEDURE This is a procedure that utilizes all available means to depressurize the RPV when normal means are not effective.
. END PATH PROCEDURES The end path procedures consist of subsequent operator action steps to be performed after the immediate action steps on the floecharts have been c omple t ed.
cNTRY CONDITION The conditions that should exist prior to entering a specific procedure.
A condition that requires or has initiated a reactor scram is the only entry condition for BSEP E0Ps.
EVAPORATIVE COOLING This is a phenomenon that occurs if the drywell sprays are actuated in a hot, los humidity environment. The associated pressure drop occurs within a few teaths of a second following spray initiation.
EVENT-ORIENTED PROCEDURES Event based procedures are written for a specific event such as pump trip or a failure of specific equipment. .
FLOWCHART A diagram consisting of a set of symbols (such as rectangles or diamonds) and connecting lines that show step-by-step progression through a complicated procedure or network.
FLOWCRART CONNECTING LINES There are two types of connecting lines on the charts. The purpose of the connecting lines is to guide the operator from one block to another.
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FLOWCRART CONNECTING LINES (Cont'd)
- a. Wide Connecting Line. This line. sometimes referred to as The Yellow Brick , Road. represents the most likely or expected plant response for each path or situation.
- b. Normal Width Connecting Lines. These are equally important and represent possible response of the plant in many situations on each path.
HEAT CAPACITY TEMPERATURE LIMIT (HCTL)
A graph which defines the set of initial reactor pressure versus suppression pool temperature combinations from which RPV blowdowns may be completed, without exceeding either the suppression pool design temperature or SRV discharge device stability limit.
INJECTION SYSTEMS Preferred systems used for injection of water into the reactor pressure vessel. They are as follows:
- a. Feedwater/ Condensate
- b. HPCI
- c. RCIC
- d. CRD
- e. Core Spray
KEY PARAMETERS The key parameters are the initial group of decision symbols at the top of each flowchart. These symbols contain the most important symptoms and will lead the operator to the appropriate procedure.
LOW PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEMS Tor the purpose of using BSEP E0Ps independent low pressure injection systems are identified as follows:
- a. Condensate System
- b. Core Spray Loop A
- c. Core Spray Loop B
- d. RRR Loop A (one or two pumps running)
- e. RRR Loop B (one or two pumps running)
MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE CORE UNCOVERY TIME The specified time interval during which all injection to the RPV may be stopped in an attempt to restore level indication to an on-scale 11 vel.
This is used during flooding operations.
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MAXIMUM DRYWELL SPRAY FLOW RATE LIMIT The flow rate at which the pressure drop resulting from dryvell spray actuation will not exceed the capacity of the ruppression chamber-to-dryvell or the Reactor Building-to-suppression ch mber vacuum breakers.
MAXIMUM NONCONDENSABLE EVACUATION TEMPERATURE The temperature (212'P) above which the primary containment should not be vented due to the depletion of the noncondensables in the dryve11.
l MAXIMUM SUBCRITICAL BANKED WITHDRAWAL POSITION The maximum suberitical banked withdrawal position, determined analytically, for which it is ensured the reactor will remain sub-criticci under all conditions. If all rods are inserted to this point.
it is known that sufficient shutdown margin exists to permit RPV cooldown to cold shutdown condition. l l
l MINIMUM ALTERNATE RPV PLOODING PRESSURE l
s The minimum differential pressure, during ATVS conditions, between the j RPV and the suppression chamber that must be maintained with a given number of SRV's open to ensure the core is being adequately cooled.
This is used for the ATVS situation when the RPV water level cannot ba determined.
MINIMUM RPV Pt00 DING PRESSURE The minimum differential pressure (100 psig) during non-ATVS conditions.
between the RPV and the suppression chamber, with a given number of SRV's open (3) that must be maintained to ensure that the RPV is actually i being flooded. This is used when the RPV vater level cannot be determined.
OWNERS' CROUP The various utilities around the country that own plants designed by each j Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor. i.e. Babcock & Wilcox.
j Combustion Engineering. General Electric, and Vestinghouse, have formed j groups called "Owners' Groups." These owners' Croups review generic l
items concerning their particular type of plant and work together with l each other and the vendors to solve problems associated with the operation and maintenance of their plants.
1
( OWNERS' CROUP GUIDELINES j
- Generic guidelines published by the Owners' Group which specify i appropriate operator actions to be taken in the case of an energency or a i situation that may degrade into an emergency. These guidelines are symptom based.
PATH Complete flowchart or a specific path on one of the flowcharts.
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PATH-TO-END PATH ARROWS (SYMBOL)
These symbols direct the operator from the flowchart to the correct procedure in the End Path Manual.
PATH-TO-PATH ARROW (3YMBOL)
These symbols aid the operator in finding the correct entry point into a flowchart when directed there from another chart. These arrows have unique shapes and colors which are designed to aid the operator when changing from one flowchart to another.
PATH SPECIFIC PARAMETERS Specific parameters on each flowchart which are highlighted by double boxing. They are as follows:
- a. Turbine Building closed cooling water header pressure above 42 psig.
- b. Conventional service water header pressure above 40 psig,
- c. Nuclear service water header pressure above 40 psig,
- d. Reactor Building closed cooling water header pressure above 60 psig.
- e. Instrument air header pressure increasing or above 100 psig.
RPV SATURATION TEMPERATJAE The temperature in the dryvell near the cold reference les vertical runs, at which the column of water vill begin to boil.
RUNNING In the BSEP E0Ps, the word RUNNING is used to denote equipment status.
This means that a system, subsystem train, component or device is performing its specified function (s) in the intended manner. If plant equipment is not running but is AVAILABLE f or use, i.e.. OPERABLE. this means that the equipment is not necessarily in-service at the tims, however, it is capab!e of performing its intended function.
STEAM COOLING This refers to procedures which provide guidance for the most efficient method of keeping the reactor core cooled with the coolant that remains in the vessel in a situation where there is no additional makeup to the vessel.
SUPPRESSION CHAMBER 9 PRAY INITIATION PRESSURE The suppressiou chamber pressure which corresponds to the purge of 95% of the dryvell atmosphere to the suppression chamber. Dryve11 spraying is required if t'se suppression chamber pressure exceed? this value.
SYMBOL BLOCKS The symbols used on the BSEP flowcharts. There are three different ,
shapes or types of symbol blocks used on these charts. Each type of block has a unique meaning.
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SYMPTOM BLOCK (SYMBOL)
Sometimes referred to as an "information block" or "caution block." This block contains information or a caution which may be useful to the operator.
SYMPTOM ORIENTED PROCEDURIS Symptom based procedures which are developed from any nunber of isolated events that result in a common symptom such as low Reactor water level or high dryvell pressure.
SYSTFM RECOVERY PROCEDURE Each End Path Manual contains a section which is designated as the system recovery section. The purpose of this section is to give the operator guidance in recovering systems that have been lost or that are degraded.
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1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of the Emergency Operating Procedures is to provide the Control Room personnel with concise symptom oriented instructions that can be used to mitigate the consequences of a broad range of accidents and multiple equipment failures.
2.0 SCOPE This E0P provides operational guidancu which is unambiguous, easy to follow and requires a minimum of operator memory reliance. The E0P is to be used following any reactor scram signal. It identifies important symptoms and establishes the priority of immediate operator actions and guides the operator to the appropriate portion of the subsequent operator action procedures required to safely take the plant to a stable '
condition.
3.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS The entry condition for the F0P is any condition that requires or has initiated a reactor scram. A reactor scram is an indication of a condition which possibly could result in an emergency situation in the absence of positive corrective action.
One of the major deficiencies in the old "event-based" ' emergency instructions was operator confusion as to which procedure to use and in what order, during multiple failure conditions.
The Bruasvick E0P has been designed to minimize the deficiency. This has been accomplished by selecting one common entry condition to the E0P; 1.e., a condition that requires or has initiated a reactor scram, which j is an indicat;on of a potential emergency. Once the E0P is entered, the I ordtr of priority is then established.
If no true emergency conditions exist, the E0P is quickly exited and normal operating procedures are entered.
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4.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Prior to the developeent of symptomatic E0Ps, the event based EIs of ten included as the first step an exhaustive list of automatic actions that the operator was instructed to verify, some of which were important and others which were not. The EOP retains only those automatic actions of sufficient importance to require prompt consideration for controlling reactor ves1e1 level and primary containment integrity. Other automatic actions of lesser importance are subordinate to actions directly affecting these functions. Those automatic actions that meet this criteria are defined as:
- a. Group isolations
- b. ECCS actuations
- c. Diesel generators Where the E0P has identified a parameter that an automatic action is associated with, the flowchart should require verification of or manual initiation of that automatic action. As an example, if the key parameter "Is reactor vessel level above +112 ..ches?" is answered "NO," the procedure will require that the group isolations and ECCS initiations associated with level decreasing to +112 inches be verified or manually initiated.
The E0P does not always define the conditions that would require those automatic actions to be actuated. As an example, if drywell pressure were above 2 psig, Path 5 would be executed. If while on Path 5 reactor vessel level were to decrease below +112 inches, the steps to verify or manually initiate these actions would not be included. It would then become the responsibility of the operator to recognize that level had decreased to +112 inches and to verify or manually initiate the appropriate automatic actions.
In all cases when executing the E0P the operstor shcold be aware of plant conditions. If a parameter which would cause any of the automatic actions described in this section reaches its setpoint, the operator should verify or manually init' ate the automatic action.
To aid the operator in verifying or mann.:lly initiating E0P-related automatic actions Attachment 1. Group leolation Checklists; Attachment 2, Reactor Water Level Actuations/Isolations/ Trips Checklist; and Attachment 3, High Drywell Pressure /etuations/Isolations Checklist are included in this procedure (a copy of each of these attachments should also be maintained in each unit's E0P table).
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 18 of 106 Rev. 5 l
5.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS Immediate operator actions at Brunswick are separated into two categories, Control Operator immediate actions and E0P immediate actions.
The Control Operator immediate actions are :he actions that may be ,
carried out following a reactor scram prior to entering the E0P. These !
actions are not mandatory ar.d should not conflict with entering the ECP. ,
All the Control Operator immediate actions are on the E0P flowcharts. In the event the actions are not carried out prior to entering the E0P, the E0P will take precedence and the actions will be taken as specified by '
the E0P. i The following lir a defines the Control Operator immediate actions:
- 1. When steam flow is less than 3 x 136 lb/Hr, place the mode switch to shutdown.
- 2. When reactor power is below the APRM downscale setpoint, trip the main turbine.
- 3. Place the feedwater/ level controller setpoint to +170".
4 When reactor vessel level is above +170" AND increasing, if two reactor fged pumps are running, trip one.
These actions should be committed to memory by licensed operators so that they may be carried out prior to entering the E0P. ,
The second category of immediate operator actione, the E0P immediate actions, are the E0P flowcharts. The E0P flowcharts are entered following any reactor scram signal.
Since the E0P ivsediate actions are visible to the operator, there is no need to attempt to memorize them.
The general process following any reactor scram should be for the Control Operator to perform the Control Operator immediate actions, within the constraints of each step, and the Shift Foreman to enter the E0P. If the Control Operator immediate actions are not completed prior to entering the E0P, the E0P will take precedence and the steps will s' completed as specified on the E0P.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 19 of 106 Rev. 5 l
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6.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS The subsequent operator actions are contained in the End Path Manuals.
Once the important immediate actions have been completed, the operator enters the End Path Manual. The plant would normally be in a stable condition at this time, therciore, nermit :ing the aperator to branch out into concurrent actiers, as required, and take the plant to hot standby or to cold shutdown. However, if the Plant is t.ot itabilized and severely degraded conditions exist, the operator, having previously
, performed the appropriate immediate actions, can now branch out into other procedures as necessary to stabilize the plant.
The operator is not required to have the OP in hand while executing the E0P but may use any other procedure as necessary.
7.0 END PATH HANUU.5 There are two End Path Manuals, i.e., End Path Manual 1 and 2. Manual 1 is used during failure to scram (ATWS) conditions. This matxal is entered from Flowchart 1 or the Level / Power Control flowchart.
Manual 2 is used during non-ATVS conditions when a successful scram has occurred. This manual is entered from Flowchart 2, 3, 4 or 5.
The End Path Manuals contain the subsequent action steps and other supportive procedures required to take the plant to a stable condition.
- a. End Path Mantal Layout The End Path nenuals are arranged in a manner that allows the operator easy unobstructed access to five different types of subsequent action procedures that may b. needed to get the Plant under control and take it to a safe shutdown condition. (See Figure 2.)
- b. Procedure Format The format used for these procedures is basically in written form.
The following section headings are used for the procedures
- 1. Title
- 2. Plant Conditions or Entry Conditions
- 3. Operator Actions Each step is provided with a place keepite aid, located on the lef t side of the page next to the step number.
The style of writing used in these procedures is described in detail in the Writer's Guide for Emergency Operating Procedures, Appendix C of 01-28.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UC Page 21 of 106 Rev. $ l 1
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All action verbs; e.g., CLOSE, OPEN THROTTLE, are capitalized.
Ccnditional statements such as, IF, WHEN and UNTIL are capitalized and underlined. Logic terms such as AND and OR are also capitalized and underlined for emphasis.
7.1 End Path Procedures The purpose of the end path procedure is to provide guidance to the operator to take the plant to a stable condition.
When the operator completes the immediate operator action steps on the flowchart, the appropriate end path procedure is entered. Each flowchart has several exit arrows, which direct the operator to the associated end path procedure, e.g., the A exit arrow on Path 2 directs the operator to end path procedure 2A, located in End Path Manual 2.
The End Path procedure branches to the containment control procedure. If a containment problem exists, the operator executes both procedures, concurrently. When conditions permit .the operator is directed to exit the E0P and enter "Unit Shutdown," CP-05 (see Figure 3).
However, during degraded plant conditions, the operator may be directed
- to exit the end path procedure and enter a Contingency Procedure or perform the steps of a Local Emergency Procedure. If the plant' conditions subsequently improve, the operarci is directed to return to the end path procedure.
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-- -> CONCVA A ENT U PMoCtovRE 2 tr A usa GP 05 HOTSHUTOQWN COLO SHUTOOWN BRUNSWICK EOP NETWORK FIGURE 3 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 24 Of 106 Rev. 5 l
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7.2 Containment Control Procedure The containment control procedure has been included as a separate section of the End Path Manual and contains the following sections:
- a. Suppression Pool Temperature High-SP/T Entry Condition, Greater Than 95'F
- b. Drywell Temperature High-DW/T Entry Condition, Primary Containment Volumetric Average Temperature, Greater Than 135'F
- c. Primary Containment Pressure High-PC/P Entry Condition, Greater Than 2 psig
- d. Suppression Pool Water Level High-SP/L-High Entry Condition, Greater Than -27 inches
- e. Suppression Pool Water Level Low-SP/L-Low Entry Condition Less Than
-31 inches The purpose of the containment control procedure is to control primary containment temperatures, pressure and level thereby preserving the integrity of the Primary Containment.
Entry into this procedure is from any of the following procedures:
- a. end path procedure
- b. Flowchart 1, 4 or 5 c Level / Power Control Flowchart The containment control procedure is to be executed concurrently with the End Path or the Level / Power Control Procedures. The five portions or sections within the containment control procedure are also to be executed concurrently with each other, when necessary.
7.3 Local Emergency Procedures The Local Emergency Procedures provide written guidance to the operator for certain emergency actions which are to be performed outside the Control Room for the purpose of stabilf eing the Plant. These procedures may be executed concurrently with otbr portions of the E0P.
The Local Emergency Procedures and he purpose of each are as follows:
- 1 - Alternate Coolant Inb.; ion the purpose of the Altern'Ie Coolant Injection LEP-01 is to provide guidance to the operator to use all available means to get water to the RPV when normal systems are not effective.
- 2 - Alternate Control Rod Insertion The purpose of the Alternate Control Rod insertion LEP-02 is to provide guidance to the operator to use all available near.s. i.e.,
electrically, hydraulically, and pneumatically to get the control rods fully inserted when the norma *. control rod system is not effective.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 25 of 106 Rev. 5 l
. s.
- 1 - Alternate Boron Injection The purpose of the Alternate Boron Injection LEP-03 is to use other means of injecting Boron into the RPV when the SLC pumps are not effective. Examples are RWCU, HPCI and RCIC.
7.4 System Recovery Procedures Both End Path Manuals contain a section which is designated as the System Recovery section. The purpose of this section is to give the operatot guidance in recovering systems that have failed or are degraded. The following systems are included:
Conventional Service Water Nuclear Service Water Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water Instrument / Service Air Station Blackout / Degraded Auxiliary Electrical Power Or.e through five above are identified as Path Specific Parameters on the flowchart.
7.5 Contingency Procedures The purpose of these procedures is to provide guidance for the operator t'o deal with severely degraded conditions to return the Plant to a safe status and prevent core damage.
The following procedures are included in this section of the End Path Manuals
- a. Level Restoration The purpose of this procedure is to use all available meaas to restore and maintain the RPV Water Level above the top of the core.
- b. RPV Emergency Depressurization The purpose of this procedure is to use all available means to depressurize the reactor when normal means are not effective,
- c. Steam Cooling This is a mode of operation that is to be used if the RPV water level cannot be maintained above the top of the active fuel and there is no injection into the RPV.
The purpose of this procedure is to minimize core heat-up and provide additional time for reestablishing a makeup source.
- d. Spray Cooling This is a mode of operation that is to be used if the RPV vater level cannot be maintained above the top of active fuel and core spray is available.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UC Page 26 of 106 Rev. 5 l
The purpose of this procedure is to provide long term core cooling even though the core cannot be flooded.
- e. RPV Flooding Procedure The purpose of this procedure is to restore RPV water level indication when it is lost and to assist in the cooling of the primary containment by spilling water out a 1.ypothesized break inside containment.
8.0 GENERIC GUIDELINES The generic guideline was intended to be used concurrently; i.e., each section of the guideline would be entered and executed concurrently if the entry conditions for each section existed.
The Brunswick flowcharts utilize a very simplistic method of establishing the order of priority, thus directing the operator to the appropriate portion of the procedure.
The generic guideline is composed of several portions that are designed to be executed concurrently.
These portions are identified as follows:
- a. RPV Control (1) Reactor Level Control - RC/L (2) Reactor Pressure Control - RC/P (3) Reactor Power Control - RC/Q
- b. Containment Control (1) Suppression Pool Temperature Control - SP/T (2) Drywell Temperature Control - DW/T (3) Frimary Containment Pressure Control - PC/P (4) Suppression Pool Water Level Control - SP/L O
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-L'c Page 27 of 106 Rev. 5 l
This page intentionally left blank.
(Figure 4 deleted)
BSEP/Voi, VI/EOP-01-UG Page 28 of 106 Rev. 5
[
9.0 OPERATOR CAUTIONS Cauttans are used throughout the Brunswick E0P's as brief and concise reminders for the operator. Many of these cautions are used to define standard operational practices, which should be observed during emergency response. They provide directions, interaation and varning:, which apply to the Brunswick E0P. In order to simplify the procedures, the cautions have been included as follows:
(1) Flowchart cautions have been enclosed in the caution or information symbol.
(2) End Path Hanual Cautions have been included in the written procedures in a format that makes them stand out from the steps of the instruction.
(3) Some cautions are dispisyed in the Control Room, near the appropriate instrumentation and controls or under glass on the E0P Table.
NOTE: The E0P cautions are included in Licensed Operator Training materials.
- AAAA**AAAA****A**A*AA*AAAAAAA*An******AA*AA*AAAAA****AA*A*AA**AA*AA**AA*A*
CAUTION #1 Enter the flowcharts if plant condition requires or has initiated a reactor scram. While executing the flowchart steps, constantly monitor the general state of the plant, especially key and path specific parsmeters. Upon entry into the End Path Manuals, enter the containment control procedures if any entry condition for these procedures exist.
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*A*A*AAAAA*AA4AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA**AAAA*AAAAAAA Objectives Define the conditions requiring entry into the Brunswick E0Ps and the conduct of operation while executing this procedure.
While the flowchart steps are being executed, a key parameter or path specific parameter change may require the operator to change flowcharts or return to a specific point in the procedure.
BSEP/Vt'. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 29 of 106 Rev. 5 [
While executing the steps of the end path procedures, the operator will be expected to enter the applicable containment control procedure when any containment control procedure entry condition exists.
CAUTION #2 Monitor RPV water level, pressure, primary containment temperature and pressure from multiple indications.
Objective: Ensure the operator does not rely upon inaccurate data.
CAUTION #3 If a safety function initiates automatically, assume a true initiating event has occurred unless otherwise confirmed by at least two independent indications.
Objectives Prevent premature manual override of automatic systems.
CAUTION #4 Whenever RHR is in the LPCI mode, inject through the heat exchangers as soon as possible.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 30 of 106 Rev. $
l
Objective: Provide early decay heat removal, minimizing the ultimate heatup of the primary containment.
- AAAA*An*********************************AAAn**********AA***********
CAUTION #5 Suppression pool temperature is determined by:
CAC-TY-4426-1 OR CAC-TY-4426-2 ~UI Point 1 on CAC TR-4426-1 OR Point 1 on CAC-TR-4426-2 UR ~~
Computer Point G050 OR Computer Point 0051 Primary containment volumetric average temperature is determined by:
Computer Point C074 OR CAC-TY-4426-1 OR CAC-TY-4426-2 UR
~~
PT-16.2 .
- AAA***A*4**4*AAA**AA**4****AA**4AAA**4*AAAAA**AA*AAAAA****A*AA**AAA*AAA*
Objective: Specify input sources for parameters referenced by the E0Ps.
Discussion: The suppression pool and the primary containment (dryvell and suppression chamber airspace) are relatively large volumes in which vide variations of temperature may occur. Consequently, actions within these procedures must be based upon average suppression pool water temperature and average primary containment air temperature respectively, rather than local temperatures.
NOTE: The E0Ps also reference dryvell average temperature which is NOT synonymous with primary containment volumetric average temperature. (Dryvell average temperature is the weighted average of dryvell temperatures ONLY. Primary Containment volumetric average temperature is the weighted average of dryvell AND suppression chamber airspace temperatures.) A .
worksheet is provided in the EOPs for calculating the drywell average temperature. ,
BSEP/Vol. VI/E0P-01-UG Page 31 of 106 Rev. 5 I
,3 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA**AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA CAUTION #6 Whenever temperature near the instrument reference leg vertical runs exceeda the temperature in the table end the instrum.nt i.ad. *ue16. iiie indicat.d lev.1-in the table, the actual RPV water level may be anywhere below the elevation of the lower instrument. tap. (See detailed discussion in Section 9.1)
Indicated Instrument Temperature Level K004 (Narrow R.nnge Level) . 304'F 170" 150-210 Inches Cold Reference Leg NO27A/N027B (Shutdown Range Affected by drywell temperature as Level) 150-550 Inches Cold indicated by Figure 6a on page 47.
Reference Leg NO36/NO37 (FuS1 Zone) These instruments are not affected
-150-+150 Inches Cold until drywell temperature exceeds the Reference Leg RPV Saturation Temperature __,
Unit 1 Only NO26A/B Affected by drywell temperature as (Wide Range) 0-210 Inches indicated by Figure 6 on page 46.
Heated Reference Leg Unit 2 Only NO26A/B If symptoms of a high energy line break (Wide Range) 0-210 Inches in secondary containment are prr.sent, these instruments should not be used if indicated level is less than 40 inches.
The instruments are not valid under any condition if indicated level is less than 10 inches.
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA objectivet Specify conditions under which RPV level instrument may provide misleading trend information.
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CAUTION #7 Unit 1 only - Heated reference leg instrument (B21-N026A and B) indicated l 1evels are not reliable during rapid RPV depressurization below 500 psig. For these conditions, utilize cold reference ieg instruments to monitor KPV water level.
Objective: Alert the operator to potentially erroneous RPV level indication, resulting from reference leg flashing.
CAUTION #8 Observe net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for pumps taking suction from the suppression pool. i l
Objective: trevent equipment damage.
i e
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 33 of 106 Rev. 5 l ,
L 0
CAUTION #9 If signals of high suppression pool water level -24 inches (high level suction interlock) or low condensate storage tank water level 3.0 feet (low level suction interlock) occur, confirm automatic transfer of or manually transfer HPCI and RCIC suction from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool, a*****************************A*n******************************************
Objective: a. Avoid addition of water to the suppression pool when a high pool water level exists,
- b. Ensure a source of water is available for high pressure ECCS systems.
CAUTION #10 Do not secure or place an ECCS or RCIC in "MANUAL" mode unless, by at least two independant indications, (1) misoperation in "AUTOMATIC" mode is confirmed, or (2) adequate core cooling is ensured. If an ECCS or RCIC is placed in "MANUAL" mode, it will not initiate automatically. Make frequent checks of the initiating or controlling parameter. When manual operation is no longer required, restore the system to "AUTOMATIC / STANDBY" mode, if possible.
Objectives a. Define conditions under which manual control of E1CS is permissible.
- b. Specify precautions to be observed while ECCS is in "MANUAL."
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 34 of 106 Rev. 5 l
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA4kkAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
_ CAUTION fil If a high drywell pressure ECCS initiation signal, 2.0 psig. (Drywell pressure which initiates ECCS) occurs or exists while depressurizing, prevent injection' from those core spray and RHR pumps not required to ensure adequate core cooling prior to reaching their maximum injection pressures. When the high drywell pressure ECCS initiation signal clears, restore core spray and RRR to '
"AUTOMATIC / STANDBY" mode.
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA**AAAAAAA**AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Objectivet Prevent unnecessary flooding of the RPV.
..r 4 *AAAAAAA*A*AA**AAA*A*AA*AAAA**AA*A*AAn***AAA*AAAAA*AA*AAAA*AA**AAAA*A***AA*
1 CAUTION #12 Do not throttle HPCI speed below 3000 rpm or RCIC speed below 2000 rpm (minimum turbine speed limit per Turbine Vender Manual).
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAhlAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Objective Prevent equipment damage.
1 e
e i
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 35 of 106 Rev. 5 l
- AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA**AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA CAUTION #13 Cooldown rates above 100*F/hr (RPV cooldown rate LCO) may be required to accomplish this step.
- AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*AAAAAAA&AAAAAAA*AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*AAAAAAAAAAAAA objective: Inform the operator that rapid cooldown rates may result from the prescribed actions.
- AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA**AAAA****AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*AAAAA*AAAAAAAAAAAAAA CAUTION #14 Do not depressurize the RFV below 120 psig (HPCI low pressure isolation
-r setpoint) unless cotor driven pumps sufficient to maintain RPV water level are running and available for injection.
- AA*AA*AAAAA*AA**AAAAAAAAAAA*AAA*AAAAAAAAAA**AAAA*AAAAAA**AA***AAA****A**AA*
Objectives Ensure a source of RPV makeup water is available following RPV depressurization.
- AAAAA*AA*AA*AA**AAAAAAAAAAAA*AA***AA*A**AA*AAAA*AAAA*****A*AAA*AAA*******AAA CAUTION #15 Open SRVs in the following sequence if possibles B,F E.G.A.C,J H.D.
AAAAAAAAAAA*A*AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*AAAAA*AAAA*****AAAAA*AAAAAAAA****A****
Objective Distribute heat evenly in the suppression pool.
NOTE SRVs K and L are not on the list because they discharge near the exhaust of HPCI and RCIC.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 36 of 106 Rev. 5 l S.
CAUTION #16 Bypassing RPV low water level MSIV incarlocks may be required to accomplish this step.
Objective: Specify conditions under which it is appropriate to bypass automatic isolations.
NOTE: Used in level / power control and emergency depressurization procedures to reestablish main condenser as main heat sink.
CAUTION #17 Cooldown rates above 100*F/hr (RPV cooldown rate LCO) may be required to conserve RPV vater inventory, protect primary containment integrity or limit radioactive release to the environment.
Objective: Specify conditions under which rapid cooldown rates may be desirable.
CAUTION #18 If continuous LPCI operation is required to ensure adequate core cooling, do not divert all RHR pumps from LPCI mode.
Objective Prioritize RHR pump usage.
Page 37 of 106 Rev. 5 l BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG
- AAAAAAAA**AAn*AA*****AAAAAAA***AA*AAn*A*****AAAAA*AA*AA*AAA**A ****gAggg CAUTION #19 +
Manually trip SLC pump at 0% in the SLC tank. ,
- AAAAAAAAA*AAAAAAAA***AAAAAAAA******Anannammananmaanimamann4444444444minAA Objective: Prevent equipment dama,te. ;
- AA**AAA*AAA*******A*AA**An*******An*AA****AAAA*AA *******A***AAn***A *A.
r CAUTION #20 Defeating RSCS interlock may be required to accomplish this step.
44AAAAAAAAAA*4**A***4AAAAAAAAAA44*AAAAAAAAAAAA**AA*AAA*AAAA*AA*AAA***AAAAAA I'
objective Specify conditions under which manual override of automatic interlocks is permissible.
l
- AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*AAAAA*AA**AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA***AAAAAA4AAAAAAA*AAAA CAUTION #21
- Elevated suppression chamber pressure may trip the RCIC turbine on high i exhaust pressure.
- AAAn49AAeAA*AA*An*A*A*A**A*A***A*AA*AAAn*******A****4*AA*********A*******
4 Objective Alert the operator to the potential loss of a source of RPV makeup water under conditions of elevated suppression chamber pressure.
T-4 4
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 38 of 106 Rev. 5 l
CAUTION f22 Defeating isolation interlocks may be required to accomplish this step.
- mmangannanmananamaname**************
Objectives Specify conditions under which manual override of automatic interlocks is appropriate.
CAUTION d23 Do not initiate dryvell sprays unless. suppression pool water level is below -1 inch (elevation of bottom of suppression chamber to Reactor Building vacuum breaker).
- =****************************************************************
Objectivet Prevent negative dryvell pressure in excess of :he design limit.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UC Page 39 of 106 Rev. 5 l t
e .
- 4********s*********************************************************
CAUTION #24 A rapid increase in injection into the RPV may induce a large power excursion and result in substantial core damage.
- 4*****************************************************************
Objective: Warn the operator of possible consequences of nonadherence to prescribed directions.
.l 4
CAUTION #25 Large reactor power oscillations may be observed while executing this step.
Objectivet To warn the operator of tha possibility of power oscillations while lowering the water level.
i BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 40 of 106 Rev. 5 l
[.
9.1 Detailed Discussion of Caution #6 Whenever temperature near the instrument reference leg vertical runs exceeds the temperature in the table and the instrument reads below she indicated level in the table, the actual RPV water level may be &Aywhere below the elevation of the lower instrument tap. (See detailed discussion in Section 9.1)
Indicated Instrument ,,
Temperature Level N004 (Narrow Range Level) 304*F 170" 150-210 Inches Cold Reference Leg NO27A/N027B (Shutdown Range Affected by drywell temperature as Level) 150-550 Inches Cold indicated by Figure 6a on page 47.
Reference Leg NO36/NO37 (Fuel Zone) These instruments are not affected
-150-+150 Inches cold until drywell temperature exceeds the Reference Leg RPV saturation temperature Unit 1 Only: NO26A/B Affected by drywell temperature as (Wide Range) 0-210 Inches indicated by Figure 6 on page 46.
Heated Reference leg Unit 2 Only: NO26A/B If symptoms of a high energy line break (Wide Range) 0 210 Inches in secondary containment cre present, these instruments should not be used if indicated level is less than 40 inches.
The instruments are not valid under any condition if indicated level is less than 10 inches.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 41 of 106 R'ev. 5 l
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REACTOR
- DRYWELL PRESSURE .f VESSEL Q ro'c
[ WALL CONDENSING ( **0' CHAMBER o4
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BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 42 of 106 Rev. 5 l l
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Objective Specify conditions under which RPV level instruments may provide misleading trend information.
Discussion: BWR water level instrume.. s sense liquid level in the vessel downcomer region by measuring the pressure differential between a variable leg water column and reference leg water column (Figure 5). If vessel level is lov, the variable leg level vill be low and the measured AP large. If vessel level is high, the variable leg level vill be high and the measured AP small.
The AP cel'.s are calibrated to give the correct indicated RPV veter level when reactor pressure, dryvell temperature and Reactor Building temperature are at normal operating values for the conditions under which the instruments are expected to be used. If the conditions under which an instrument is used vary from these for which it was calibrated, errors will be introduced. Elevated reference leg temperatures, for example, will decrease the density of water in the reference leg, resulting in a smaller sensed AP and a higher indicated level. If the temperature is high enough, RPV vater level could actually drop below the elevation of the lower instrument tap with the indicator still on scale. ,
Caution #6 alerts the operator to conditions under which an onseale instrument reading could correspond to an actual water level below the lower instrument tap. 'in these circumstances, further changes in level would not be detectable since the aP cell vould sense no subsequent variation in variable leg height.
The operator could, therefore, believe water level had stabilized (or was even slowly increasing) when, in fact, it had dropped below the lower tap.
Unit 1 Only: Heated Reference Legs N026A/B (vide range)
Figure 6 (page 46) illustrates the effects of dryvell temperature on the heated reference leg instruments. It is assumed on the graph that the reference leg temperature has reached equilibrium with the dryvell temperature. Any point on the SAFE regien of the graph indicateu the actual RPV vater level to be at or above the TAF.
The reference leg is heated by the variable leg water through heat transfer elamps (See Figure 7). At normal water levels, the water in the variable leg is relatively stagnant, and cooled to somewhat below RPV saturation temperature by the surrounding space. If RPV vater level is lower than normal, an increased steam volume vill be present in the variable leg, condensing, and being continuously replenished by fresh steam at RPV saturation temperature. If the lov level is maintained for an extended time, the resulting convection heating effect can generate higher reference leg temperatures, a corresponding lower water density, and a higher indicated level.
BSEP/Vol. V1/EOP-01-UG Page 43 of 106 Rev. 5 W
Unit 2 Only: NO26A/B (wide range)
These level instrument reference legs have a very short vertical drop in the drywell (-2ft). The remainder of the reference leg vertical drop is in secondary containment (-25ft). Since the vertical drop in the drywell is short, these instruments will not read on-scale with level below the instrument tap due to a high drywell temperature. However, since the vertical drop in secondary containment is long, a large error may be induced by high temperatures in secondary containment.
If a high energy line leak in secondary containment occurs, these instruments should not be used to determine RPV level if the indicated level is less than 40 inches.
These instruments should not be used under any circumstances if indicated RPV level is less than 10 inches.
NO27A/B (Shutdown Range)
Figure 6a (page 47) illustrates the effects of drywell temperature on the NO27A/B level instruments. Ic is assumed on the graph that the reference leg temperature has reached equilibrium with the dryvell temperature.
If in the UNSAFE region of this graph, actual RPV level may be at or below the lower tap and the instrument may not be used to determine RPV level.
NO36/NO37 (Fuel Zone)
The variable leg tap for these instruments is 224 inches below instrument zero. The bottet of the scale for NO36 and NO37 is 150 inches below instrument zero. This allows a large error in indicated level prior to it being on scale when the actual water level is at or below the variable leg tap. The instrument is also calibrated assuming the reference leg, variable leg, and RPV water temperature is 212'F (saturated condition) causing the affect of elevated drywell temperature to be minimized.
These two conditions combined ensure the NO36 and the NO37 vill provide valid trend information so long as dryvell temperature remains below the RPV saturation temperature.
N004A, B, C (Narrow Range)
These instruments are valid for trend information so long as dryvell temperature near the instrument reference leg is less than 304'T AND indicated level is above +170 inches.
The 304'F represents the reference leg temperature which will produce an on-scale reading when RPV level is at the variable leg tap for the in s t rumen t . The actual level say be below the range of the instrument; however, since it is above the variable leg tap it will still provide valid trend information.
SSEP/Vol. VI/E09-01-UG Fage 44 of 106 Rev. 5 l
\' th' l
The +170 inches represents the level that would be indicated on the instrument if actual RPV level was at the variable leg tap and the l
reference leg ttmperature was at 540'F. Again, since e.he actual level is above the variatie leg tap, the instrument will not provide accurate lev.1 indication. but will provide valid trend information.
q 1
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-t'G Page 45 of 106 Rev. 5
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_A_LL HEATED REFERENCE LEG INSTRUMENTS mm DRYVGL TDPDtATURE NEAR ThE LIWL 6STRu%i'N7 REFIRENCE t.ECS IS DCTERvhED By:
hE AWRACC OF PON7 9 AND 10 CN CAC-TR-4426-1 AND PONT3 8 AND 9 ON CAC-TR-4426-2 Cft THE AWRACE OF COWPUTkR PONT5 M09,m10.F147 AND F148 PIGURE 6 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UC Page 46 of 106 Rev. 5 l l
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-- H d VARIABLE TAP h 150 illillMd JslGlifill M is M til 1 100 200 300 400 500 REFERENCE LEG AREA DRYWELL TEMP (*F)
CAUTION 6 SHUTDOWN RANGE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS B21-Li-R605A/RG056 (N027A/B) i NOTE N027A/B REFERENCE LEG AREA DRYWELL TEMPERATURE IS DETERMINED AS FOLLOWS kl SM C AC TY-44N't NZ.
80' ELF.VAtlCN 4426-1 PQlN7 il 158223 44M-2 PQiNT to (5823) + _=_ .,a 0.35 =
4 4 M-2 PCINT t t (5824)
TEMAb tee tee SEToCEN 70' AND S0' ELEVATICH 44M-2 PolNT 9 (5802) 44M-l PQlNT S L58033 + = a 0.63 =
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Ts$ cr M [ENAYtEAkhttes FIGURE 6a BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 47 of 106 Rev. 5 "
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BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 48 of 106 Rev. 5 l
m 550' "ofG$. . .
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FIGURE 8 BSEP/ Val. VI/EOP-01-UG ? age 49 of 106 Rev. 5 l I
10.0 TECHNIQUES OF FLOWCHART AND END PATH MANUAL USE
- a. Flowcharts The entry condition for E0P-01 is "ANY CONDITION THAT REQUIRES GR HAS l INITIATED A REACTOR SCRAM."
All flowcharts have the same initial format, a series of questions, i.e., key parameters at the top of each flowchart which will direct the operator to the correct Path. Thess key parameters are a series of symptoms which establish the priority of actions. It makes no difference which Path the operator looks at first. The key parameters at the top of each flowchart will provide direction to the proper procedure.
The key parameters are double boxed to make them stand out from other decision symbols (see Figure 1).
The following is the recommended method for using the EOPs:
- 1. The Shift Foreman on the affected unit should read from the E0Ps.
This allows him to remain apart from specific problems and gives him the overall picture of the unit status.
- 2. The Control Operator on the affected unit should operate the RTCB ,
until assistance is provided. t
- 3. The Senior Auxiliary Operator, Senior Control Operator, reli.f i Control Operator, or the Shift Foreman on the unaffected unit should assist the affected unit Control Operator on RTCh. (NOTE: Shift Foreman on unaffected unit is last resort.)
- 4. The Shift Technical Advisor should continue sich providing technical advice and ensuring no parameter changes are unnoticed.
- 5. The Shift operating Supervisor should ensure himself that the plant is responding as designed and make the required notifications per the plant's Emerget'cy Response Plan and 01-22.
The wide dark line on each Path represents the expected Plant response. The operator should follow the route through the "EOP Immediate Actions" of the flowchart by answering the l
questions and performing the operation and verification.
It is very important for the operator to maintain a constant vigil of the entire Plant's condition while using these procedures.
The procedures will greatly enhance the operator's ability to perform the correct actions consistently in a timely manner, during many varied situations. However, the operator must not "lock in" on the procedures and become unaware of important parameters and conditions thet may change during rapidly develop-ing transients and Plant evolutions.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 50 of 106 Rev. 5 l
The operator must keep in mind that if a key parameter of higher priority changes, it will be necessary to STOP. CO TO THE TOP of the flowchart. REASSESS all key parameters, then PROCEED to another Path as required. Notice the order in which the question blocks are arranged at the beginning of each Path. This order sets or determines, the order of priority for the operator. This priority must be maintained at all times. For example, if the operator is halfway down i Path 3, when the vessel water level decreases below +112 inci;et, I the required action is to. STOP. C0 BACK TO THE TOP of the flowchart. REASSESS the key parameters and PROCEED to Path 4. ,
There are some transients in which the vessel water level usually decreases below the +112 inch point, then quickly increases above that point, due eo the initiation of RCIC and/or KPCI. In such a situation, the operator may tend to think that there may not actually be anything wrong and is inclined not to switch charts. However due to the uncertainty of whether or not there is a serious problem i.e.. small loss of coolant or a leak outside Containment, the operator should always ,
switch flowcharts w%en a key parameter of higher priority changes.
In the above situation, the operator would switch to Path 4. entering i this flovchart at the top, then continue on through the "EOP Immediate Action" steps. The operator would not be ir. error to perform the steps ,
on Path 4. even if the water level quickly increases above +112 inches.
Path 1 is the highest priority flowchart. The initial symptoms are identical to the other flowcharts, except that they are not designated as "key parameters" i.e.. double boxed. Therefore, the operator never ,
returns to the key parameter on Path 1 for the purpose of changing flowcharts. 7 i
Another important situation is the appropriate operator action to take in i the event a path specific parameter changes after it has been checked off. The path specific parameters are also enclosed in double boxed decision symbols.
Assume that the operator is following one of the Paths, performing the "EOP Immediate Actions" and something that was previously checked off.
"YES" changes. For example. "RBCCW HEADER PRESSURE ABOVE 60 PSIG7" was "YES" when it was checked off. Now the system fails i.e. pump trip.
valves close or a rupture in the system causes the pressure to decrease below 60 psig. In this situation the operator should return to the path specific parameter, attempt to return the system to normal, but if this cannot be accomplished immediately, take the other Path in this case the "NO" Path. (See Figure 9.)
PSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 51 of 106 Rev $ l
All other decision symbols on the flowcharts may be handled similarly to path specific parameters, i.e., if a decision changes after it has been :
checked off, the operator may return to that point, then continue on the other route. An example of this is the decision symbols containing, "MSIV's OPEN." In this case, if the MSIV's close after they have been checked of f "0 PEN", the operator should return to the "MSIV's OPEN" decision symbol and continue on the "NO" route. In this example, the Plant conditions have drastically changed, due to the MSIV position, i.e., normal RPV pressure control and feedwater supply have been lost. The operator must use good judgemant when normal decision step changes.
The following information is intended to clarify some specific points on 4 the flowcharts:
(1) Reactor Water Level Above +112 inches When on Path 2 or 3, if the Reactor water level decreases below +112 .
inches, the operator is to GO TO THE TOP of the flowchart, REASSESS all key parameters, then PROCEED to Path 4, even if the water level Tater increases rbove +112 inches.
(2) EHC System Malfunction o Turbine Control / Bypass Valves Failed open Failed closed Stuck in position ,
i Oscillating r
o Pressure Control System not controlling Reactor pressure at setpoint i
CONTINUED ON PAGE 54 ,
i i
I s
I i
i i
i BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 52 of 106 Rev. 5 .
i.
Y 1
PATH SPECIFIC PARAMETER CHANGE
+___ _._.__
i MCCW HEADER I NO M PRESSURE ABOVE l
\ 60 PSIG I N/ I YES l
l i
i STEP A i l
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I IF RSCCW NOW FAILS (HEADER PRESSURE DECREASES BELOW 60 PSIG), RETURN TO THE QUESTION BLOCK AND ATTEMPT TO RESTORC - J THE SYSTEM. IF UNSUCCESSFUL, IMMEDIATELY TAKE THE NO PATH.
FIGURE 9 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 53 of 106 Rev. 5 l
(3) Main Condenser Available as Heat Sink o Circulating water available. .
o Turbine seals operable, o Vacuum System operable.
o A path available from the RPV to the condenser. t o EHC System operable; i.e., a means of controlling steam flow to the condenser.
NOTE The HSIV's may be open or 1 elosed, i
1 (4) Two Low Pressure Systems Running o Condensate System o A Core Spray Pump o B Core Spray Pump o RRR Loop A (A or C Pumps) o RNR Loop B (B or D Pumps) 1 (5) If the operator is following a flowchart and RPV level indications are lost, it should be assumed that the water level is low and decreasing each time a "Decision Step" concerning RPV water level is encountered.
(6) Continous SRV Pneumatic Supply 7 If continuous SRV pneumatic supply is not available to the SRVs. the I SRVs should not be cycled manually to control RPV pressure. The ,
remaining pneumatic supply should be conserved to effect either an +
emergency depressurisation or a controlled cooldown when required. ,
i Continous SRV pneumatic supply to the SRVs exists when at least one f of the following criteria are mets :
i 1.(a) Instrument air header pressure is greater than 95 psig. 3 AND ;
(b) Noninterruptible instrument air to drywell isolation valve RNA-SV-5261 or RNA-SV-5262 is open. AND ;
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UC Page 54 of 106 Rev. 5
r (c) At least one air compressor (Turbine Building air compressor or Reactor Building standby compressors) is available to maintain header pressure greater than 95 psig.
SE 2.(a) Division I (or Division II) nitrogen backup rack and dryvell isolation valves RNA-SV-5482 and RNA-SV-5253 (or RNA-SV-5481 and RNA-SV-5251) are open, AND (b) The associated N, backup supply header pressure is greater than 95 psig, AND (c) The associated Ny backup bottle pressure is greater than
!!30 psig.
(7) Feed pumps, HPCI, or RCIC tripped on high level.
On Path 4, the first two steps following the key parameters, directs the operator to control RPV vater level with the HPCI and RCIC. The intent is to provide guidance to the operator to control RPV vater level with these systems for the duration of the time on the flowchart. However, the tripped on high level decision steps are included later in the procedure for additional guidance to place the systems back in service if they have been tripped due to high level but can now be reset. The experienced operator, when properly trained, will constantly monitor and cont-ol the RPV vater level after executing the initial level control steps even if it requires the resetting of the HPIC, RCIC, or feed pumps.
- b. End Path _ Manuals These manuals contain the subsequent action steps for aach flowchart.
Upon entry into the end paths, the plant is expected to be under control and stabilized, therefore, the operator may now branch out into concurrent operations, as necessary to continue to take the plant to a safe condition.
While performing steps in the end path procedure, should any containment control procedure entry condition occur, the cperator should enter those procedures and execute them concurrently.
When conditions permit, the operator is directed to EXIT the E0P and ENTER the general operating procedures.
However, during degraded plant conditions, the operator may be directed to EXIT the end path procedure and ENTER a contingency If procedure or perform the steps of a local emergency procedure.
the plant conditiens subsequently improve, the operator is directed to RETURN to the end path procedure.
Page 55 of 106 Rev. 5 l BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG
11.0 EOP LIMITS
- a. Limite Associated with EOP Cautions (1) Caution #6 is associated with the RPV water level indication when the drywell temperature is above normal. High drywell temperatures may cause the RPV water level instruments to become inaccurate.
The information accompanying this caution provides details of how each instrument is effected by high drywell temperatures.
The objective of this caution is to specify conditions under which RPV water level instruments may provide misleading trend inf o rmation. The affected Control Room RPV level f astruments are mar'4ed by permanent yellow caution labels whicl: reference this Users' Guide. A discussion of this caution at d the details of each instrument is included in section 9.1 of this Users' Guide.
(2) Caution #8 is associated with the net positive suction head requirements for pumps taking suction from the suppression pool, RHR, Core Spray, HPCI, and RCIC. These curves are based upon Brunswick's specific calculations. (See Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13.)
For low suppressicn pool water levels, substract 0.5 psis per
, foot below -31 inches from the suppression chamber pressure curves The objective of these graphs is to prevent equipment damage
! due to low available NPSd.
i BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UC Page 36 of 106 Rev. 5 l
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FIGL7E 10 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 57 of 106 Rev. 5
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- CAC m tast 3 0% aus4 FIGURE 11 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 58 of 106 Rev. 5 l
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- SUPPRESSION CHAM 8tR PREllVRE iCAChtil?3CN 454 TICURE 12 Rev. 5 l Page 59 of 106 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-Uc
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PIGURE 13 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 60 of 106 Rev. 5 l
v
- b. Limits Associated with Reactivity Control (1) Maximum suberitical banked withdrawal position The maximum subcritical banked withdtawal position, determined analytically, for which it is ensured the reactor will remain subcritical under all conditions. The purpose of this limit is to establish any easily determinable point at which it is known that sufficient shutdown margin exists to permit reactor cool down. This point is reached when all control rods are inserted to position 00.
(2) Boron Injection Initiation Temperature The temperature of the suppression pool, during ATWS conditions, when boron injection is required. The purpose of this limit it to establish a point at which boron injection must be initiated in order to shut down the reactor before the heat capacity temperature limit is exceeded.
This temperature for Brunswick is 110*F.
(3) Not Shutdown Boron Weisht The purpose of this limit is to establish an amount of Boron which must be injected into the RPV to ensure that the reactor is in the hot shutdown condition. This quantity of boron is.eppressed in terna of weight so as to be applicable to both the normal and alternate methods of pumping boron into the reactor.
For Brunswick, this value is 287 pounds. Unfortunately, there is no instrument in the Control Room which indicates pounds of Boron.
The Brunswick E0P provides a Boron tank level in percentage which is to be used by the operators to determine when the desired amount of solution has been pumped into the RPV. The Control Room's SLC tank level instrumentation is equipped with a percentage scale.
In the event that the boron is being injected by an alternate method e.g., the Reactor Water Cleanup System (LEP-03), the weight of horax is identified in the E0P. The borax weight will correspond to the hot shutdown boron weight.
ROT SHUTDOWN BORON WEICHT = 287 lbs.
EQUIVALENT AMOUNT RTGB Gase Local Cage Ut. of Borax 378 1910 sais 2520 lbs (4) Cold Shutdown Boron Weiaht The purpose of this limit is to establish an amount ef boron which must be injected into the RPV to ensure that the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition.
. BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 61 of 106 Rev. 5 l
As in the case of hot shutdoin weight, the quantity of boron is expressed in terms of weight for the cold shutdown condition. For Brunswick, this value is 570 pounds.
The Brunswick E0P simplifies this by providing an amount of boron solution which should be pumped f rom the SLC tank or a weight of borax to be used if injecting boron by an alternate method.
COLD SHUTDOWN BORON WEIGHT = 570 lbs.
EQUIVALENT AMOUNT RTCB Gage Local Gage Wt. of Borax 0% 0 gals 5030 lbs
- c. Limite Associated with Spraying and Venting the Primary Containment (1) Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure The purpose for this limit is to reduce containment pressure by using suppression chamber sprays initially to prevent the possible
,need for dryvell sprays, should the primary containment pressure continue to increase. Therefore, the Brunswick E0Ps direct the operator to initiate the suppression pool sprays when the suppression chamber pressure' exceeds 2 psig. The sprays must be on before the suppression chamber pressure exceeds 16.5 psig, which corresponds to the purge of 95% of the dryvell atmosphere to the suppression chamber.
If the suppression chamber pressure exceeds the suppression chamber spray initiation pressure (16.5 psig), chugging; i.e., an intermittent condensation phenomenon, will occur and dryvell spraying vill be required.
(2) Maximum Noncondensable Evacuation Temperature The purpose of this limit is to ensure that the operator does not vent the containment if the containment atmosphere, i.e..
noncondensables, are being replaced by steam.
A temperature restriction of 212*F must be placed upon venting operations. If the temperature in the space being evacuated f.s above 212'F. it is likely that steam is being admitted to the volume. Noncondensables evacuated through the SBGT system will gradually be replaced by steam until, eventually. very feu non- ,
condensables remain. If dryvell or the suppression chamber sprays were actuated, the containment pressure would decrease rapidly, at a rate beyond vacuum breaker capacity. approaching saturation pressure for the spray temperature. Since this pressure is generally substantially below the negative containment design pressure, containment failure may result. Venting is thus permitted only below 212'F. At lower temperatures, it is assumed that noncondensables removed by these systems vill not be replaced by steami sufficient noncondensables vill therefore, remain in the containment to satisfy the dryvell spray initiation pressure limit. .
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 62 of 106 Rev. 5
(3) Maximum Drywell Spray Flow Rate Limit The purpose of this limit is to prevent the initiation of the !
drywell sprays at a flow rate that will cause the primary >
containment internal pressure drop to exceed the capacity of the suppression chamber-to-drywell or the Reactor '
Building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers.
Since it would be very difficult to accurately restrict and monitor the spray flow at Brunswick, a very restrictive limit or graph is to >
be used when spraying the dryvell. (See Figure 16. Drywell Spray [
Initiation Pressure Limit, or. Page 74) i
- d. Major Limits Associated with the' Primary Containment ,
The containment control procedure contains the following limitse (1) Heat Capacity Temperature Limit Objective Maintain sufficient heat capacity in the suppression pool to ensure continuous stable condensation during SRV discharge.
Required Action if Exceeded: RPV depressurination E0P Location: Suppression Pool Temperature Control l I
(2) RPV Saturation Temperatur_e_
Objective:
~~
To ensure core cooling under conditions i which RPV water level instrumentation cannot be relied upon. !
Required Action if Exceeded: RPV flooding i IOP Location: Dryvell Temperature Control l
l l
i BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 63 of 106 Rev. 5 l m
. i-(3) Dryvell Spray Initiation Limit objective: To allow safe spraying of the drywell to avoid damage due to excessive negative containment pressure.
Required Action if Exceeded: Drywell spraying NOT allowed.
E0P tocations: Drywell Temperature Control, Primary Containment Pressure Control, and Suppression Pool Level Control - High (4) Pressure Suppression Pressure Objectives: (a) Verify proper operation of the suppression chamberg (b) Insure the suppression chamber design pressure will NOT be exceeded, should emergency RPV depressurization be required.
-7 Required Action if Exceeded: RPV depressurization EOP Location: Primary Oontainment Pressure Control (5) Primary Containment Design Pressure Graph objective: To derate the primary containment design pressure from 62 pois to 54 psig, to account for a suppression pool water level which is higher than the normal maximum; i.e.. -27 inches.
Required Action if Exceeded: RPV flooding prior to reaching 58 peig 30P tocation: Primary Containment Pressure Control l
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 64 of 106 Rev. 5 l
(6) Primary Containment Pressure Limit Graph Objective To derate the primary containment pressure limit of 62 psig to 58 psig to account for a suppression pool water. level which is higher than the normal maximum; i.e.. -27 inches.
Required Action if Ex,ceeded: VENT the primary cor 2inment if 58 psig is exceeded E0P Locatient Primary Containment Pressure Control Procedure (7) Heat Capacity Level Limit Objectivest (a) Derate the heat capacity temperature limit to compensate for the reduction in heat capacity caused by low suppression pool water levels.
(b) Depressurize the RPV before suppression pool heat capacity is reduced excessively.
Required Action if Exceeded: RPV depressurization EOP Location: Suppression Pool Water Level Control - Low Procedura l
l (8) Suppression Pool Load Limit l
Objective: To limit dynamic loads upon submerged suppression pool structural components i
and SRV discharge piping during SRV l
actuation when the pool level is I above normal.
l Required Action if Exceededt ' RPV depressurination E0P Location: Suppression Pool Water Level Control - High Procedure BSEP/Vol. V!/EOP-01-LG Page 65 of 106 Rev. 5 l i
L
- e. Limits Associated with Brunswick E0P Contingencies (1) Minimum Zero Injection RPV Vater Level Objective: To establish a point to which the RPV vater level can decreas.e during zero injection conditions without causing the fuel cladding to begin melting (-100 inches).
Required Action if Exceeded: Steam cool the core.
E0P Location: Steam Cooling Procedure (2) Maximum Acceptable Core Uncovery Time Objective To prevent fuel cladding melt while attempting to .eestablish RPV vater level indication.
Required Action if Exceeded: Reflood RPV.
E0P Location: Flooding Procedure (3) Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure objective: To establish a rslue. 100 paid, that can be used to deternine whether or not the RPV vater level is increasing during the flooding operation. Three (3)
SRVs must be open.
Required Action if Exceeded: Naintain RPV pressure at least 100 peig above the suppression
~~
chamber pressure.
E0P Location: Flooding Procedure in End Path Manual BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 66 of 106 Rev. 5 l
(4) Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure objective! To ensure that the minimum differential pressure, 250 psid, during ATVS conditions.
'oetween the RPV and the suppression chamber is maintained with a given number of SRV's open (3 SRVs) to ensure the RP7 is actually being flooded.
Required Action if Exceeded: Maintain RPV pressure at least 250 psig above suppression chamber pressure.
E0P Location: Flooding Procedure in End Path Manuals BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 67 of 106 Rev. 5 l
. .. I 11.1 Dineussion of Major E0P Limits
- a. Heat Capacity Temperature Limit The object is to maintain sufficient heat capacity in the suppression pool to ensure continuous stable steam condensation during '
SRV discharge. >
Continued heatup of the suppression pool may ultimately result !
in water temperature which exceeds design or which introduces a '
potential for unstable steam condensation during SRV discharge.
Should unstable condensation occur, high. potentially destructive oscillatory loads could be placed on the suppression pool walls, challenging the integrity of the primary containment. The heat capacity temperature limit (HCTL) defines the set of initial reactor pressure-suppression pool temperature combinations from which RPV blowdowns may be completed without exceeding either the suppression pool design temperature or the SRV discharge
- device stability limit. If available suppression pool cooling is incapable of maintaining suppression pool temperature below the HCTL. additional operating margin can be gained by lowering RPV pressure. Any available pressure control system may be used to reduce pressure, but those which do not add heat to the suppression pool are preferred.
i As shown in Figure 14. the HCTL curve specifies maximum allowable suppression pool temperatures for APV pressures between the shut-down cooling interlock and the lowest SRV setpoint. Below this range, pool heat capacity is less a concern since the shutdown cooling system may be used for heat removal. Additionally, steam i flow rates during SRV discharge vill be sufficiently low as to i preclude unstable condansation.
The actual suppression pool temperature at which unstable steam condensation vill occur during SRV discharge cannot be precisely quantified using available test data, but a 10'T margin to satu- !
ration is considered conservative. The most limiting of this r value and the suppression pool design temperature is defined in Figuro 14. The HCTL is then derated for RPV pressures above the .
shutdown cooling interlock to ensure sufficient heat capacity [
exists to absorb an RPV blowdown without exceeding the limiting suppression pool temperature. Through energy balance calculations, "
the suppression pool temperature rise (AT) resulting from a blow-down from an assumed RPV pressure is determined. Subtracting this AT from the suppression pool design temperature, defines the limit-ing suppression pool temperature for the assumed initial pressure.
Thus, in Figure 14. a bloviown can be accomeisted without exceed- t ing the maximum suppression pool temperature with RPV pressure [
decreases to the shutdown cooling interlock.
- t i
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- b. RPV Saturation Temperature The objective is to ensure core cooling under conditions in which RPV water level instrumentation cannot be relied upon. The RPV water level instruments sense liquid level in the downcomer region by measuring the pressure differential between a variable leg water column and a reference leg water column. If reference leg water temperatures reach saturation (Figure 15), the column of water will begin to boil, and the reference leg water inventory will gradually be depleted. As the level of water in the reference leg drops the dif ferentist pressure sensed by the level instrument will decrease, and the indicated RPV water level will become erroneously high. The effect is slow, but none the less suggests potentially serious consequences. The operator might gradually throttle injectica l systems in response to the perceived slow increase in water level until, ultimately, the actual water level may fall below the lower instrument tap. Cold reference leg instruments should, therefore, be considered unreliable as soon as saturation conditions are reached.
[ Heated reference leg instruments would become unreliable even before this point (applies to Unit 1 only)].
With the loss of both heated and cold reference leg instruments, the operator no longer has the capability of ascertaining RPV water level. It is then appropriate to flood the vessel so that core cooling may be ensured, even though the actual water level is unknown. The operator is, therefore, directed to flood the vessel.
Because the reference leg pressure is equal to RPV pressure, a reference leg temperature above saturation requires a dryvell temperature above the RPV temperature. Since the reactor is the primary heat input to the containment, this is an unlikely set of circumstances, but by no means impossible. For instance, if drywell temperature will increase until, assuming no further action, it ultimately equals the RPV temperature. If, subst.quently, emergency RPV depressuritation is required, RPV pressure could be reduced below the saturation curve, and reference leg boiling could occur.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 70 of 106 Rev. 5
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RPV SATURATION LIMIT NOTE ORf*In TIVDEMATsRE NE AR THE LINT. INSTRyv!NT REFERENOE LICS 15 DCTIRWAC Bt THE ANTR AGE OF PC'NTS 9 AND 10 ON CAO-TR-4426-1 AND POthTS 8 AND 9 ON CAC-TR- 4426-2 , 2 TFi ANTR ACE Of COW'VTER PO,NTS W109,m10.F147 AND F148 TIGURE 15 Rev. 5 l Page 71 of 106 BSEP/Vol. V!/EOP-01-UG
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- c. Dryvell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit The objective is to allow safe spraying of the dryvell to avoid excessive i negative containment pressures.
If normal dryvell cooling is insufficient to prevent further dryvell temperature increases, the cooling effect of dryvell sprays may prove . effective. Notwithstanding potential damage to electrical equipment l located in the dryve11. dryvell spray should be considered an appropriate a measure if it is determined that dryvell temperatures may otherwise approach design limits. The exact time of initiation must be left to the ; discretion of Plant's operational personnel. To avoid containment i damage, however, rather stringent limitation must be placed upon use of the f sprays. When the dryvell is spray-coole4. a corresponding drop in dryvell > pressure may be expected. Under some conditions, the pressure drop may i occur at a rate beyond the capacity of the vacuum breakers, resulting in I negative containment pressures in excess of design. [ Following a pipe break inside the dryvell, the dryvell vill rapidly ; pressurise, blowing steam and noncondensables into the suppression pool. i The dryvell vill then be filled with steam and the suppression chamber i pressurised by noncondensables. If dryvell spray is initiated heat will ; be transferred from the dryvell atmosphere to the spray droplets at a ! rate proportional to the temperature difference between the atmosphere and the spr.'.y. Steam in the dryvell vill condense and dryvell pressure
; vill decrease until the dryvell temperature is' in equilibrium with the j spray. If the dryvell pressure decreases sufficiently, the supp ession l 5 chamber-to-dryvell vacuum breakers vill open to relieve the negative t
! pressure. The final pressure vill be a function of the total air mass in l the containmenti a lover ir.itial mass vill result in a lover final ' pressure. A large pressure drop will occur if the initial dryvell relative humidity is 1001; i.e., the dryvell is full of steam when spray is initiated. Thc suppression chamber-to-dryvell vacuum breakers are. ; therefore, sised to accommodate the pressure drop resulting from spraying I the dryvell at rated flow following a 1.0CA with all noncondensables ! i purged to *.he suppression chamber. However, if the initial air mass was i very lovl 1.e.. if the the primary containment had been vented, the final , containment pressure may decrease below atmospheric at a rate beyond the l 1 capnetty of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vecuum breakers. i j resulting in negative cortainment pressures in excess of design. Dryvell ; spray must, therefore, not be initiated ualess the total air mass in the ; containment is sufficient to ensure the negative crassure limit will not , h1 exceeded when dryvell temperature decreases to the spray temperature, j j This condi: ion is defined by Tigure 16; at temperature and pressure -
- conditions below and to the right of the curve, sufficient air mass i exists, and dryvell spray is permissible. [
L I i i BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 72 of 106 Rev. 5 l l i i
While the suppression chamber-to-dryvell vacuum breakers are sized to accomodate the pressure drop resulting from dryvell spray subsequent to the design basis 1.OCA. they vill not necessarily accomodate spray f eitiation under conditions beyond the design basis. If the sprays are actuated in a steam environment. the Reactor Beilding-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers are limiting and the restrictions of Figure 16 must be observed. l t BSEP/Vol. V!/E0P-01-t'G Page 73 of 106 Rev. 5 l l l 1 l l 1 i l t
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60 % - --- - -- L ' ' 40 -- O 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PRESSURE (PSIG) DRYWELL SPRAY INITIATION PRESSURE LIMIT NOTE SUPPRESS'ON CHAWDER AlR TEWPERATVRE IS DETERu:NED BY: THE AWtACE OF PONTS 2 AND 3 ON CAC-TR-426-1 AND PONTS 2 AND 3 ON CAC-TR-426-2 OR THE AWRACE OF COMPUTER POINTS M06,m07,M15 AND M16. FIGURE 16
SEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page /4 of 106 Rev. 5 l W
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~d.. Pressure Suppression Pressure The. objective is to verify proper operation of the suppression chamber and to ensure the suppression chamber design pressure vill not be exceeded should emergency RPV depressurization be required.
Figure 17 defines 'the pressure suppression preasure Jiuit. The pressure suppression pressure is act'4 ally the sum of the most limiting values of two separate curves, each a function of suppression pool water level. If a pipe break occurs inside the dryvell, steam and noncon-densables will be forced through the drywell vents into the suppression pool, pressurizing the suppression chamber. Figure 17 defines the maximum suppression chamber pressure , expected following complete purge of the drywell cmosphere to the suppression chamber, assuming the suppression chamber tem-perature is equal to that at the HCTL endpoint. A higher water level decreases the available suppression chamber air space and thus, results in a higher pressure. If, at any time, the suppression chamber pressure exceeds the line, it must be as-sumed the pressure suppression function is not functioning correctly; steam is somehow being admitted to the suppression
, chamber. The RPV is, therefore, depressurized to terminate energy addition to the suppression chanber and to take advan-tage of whatever pressure suppression capability remains. This avoids later occurence of a situati)n requiring emergency RPV depressurization at a time when the pressure suppression function is inoperative.
If emergency RPV depressurization is necessary, suppression chamber pressure will increase due to the resulting heatup of the suppression pool and the airspace above it. Figure 17 defines the conditions from which this heatup may be accommodated without exceeding the suppression chamber design pressure, assuming all noncondensable; have been purged from the drywell to the suppression pool. If sup-pression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below this value, the RPV should be depressurized to ensure that emergency depressuri-zation will not later be necessary under conditions from which the design pressure will be exceeded. BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 75 of 106 Rev. 5 l
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- e. Primary Containment Design Pressure The objective is to derate the primary edntainment design pressure to account for a suppression pool water level which is higher than the normal maximum; i.e. , -27 inches.
If emergency RPV depressurization failed to terminate the energy addition to the suppression chamber, it is likely that steam leakage exists from the dryvell to the suppression chamber, pressurizing the entire containment. If drywell sprays were ineffective, or could not be used due to the imposed restrictions, the operator may attempt to quench the s team in the drywell by floodirig the RPV, spilling water through the hypothesized break. Once steam is no longer being admitted to the drywell, the sup-pressi.a chamber pressure should stabilize. Heretofore, the suppression chamber design pressure has been specified as an absolute value, based upon an assumed maximum suppression pool level. A higher level, ' ovever, will increase the hydrostatic head exerted upon submerg;d locati at a rate of 0.423 psi per foot of level increase. Since th increased prescure cannot be detected by instruments located woove the water surf ace, the design pressure must be derated accordingly in Figure 18. Once the suppression pool water level reaches the elevation of the suppression chamber pressure intstrument tap in Figure 18 furthsr increases in hydrostatic hoad will be sensed directly by the instrument and continued duracion is unnecessary. Since the operating margin gained through the use of the curve does not warrant the additional complications pcsed by a two-dimensional limit and he current instrumentation cannot provide indication in the required range, the BSEP EOPs utilize the most limiting pressure as the design pressure limit; i.e., 58 psig. BSUP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 77 of 106 Rev. 5 l
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- f. Primary Conts,inment Pressure Limit the objective is,to derate primary containment pressure limit to account for a suppression pool water level which is higher than the' normal maximum; i.e., -27 inches.
The primary containment pressure limit.is the same as the design limit. This is due to the uncertainties of how SRV, MSIV, and containment venting valves are affected by primary containment pressures above the design valve. s b i l' I 4 1 L l L i L BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-L'G Page 79 of 106 Rev. 5 { L I 9 9 e.---rno,m-nm,---aw.,, -,n =-n < -an.= ,- .nen ,w-w+-r - --- ~ - , - - ,rnn-, -- rw
- g. Hegt Capacity Level Limit The objectives are to derate the heat capacity temperature limit to compensate for the reduction in heat capacity caused by low suppres-sion pool water levels and direct the operator to depressurize the RPV before suppression pool heat capacity is reduced excessively.
The heat capacity level limit (HCLL - Figure 19) defines the maximum suppression pool temperature from .which an RPV blowdown may be completed without exceeding either the suppression pool design temperature or SRV discharge device stability levels. 'The energy balances used in the HCLL calculation, however, assume a suppression pool water level at or above the minimum suppression pool water level LCO. If a lower level exists, the hett capacity of the-suppression pool will be reduced accordingly and the temperature ride during a blowdcen will be greater. The. heat capacity level limit (HCLL) therefore, derates the HCTL for suppression pool water levels below the minimum technical specification LCO. ' Referring to Figure 19, the HCLL specifies the margin to the HCTL (ATHC) required to ensure adequate suppression pool heat capacity at low pool water levels. Above the level assumed in the HCTL calculations, no marg'.n is required. As the suppressiot; pool water level is decreased, increasing temperature margins are necessary to compennate for the associated reduction of pool heat capacity. The HCLL, therefore, has a negative slope. Below a certain suppression pool water level, the heat ' capacity of the suppression pool becomes inconsequential, as tbsre will no longer be sufficient water to condense discharged stesa. This level has been determined to be the elevation cf the downcomer openings. I If the su- ression pool water level cannot be maintained above the HCLL the HCTL may be exceeded, if mergency RPV depressurization is later required. It is, therefore, appropriate to depressurire the RPV before the heat capacity of the suppression pool is ."rther reduced. 1 The operator need not resort to emergen:y depressurization imme-diately upon reaching the H"' Some flexibility is allowed so that, if possible, opera': ion :4y be restored to within acceptable limits by more contre 11ed means. This ahould not, however, be construed as authorization for extended oieration below the curve. The appropriate course and time of action must be determined based upon parameter trends and system availability. Note that three parameters are involved - suppression pool w0ter level, suppression pool temperature, and RPV pressure. Any or al? may be controlled to avoid violation of HCLL. BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 80 of 106 Rev. 5 ] P
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 i M HC ('F) HEAT CAPACITY LEVEL LIMIT NOTE SUPPRESSION P0OL WATER TEWPERATURE IS DETERMlNED BY; CAC-TY-4426-1 OR CAC-TY-4426-2 OR PONT 1 ON CAC-TR-4426-1 OM PONT 1 CN CAC-TR-4426-2 09 COMPUTER PONT C050 OR COWPUTER PONT %51. FIGURE 19 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 81 of 106 Rev. 5 l l
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- h. Suppression Pool Load Limit The objective is to limit dynamic lo , upon submerged suppression pool structural components and relief valve tail pipts during SRV actuation.
SRV actuation results in dynamic loads upon submerged suppression pool structures which are a function of both RPV pressure and sup-pression pool water level (Figure 20). Continued increase of suppression pool water level may ultimately result in dynamic 1 cads equal to che yield strength of a particular component. The suppression pool Lead Limit, therefore, limits suppression pool water level as a function 9f RPV pressure, such that the yield Stress of the most limiting submerged structural components vill not be exceeded during SRV actuation. If the operator is unable to reduce suppression pool water level below the suppression pool load limit, additional operating margin may be gained by lowering RPV pressure. The potentially harmful effects of SRV actuation from above the suppression pool load limit are of sufficient concern to warrant imposition of rapid cooldown rates in maintaining 5PV pressure below the limit. The operator is authorized to exceed the normal cooldown rate limit but should not depressurize the RPV below the isolation setpoints of steam-driven injection systems unless motor-driven pumps are available. If suppression pool water level and RPV pressure cannot be restored and maintained below the suppression pool load limit, emergency RPV depressurization is required. The objective of this is to prevent further reduction of operating margins. If operation cannot be maintained below the suppression pool load limit by controlling either suppression pool water leve), or RPV pressure, it is appropriate to depressurize the RPV before design margins are further reduced. BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 82 of 106 Rev. 5 l
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700 800 900 1000 1100 REACTOR PRESSURE (PSIG) SUPPRESSION POOL LOAD LIMIT CAUTION IF SUPPRESSON PCCL WATER LENE 15 CREATER THAN -1 INCH CEEP THEN ThE R(ACTOR WUST BE OCPRESSUR1 ZED. FIGURE 20 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 83 of 106 Rev. 5 l i g---- - - e,, ,,--,--,..,----------,,e----.-
- 1. Maximum Acceptable Core Uncovery Time The objective is to prevent fuel cladding melt while attempting to reestablish RPV water level indication.
When it is determined that the RPV is filled, all injection is terminated for a specified time interval (the Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit - Figure 21) and water level allowed to decrease. If on-scale RPV water level indication is not observed within this time limit, the RPV must be reflooded. Adequate core cooling cannot be ensured by off-scale level indicators, even if it is believert the instruments will respond properly when RPV level is decreased. The operator cannot wait for indicator response indefinitely following termination of injection flow, as the instruments - may, in fact, be inoperative, and actual level cannot be known in t!.e intetim. Though the RPV vould have been filled when injection was terminated, level would subsequently decrease due to decay heat-generated boiloff and flow through any existing breaks, The rate of decrease cannot be predicted, since break flow would be dependent upon the size of the break. It must, therefore, be conservatively assumed that water level is below the top of the active fuel as soon as injection is terminated. If this were crua, fuel temperatures would begin to rise, ultimately exceeding fuel thermal limits. The maximum core uncovery time limit (Figure 21) definer the time required is' the peak cladding temperature to reach 2200'F with no epray or steam cooling and the core completely uncovered. If level indication has not been restored upon expiration of this time period, the RPV must be reflooded. The specified interval is measured from the time termination of injection is begun, rather than the time at which injection is completely terminated. Since, barring large pipe breaks, RPV vater level will, in actuality, decrease much more slowly upon termination of injaction, it is possible that an on-scale level may not be attained within the time ali. owed by the anximum core uncovery time limit. The operator would then again attempt to restore on-scale indication. Injection may be terminated for longer time periods in subsequent attempts, since the reactot was shut down. Eventually, the permissible time should be sufficient to allow RPV water level to decrease to an on-scale value.. Injection is only terminated when it can be determined that the RPV is filled. This may be accomplished either by maintaining RPV pressure above the minimum RPV flooding pressure, or by other direct confirmation. Water level is reduced throug boilef f (or by break flow if a break exists); rejection through RWCU is unnecessary. BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 84 of 106 Rev. 5 l
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1 : I';. .: 22. :I11. '.-'-'- -I;Titr121 ._*t: :.'rr~'I L 1r: -' T I:: . - -__.--- _ -,_._._ j ---li ~r i 0 10 20 30 40 50 MAXIMUM CORE UNCOVERY TIME-MINUTES MAXIMUM CORE UNCOVERY TIME . FIGURE 21 BSEP/Vol. VI/E0P-01-UG Page 85 of 106 Rev. 5 (
12.0 CONDITIONS REQUIRING REACTOR DEPRESSURIZATION, FLOODING OR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SPRAYING
- a. Reactor Depressurization (Contingency #2)
A number of situations require depressurization of the reactor vessel. Should any of these conditions arise the operator is directed to initiste a rapid pressure reduction, using the SRVs or the Main Condenser. These situations'are as follows: (1) Low Water Level Conditions (Level Restoration Procedure) If the high pressure systems will not maintain the reactor water level above 0 inches, rapid depres-surization uhould be performed. Specific situations are as follows: o RPV pressure "intermediate" (120 psig - 350 pois) and increasing with RPV vater
-_. r level increasing while HPCI and RCIC are unavailable, o RPV pressure "low" (below 120 psig) and increasing with RPV water level increasing.
o RPV pressure "high" or "intermediate" (above 120 peig) with RPV vater level at or below 0 inches (TAF) and any HP/LP or alternate coolant injection system available. o RPV pressure below 120 psig and increasing with RPY water level decreasing. (2) Containment Control Problems These situations are described in the containment control procedures. However, the specific situations are as follows: o If the suppression pool temperature and RPV pressure cannot be restored and maintained belev the heat capacity temperature limit (Section SP/T). BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 86 of 106 Rev. 5 l
e O o If the drywell temperature cannot be main-tained below the drywell design temperature 300'F (Section DW/T). o If the suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below the pressure suppression pressure (Section PC/P). o If suppression pool water level cannot be maintained above the heat capacity level limit (Section SP/L). o If suppression pool water level and RPV pressure cannot be rectored'and. maintained below the suppression pool load limit (SP/L). (3) Other conditions; e.g., loss of RPV water level indication, may necessitate RPV flooding which must be performed at low reactor pressures. Unique guidance for depressurization under ATWS conditions is provided as follows:
. o If all control rods are fully inserted OR the reactor is shutdown AND no boron has been injected, the reactor is depressurized per the end path procedure, o If the Reactor is not shutdown OR, all control rods are not fully inserted AND boron has been injected, the Reactor is depressurized per the Level / Power Control flowchart.
(2) Unique guidance is also provided if the reactor cannot be de-pressurized by normal means; i.e., SRVs OR main condenser, l l t The operator is directed to enter the Emergency l Depressurization Procedure in the Contingency section of the i End Path Manual. This section contains guidance to use alternate methodsl i.e., HPCI, RCIC, etc., for depressurizing ! the reactor. BSEP/Vol. V1/EOP-01-UG Page 87 of 106 Rev. 5 l
- b. RPV Flooding (Contingency #6)
A number of situations require RPV flooding. The RPV flooding procedure entails depressurizing the RPV and injecting water into the vessel using any of a number of makeup systems. If water level cannot be determined, flooding may be verified by monitoring the response of RP'? pressure. This procedure is exited when the vessel is filled, and the condition which ren.uired flooding has been corrected,
- i. The RPV flooding procedure affects the methods by which both RPV level and pressure are controlled. When the requirement
^ for RPV flooding is encountered, the operator is directed to enter this procedure. If less than the required number of SRV's are open, the RPV must first be depressurized. When RPV pressure has been reduced, RPV flooding may be commenced. The conditions under which RPV flooding is required are as follows: (1) RPV vater level cannot be determined. If the vessel water level cannot be determined, the level should be assumed to be decreasing and/or lov. (2) Containment control problems These situations are described in the containment control procedures, however, the specific situations are as follows: o If dryvs11 temperature reaches the RPV saturation temperature (Section DW/T). o If suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below the primary containment design pressure (Sectien PC/P). (3) During an ATVS condition if RPV vater level cannot be determined (or flooding is required for other reasons), and reactor power cannot be determined. t i
$SEP/Vol. V1/EOP-01-UG Page 88 of 106 Rev. 5 l
- c. Primary Containment Spraying A number of situations require primary containment spraying; i.e.,
suppression chamber or dryvell spraying. These condition's are as follows: (1) Conditions requiring suppression pool spraying o Primary containment pressure (PC/P), should initiate sprays above 2 psig. Must initiate sprays before suppression chamber pressure reaches 16.5 psig; o Primary containment pressure (PC/P), if suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below 58 psig, irrespective of whether adequate core cooling is ensured. (2) Conditions requiring drywell spraying o Drywell temperature control (DW/T), before dryvell temperature reaches 300*F o Suppression pool level control (SP/L-High), before suppression pool level reaches -1 inch. o Primary containment pressure control (PC/P), if suppression chamber pressure exceeds 16.5 psig o Pr$ mary containment pressure control (PC/P), if suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below 58 psig, irrespective of whether adequate core cooling is ensured. SSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 89 of 106 Rev. 5 I
E0P-01-UG Attcch cnt 1
*
- Pega 1 of 13 l
l l l
. E0P-01-UG Attachment 1 Group Isolation Checklists i
p BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 90 of 106 Rev. 5 l
i,z. E0P-01-UG Attachmsnt 1 Page 2 of 13 ' Group 1 Isolation Checklist Control Room - RTCB - Panel H12-P601 l Valve Number Valve Description B21-F016 HSL Drain Inboard Ioolation.Velve B21-F019 HSL Drain Outboard Isolation Valve B21-F022D Inboard HSIV D B21-F028D Outboard HSIV D B21-F022C Inboard MSIV C B21-F028C Outboard HSIV C B21-F022B Inboard HSIV B B21-F028B Outboard MSIV B _ B21-F022A Inboard HSIV A B'21-F028A Outboard HSIV A-Control Room - RTGB - Panel H12-P603_ B32-F019* Sample Inboard Isolacion Valve B32-F020* Sample Outboard Isolation Valve
- NOTE: The Repctor Sample Isolation Valves, B32-F019 and 832-F020, will only isolate on reactor water level low and main steam line radiation high. l l,
BSEP/Vol. V1/EOP-01-UG Page 91 of 106 Rev. 5 l 1 , _ _ _ - . _ _ _ , - , , . .. .._..___._-,,,.,y ,_ , - _ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . , . , _
E0P-01-UG Attachtsnt 1 Psge 3 of 13 Group 2 Isolation Checklist Contral Room - RTCB - Panel H12-P601 Valve Number Valve Description l E11-F049 RHR to Radwaste Inboard Isolation Valve D E11-F040 RHR to Radwaste Outboard Isolation Valve G16-F003 Floor Drain Sump Containment Isolation Valve C16-F004 Floor Drain Sump Containment Isolation Valve G16-F019 Drywell Equipment Drain Tank Containment Isolation Valve C16-F020 Drywell Equipment Drain Tank Containment Isolation Valve TIP V-1 TIP Isolation Valve
- TIP V-2 TIP Isolation Valve
- TIP V-3 TIP Isolation Valve *
. TIP V-4 TIP Isolation Valve
- I Valve Control Panel - Panel H12-P607 TIP V-1 TIP Isolation Valve ,
TIP V-2 TIP Isolation Valve TIP V-3 TIP Isolation Valve i TIP V-4 TIP Isolation Valve Control Butiding - Flectronic Equipment Room - XU75 i E11-F079A RHR Ex A Outlet Inboard Sample Iso 1Gelon Valve E11-F079B RRR Ex B Outlet Inboard Sample Isolation Valve
- NOTE: The "All Valves Closed" light on RTGB Par.el P601 will verify that all TIP isolation valves are closed. Indicacion and control of individual valves is accomplished on Valve Control Panel H12-P607.
BSCP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 92 of 106 Rev. 5 l
-- - -,m , . - - - , , , - . - - - - - - , - - , . . - - ~ , , , - --
,- , , , - . - m
s j E0P-01-UG Attechment 1
* * ' Page 4 of 13 Group 2 Isolation Checklist (Cont'd)
Control Building - Electronic Equipment Reom - XU79 , Valve Number Valve Description E11-F080A RHR Hx A Outlet Outboard Sample Isolation Valve E11-F080B RHR Ex B Outlet Outboard Sample Isolation Valve I L I P r e i i i i i l o BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 93 of 106 Rev. 5 l .
\
i 4
- - - . - _ . , , - - _ . - , , - , . , - - - ._ _ _ - . _ . , . - - _ - - - _ - . , . _ , , . , , , - - . -. -- ----n-. ,. , ,- . -.w. ,- ,,c.- -,,,, ,-,wn,--- n-
E0P-01-UG~ Attechsent 1 Page 5 of 13 Group 3 Isolation Checklist Control Room - RTGB - Panel H12-P601 Valve Number Valve Description G31-F001* RWCU Inlet Inboard Isolation Valve G31-F004 RWCU Inlet Outboard Isolation Valve
- NOTE: The St,C Initiation and RWCU Non-Regen HX Outlet Temperature Hi signals d,o o not isolate the RWCU Inlet Inboard Isolation Valve, G31-F001.
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 94 of 106 Rev. 5 l
E0P-01-UG Attachnont 1 P:ge 6 of 13 Group 4 Isolation Checklist Control Room - RTGB - Panel H12-P601 Valve Number Valve Description E41-F002 HPCI Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve E41-F003 HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve E!el-F041 HPCI Suppression Pool Suction Valve E41-F042 HPCI Suppression Pool Suction Valve BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 95 of 106 Rev. 5 l
E0P-01-UG Attacha:nt 1
- a Pcg2 7 of 13 Croup 5 Isolation Checklist Control Room - RTCB - Panel H12-P601 Valve Number Valve Description 351-F031 RCIC Suppression Pool Suction Valve ,
l E51-F029 RCIC Suppression Pool Suction Valve E51-F008 'RCIC Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve E51-F007 RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve SSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 96 of 106 Rev. 5 l
-r i E0P-01-UG Attechssnt 1 P:ss 8 of 13 Group 6 Isolation, Checklist Control Room - RTGB - Panel XU51 Valve Number Valve Description CAC-SV-4541 CAC-AT-4410 Outboard Sample Return Valve _ CAC-SV-1260 CAC-AT-1260 Outboard Sample Inlet Valve CAC-SV-1261 CAC-AT-1261 Outboard Sample Inlet Valve CAC-SV-1262 CAC-AT-1262 Outboard Sample Inlet Valve CAC-SV-3439 CAC-AT-1262 Outboard Sample Return Valve CAC-SV-4540 CAC-AT-4409 Outboard Sample Return Valve CAC-V58 Outboard Primary Containment N2 Inerting Inlet Valve CAC-V4 Inboard Primary Containment N2 Inerting Inlet Valve CAC-V5 Suppression Pool N2 Inlet Valve CAC-V6 Drywell N2 Inlet Valve CAC-V7 Inboard Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V8 Outboard Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V9 Inboard Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve
,CAC-V10 Outboard Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V49 Inboard Drywell Head Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V50 Outboard Drywell Head Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V55 CAD DC Supply Valve CAC-V56 CAD AC Supply Valve CAC-V22 Suppression Pool 2-Inch Exhaust Valve f CAC-V23 Drywell 2-Inch Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V15 Primary Containment Purge Air Inlet Valve SSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 97 of 106 Rev. 5 l
E0P-01-UG Attcchtsnt 1
. Peg 2 9 cf 13 Group 6 Isolation Checklist (Cont'd)
Control Room - RTGB - Panel XU51 (Cont'd) Valve Number Valve Description CAC-SV-3440 Outboard Common Sample Return Valve For CAC-AT-1260, 1261 CAC-V160 Suppression Pool CAD DC Inlet Valve CAC-V161 Drywell CAD DC Inlet Valve CAC-V162 tappression Pool CAD AC Inlet Valve CAC-V163 Drywell CAD AC Inlet Valve CAC-V170 Suppression Pool Hakeup Valve CAC-V171 Drywell Hakeup Valve CAC-V172 2-Inch Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Valve To SBGT System Control Room - RTGS - Panel XU2 CAC-SV-1213A CAC-AT-4410 Suppression Pool Sample Inlet RIP Valve (X206A-A) CAC-SV-1200B CAC-AT-1261 Inboard Sample Inlet RIP Valve (X49B-A) CAC-SV-1205E CAC-AT 4409 Drywell Sample Inlet RIP Valve (X60-E) CAC-SV-1227A CAC-AT-4410 Drywell Sample Inlet RIP Valve (X73-A) CAC-SV-1227B CAC-AT-4410 Drywell Sample Inlet RIP Valve l (X73-B) l 1-CAC-SV-1227C CAC-AT-4410 Drywell Sample Inlet RIP Valve (Unit 1) (X73-C) 2-CAC-SV-1227C CAC-AT-1260 Inboard Sample Inlet RIP Valve
~~~-
(Unit 2) (X73-C) 1-CAC-SV-122?E CAC-AT-1260 Inboard Sample Inlet RIP Valve (Unit 1) (X73-E) BSEP/Vol. V;/EOP-01-LG Page 98 of 106 Rev. 5 )
E0P-01-UG Attcchment 1
- Pcgs 10 cf 13 Group 6 Isolation Checklist (Cont'd)
Control Room - RTCB - Panel XU2 (Cont'd) Valve Number Valve Description 2-CAC-SV-1227E CAC-AT-4410 Dryvell Sample Inlet RIP Valve (Unit 2) (X73-E) CAC-SV-1225B Common Inboard Sample Return RIP Valve (X76-B) For CAC-AT- 1260, 1261 CAC-SV-1209A CAC-AT-4409 Dryvell Sample Inlet RIP Valve (X57-A) CAC-SV-1209B CAC-AT-4409 .,.vell Sample Injst RIP Valve (X57-B) CAC-SV-1211E CAC-AT-1262 Inboard Sample Return RIP Valve (X54-E) CAC-SV-1211F CAC-AT-1262 Inboerd Sample Inlet RIP Valve (X54-F) CAC-SV-1231B CAC-AT-4410 Inboard Sample Return RIP Valve (X244-B) CAC-SV-1213A CAC-AT-4409 Suppression Pool Sample Inlet RIP Valve (X209B-A) CAC-SV-1215E CAC-AT-4409 Inboard Sample Return RIP Valve (X245-E) Control Building - Electronic Equipment Room - Panel XU75
,,_ RXS-SV-4186 Liquid Sample Return To Suppression Pool Inboard Isolation Valve RXS-SV-4188 Gas Sample Return To Suppression Pool Inboard Isolation Valve Control Building - Electronic Equipment Room - Panel XU79 RXS-SV-4187 Liquid Sample Return .o Suppression Pool Outboard Isolation Valve RXS-SV-4189 Gas Sample Return To Suppression Pool Outboard Isolation Valve SSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 99 of 106 Rev. 5 l
.,.,y-..
1 l E0P-01-UG , Attachx nt 1 '
- Pcg2 11 of 13 i.
)
I Group 7 Isolation Checklist ! l Control Room - RTCB - Panel H12-P601 1 Valve Number . Valve Description i E41-F079 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Valve E41-F075 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Valve l P P I l i i i t i 1 1 l ! l k I
. e t
i i . a { 1 1 BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 100 of 106 Rev. 5 f 4 l 4 4 i
i
~
E0P-01-UG Attachasnt 1
. Page 12 of 13 _
l Group 8 Isolat y ._Qe. list , Control Room - RTGB - U2nel H12-P601 Valve Number Valve Description E11-F009 RHR Shutdown Cooling Inboard Suction Throttle Valve E11-F008 RHR Shutdown Cooling Outboard Suction Isolation $ Valve t E11-F022 RHR Reactor Vessel Head Spray Inboard Isolation e Velve , E11-F023 RHR Recctor Vessel Head Spray Outboard Isolation Valve E11-F015A* LFCI Inboard Injection Valve _ E11-F0155* LPCI Inboard Injection Valve
- NOTE: The LPCI Inboard Injection Valves, E11-F015A and E11-F0155 will ,
l 1solate on Reactor Water Level Low (+162 1/2 inches) only in the i shutdown cooling mode. 4 t e v
- l t
I i { t L i I i i i BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 101 of 106 Rev. 5 l l 6 l l
E0P-01-UG ! Attech2ont 1 i
, . Pago 13 of 13 Group 9 Icslation Checklist l
Control Room - RTCB - Panel H12-P601 Valve Number Valve Description f 151-F066 RCIC Turbf.no Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Valve ' E51-F062 RCIC Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Blnaker Valve F ( l 4 t t I t t l I L f i
)
BS' ' 00 Page 102 of 106 Rev . .'. l ,
?
I i i i (
E0P-01-UG Attcch::nt 2 P ge 1 cf 2 E0P-01-UG Attachment 2 Reactor Vater Level Actuations/Isolations/ Trips Checklist I BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG 'Page 103 of 106 Rev. 5 l I 9 k -. .
o E0P-01-UG Attachm:nt 2
, P:ge 2 of 2 Reactor Jater I.evel Actuations/Isolations/ Trips Checklist
+208 inches HPCI trips RCIC trips RF'<T trips Main Turbine trips
+182 inches Rx reutre runback (with < 20% RFP suction flow on either pump) '
+162 1/2 inches SCRAM !
Grp 2 isolatic;- Grp 6 isolation Grp 8 isolation ADS permissive
+112 inches RCIC initiation HPCI initiation Crp 1 isolation l (Unit 1 only)
Grp 3 isolation Secondary containment isolat'an SBCT initittion _ Rx recire pumps trip ARI initiation l
+45 inches CS initiation LPCI initiation ADS timer actuation DG 1 through 4 start Grp 1 isolation (Unit 2 only)
BSEP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 104 of 106 Rev. 5 l
.-- - . - . - - - . - _ e.
m_. - _ . _ .-
r E0P-01-UG Att chment 3 P:ge 1 cf 2 E0P-01-UG Attachment 3 High Dryvell Pressure Actuations/Isolations Checklist BSEP/Vol. VI/EUP-01-UG Page 105 of 106 Rev. 5 l
E0P-01-UG i Attcchment 3
- Pego 2 of 2 High Dryvell Pressure Actuations/Isolations Checklist ,
1.8 peig SGBT initiation HPCI initiation LPCI initiation
- CS initiation
- _ ,
DG 1 through 4 start
- Grp 2 isolation Grp 6 isolation i
. i t
A i l l l i-
*Coincidspk with low reactor pressure (410 peig) l l l.
1 1 i ! l-l 6 R$EP/Vol. VI/EOP-01-UG Page 106 of 106 Rev. 5 l t (. - I a l r , s ~. ' ?
- - . , _ - , _ . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ , . _ , _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ , , , _ _ , _ _ , _ _ , _ _ , . _ _ , . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ___ _. ,}}