ML20204D496

Rev 0 to Brunswick Steam Electric Plant,Unit 1 Simulator Certification Rept

ML20204D496
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/31/1999
From:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20204D488	List: BSEP-99-0029, Forwards Brunswick Steam Electric Plant,Units 1 & 2, Simulator Certification Quadrennial Rept, Identifying Any Uncorrected Performance Test Failures & Schedule of Such Performance Test Failures ML20204D496 ML20204D524
References
NUDOCS 9903240231
Download: ML20204D496 (53)

Text

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1 SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION QUADRENNIAL REPORT MARCH 1999 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SOUTHPORT, NORTH CAROLINA ra "idu Pe%* I P

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CP&L BRUNSWICK. UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TABLE OF CONTENTS

! -INTRODUCTION ................................................... 2 l General Information ....................................... 2 l Simulator Configuration Control Board ..................... 2 Exceptions to ANSI /ANS 3.5 ................................ 3 1

! I. GENERAL DESCRIPTION ............................ ....... ..5 A. Owner ........................................... ... .5 B. Reference Plant........................................ 5 C. Ready for Training Date ................................. 5 D. Type of Report ......................................... 5 i

II. CONTROL ROOM COMPARISON ................................... 6 l A. Physical Arrangement............................... ...6 '

l B. Panels and Equipment................................... 7 i

C.~ Systems ............................................... 10 (

D. Environment ............................................ 14 l III. Instructor Interface ..................................... 15 a%

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IV. Procedure Analysis ....................................... 17

) A. Emergency Operating Procedures ............. . . . . . . . . . . 17 B. Abnormal Operating Procedures ......................... 18 l C. Technical Specifications .............................. 19 D. Normal Operating Procedures ...................... ....22 V. Simulator Changes Since Last Report ...................... 23 VI. Simulator Design Data Base ............................... 23 1

VII. Simulator Discrepancy Resolution and Upgrading Programs .. 23 VIII. Simulator Tests .......................................... 23 l Appendix A Emergency Operating Procedure Review For Differences Between Unit 1 And Unit 2.... ......... 24 l Appendix B Abnormal Operating Procedure Review For L Differences Between Unit 1 And Unit 2.............. 45 l

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l General Information 1

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The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Simulator Certification Quadrennial Report is provided to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.45(b) including compliance with ANSI /ANS-7.5-1985 as implemented by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.149 Rev 1, 1987. The subject simulator facility consists solely of a plant referenced full scope simulator, which is the primary vehicle for providing positive, practical license training and l examination. The documentation provided herein is intended to

! constitute sufficient basis for the retention of the certification of the Brunswick Simulator. The last renewal was submitted March 21,1995. t l Simulator Configuration Control Board l

l One means of evaluation and review of the simulator operations is )

l the Simulator Configuration Control Board (SCCB). The SCCB is I

tasked with the review and a training value assessment of proposed non-routine changes in design or scope to the simulation facility, simulator discrepancies that impact simulator training, and recent operating experience lessons learned that may be applied to the simulator. The SCCB also reviews the status of simulator certification testing to ensure compliance with the  ;

Test Schedule. l The SCCB is comprised of the Manager of Operations, Manager of Training,~ Superintendent-Operator Training, Team-Leader Licensed Operator Continuing Training (LOCT), Team-Leader Operator Initial Training (OIT),and Supervisor-Computer and Simulation Technology.

Other training and plant personnel may also participate in SCCB meetings as a function of the topics to be addressed.

The SCCB also reviews and accepts, through training value assessments, differences between the simulator and the plant to ensure they do not impact the actions taken by the operator or detract from training. Minutes of board meetings are maintained l

to serve as a record of SCCB decisions.

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l Exceptions to ANSI /ANS 3.5 The exceptions listed below were identified at the time of the initial certification or the certification renewal of the Brunswick Simulator through certification testing or the review / analysis of ANSI /ANS 3.5. Each exception was previously reviewed and approved by the SCCB to ensure that they did not adversely impact the license operator training progism and did not prevent 10 CFR 55 compliant simulator examinatiuns (operating tests) from being conducted. The exceptions identified in this section are listed by ANSI /ANS 3.5 reference and subject. Each l

specific exception taken and associated justification is addressed individually and still applies to this submittal.

1. ANS Section 3.2.1 - Degree of Panel Simulation l

The simulator is referenced to the Unit 2 Control Room for panels, labels, identifiers, controls, instrumentation, alarms, and other man-machine interfaces. The differences between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control boards are discussed

, in Section'II.B Panels and Equipment. Plant modifications implemented on one unit usually appear nn the opposite unit during a future outage. The Control Room is a two unit Control Room, the simulator is a single unit Control Room. l i

All simulator Back Panels are referenced to Unit 2 for l controls, instrumentation, labels, identifiers, and other i man-machine interfaces. None of the actual Unit 1 back l panels are modeled, but the differences between the Unit 1 l panels and the back panels that are simulated are limited <

and are discussed in Section II.B Panels and Equipment. I

2. ANS Section A1.4 - Operating Procedures for Reference Plant Unit 2/ common controlled procedures are normally used on the i simulator, however contro3d copies of Unit 1 Technical i Specifications, Unit 1 on' OP flow charts, and Unit 1 only '

AOPs are also maintained tu. use $then Unit 1 training is conducted. When simulating Unit 1, the above listed Unit 1 procedures along with controlled copies of the Unit 2/ common Operating Procedures are used. A review of Technical Specifications, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures was conducted to identify the unit differences and their i possible impact on training. The results of this review is contained in Section IV, Appendix A and Appendix B.

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3. The following ANSI /ANS 3.5 sections are noted in the Unit 2 f Certification package submittal and also apply to the Unit 1  !

exception listing. Refer to Unit 2 Exceptions to ANSI /ANS l 3.5 for additional information.

Section 3.1.1 (4) - Reactor Trip Followed by Recovery To Rated Power.

Sectiori 3.1.2 (la)- Significant PWR Steam Generator Tube Leaks Section 3.1.2 (12) . Misaligned Control Rods Section 3.1.2 (18)- Failure Of Reactor Coolant Pressure and l Volume Control Systems Section 3.1.2 (22)- Process Instrumentation, Alarms, and Control System Failures Section 3.2.3 - Control Room Environment Section 4.3 (4) - Reactor Coolant System pressure versus temperature relationship indicative of gross core voiding l Appendix Bl.1 BWR Steady State Performance At 25%

Power Appendix B2 - PWR Simulator Operability Test l

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l I. GENERAL DESCRIPTION i

1 A. Owner l

The Brunswick Simulator is owned by Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) Company. The Simulator is located at the  !

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, about 2.5 miles north of Southport, North Carolina. CP&L has its  !

. headquarters in Raleigh, North Carolina about 135 miles northwest of the city of Southport.

B. Reference Plant The Brunswick Simulator simulates the Brunswick Unit 2 Control Room. Brunswick site is a two unit, 895 Mwe,2558 MWTH(UPRATED), General Electric Boiling Water Reactor.

- 1 C. Ready-for Training Date The Simulator was built by Electronics Associates, Inc. i

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(EAI) of West Long Branch, New Jersey. The contract for  !

the Simulator was signed August of 1980. EAI delivered  !

the Simulator to the site and training was started in l February of 1984. From 1988 to present, major modeling l and executive system upgrades have been performed by l EXITECH Corporation of Maryville, Tennessee. I D. Type of Report Quadrennial (4-Year) Report f

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CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SINULATOR CERTIFICATION I II. CONTROL ROOM COMPARISON A. Physical Arrangement There are four major exceptions taken to the Plant Control Room physical arrangement or layout. All of the below listed exceptions were reviewed and accepted by the SCCB as to not impact the actions taken by the ,

vperators or to detract from training. I The first exception is Fire Detection Panel, XU-69 which is unique to Unit 1. This panel is not modeled in the simulator based on a training value assessment.

The second exception is the location of the Shift

' Technical Advisor (STA) desk, which is placed i approximately five feet away from where it is located in the Plant Control Room. This is due to access / egress j requirements for the door in the simulator. Since the STA is rarely at his desk during training sessions, this change has no impact on training. l The third exception is the location of the Shift Supervisor / Communicator table. In the reference control room this table is located near the end of the P601 panel; however, due to constraints in the simulator for l access to doorways, the desk is located near the XU-5 panel. Since this desk is rarely used during normal l

training (it is normally only used during plant Emergency Plan exercises for communications with the i

Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center), this location change has no impact on training.

The fourth exception is the location of the Senior Reactor Operator platform. This raised section of flooring is located approximately one foot further away from the P601 panel than in the reference control room.

It has been verified by Operations and Training that this difference does not affect the ability to see items on the Reactor Turbine Gauge Board, therefore it has no impact on training. There are also minor spatial differences due to the Simulator Control Room not conforming exactly to Plant Control Room dimensions.

These differences do not adversely affect training.

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CP&L BRUNShlCK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION B. Panels and Equipment All control room (front) panels and controls are included in the simulation and are modeled after-Unit

2. This consists of the following panels:

1. Emergency Core Cooling System panel (P601).

2. Reactor control panel (P603).

3. Main Turbine / Generator control panel (XU-1).

4. Feed pump / Diesel Generator control panel (XU-2).

5. Turbine / Balance of Plant control panel (XU-3).

6. Turbine / Balance of Plant recorder panel (XU-4).

7. Switchyard control panel (XU-5).

8. Primary Containment vent / purge panel (XU-51).

9. Steam Jet Air Ejector /Off-Gas panel (XU-80).

There are some differences between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room panels. These differences were captured during the hardware verification process and were reviewed and accepted by the SCCB as to not impact the action'to be taken by the operators or detract from j training. The notable differences are summarized below. i The official list with the SCCB approval is not included as part of this report but is maintained {

I available on-site.

1. Panel P601: Vessel bottom drain temperature is point 6 on Unit 1 and point 5 on Unit 2.

2. Panel P603: Select Rod Insert Initiation and APRM Setdown Reset push buttons do not exist on Unit 1.

3. Panel XU-1: Turbine bypass valve indications and test switch on Unit 2 is set up for ten valves while Unit 1 panel only has four valves.

4. Panel XU-2: Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 1 and 2 are controlled from Unit 1 while EDGs 3 and 4 are controlled from Unit

2. Electrical sub stations 3L and 4L can be cross tied from the Unit 1 panel but not the Unit 2 panel. There

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l is no level indicator for the )

demineralized water tank on Unit 1. '

The instrument penetration for CAC-4410 is X73C on Unit 1 and X73E on Unit 2. The instrument penetration for CAC-LT-1216 is X83D on Unit 1 and X83B on Unit 2.

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5. Panel XU-3: Demineralized water transfer pumps (lamps, control switches, and pressure indicator) are on the Unit 2 panel only. Unit 1 does not have a turbine 1 bypass valves drain valve, MS-V35, >

control switch or lamp. Unit 1 does not have controls for well water pumps. The controls for Control Building Emergency. fans, Diesel Generator Vent fans, and the Control Building Air Compressors are located on Unit 2. Unit 1 has indication only for these items. Unit 1 has controls for one Turbine Building cooling tower pump while Unit 2 has controls for two pumps.

6. Panel XU-4: Unit 1 has Fire Detection Alarm Panels that have alarms for both units. Unit 2 does not have these alarm panels.

7. Panel XU-51: Unit 2 has a Main Stack flow recorder and Unit 1 does not.

8. Panel XU-69:The Fire Protection Panel that controls the diesel and motor driven fire pumps is on Unit 1 only.

Selected back panels and controls are also included in the simulation and are modeled after Unit 2. A task analysis was conducted in March of 1990 to determine the scope of back panel simulation needed to support the required tasks. Plant Modification 91-031 was '

developed and completed in December 1995, adding new panels and upgrading some existing panels to meet these training requirements. The present configuration was then determined to meet training needs and approved as a difference, even though the simulated back panels Page 8 Rev 0

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-(which are listed below) do not match the plant in physical dimensions, number, location, or configuration.

1. Source and Intermediate Range Monitoring / Radiation Monitoring panel (P606).

2. Traversing In-core Probe / Rod Worth Minimizer panel

'(P607: partial panel-one of four TIP machines modeled).

3. Average Power Range and Rod Block Monitoring / Flow Unit panels (P608: partial panels-two of five panels modeled with all hardware, photos).

4. Steam Leak Detection / Temperature Recorder / Drain sump timer panel (P614).

5. Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation monitoring panel (XU-55).

6. Drywell Radiation monitoring panel.(XU-61).

7. Electro-Hydraulic Control First Hit panel (P644).

8. Process Radiation Monitor. panel (P604).

9. Process Radiation Monitor / Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) panel (XU-75).

10. Process Radiation Monitor / PASS panel (XU-79).

11. Select Rod Insert panel (P610).

12. Area Radiation Monitor panel (P600).

13. Digital Feed Water panel (P612: partial model of field bus modules, control processor, and power supplies).

There are also some differences between the Unit 1 and l Unit 2 back panels which are simulated. These j differences were also captured during the hardware '

verification process and were reviewed and accepted by

-the SCCB as to not impact the action to be taken by the l operators or detract from training. The notable differences are summarized below. The official list with SCCB approval.is not included with this report but is also available on-site.

1. Panel P600: Area radiation monitor (ARM) channels L on Unit 1 include the control room L ARMS and Unit 2 does not. Unit 2 includes the service building ARMS and #

Unit 1 does not.

2. Panel'XU-79: Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM)is on Unit 2 only.

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CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION C. Systems A system by system review was conducted to determine the Unit operational differences for each of the major plant systems. System Engineers, Technical Manuals, and System Descriptions were used in this survey. From the information gathered the following list of differences have been determined to exist. A majority of these differences are simulated.in the various system models, thus giving the instructor the ability to train on some of the unique unit system differences, by activating a Remote Function for " UNIT 1 SIMULATION" on the instructor station. Refer to Section III, Instructor Interface, for further details on which differences are modeled.

System: Main Turbine Major differences identified were the Main Turbine bypass vals-s. Unit 1 has four bypass valves for approximately 25% bypass capacity and Unit 2 has ten bypass valves for approximately 85% bypass capacity.

Also, Unit 2 has a bypass valve chest drain valve and Unit 1 does not. These differences are also reflected in Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) System, Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) and the Main Steam (MS) System, which are discussed in this section.

System: PCIS The difference in PCIS is an additional isolation signal on Unit 2 which actuates at > 40% steam flow I when the Mode Switch is not in RUN. The Main Steam !

System for Unit 2 has an additional steam flow I sensor to support this isolation.

System: Emergency Diesel Generators The four EDGs are split between the Units. Unit 1 has EDGs one and two while Unit 2 has EDGs three and four. This configuration also causes the 4160 VAC

! system to be different for each Unit. Unit 1 has Emergency Buses E-1 and E-2 and Unit 2 has E-3 and E-4. Each bus is shared between the units for powering equipment.

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CPicL BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION System: Stand-By Gas Treatment l Stand-By Gas Treatment (SBGT) system inlet and outlet valves on each train will auto open on an initiation signal on Unit J. Unit i valves do not receive an automatic open signal.

System: Electro-Hydraulic Control The crack point voltages and the open end voltages for the bypass valves are different between Unit 2 and Unit 1 due to the difference in the number of bypass valves. The bypass valve amplifier and maximum combined flow limiter amplifier gains are also different for the same reason. Unit 2 gains are set at one and Unit 1 gains are set at four. Also the Load Limit potentiometer is set at ten on Unit 1 and less than ten on Unit 2. This is done to reduce the margin between control valves being wide open and the bypass valves starting to open. On Unit 2

_ only the #3 control valve (CV) is limited to 80% )

travel. The Diode Function Generator (DFG) curves  !

for the #3 CVs are also different to account for this.

The stator coolant runback circuit is disabled on Unit 2, preventing the EHC System load reference motor from receiving a pulsing decrease signal when the run back circuit energizes. Unit 1 will runback.

System: Firci Detection Unit 1 has two annunciator panels on panel XU-4 for the fire detection system alarms. These panels contain alarms applicable to both units, and therefore Unit 2 does not cuplicate these annunciator panels. The simulator replicates Unit 2 and also does not model the fire detection systems.

System: Reactor Protection i

Unit 1 does not have a Select Rod Insert (SRI) bus. '

The SRI position on the individual rod test switches is equivalent to another SCRAM position on the switch. There is also no SRI push button or annunciator for " SRI INITIATED" on P603.

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i System Reactor Protection & Neutron Monitoring l

, Unit 2 has a 90% Average Power Range Monitor (.APRM) l setdown on a Generator Load Reject signal. The load reject timer, however is set to zero causing a SCRAM

signal to be initiated whenever the control valves shut on a fast closure signal. However, if any one control valve is Fast Closed (e.g. valve testing) l and remains shut for 30 seconds, the APRM setdown to 90% will occur. Unit i does not have this feature.

The APRM rod block and scram setpoints of the Flow Control Trip Reference (FCTR) cards are different due to the flow mapping application of Thermal Hydraulic Instability Option E1A.

System: Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

The RHR Shutdown Cooling isolation valve logic for Unit 1 and Unit 2 is different. On Unit 2, the E11-F008 is a throttle valve and the E11-F009 is a seal-in valve. On Unit 1, the E11-F008 is a seal-in valve and the Ell- F009 is a throttle valve. The remaining logic for each of the valves is identical between the units.

System: Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)

When operated from the Remote Shutdown Panel, SRVs B21-F013B,E and G receive power from Motor Control Center (MCC) XDB on Unit 1 and DC Panel 2B on Unit 2.

System: Condensate The Condensate Pump start logic between the units is different. On Unit 1, condensate pumps will AUTO start if booster pump suction pressure is < 20 psig and either the header pressure is < 145 psig or the discharge valve is closed. On Unit 2, they will AUTO start if booster pump suction pressure is < 20 psig.

On Unit 1, the condensate pump can be manually started if the control switch is in manual and either the discharge valve is closed or header pressure is < 145 psig. On Unit 2, they can be manually started if either the discharge valve is closed, header pressure is < 145 psig, or the control switch is in AUTO.

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CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION System: High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

HPCI System design maximum steam flow is different for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Unit 2 is 183,000 LBM/HR and Unit 1 is 166,000 LBM/HR. The high steam flow isolation setpoints are also different since they are set at 220% of design maximum steam flow.

System: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

RCIC System design maximum steam flow is different for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Unit 2 is 22,190 LBM/HR and Unit 1 is 21,000 LBM/HR. The high steam flow isolation setpoints are also different since they {

are set at 220% of design maximum steam flow. l System: Reactor Core And Internals Core flow orificing is different between the units which results in slightly different pressure drops across the core. Also the fuel loading is different.

Unit i reload B1C11 has 164 bundles of GE10, and 396 bundles of GE13 fuel. Unit 2 reload B2C13 has 176 bundles of GE10 and 384 bundles of GE13 fuel.

Systems Drywell Cooling The drywell cooling duct system is different between the units. The Unit 1 system simply dumps air into the bottom of the drywell, blowing upward, and then returns the air from the upper elevations. Unit 2 uses common supply and return headers. This difference causes Unit 2 drywell average air temperature to be slightly higher than Unit 1. In the Unit 2 May 1999 outage, the cooling fan filters will be removed in order to increase air flow and bring drywell temperatures closer to Unit 1.

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'CPEL BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION D. Environment The environmental differences that exist between the Simulator'and the Plant Control Room are summarized below. All of these differences were determined not to impact the actions taken by the operator or to detract from training and were approved by the SCCB.

The actual shape, size, and walls of the simulator control room does not match the plant control room. The Simulator contains Unit 2 only and has a white board on one wall, while the plant has a dual unit control room with no white board.

The plant Unit 2 work request counter / window is fully enclosed with an entrance to the control room at the end of panel XU-5. The simulator has a entrance / exit door by the work request counter and another double door by panel P601 that the plant does not have.

The annunciator alarms produce a difference in sound

, between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems. The alarms for the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) panels j has a distinctly different sound from Unit 1. The sound of Unit 2's alarms could not be replicated; therefore, Unit l's sound was used for modeling the simulator.

The Simulator Control Room lighting and configuration approximates the Plant Control Room lighting as close as possible. Plant Control Room carpet color and arrangement as well as panel paint color have also been matched as close as possible. The carpet in the simulator does not exactly match the shade of the carpet in the plant; however, the colors and the layout 1 of the dark and lia* , carpet is the same. l The Simulator Control Room has video cameras with  ;

microphones permanently installed in the ceiling and a l Halon Fire Protection system with nozzles protruding from the ceiling, none of which are in the plant.

The simulator has a Public Address (PA) station on the I wall by panel XU-80. The plant does not have a PA in this location. This PA is connected to the actual plant PA system instead of the simulator PA system and can be activated for use during Emergency Plan Drills. It is s not used during normal training.

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CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT-ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION III.' Instructor Interface Refer to Section III of the Brunswick Unit 2 Simulator Certification for additional details on this section.

As discussed in Section II.C under Systems, there are some unique operational differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 major plant systems. The simulator has the capability to simulate and train on some of the more important Unit 1 unique system features by activating a Remote Function for

" Unit 1 Simulation" on the instructor station. When activated, this Remote Function changes the following items in the various system models to match Unit 1 response.

l The EHC system bypass valve quantity and capacity is I changed from 10 valves with 85% total steam flow capacity to only 4 valves with 25% total steam flow ,

capacity. Also the crack point voltages and open end j voltages for bypass valves are changed to reflect the Unit 1 values and the gains for the bypass valve

._ amplifier and the maximum combined flow limit amplifier are changed from 1 to 4 due to the lower capacity.

2. The EHC system DFG curve is changed for CV #3 and the

1. 3 CV stroke is no longer limited to 80% travel. j

3. The EHC system load reference motor will receive a l J

pulsing decrease signal when the stator cooling runback circuit energizes.

4. Group I isolation on Main Steam Line high steam flow of 40% when not in Run is removed from isolation logic.

5. 90% APRM set-down is removed from the APRM circuitry and the set-down reset push buttons no longer function.

6. SRI Bus is functionally removed. On panel P610 the SRI position becomes another scram position for the 137 rod scram test switches. Also on P603, the SRI push button will no longer function.

7. The APRM rod block and scram setpoints of the Flow Control Trip Reference (FCTR) cards are changed to reflect the_ Thermal Hydraulic Instability Option ElA Flow Mapping Application for Unit 1.

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8. SBGT inlet and ou't let valves do not automatically open on an initiation signal.

9. Condensate pump start logic.is changed to reflect the Unit 1 logic. Refer to Section II.C under the Condensate System for an explanation of the. logic difference.

10. SRVs B21-F013B,E,,and G when operated from the Remote ,

Shutdown Panel receive control power from MCC XDB not l

DC Panel 2B.

11. The bypass valve chest drain, '2-MS-V35, is disabled.

12. HPCI design maximum steam flow is changed from:183,000 LB/HR to 166,000.LB/HR. Also the High Steam Flow Isolation setpoint for E41-PDS-N004 and N005 is changed from 402,600 LB/HR to 365,200 LB/HR (220% of design maximum steam flow).

13. RCIC design maximum steam flow is changed from 22,190

LB/HR to 21,000 LB/HR. Also the High Steam Flow Isolation setpoint for E51-PDS-N017 and N018 is changed from 48,818 to 46,200 LB/HR (220% of design maximum steam flow).

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CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION IV. Procedure Analysis A. Emergency Operating Procedures The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) were reviewed to determine if any differences existed between Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the operator actions required to execute the procedures. Each procedural difference found was then analyzed to determine its impact on training and the results documented. This documentation is included as Appendix A to this certification, and only the notable differences are summarized below.

1. Direction is given for Unit 2 only to wait until steam flow is less than 3.X 106 lb/hr before taking the Mode switch out of RUN. This is done to avoid the Group I isolation due to high steam flow with the Mode switch not in the RUN position. Unit 1 does not have this isolation.

2. Direction is given to specify which terminal lugs, j terminal boards, and panels are needed to install '

jumpers, lift leads or manipulate switches for various overrides. These terminal board and switch locations are different for each unit.

3. Locations are provided for in field plant components which do not have the same location on each unit.

4. Descriptions are given for plant components and power panels which do not have the same prefix number between units, but perform the same function.

5. Directions are given on operation of RHR Shutdown Cooling suction valves which are different for each unit.

6. Directions are given on how to lineup loop A or B of Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) system to

-either unit. Normally loop A is Unit 1 and loop B is Unit 2.

7. Directions are given to identify components which perform the same function but are labeled

} differently between the units.

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8. Direction is given for Unit 1 to ensure Alternate Safe Shut Down (ASSD) power feed to the steam line drain valve is de-energized.

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9. Unit specific graphs and tables are provided for the l determination of various levels, containment limits, l level instrument validity, core uncovery times and l ECCS pump vortex and NPSH limits. This is due to differences in fuel loading, slight differencea in level instrument legs and taps, suction elevations piping arrangements, and rounding off of calculations.

10. Directions are given for the operation of component switches / controls that are manipulated differently but once positioned cause the same function to occur.

11. Directions are given for establishing / routing alternate injection pathways due to the dissimilarities between the unit building layouts.

B. Abnormal Operating Procedures The Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) were reviewed to determine if any differences exist between Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the operator actions required to execute the procedures. Each procedural difference found was then analyzed to determine its impact on training and the results documented. This documentation is included as Appendix B to this certification, and only the notable differences are summarized below.

l Directions are given for Unit 2 to initiate SRI.

Unit 1 does not have SRI.

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2. Direction is given for Unit 2 only to wait until Main Steam Line flow is less than 3 X los lb/hr before taking the Mode switch out of RUN. This is done to avoid the Group I isolation due to high steam flow with the Mode switch not in the RUN position. Unit 1 does not have this isolation.

3. Locations are provided for plant components which do not have the same location on each unit.

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4. Descriptions are given for plant components and power panels which do not have the same prefix number between units, but perform the same function.

5. Directions are given on operation of RHR Shutdown Cooling valves which are different for each unit.

6. Directions are given to identify components which perform the same function but are labeled differently between the units.

7. References used to determine the region of instability based on core flow / core plate d/p is different between Unit 1 and Unit 2. This is due to the core plate d/p graphs are unit specific.

8. Guidance is provided on the difference in Condensate Pump auto start logic for expected AUTO ACTIONS.

9. Directions.are provided for transferring power

, supplies to common distribution panels that are normally powered from Unit 2.

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10. Directions are given for the loss of shared plant systems / components which are powered from a specific unit.

l C. . Technical Specifications The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications were compared through Amendments 204 for Unit 1 and 234 for Unit 2. The notable differences along with their training impact are summarized below.

1. Under Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation, i

Unit 2 has a Main Steam Line Flow-High of 33% that will cause a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure when not in the RUN mode. Unit 1 does not. I l This difference in isolation instrumentation is modeled and can be activated through the use of a '

Remote Function for Unit 1 Simulation. Since Unit 1 ,

Technical Specifications are available in the simulator, and the difference in isolation logic is modeled, there is no impact on training.

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CPtL BRUNSWICK UNIT'ONE SINULATOR CERTIFICATION

2. Under Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits, the graphs for Normal Operation Core Not Critical, Normal Operation Core Critical, Hydrostatic Pressure Test 5 14 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY), and Hydrostatic Pressure Test 5 16 EFPY are slightly different between the units.

The same control room instruments are used by the operator to determine the safe and unsafe regions of both unit graphs. Since the graphs are similar and

-the-same actions are taken once the region is determined, there is no impact on training.

3. Under Design Features Fuel Storage, the capacity limits are different between the units. Unit 1 capacity is limited to 160 PWR assemblies and 1803 BWR assemblies. Unit 2 is limited to 144 PWR assemblies and 1839 BWR assemblies.

The Fuel Pool Storage area is not simulated. The training and testing of any knowledge required for determining the operability requirements of this l

, system is covered outside the simulator setting.  !

Therefore, there is no impact on training.

4. Under Appendix B, " Additional Conditions", Unit 2 lists a condition for the End-Of-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip System instrumentation. It states that the instrumentation shall be maintained inoperable during Mode 1 when thermal power is 2 30% rated thermal power. Unit 1 does not have this instrumentation and Unit 2 maintains it manually bypassed. ITS implementation deleted the instrumentation section from Technical Specifications.

Since the system, which never existed on Unit 1, is maintained out of service on Unit 2 and the instrumentation section was deleted from Unit'2 Technical Specifications, there is no impact on training.

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5. In the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) under l Seismic Monitoring (section 3.9) Unit 2 has three passive triaxial peak shock recorders located l outside the control room and Unit 1 does not. '

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i CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION The Seismic Monitoring System is not simulated. The l training and testing of any knowledge required for  !

determining the operability requirements of this system is_ covered outside the simulator setting.

Therefore, there is no impact on training.

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6. In Appendix B of the Technical' Requirements Manual (TRM) for Technical Specification Instrument l List, under. Table 3.3.3.1-2, Primary Containment I Isolation Valve Position Indication, the Drywell Level and Pressure on XU-2 shows 2-CAC-SV-1216B for i Unit 2 and 1-CAC-SV-1216D for Unit 1. 1 The CAC instruments are located on the same  !

instrument penetration,X83, just a different J location on that penetration betwe1n the units. If just the indication is lost, there is no initiating queue of this loss to the operator, such as an alarm. Therefore simulator training on this type of failure is not conducted but is covered in another setting. Thus there is no impact on training.

7. In Appendix D of the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) the Primary Containment Isolation Valve List,-Table 3.6.1.3-1, has two valves for Recirc Pump 2A/2B Cooler Outlet Sample Test listed for Unit 2 and not Unit 1, and one valve for RHR Containment Spray Air Test Connection Blind Flange listed for Unit 1 and not Unit 2. Also in Appendix D, Table 3.6.1.3-2, Unit 2 shows'2-CAC-SV-1216B for Drywell Level and Pressure and Unit 1 shows 1-CAC-SV-1216D.

The Recirc Pump Cooler valves and the RHR air test valve are local valves and are not simulated. The training and testing of any knowledge required for determining the operability requirements of these valves is covered outside the simulator setting.

Therefore, there~is no impact on training. The CAC instruments are located on the same instrument penetration,X83, just a different location on that penetration between the units. If just the indication is lost, there is no initiating queue of this loss to the operator, such as an alarm.

Therefore simulator training on this type of failure is not conducted'but is covered in another setting.

Thus there is no impact on training.

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l CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR C5.RTIFICATION i 1

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8. In the Core Operating Limits Reports _for Unit 1 and 1 2 there is a difference in the Power To Flow Maps for.the Monitored, Restricted, and Exclusion Regions

.for determining thermal hydraulic instability requirements.

The same control room instruments are used by the operator to determine which regions of the Power To Flow Map are applicable for either units graphs.

Since the graphs are similar and the same actions are taken once the region is determined, there is no impact on training.

D. Normal Operating Procedures The simulator uses controlled copies of Unit 2 procedures. Ncne of the Normal Operating Procedures (ops) for Unit 1 are available in the simulator.

.. A systematic comparison of plant systems indicated

') naited dif ferences (see II.C. Systems) between' Unit 1 l and Unit 2. As a result a detailed review of Normal I Operating Procedures was not conducted nor is it required by Regulatory Guide 1.149 Revision 1.

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CP&L BRUNSWICK UNIT ONE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION

- V. Simulator Changes Since Last Report Information on this item is contained in Section V of the Brunswick Unit 2 Simulator Certification submittal.

VI. Simulator Design Data Base Information on this item is contained in Section VI of the Brunswick Unit 2 Simulator Certification submittal.

VII. Sbaulator Discrepancy Resolution and Upgrading Progroma Information on this item is contained in Section VII of the Brunswick Unit 2 Simulator Certification submittal.

VIII. Simulator Tests Based on the systematic review of plant systems, only two

, tests were determined to be significant enough to run using the Unit 1 simulator option (see Section III). These tests were STP-TN-006.1, Unit 1 Turbine Trip At Less Than 30%

Power, and STP-MA-99.1, Unit 1 Turbine Trip From Rated Power. Both of these tests were conducted per the 1995-1998 Test Plan and were completed satisfactorily.

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APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO

< I.EOP-01-REACTOR SCRAM PROCEDURE (RSP) - U1 Rev 4, U2 Rev 3 A. Step 005 and 029: These steps have the operator place the Mode switch to SHUTDOWN for Unit 2 only if steam flow is < 3 X 106 LB/HR. These same steps have the operator place the Mode switch to 3HUTDOWN for Unit 1 with no qualification.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference is a result of the Bypass Valve physical configuration and high steam flow isolation on Unit 2 when not in RUN Mode. From the simulator instructor station, instructors have,the capability to select Unit 1 or Unit 2 mode of operation which allows Bypass Valve operation and MSIV steam flow isolation logic to be activated for the respective unit. There are Unit 1 only and Unit 2 only EOP procedures maintained in the simulator. The applicable procedures are placed on the EOP table by the instructor depending upon the unit

. selected for simulation, therefore, thare is no impact on training.

II.EOP-01-REACTOR VESSEL CONTROL PROCEDURE (RVCP) - U1 Rev 4 U2 Rev 3 A. Step RC/P-10: This CAUTION statement for Unit 2 only warns that a Group I isolation may occur if steam flow is raised above 3 X 106 LB/HR.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference is a result of the Bypass Valve physical configuration and high steam flow isolation on Unit 2 when not in RUN Mode. From the simulator instructor station, instructors have the capability to select Unit 1 or Unit 2 mode of operation which allows Bypass Valve operation and MSIV steam flow isolation logic to be activated for the respective unit. There are Unit 1 I only and Unit 2 only EOP procedures maintained in the simulator. The applicable procedures are placed on the EOP table by the instructor depending upon the unit selected for simulation, therefore, there is no impact on training.

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c APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCEE BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO C. Step RC/P-016: This step gives direction to de-energize Unit 1 B21-F016 valve at MCC 1XD, compartment DX9, with no additional direction given for Unit 2.

D. Impact of Procedural Differences. Directions are given to ensure that the alternate ASSD feed to B21-F016 is de-energized on Unit 1. Unit 2 does not have ASSD alternate feed, therefore the simulator does not model this power feed to the valve. This breaker is normally OFF and only energized during ASSD procedures which are not trained on in the simulator. Therefore this breaker is off under most simulator conditions. Training and testing of the knowledge required for this evolution are covered outside the simulator setting. There is no impact on training.

III.EOP-01-LEVEL POWER CONTROL (LPC) - U1 Rev 4, U2 Rev 3

_ A. Step RC/Q-02: This step h.is the operator place the Mode l switch 6

to SHUTDOWN for Un. 2 only if steam flow is < 3 {

X 10 LB/HR. This same s. > has the operator place the Mode switch to SHUTDOWN for Unit 1 with no qualification.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference is a result of the Bypass Valve physical configuration and high steam flow isolation on Unit 2 l when not in RUN Mode. From the simulator instructor I station, Instructors have the capability to relect Unit i 1 or Unit 2 mode of operation which allows Bypass Valve operation and MSIV steam flow isolation logic to be  !

activated for the respective unit. There are Unit 1 only and Unit 2 only EOP procedures maintained in the simulator. The applicable procedures are placed on the EOP table by the instructor depending upon the unit selected for simulation, therefore, there is no impact on training.

C. Step RC/P-40: This step gives direction to de-energize Unit 1 B21-F016 valve at MCC 1XD, compartment DX9, with no additional direction given for Unit 2.

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APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFEREN(, 3 BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO D. Impact of Procedural Differences. Directions are given to ensure that the alternate ASSD feed to B21-F016 is de-energized on Unit 1. Unit 2 does not have ASSD alternate feed, therefore the simulator does not model this power feed to the valve. This breaker is normally OFF and only energized during ASSD procedures which are not trained on in the simulator. Therefore this breaker is off under most simulator conditions. Training and testing of the knowledge required for this evolution are covered outside the simulator setting. There is no impact on training.

IV. EOP-01-STEAM COOLING PROCEDURE - Rev 6 A. LL-5 Deteruination Using B21-LI-R610 OR LR-R615: I Question is asked if level is above LL-5. There are l graphs specific to Unit 1 and Unit 2 for this determination as part of this flow chart.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences: Procedural

~

differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are due to the differences in the amount and type of fuel loading and the rounding off of the calculations. This results in slightly different graphs for LL-5 for Unit 1 and Unit

2. The same instruments are used by the operator to determine LL-5, whether Unit 1 or Unit 2 is being simulated. Since the graphs only differ by a few inches and the same actions are taken once LL-5 is determined, there is no impact on training.

V. EOP-01-REACTOR FLOODING PROCEDURE - Rev 9 4

A. Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit Graph / Tables: Maximum alternate flooding pressure, maximum core flooding interval, and maximum core uncovery time limit are required to be determined using unit specific graphs and tables which are part of this flow chart.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences: Procedural differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are due to the differences in the amount and type of fuel loading and the rounding off of the calculations. This results in slightly different flooding interval for 5 SRVs open Page 26 Rev 0

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APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO between Unit 1 and Unit 2. The same instruments and components are used by the operator to determine core flooding pressure,- flooding interval, and uncovery time, whether Unit 1 or Unit 2 is being simulated.

]

Since the graphs are the same and the tables only differ by one minute, and the same actions are taken once the parameter is determined, there is no impact on training. I VI. EOP-01-CONTAINMENT LIMITS GRAPHS Rev N/A A. Centainment And Pump limits: Containment limits such as Drywell Spray Initiation Limit, Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) Limit, SRV Tail Pipe Limit, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL), Primary Containment fressure Limit and ECCS pump limits such as Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray (CS)

Vortex and Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) Limits are required to be determined using unit specific graphs while executing the various EOP flow charts.

1 B. Impact of Procedural Differences: Procedural differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are due to the differences in the amount and type of fuel loading, i slight differences in the level instrument tap <

elevations, slight differences in the pump suction elevations and flows, and the rounding off of the l l

calculations. This results in slightly different curves  !

between Unit 1 and Unit 2. The same instruments and '

components are used by the operator to determine the various limits, whether Unit 1 or Unit 2 is being simulated. Since the graphs are very similar and the same actions are taken once the parameter is determined, there is no impact on training.

VII. EOP-01-CAUTION 1 Rev h/A A. Level Instrument And Water Level Determination: At various times during the EOP flow chart execution, the operator has to determine if water level can be determined or if level is abcve or can be maintained above Top of Active Fuel (TAF), Low Level (LL)-4, or 90 inches. To make these determinations Caution 1 graphs must be used.

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APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO t 1

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B. Impact of Procedural Differences: Procedural i differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are due to the differences in the amount and type of fuel loading, slight differences in the level instrument tap elevations, and the rounding off of the calculations.

This results in slightly different curves between Unit 1 and Unit C. The same instruments and components are j used by the operator to determine the various limits, '

whether Unit 1 or Unit 2 is being simulated. Since the graphs are very similar and the same actions are taken ,

once the parameter is determined, there is no impact on j training. f I

VIII.EOP-01-SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (SEP) Rev 18 A. Section 1 Step da and 8a

1. Unit 1 only: jumpers are installed in cabinet XU-28 '

between terminals 77 and 82 on terminal board BB and in cabinet XU-27 between terminals 77 and 82 on terminal board CC.

2. Unit 2 only: jumpers are installed in cabinet XU-28 between terminals 79 and 84 on terminal board BB and in cabinet XU-27 between terminals 79 and 84 on terminal board CC.

I B. Section 1 Step Sa, 5b, and Note prior to 5a l

1. The CAC-V7, CAC-V216, and the CAC Division I Override Circuit for the CAC-V7 are powered from a 120 VAC distribution panel which can be supplied by either Division I or Division II by manual transfer at the input to the panel.

Unit 1: Distribution Panel 31AB (Normal power, Division I, E5 and Alternate power Division II, E6  ;

Unit 2: Distribution Panel 32AB (Normal power, Division I, E7 and Alternate power, Division II, E8.

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I APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO l

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, 2. Unit 1 only: if power is lost to Panel 31AB then i transfer to alternate source at Panel 31AB. If power is lost to Panel 31B then install jumper 4 to allow opening CAC-V216 in Panel XU-53 terminal board C terminal 29 to 30.

3. Unit 2 only: if power is lost to Panel 32AB then transfer to alternate source at Panel 32AB. If power is lost to Panel 32B then install jumper 4 to allow opening CAC-V216 in Panel XU-53 terminal board C terminal 29 to 30.

C. Section 4 Step 11a and lib

1. Unit 1 only: removes jumpers, if installed earlier, in cabinet XU-28 between terminals 77 and 82 on terminal board BB and between terminals 28 and 30 on terminal board E. In cabinet XU-27 it removes I jumpers between terminals 77 and 82 on terminal board CC and between terminals 28 and 30 on terminal board E.

2. Unit 2 only: removes jumpers, if installed earlier, in cabinet XU-28 between terminals 79 and 84 on terminal board BB and between terminals 28 and 30 on terminal board E. In cebinet XU-27 it removes jumpers between terminala 79 and 84 on terminal board CC and between terminals 28 and 30 on terminal board E.

D. Impact of Procedural Differences Sections 1 and 4 Procedural differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are due to the placement and removal of jumpers on associated terminal boards and transferring power to distribution panels that allow the operation of primary containment purge valves and fans. The physical panels identified in the procedure are not part of the current scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for jumpers to be installed / removed and power to be transferred in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an override that simulates the installation and Page 29 Rev 0

I APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFEPENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE JJE) UNIT TWO i

or removal of the requested jumper (s) or transfer of power. Once performed, the associated system is operated using only one set of procedures which l

provides steps to be performed for both units. There is no impact on training as a result of jumper placement / removal or' power transfer. Training and l testing of the knowledge and ability required for j jumper installation / removal and power transfers are cevered outside of the simulator setting. Therefore, tnere is no impact on training.

IX. EOP-01-SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (.3EP) Rev 12 A. Step 4.c.and 4.d

1. Unit 1 only: In panels XU-27 and XU-28, west side, j places D/W Coolers A B C& D override switches, VA-l CS-5993 and CS-5994, in the STOP position.

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2. Unit 2 only: In panel XU-27, west side and XU-28, I east side, places D/W Coolers A B C& D override switches, VA-CS-5993 and CS-5994, in the STOP position.

B. Step 4.f l

1. Unit 1 only: In panel XU-27, it lifts and tapes black wire 1-EVO-3 from terminal 40 on TB-A, 1-EVl-3 from terminal 42 on TB-A, 1-EPl-3 from terminal 56 l on TB-B, and 1-EP2-3 from terminal 58 on TB-B. In i XU-28, it lifts and tapes black wire 3-87A-5 from l terminal 40 on TB-A, 3-87B-5 from terminal 42 on TB-l A, 1-ER6-3 from terininal 56 on TB-B, and 1-ER7-3 -

from terminal 58 on TB-B.

b

2. Unit i only: In panel XU-27, it lifts and tapes i black wire 2-EVO-3 from terminal 40 on TB-A, 2-EVl-3 l from terminal 42 on TB-A, 3-83A-5 from terminal 56 '

on TB-B, and 3-83B-5 from terminal 58 on TB-B. In l XU-28, it lifts and tapes black wire 2-EY6-3 from terminal 40 on TB-A, 2-EY7-3 from terminal 42 on TB- {

j A, 3-91A-5 from terminal 56 on TB-B, and 3-91B-5 from terminal 58 on TB-B.

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APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO C. Step 9.e and 9.f q

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1. Unit 1 only: In panel XU-27 and XU-28, west side, l places D/W Coolers A, B, C, and D override switches, i

, VA-CS-5993 and 5994, in the NORMAL position.

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2. Unit 1 only: In panel XU-27, it terminates black l wire 1-EVO-3 from terminal 40 on TB-A, 1-EVl-3 from terminal 42 on TB-A, 1-EPl-3 from terminal 56 on TB-i B, and 1-EP2-3 from terminal 58 on TB-B. In XU-28, i it terminates black wire 3-87A-5 from terminal 40 on l TB-A, 3-87B-5 from terminal 42 on TB-A, 1-ER6-3 from terminal 56 on TB-B, and 1-ER7-3 from terminal 58 on TB-B.

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3. Unit 2 only: In panel XU-27, west side, and XU-28, east side, places D/W Coolers A B C& D override j switches, VA-CS-5993 and 5994, in the NORMAL l position. I

4. Unit 2 only: In panel XU-27, it terminates black wire 2-EVO-3 from terminal 40 on TB-A, 2-EV1-3 from terminal 42 on TB-A, 3-83A-5 from terminal 56 on TB-l B, and 3-83B-5 from terminal 58 on TB-B. In XU-28, it terminates black wire 2-EY6-3 from terminal 40 on TB-A, 2-EY7-3 from terminal 42 on TB-A, 3-91A-5 from terminal 56 on TB-B, and 3-91B-5 from terminal 58 on TB-B.

D. Impact of Procedural Differences. Procedural differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are due to the l placement and removal of jumpers on associated terminal

! boards and/or switches that allow defeat of the l automatic start of the Drywell Coolers due to a reactor scram signal or loss of air. The panels identified in the procedure are not part of the current scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for jumpers to be l installed / removed and control switches manipulated in l accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then j inputs an override that simulates the installation / removal of the requested jumper (s) or switch manipulation (s). Once performed, the associated system is operated using only one set of procedures Page 31 Rev 0

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APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFTERENCES BETWEEN UNIT l

ONE AND UNIT TWO which provides steps to be performed for both units.

Training and testing of the knowledge and ability ,

required for jumper installation / removal and switch

{

manipulations are covered outside of the simulator setting. Therefore, there is no impact on training.

X. EOP-01-SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (SEP) Rev 17 A. Section 2 Step 4.a and 4.b

1. Unit 1 only: -IF vaporizer B is being placed into service, THEN 6 PEN either or both of the following valves:

a. CAD LOOP A/ LOOP B X-TIE VLV, CAC-CV-2715

b. CAC LOOP A/ LOOP B X-TIE VLV, CAC-CV-2716

2. Unit 2 only: -IF vaporizer A is being placed into service, THEN 6 PEN either or both of the following valves:

a. CAD LOOP A/ LOOP B X-TIE VLV, CAC-CV-2715 J

b. CAD LOOP A/ LOOP B X-TIE VLV, CAC-CV-2716 B. Section 2 Step 4.f and 4.g

1. Unit 1 only: Place the CAC-FIC-2717 (2720) SELECTOR switch to the "FIC-2717-1 (FIC-2720-1)" position.

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2. Unit 2 only: Place the CAC-FIC-2717 (2720) SELECTOR switch to the "FIC-2717-2 (FIC-2720-2)" position.

C. Section 2 Step 4.1 and 4.j Step 10 and 11

1. Unit 1 only: Set and then adjust the CAD N2 Flow Loop A(B) CAC-FIC-2717-1(2720-1), controller to maintain approximately 20 SCFM and up to 50 SCFM in auto to control primary containment pressure as desired.

2. Unit 2 only: Set and adjust the CAD N2 Flow Loop i A(B) CAC-FIC-2717-2(2720-2), controller to maintain approximately 20 SCFM nnd up to 50 SCFM in auto to t l control primary containment pressure as desired.  ;

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4 APPENDIX A I EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO D. Section 2 Step 14.a,14.b,15a,15b,18,19,20,21,26,27

1. Unit 1 only: Set / ensure the CAD N2 Flow Loop A(E)

CAC-FIC-2717-1(2720-1), controllers are at zero and CAD x-tie valves CAC-CV-2715 AND 2716 are closed.

2. Unit 2 only: Set / ensure the CAD N2 Flow Loop A(B)

CAC-FIC-2717-2 (272 0-2 ) , controller are at zero and CAD x-tie valves CAC-CV-2715 AND 2716 are closed.

E. Impact of Procedural Differences: The Containment j

Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System consists of two fully redundant loops that are common to both Unit 1 and Unit

2. All control switches and labels are identical on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room XU-51 Panels.

Normally, the Loop A vaporizer is used for Unit 1 and Loop B vaporizer is used for Unit 2. Procedural provisions exist to allow the use of cross tie valves to supply either unit from Loop A or Loop B and to i select the main point of control, either Unit 1 or 2.

. This can be performed on the simulator, and therefore these differences have no impact on training.

XI. EOP-01-SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (SEP) Rev 6 A. Step 17,18,21,22,23.a,23.b,24, and 25: )

1. Unit 2 Only: Directions are given to CLOSE Ell-F008, OPEN Ell-F009, then slowly throttle open Ell-F008.

If water hammer occurs, directions are given to j CLOSE Ell-F008, fill and vent piping if reactor j building is accessible, throttle OPEN Ell-F008 or if l

reactor building is not accessible then throttle i Ell- F008. If water hammer does not occur, then  !

fully OPEN the Ell-F008. l l

2. Unit 1 Only: Directions are given to slowly throttle  ;

, open Ell-F009. If water hammer occurs, directions l are given to CLOSE Ell-F009, fill and vent piping if l reactor building is accessible, throttle OPEN Ell-F009 or if reactor building is not accessible then throttle Ell-F009. If water hammer does not occur, then fully OPEN the Ell-F009.

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I APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO B. Impact of Procedural Differences: The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 concerns the  !

operation of the RHR shutdown cooling inboard and j outboard suction valves. On Unit 1 the inboard valve is a throttle valve, and on Unit 2 the outboard valve is a throttle valve. Procedural guidance is given to utilize {

the throttle valve to control filling the system. The I method and outcome of the procedure is the same for i both units regardless of whether the inboard or l

outboard valve is the throttle valve. Therefore, there is no impact on training.

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XII. EOP-01-SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (SEP) Rev 8  !

A. Section 5 Step 1.a and 1.b

1. Unit 1 only: In panel H12-P621 TERMINATE white wire,.

1-E51-304, lifted from terminal 99 on terminal board BB and in H12-P617 TERMINATE black wire, 1-E51-305, 1 lifted from terminal 62 on terminal board CC. l

2. Unit 2 only: In panel H12-P621 TERMINATE white wire, l 2-E51-304, lifted from terminal 99 on terminal board i BB and in H12-P617 TERMINATE black wire, 2-E51-305, lifted from terminal 62 on terminal board CC.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the termination of lifted leads on the associated terminal boards that restore RCIC low reactor pressure isolation logic to normal. The panels identified in the procedure are not part of the current scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for leads to be terminated in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an override that simulates the termination of the requested lead (s). Training and testing of the knowledge and ability required for termination of wire leads is covered outside of the simulator setting. Once terminated, the RCIC System is operated using only one set of procedures which provides steps to be performed for both units. There is no impact on training Page 34 Rev 0

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APPENDIX A- j EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT j ONE AND UNIT TWO C. Section 6 Step 1.a and 1.b d

1. Unit 1 only: In panels XU-27 and XU-28, west side, l place D/W Coolers A, B, C, and D override switches,

! VA-CS-5993 and CS-5994, in the NORMAL position. In panel XU-7 and XU-24, place SW-VlC6 and SW-V103 Loss Of Coolant Accident-(LOCA) override switches, ,

SW-CS-5997 and CS-5998, in the NORMAL position. l

2. Unit 2 only: In panel XU-27 west side and XU-28, east side, place D/W Coolers A, B, C, and D override switches, VA-CS-5993 and CS-5994, in the NORMAL position. In panel 2-XU-29 and XU-30, place SW-V106 and SW-V103 LOCA override switches, SW-CS-5997 and CS-5998, in the NORMAL position.

D. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the manipulation of logic override switches that restore ,

. the Drywell Cooler LOCA Lockout Logic and the SW-V103 & l 106 LOCA override logic to normal. The panels j identified in the procedure are not part of the current i scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for .

manipulation of the switches in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an override that simulates the manipulation of the requested switches. Once performed, the system is operated using only one set of procedures which provides steps to be performed for both units. Training and testing of the knowledge and ability required for 3' operation of the switches is covered outside of the simulator setting. Therefore, there is no impact on training.

E. Section 7 Step 2.a and 2.b l 1. Unit 1 only: In panel H12-P620 TERMINATE black wire, CC-F2-2, lifted from terminal 58 on terminal board AA. In panel H12-P620 TERMINATE red wire, 1-E41-34, lifted from terminal 60 on terminal board AA.

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f APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT l ONE AND UNIT TWO i

l l 2. Unit 2 only: In panel H12-P620 TERMINATE black wire, l BB-F2-2, lifted from terminal 58 on terminal board AA. In panel H12-P620 TERMINATE red wire, 2-E41-34, lifted from terminal 60 on terminal board AA.

F. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the termination

! of lifted leads on the associated terminal boards that restore the HPCI High Suppression Pool Level Suction Transfer Logic to normal. The panels identified in the procedure are not part of the current scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for leads to be terminated in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an override that simulates the l

termination of the requested lead (s). Training and testing of the knowledge and ability required for termination of wire leads are covered outside of the simulator setting. Once terminated, the HPCI System is l operated using only one set of procedures which provide steps to be performed for both units. There is therefore no impact on training.

XIII.EOP-01-SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (SEP) Rev5 )

A. Section 1,2,3

1. Unit 1 only: All steps in this procedure when referenced to Unit 1 uses C11 for the system i designation. The component nomenclature is the same for both units.

2. Unit 2 only: All steps in this procedure when referenced to Unit 2 uses C12 for the system designation. The component nomenclature is the same for both units.

B. Impact of procedural differences: The component nomenclature is the same for both units with the exception of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system designation which uses C11 for Unit 1 and C12 for Unit

2. There is no impact on training.

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l APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES Lt...NEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO XIV. EOP-01-SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (SEP) Rev 10 A. Section 1 Step 1.a and 1.b

1. Unit 1 only: In panel H12-P620 LIFT AND TAPE black wire, CC-F2-2, from terminal 58 on terminal board AA. In panel H12-P620 LIFT AND TAPE red wire, 1-E41-34, from terminal 60 on terminal board AA.

2. Unit 2 only: In panel H12-P620 LIFT AND TAPE black wire, BB-F2-2, from terminal 58 on terminal board l AA. In panel H12-P620 LIFT AND TAPE red wire, 2-E41-34, from terminal 60 on terminal board AA.

, B. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the lifting of leads on the associated terminal boards that defeat the HPCI High Suppression Pool Level Suction Transfer Logic. The panels identified in the procedure are not part of the current scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for leads to be lifted in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an override that simulates the lifting of the requested lead (s). Training and testing of the knowledge and ability required for lifting of leads are covered outside of the simulator setting. Once lifted, the HPCI System is operated using only one set of procedures which provides steps to be performed for both units.

Therefore, there is no impact on training.

C. Section 3 Step 1.a and 1.b

1. Unit 1 only: In panel H12-P621 LIFT AND TAPE white wire, 1-E51-304, on terminal 99 on terminal board BB. In panel H12-P617 LIFT AND TAPE black wire, 1-E51-305, on terminal 62 on terminal board CC. j

2. Unit 2 only: In panel H12-P621 LIFT AND TAPE white wire, 2-E51-304, on terminal 99 on terminal board BB. In panel H12-P617 LIFT AND TAPE black wire, 2-E51-305, on terminal 62 on terminal board CC.

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i APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ;

ONE AND UNIT TWO l

)

1 D. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the lifting of leads on the associated terminal boards that defeat ,

RCIC low reactor pressure isolation logic. The panels '

identified in the procedure are not part of the current scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for leads to be lifted in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an override that simulates the j lifting of the requested lead (s). Training and testing of the knowledge and ability required for lifting leads are covered outside of the simulator setting. Once ,

lifted, the RCIC System is operated using only one set )

of procedures which provides steps to be performed for both units. Therefore, there is no impact on training.

E. Section 4 Step 1.a and 1.b

1. Unit 1 only: In panel XU-27 and 28, west side, place D/W Coolers A, B, C, and D override switches,

. VA-CS-5993 and CS-5994, in the RUN position. In panel XU-7 and 24, place SW-V106 and SW-V103 LOCA override switches, SW-CS-5997 and 5998, in the OVERRIDE position.

2. Unit 2 only: In panel XU-27 west side and XU-28, east side, place D/W Coolers A, B, C, and D override switches, VA-CS-5993 and 5994, in the RUN position.

In panel 2-XU-29 and 30, place SW-V106 and SW-V103 LOCA override switches, SW-CS-5997 and 5998, in the OVERRIDE position.

F. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the manipulation of logic override switches that defeat the Drywell Cooler LOCA Lockout Logic and the SW-V103 and SW-V106 LOCA isolation logic to allow cooling of the Drywell. The panels identified in the procedure are not part of the current scope of simulation. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for manipulation of the switches in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an override that simulates the manipulation of the requested switches. Training and testing of the Page 38 Rev 0 l

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l APPENDIX A l EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWELN UNIT l ONE AND UNIT TWO l

l knowledge and ability required for operation of t.Se I switches are covered outside of the simulator settlui.

Once performed, the system is operated using only one set of procedures which provides steps to be performed ,

! for both units. Therefore, there is no impact on

! training.

XV. EOP-01-LOCAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (LEP) Rev 16 A. Section 6 Step 4 and 12.d and Step 5 and 12.e 1

l

1. Unit 1 only: UNLOCK, OPEN, then close and lock fire protection (well water) to service water flush shutoff valve, 2-FP-PIV-20 (located North of Unit 1 l Reactor Building near Makeup Water Treatment).

2. Unit 2 only: UNLOCK, OPEN, then close and lock fire protection (well water) to service water flush i shutoff valve, 2-FP-PIV-10 (located adjacent to the I hot maintenance shop).

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. This procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is related to the routing of the Fire Protection Water Main to each units I

Reactor Building. Each building has its own supply tap off the main header which then connects to the service water system to allow injecting service water into the Reactor Vessel. The equipment identified in the procedure is located outside of the Main Control Room and is not physically simulated. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for manipulating these components in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs an o"erride that simulates manipulating the components to the desired position. Training and testing of the knowledge and ability required for the routing of Fire Protection Water to the service water system for injection is covered outside of the simulator setting.

l Once aligned, the system is operated using only one set sf procedures which provides steps to be performed for both units. Therefore, there is no impact on training.

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e APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO XVI. EOP-01-LOCAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (LEP) Rev 19 A. Section 1 & 5 Equipment Needed

1. Unit 1 only: Directs the use of key 5450 for RWM j

2. Unit 2 only: Directs the use of key 5451 for RWM B. Impact of Procedural Differences: The key numbers are different but are located in the same location in the control room. Once the key is obtained, system operation is the same. Therefore, there is no impact on training.

C. Section 3 Step 2 And Section 4 Step 1 l

1. Unit 2 only: If steam flow is less than 3E6 lb/hr, then ensure the reactor mode switch is in

" SHUTDOWN".

D. Impact of Procedural Differences: The procedural difference is a result of the Bypass Valve physical configuration and high steam flow isolation on Unit 2 when not in RUN Mode. From the simulator instructor station,' instructors have the capability to select Unit 1 or Unit 2 mode of operation which allows Bypass Valve operation and MSIV steam flow isolation logic to be activated for the respective unit. There are Unit 1 only and Unit 2 only EOP procedures maintained in the simulator. The applicable procedures are placed on the EOP table by the instructor depending upon the unit selected for simulation, therefore, there is no impact  !

on training.

l I

E. Section 4 Step 10.a '

1. Unit 2 only: A sound powered phone jack is located ecross from panel P611 on conduit supports, and in panels XU-12,58,49, and 61.

2. Unit 1 only: A sound powered phone jack is located l on the column beside panel XU-76 and in panels XU- )

12,58,49, and 61. I Page 40 Rev 0

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APPENDIX A l EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT l ONE AND UNIT TWO i

F. Impact of Procedural Differences: The only difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are the phone jacks on the conduit support and the column, neither of which are modeled in the simulator. Also panels XU-12,58, and 49 are not modeled. The only panel that is modeled in the simulator is XU-61 and a phone jack is on this panel in the simulator. Therefore, there is no training impact.

)

G. Section 4 NOTE Before Step 10.c 1

1. Unit 1 only: The individual scram test switch

" SCRAM" position is down.

2. Unit 2 only: The individual scram test switch

" SCRAM" position is center, j

H. Impact of Procedural Differences: The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is related to the function of the different positions of the individual scram test switches. On both units the switches are three position switches, UP, CENTER, and DOWN. On Unit 2 UP is the normal position, CENTER is the Scram position, and DOWN is the SRI BUS position. On Unit 1 l UP is the normal position, CENTER is the Scram position, and DOWN is also a Scram position (no SRI position). From the simulator instructor station, Instructors have the capability to select Unit 1 or Unit 2 mode of operation. This will make the SRI l

position become another Scram position for the rod scram test switches when Unit 1 mode is selected. Since the unit differences in the scram test switch positions are modeled, there is no impact on training.

XVII.EOP-01-LOCAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (LEP) Rev 19 A. Section 1 Step 3c

1. Unit 1 only: Route discharge hose of submersible l pump to the southeast stairwell.

2. Unit 2 only: Route discharge hose of submersible pump to the 50-foot elevation via refuel crane access.

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f APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT l ONE AND UNIT TWO l

l B. Section 1 Step 3d

1. Unit 1 only: To the discharge of the submersible pump via the southeast stairwell on the 80-foot elevation.

2. Unit 2 only: To the discharge of the submersible pump at the refueling floor crane access on the 50-foot elevation.

C. Sectian 1 Step 3f

1. Unit 1 only: Through the southeast stairwell.

2. Unit 2 only: Through the refueling floor crane access.

D. Section 1 Step 3g

1. Unit 1 only: From the 20-foot elevation to the B RHR

~

Heat Exchanger 9-foot elevation via the southeast stairwell.

2. Unit 2 only: From the 20-foot elevation refueling floor carne access to the A RHR Heat Exchanger via the northeast stairwell.

E. SECTION 1 Step 4b

1. Unit 1 only: Through the southeast stairwell.

2. Unit 2 only: Through the refueling floor crane access.

F. Section 1 Step dc

1. Unit 1 only: From the 20-foot elevation to the B RHR heat exchanger 9-foot elevation via the southeast stairwell.

, 2. Unit 2 only: From the 20-foot elevation refueling l floor crane access to the A RHR heat exchanger via the northeast stairwell.

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l APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO G. Impact of Procedural Differences. These procedural differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are related to the dissimilarity between the units for routing of equipment that is located outside of the Main Control Room. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for manipulating components in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor then inputs overrides that simulate the manipulation the required components. Training and testing of the knowledge and ability required for the routing of the  ;

hoses for boron injection with the CRD system is I covered outside of the simulator setting. Once aligned, the system is operated using only one set of procedures  ;

which provides steps to be performed for both units.

Therefore, there will be no impact on training.

l H. Section 5 Step lib I

1. Unit 1 only: Open manual inlet drain valve of the

~

selected Condensate Filter Demineralizer (CFD) vessel, 1-CFD-VUA-2(V434B, V434C, or V434D).

2. Unit only: Open manual inlet drain valve of the selected vessel, 2-CFD-VUA-2(VUB-2, VUC, or VUD).

I. Section 5 Step 11h and lli

1. Unit 1 only: When annunciator CYCLE COMPLETE (CFD-1 2-6) alarms, then the CFD is ready for a precoat.

2. Unit 2 only: When annunciator CYCLE COMPLETE (CFD-2 2-6) alarms, then the CFD is ready for a precoat.

J. Section 5 Step 12m and 12n

1. Unit 1 only: Ensure the CFD precoat pump is operating, monitoring tank level and locally stop the CFD precoat pump.

2. Unit 2 only: Notify RW control room to place the CFD precoat pump switch to " MAN", and notify RW control room to stop the CFD precoat pump by placing the l switch to " AUTO".

I

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! APPENDIX A EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO K. Section 5 Step 17a

1. Unit 1 only: Close manual inlet drain valve of the selected vessel, 1-CFD-VUA-2 (V4 3 4B , V434C, or V434D).

2. Unit only: Close manual inlet drain valve'of the selected vessel, 2-CFD-VUA-2(VUB-2, VUC, or VUD).

L. Impact of procedural differences: Directions are given to identify and operate components which perform the l

same function but are labeled differently between the units, or are controlled from different locations.

These valves and pumps are not modeled on the simulator, and therefore this method of boron injection is not trained on in the simulator. Training and 1 testing of the knowledge and ability required for this evolution are covered outside of the simulator setting.

Therefore, there will be no impact on training.

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APPENDIX B ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO I. AOP-2.0 RPIS FAILURE - Rev 8 I

A. Step 3.2.4.3 and 3.2.5.2 I

1. Unit 1: 120 VAC UPS panel V7A, CKT 12, V9A, CKT 1, 120 VAC INSTRUMENT POWER panel LAB, CKT 2. j i

2. Unit 2: 120 VAC UPS panel V8A, CKT 12, V10A, CKT 1, 120 VAC INSTRUMENT POWER panel 2AB, CKT 2.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. This procedural difference is related to the 120 VAC Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) and Instrument Power System electrical panels which power the same equipment within its own unit but has its own unit specific designation.

The panel and breakers identified in the procedure are located outside of the Main Control Room and are not physically simulated. The electrical output from the panels (main breaker output) is currently modeled, but individual panel breakers are not. During a training ,

exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor i for component verification in accordance with procedural steps. The instructor can re-energize individual panels through remote functions or report l the problem cannot be cleared. Once energized or de-energized, the system is operated the same using only one set of procedures which provides steps to be performed for both units. Other training and testing of the knowledge and abilities required for this evolution are covered outside of the simulator setting. There is, therefore, no impact on training.

II. AOP-3.0 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE DECREASE - Rev 15 A. Step 3.1.2 and 3.2.13

1. If necessary to prevent a reactor scram, manually INITIATE a select rod insert (Unit 2 Only).

2. Verify the select rod insert is clear by verifying the annunciator SELECT ROD INSERT (A-07 5-2) IS CLEAR (Unit 2 Only).

l Page 45 Rev 0 4

APPENDIX B {'

ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIrrER NCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO l

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. These procedural differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are related to i the SRI function of the Reactor Protection System. This equipment identified in the procedure is located on the Unit 2 Main Control Panel, P603, and does not exist on the Unit 1 panel. The simulator presently models Unit 2 as the reference plant. When using the simulator for Unit 1 training, the simulator instructor has the abi.'.ity to select the Unit 1 mode of operation through )

the instructor station remote functions, which disables l the SRI function including the SRI push button and the SRI annunciator. Therefore, there is no impact on training.

III. AOP 4.0 LOW CORE FLOW A. Unit 1 AOP 4.0- Rev 6: The entire procedure is for Unit 1 only. This procedure provides guidance for determining the region of instability using core flow versus reactor power graph. If no valid core flow indication is available then it provides a graph to determine core flow using core plate D/P. This graph is  ;

unit and cycle specific.  !

B. Unit 2 AOP 4.0- Rev 5: The entire procedure is for Unit 1 2 only. This procedure provides guidance for determining the region of instability using core flow versus reactor power graph. If no valid core flow 1 indication is available then it provides a graph to determine core flow using core plate D/P. This graph is unit and cycle specific.

i C. Impact of Procedural Differences: Although the procedures are unit specific, the information and steps within each procedure are identical with the exception of the core flow versus core plate D/P graphs. These graphs are unit and cycle specific. The information required for either unit to execute its procedure is l available on the simulator, and therefore either unit procedure can be completed. Thus there is no . impact on training.

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APPENDIX B ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO IV. AOP 5.0 RADIOACTIVE SPILLS, HIGH RADIATION, AND AIRBORNE ACTIVITY - Rev 12 l

A. Step 3.2.2

1. Ur.it 1: Close PIV-45 l

2. Unit 2: Close PIV-33 l i

B. Impact of Procedural Differences Directions are given to identify components which perform the same function but are labeled different between the units. These valves are not modeled on the simulator. Training and testing of the knowledge required for this evolution are covered outside of the simulator setting. There will be no impact on training.  ;

V. AOP-12.0 LOSS OF UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) - Rev 11 A. Step 3.2.5 And General Section l i

1. Loss of Unit 2 UPS only: Notify Security of power i loss as required by site procedure.

2. Loss of Unit 1 UPS only: Pneumatic Nitrogen System (PNS) cross tie valve solenoid power, turbine {

supervisory instrumentation vibration trip, and turbine expansion indication will be lost. l B. Impact of Procedural Difference Security computers are powered from Unit 2 UPS only therefore loss of Unit 1 UPS will not affect Security. The security system is not modeled in the simulator and no affects on the loss of the security system is available to the operator in the control room. Thus there is no impact on training.

The PNS cross tie valve is modeled in the simulator with a control switch and lamp indication and simulated to be powered from Unit 1 UPS panel V7A. This valve is a normally closed valve. When simulating Unit 1 the instructor has the ability to use lamp overrides to turn OFF the green and red lamps, and switch overrides to override the switch in CLOSE, thus simulating loss of power. There is no impact on training. The turbine Page 47 Rev 0

s APPENDIX B ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO vibration trip on Unit 2 is not lost on loss of Unit 2 UPS. Therefore when simulating Unit 1 with a loss of UPS, the instructor has the ability to disable the vibration trip with a remote function. With this ability there is no impact on training. Turbine expansion is provided to a recorder which is not powered from UPS. Thus on a loss of Unit 1 UPS, the expansion sensor will loose power but the recorder will still have power and indicate. Through instructor station overrides, the simulator instructor has the ability to override each point on the recorder and can therefore make the point for turbine expansion fail to a value simulating a loss of sensor power. With this ability there is no impact on training.

VI. AOP-18.0 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE - Rev 15 A. Step 3.2.11f and lig

_. 1. Unit 1 only: UNLOCK AND OPEN fire protection (well

~

water) to service water flush shut-off valve, 2-FP-PIV20.

2. Unit 2 only: UNLOCK AND OPEN fire protection (well water) to service water flush shut-off valve, 2-FP-PIV10.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences. These procedural differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are related to Fire Protection (Well Water) to Service Water Flush Shut-off Valves. Equipment identified in the procedure is located outside of the Main Control Room and is not physically simulated. During a training exercise, the operators call the simulator instructor for manipulation of these components in accordance with procedural steps. Once completed, the system is operated using only one set of procedures which provides steps to be performed for both units. Training and testing of the knowledge required for this evolution is covered outside of the simulator setting, therefore, there is no impact on training.

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APPENDIX B ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO VII. AOP-23.0 CONDENSATE /FEEDWATER SYSTEM FAILURE - Rev 14 A. Attachment 1 Condensate System Setpoints 1 Unit 1 Only: If the condensate booster pump suction pressure is less than 20 psig, and the condensate pump discharge header is less than 145 psig, or the condensate pumps discharge valves are closed, then the standby condensate pump starts.

2. Unit 2 only: If the condensate booster pump suction pressure is less than 20 psig, then the standby condensate pump starts.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences: These procedural i differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are related to '

the condensate pump auto start logic. The manual start i logic is the same for both units. These steps are guidance on when an Auto start should occur. These differences in the pump auto start logic are modeled I when simulating Unit 1 through the use of the remote function; therefore, there is no imoact on training.

VIII.AOP-32.0 PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM - Rev 32 A. Step 3.1.A.4

1. Unit 2 only: When main steam line flow is less than 3X106 lb/hr, PLACE mode switch to shutdown.

B. Impact of Procedural Di'forences. The procedural dif ference is a result or the Bypass Valve physical  ;

configuration and high nain steam line flow isolation on Unit 2 when not in RUd Mode. From the simulator instructor station, instructors have the capability to select Unit 1 or Unit 2 mode of operation which allows Bypass Valve opera?. ion and MSIV steam flow isolation logic to be activataf for the respective unit. When Unit 1 mode is selected this will cause the 40% high steam flow isolation when not in Run to be removed.

There is only one set of AOP procedures and it provides steps to be performed for both units; therefore, there is no impact on training.

Page 49 Rev 0

APPENDIX B ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT l ONE AND UNIT TWO l

C. Step 3.2 Notes on page 9 of 55 I

1. Note 1: 1-E41-F011 located Unit 1 Rx Bldg., south l RHR room, 9' elevation SE corner. '

2. Note 2: 2-E41-F011 located Unit 2 Rx Bldg., north RHR room, above off-gas drain tank.

D. Impact of Procedural Differences. The procedural difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is related to equipment that performs the same function but is physically in a different location for each unit. The equipment is located outside of the Main Control Room i on both units and the only portion of this procedure I that is trained on in the simulator is the Immediate i Operator Actions that are required to be performed on l the control board prior to evacuation of the Main Control Room. All other actions are performed outside of the Main Control Room and the simulator is not utilized for this training. Training and testing of the knowledge and abilities required for this procedural evolution are covered outside of the simulator setting.

Therefore, there will be no impact on training.

E. Step 15h, 15o and 151

1. Unit 1 only, Station 3, E11-F009 at MCC 1XA compt DH3, Row C1.

2. Unit 2 only, Station 2, E11-F008 at MCC 2XDB compt B50, Row A4.

3. Unit 1 only, Station 2, Ell-F008 at MCC 1XDBA compt D50, Row A4.

4. Unit 2 only, Station 3, E11-F009 at MCC 2XA compt DH3, Row C1.

F. Impact of Procedural Differences. The main procedural l differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are related to

! the dissimilarity between the units for equipment that i is located outside of the Main Control Room that perform the same function. The only portion of this Page 50 Rev 0 I

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APPENDIX B ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETUEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO procedure that is trained on in the simulator is the Immediate Operator Actions that are required to be performed on the control board prior to evacuation of the Main Control Romm. All other actions are performed outside of the Main Control Room and the simulator is not utilized for this training. Training and testing of the knowledge and abilities required for this procedural evolution are covered outside of the simulator setting. Therefore, there will be no impact on training.

IX. AOP 38.0 LOSS OF FUEL POOL COOLING- Rev. 8 A. Step 3.2.11y and 3.2.13bac l

l 1. OPEN loop A(B) RHR system high point vent valves E11-V77 & 78 for Unit 1 or E11-V154 & 155 for Unit 2.

, B. Impact of Procedural Differences: Directions are given to identify components which perform the same function l

but are labeled different between the units. These valves are not modeled on the simulator. Training and testing of the knowledge and abilities required for this evolution are covered outside of the simulator setting. There will be no impact on training.

l C. Step 3.2.13b and 3.2.13c

1. If Unit 1 conventional service water header is used perform 3.2.13b and if Unit 2 conventional service water header is used then perform 3.2.13c.

D. Impact of Procedural Differences: Directions are given l to identify and operate components which perform the I

same over all function but are labeled and setup differently between the units. These valves / components are not modeled on the simulator. Training and testing of the knowledge required for this evolution are covered outside of the simulator setting. There will be no impact on training.

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APPENDIX B

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ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE REVIEW FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT ONE AND UNIT TWO X. AOP 39.0 LOSS OFF DC POWER - Rev. 10 A. Step 3.2.2.2

1. Unit 2 only: If loss of DC Distribution Panel 17 has occurred, OPEN normal supply incoming feeder breaker and CLOSE alternate incoming supply feeder breaker.

B. Impact of Procedural Differences: Directions are provided for transferring incoming power to a common distribution panel that is normally powered from Unit

2. This panel provides oower to emergency lighting outside the control room, and control power to the feeder breaker for switch gear 4L. Switch gear 4L provides lighting for areas outside the control room.

None of these loads are modeled. The control switch for the 4L feeder breaker is modeled on the RTGB, however if Unit 1 is being simulated using the remote function, and a loss of this power panel is simulated, the instructor can use lamp overrides to simulate control power available to the breaker. The operator would see no other impact; therefore, no impact on training.

C. Step 3.2.4.4 and 3.2.4.5

1. Unit 2 only: If a loss of DC distribution panel 13 has occurred, OPEN normal supply incoming feeder breaker and CLOSE alternate supply feeder breaker.

t

2. Unit 2 only: If a loss of MWT control panel has occurred, OPEN SWBD 2B disconnect switches LI4 & LA6 and CLOSE SWBD 1B disconnect switches LA5 & L70.

D. Impact of Procedural Differences: Directions are provided for transferring incoming power to common distribution panels that are normally powered from Unit

2. These distribution panels provide power to Radwaste annunciator panels, the radio communications system fiber optic remote transceiver, and MWT control panels.

These components are not simulated, and any training in these areas are covered outside the simulator setting.

There is no impact on training.

Page 52 Rev 0

ENCLOSURE 2 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 l

CERTIFICATION OF SIMULATOR FACILIES i

CERTIFICATION REPORT FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 i

Nnc FORM 474 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION mR YED SY M Na 3WusENS: mm (0 1996)

Estenated burden por risponsa to conply with thes gndalory mformetson collGCison request 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> Thas miormaison es used to certely a semulaison facehty Forward commerits regardeng burden estemale to the Records Mariagemorit Branch (T 6 F33L US Nuclear Flegulatory Comnussson. Wa SIMULATION FACILITY CERTIFICATION e a twor= a duc'aa washmgton. DC =03 era.n '.c' egim'3ai-o c on. DC 20555-0001 and to the a' ==a=9 m ai aad s conecor,=does not m, a cu,senu,udvei- .af.d i OMil corutos number. the NRC may nol conduct or sponsor, and a persori es not requered to respond to the mformate conection INSTRUCTIONS:

This torm a to be idad los maal ceridcalm. racertifcahon (d requued). and tot any change lo a esmulaten tacsidy performance testeg plan made after metsal submetal of s provide lhe todowin0 mtormate and cher 8 the appropraale tion lo mdecate reason for submetal F ACLITY DOCKET NUMBER Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No.1 50-325 3 UCENSEE DATE i Carolina Power and Light Company 03/17/99 rh . io t.rMy ir.

1 The above named tecdity hoensee a usmg a svnulahon facdsiy consesling solely of a planl-referenced swnulator that meets the requerements of 10 CFR $$ 45 a oocu,nonianon . ..ad.we i. NRC ,e- m .cco,ance w.m i0 CFR ss .sm 3 Thss senvianon tscder meets the guidance conlaned e ANSuANS 3 5198$ or ANSUANS 3 51993, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide l 149 It there are any EXCEPTIONS to lhe twtifcaHon of thes nom. CHECK HERE [ % ) and describe tuity on addnional pages as necessary NAME (or omer sforWdcatm) AND LOCATION OF SIMULATION FACluTY Brunswick Simulator - Brunswick EOF / Training Building Box 10429, Nonh Carolina Highway 87,2 % Miles Nonh Southpo 1, North Carolina 28461 SIMULATION F ACluTY PERFORMANCE TEST ABSTRACTS ATT ACHED (for permomance sests conducted a she penod enchng iwm the date of rus cemAcarm) x DESCFfPTION OF PERFORMANCE YESTING COMPLETED (Attach aceronstpages 33 necessary and adent4 me dem descrpren camp conhnped)

Abstracts for tests added since the 1995 Certification Quadrennial Report are attached.

See Section VIII," Simulator Tests," and Appendix D,"1995-1998 Completed Test Schedule," of the Unit 2 Cenification submittal.

SIMOLATION F ACluTY PERFORMANCE TESTING SCHEDULE ATTACHED (for the conduct at appronsmateryis percent otperformance tests per year for the four yearperiod commenceg ne me dare at a s cerrscarms x

DE SCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE TESTING TO BE CONDUCTED (Atrae acurrenaipages as necessary and sdent$ the nem descripton camp consnued)

See Section VIII," Simulator Tests," Appendix A. " Brunswick Simulator Annual Operability Test Index " and Appendix B," Brunswick Simulator Malfunction Tests," of the Unit 2 Certification submittal.

PERFORMANCE TESTING PLAN CHANGE (For any modecaten to a performance aestmp pian submstred on a prewous cerfdcarm )

x DESCRIPTION OF PERFORMANCE TESTING PLAN CHANGE (Atrach adunenaspages as necessary andident4 rw som descepton comp connnued)

A complete revised test plan is attached. See Section VIII," Simulator Tests," Appendix A," Brunswick Simulator Annual Operability Tests Index," and Appendix B. " Brunswick Simulator Malfunction Tests," of the Unit 2 Certification submittal, RECERTIF> CATION (Cescnbe correctrwe actms tekeA attach resuRs of compieredper1bemance lestag e a;xortsance wth to CFR 55 4S(b)($1(v)

(Atrach adstenalpages as necessary and afenr$ ihe som descrpren bemp confanued) i

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i Any talso statement or omissen m lhes clocument. hctudsng attachments may be subsect to esve .ad enmmal sanctens I certdy under penalty of pequry that the mformahon m lhes document and etischments a true and correct ,

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l S:GNATURE - AUTHOfu2ED REPRESENTATWE TITLE DATE

]- 03/17/99 Manager -Regulator Affairs, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant in screrdance with to CFR 55 S. Communcatens. Ihm form sima be submated to the NRC as lomows CY Mall ADDRESSED TO: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION BY DEUVERYIN PERSON ONE WHITE FLINT NORTH  !

U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION TO THE NRC OFFICE AT: 11555 ROCKVILLE PtKE j WASHINGTON, DC 30555 4 001 ROCKVILLE, MD l

NHC FOHM474 (0-1996) PHiNikD ON H6CyCt ED PAPLR

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