ML20210P360

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Proposed Tech Specs Bases Pages Incorporating 961101 Power up-rate Amendments
ML20210P360
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/22/1997
From:
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20210P357 List:
References
NUDOCS 9708270068
Download: ML20210P360 (4)
v • d • e


Text

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4' ENCLOSURE'1-BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324  ;

OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 d SUPPLEMENT TO REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENTS REVISION OF SUPPRESSION CHAMBER POOL WATER VOLUME l-t TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE - UNIT 1 9708270068 970822 PDR P ADOCK 05000324*

PDR

. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ~

BASES 3/4.6.2 0EPRESSURIZATION AND-COOLING SYSTEMS The specifications of this section ensure that the primary containment pressure will not exceed the calculated prassure of 49 psig during primary system blowdown from full operating pressure.

The pressure suppression pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor system.

primary system energy release following a postulated rupture of the The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blowdown from 1045 psig. Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged i

into the pressure suppression chamber air space during a loss of coolant accident, the pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the su)pression chamber maximum pressure. The design volume of the suppression cham)er, water and air, was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be condensed is discharged to the suparession chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression cham)er.

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 49 psig, which

-27 inches is belowtothe (equivalent design a volume pressure of 89.750 ft of 62Maximum p)sig. water level of results in a downcomer submergence of 3*4" 3 and the minimum level of -31 inches (equivalent to a volume of 86.450 ft ) results in 2 submergence approximately four inches less. '

The Monticello tests were run with a submerged length of-three feet and with ,

complete condensation. Thus, with respect to the downcomer submergence this specification is adequate. The maximum temperature at the end of the blowdown tested during the Humboldt Bay and Bodega Bay tests was 170*F and this.is conservathely taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the reactor coolant although condensation would occur for temperatures abovt 170*F.

When it -is necessary to make the suppression chamber inoperable. this shall only be done as provided in Specification 3.5.3.3.

Under full power operation conditions. blowdown from an initial suppressior: chamber water temperature of 90*F results in a water temperature of approximately 135*F immediately following blowdown which is below the temperature 170 F used for complete condensation. At this temperature and atmospheric pressure and core spray pumps:, thethere-is thus, available NPSH exceeds no dependency that required by both the RHR on containment overpressure during the accident injection phase. If both RHR loops are used for containment cooling, there is no dependency on containment overpressure for post-LOCA operations.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6 3 Amendment No.

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ENCLOSURE 2 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324

. OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-/1 AND DPR-62 SUPPLEMENT-TO REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENTS REVISION OF SUPPRESSION CHAMBER POOL WATER VOLUME l.

- TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE - UNIT 2

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' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS a

BASES I-3/4.6.2. DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS The specifications of this section ensure that the primary containment pressure will not exceed the calculated pressure of 49 psig during primary system blowdown from full operating pressure, The pressure suppre;sion pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor primary system energy release following a postulated rupture of the system. The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blowdown from 104F psig. Since all of the cases in the drywell are purged into the pressure suppression chamber air space during a loss of coolant accident, the pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the suppression chamber maximum pressure. The design volume of the suppression cham)er, water

-and air, was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactm coolant to be condensed is discharged to the sup)ression chamber and that the drywell "

volume is purged to the suppression cham)er.

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 49 psig which

-27 inches is belowtothe (equivalent design a volume pressure of 89.750 of 62Maximum ft results p)sig. water level of in a downcomer submergence of 3'4" and the minimum level of -31 inches (equivalent to a volume of 86.450 ft ) results in a submergence approximately four inches less.

The Monticello tests were run with a submerged length of three feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with espect to the downcomer submergence, this specification is adequate. The maximum temperature at the end of the blowdown tested during the Humboldt Bay and Bodega Bay tests was 170'F. and this is conservatively taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the iactor coolant, although condensation would occur for temperatures above 170'F.

When it is necessary to make the suppression chamber inoperable, this shall only be done as provided in Specification 3.5.3.3.

Under full power operation conditions, blowdown from an initial suppression chamber water temperature of 90 F results in a water temperatere of approximately 135*F immediately following blowdown, which is below the temperature 170'F used for complete condensation. At this temperature and atmospheric pressure, the available NPSH exceeds that required by both the RHR and core spray pumps: thus, there is no dependenc overpressure during the accident injection phase. y on containmentIf both RHR loops are us for containment cooling, there is no dependency on containment overpressure for post-LOCA operations.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. ,

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