ML20210P465

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Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Power up-rate Amend 183 Provided as Replacement & Addressing Administrative Error W/Typed Bases Page Submitted w/970115 Amend Request
ML20210P465
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/22/1997
From:
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20210P463 List:
References
NUDOCS 9708270143
Download: ML20210P465 (2)


Text

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ENCLOSURE 1 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS 50 325 AND 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR 71 AND DPR 02 SUPPLEMENT TO REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENTS REVISION OF SUPPRESSION CHAMBER POOL WATER VOLUME I

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TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE - UNIT 1 '

97082701'3 4 9 PDR ADOCK-0 4 P

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,- CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEM The specifications of this section ensure that the primary containment pressure will not exceed the calculated pressure of 49 psig during primary system blowdown from full operating pressure.

The pressure suppression pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor primary system energy release following a postulated rupture of the I

system. The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blowdown from 1045 psig. Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged in~.s the pressure suppression chatber air space during a loss of coolant accident, the pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, th^ cu)pression chamber maximum pressure. The design volume of the suppression cham)er, water and air.-was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be condensed is discharged to the sup)ression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamaer, Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment ressure during the design basis accident is approximately 49 psig, whi h is below the design pressure of 62 asi Maximum water volume of 89.B43 ft resuljs in a downcomer submergence of 3'g.4" and the minimum volume of 86.545 ft results in a submergence approximately four inches less.

The Monticello tests were run with a submerged length of three feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with respect to the downcomer submergence, this specification is adequate. The maximum temperature at the end of the blowdown tested during the Humboldt Bay and Bodega Bay tests was 170'F, and this is conservatively taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the reactor coolant, although condensation would occur for temperatures above 170*F.

When it is necessary to make the suppression chamber inoperable, this shall only be done as provided in Specification 3,5.3.3, Under full power operation conditions, blowdown from an initial suppression chamber water temperature of 90'F results in a water temperature of approximately 135'F immediately following blowdown, which is below the temperature 170*F used for complete condensation. At this temperature and atmospheric pressure, the available NPSH exceeds that required by both the RHR and core spray pumps: thus, there is no dependenc overpressure during the accident injection phase, y on containmentIf both RHR loops are for containment cooling, there is no dependency on containment overpressure for post LOCA operations.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6 3 Amendment No. 1

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